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[1] Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Change as co-evolution 
This dissertation is about long-term changes in the world economy, as seen from the 
perspective of a particular industry. ‘Change’ simply means becoming different, but it is 
a rather complex phenomenon, given the differences in the degrees of difference and in 
the way of becoming different. It can refer to fundamental or marginal transformations, 
undisputed to observers or hard to distinguish from the state of stability, and can be of 
radical or gradual nature. The convolution is certainly amplified if one is to identify 
change in a complex system such as the world economy. 
Over the past half a century, we have witnessed multitude of global transformations 
(Simai, 2001). To highlight a few: some of the developing countries transformed into 
advanced industrialized ones; accelerated economic growth and a significant 
improvement of living standards in newly industrializing economies of Southeast Asia 
and ‘BRIC’ countries, most of all China. New information and communication 
technologies (ICT) allowed an unprecedented level of interconnectedness and growing 
interdependence between economies as the process of globalization unfolded. The 
different parts and components of today’s products have often traveled thousands of 
miles by the time they reach their consumers. The transformations have far-reaching 
social and political consequences; from changing the nature of international social 
interactions to shifting the world order established after the end of the Cold War. 
Regional economic and military powers have emerged, striving for increased political 
influence. Some governments don’t spare funding from military-industry complexes, 
even to the detriment of overall wellbeing of their citizens. 
Yet the changes apparently occur in an uneven way, multiplying the societal 
heterogeneities. Alongside poor regions dominated by agricultural activities, one finds 
regions with clusters of advanced low-tech as well as high-tech industrial activities 
capitalizing on cheap labor. Many of the fast-changing economies give home to 
companies that copy technologies as well as others that may be innovators at the 
technology frontier. The mere availability of advanced technologies does not imply that 
it is also diffused to society. At the same time, the economic weight of the largest 
transnational companies matches that of smaller countries, yet their political power 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2016013
12 
 
often stays informal.  What appear to be unsustainable political or economic 
arrangements continue to survive for decades. Socio-economic development is thus the 
outcome of the combination of technological, economic, demographic and political 
change. Change in these different domains need not be synchronized, causing 
accelerations, slowdowns and lock-ins.  
 Perceiving economic development as the co-evolution of different – but interlinked 
– economic (and social) domains (such as companies, industries, finance, public sector) 
is at the heart of neo-Schumpeterian economics (Nelson, 1994). Following a definition 
proposed by Hanusch and Pyka: 
“Neo-Schumpeterian economics deals with dynamic processes causing qualitative 
transformation of economies driven by the introduction of innovation in their various 
and multifaceted forms and the related co-evolutionary processes.  
This definition includes the three characteristic features of neo-Schumpeterian 
economics (…), namely (i) qualitative change, affecting all levels and domains of an 
economy, (ii) punctuated equilibria i.e. periods of radical change followed by periods of 
smooth and regular development, and (iii) pattern formation: despite the true 
uncertainty, the processes to be observed are not completely erratic but spontaneously 
structuring.” (Hanusch and Pyka, 2007; p.1161, emphasis in original) 
 Scholars have long tried to make sense of these tectonic changes; and among the 
many factors that drive these trends, highlight the role of learning and innovation, 
alongside changes in capital and labor (Freeman, 1995; Lall, 1992, 2001). At the root of 
such transformations, one can find the innovative activities of companies that are 
incessantly seeking new ways to improve their position on the market and outsmart their 
competitors. They may introduce new or improved products that the world – or their 
customers have never seen, change the way of production or delivering their goods. In 
an analogy of introducing new products to the market, the concept of innovation as a 
source of deeper transformations refers to the introduction of institutional and 
organizational changes as well as their diffusion. A crucial observation to make is that 
the introduction of novelties and their diffusion occur over time, in a given socio-
economic context, and necessarily interacts with its environment. This implies that 
interpreting innovations necessitates a specific context – which is a main reason why 
this dissertation has decided to focus on an economic (and technical) domain: the 
aerospace industry. 
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The aerospace industry provides for an excellent object of study change in a co-
evolutionary perspective, as it simultaneously influenced by and influencing economic, 
political and technological developments. It appears to be more globally spread than 
ever before: parts and components of the most modern Airbus and Boeing jets are 
produced (apart from Europe and North America) in China, India, South Korea or 
Mexico; advanced regional jets are designed and produced in Europe, Brazil, Russia, or 
Japan. At the level of producers, we observe Schumpeterian dyanamics in action: after 
European producers Fokker and British Aerospace exited, first Bombardier, then 
Embraer of Brazil even became world leaders. The military industry is also thriving, 
new generations of fighter jets are developed in the US, Russia and China (Deloitte, 
2014; Medeiros, 2005). In short, the fast-evolving aircraft industry provides for an ideal 
terrain to study the co-evolutionary forces in technology, economics, politics and 
industrial organization. Many of its domains have been studied in great details by a 
variety of disciplines, by natural as well as social scientists. Our investigation is 
primarily, but not exclusively, of an economic nature, since we aim at understanding, 
describing and explaining the forces behind catch-up and eventual changes in industrial 
leadership in the aircraft industry. We address the problems of entry and catch-up of 
latecomer companies, changes in the global distribution of labor, in the interdependence 
of economies, expands and deepens technological capabilities, and its potential impact 
on global political power. The aircraft industry lies at the center of these processes in all 
its aspects: it is a capital- and knowledge-intensive, strategic sector, characterized by 
high value added and high incomes (Prencipe, 2013). Beyond all these, the aircraft 
industry is structurally connected with one of the largest service block in the global 
economy, which is serving hundreds of millions. This has also a major stimulating role 
for the development of the sector and its innovations. 
A number of widely discussed aircraft development programs in South America and 
Asia testify for the innovation and industrial policy ambitions of many emerging 
economies. In the Peron years, Argentina became one of the few capable of making jet 
engines, and subsequently launched many military-oriented aircraft programs, including 
the IA 63 Pampa jet trainers. Most of the programs failed and Argentina’s capabilities 
today consist of merely maintenance and overhaul (Hira and Oliveira, 2007). Brazil has 
gained fame for giving birth to Embraer, one of the only emerging multinational 
companies in the aerospace industry. Embraer’s many aircraft designs, starting from the 
EMB-110 Bandeirante commuter prop to the currently produced E-Jet family of 
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regional jets, have become globally successful export products (Cassiolato, 2001; 
Marques, 2004; Goldstein, 2002a,b). The former president of Indonesia, Habibie, was a 
leading figure in establishing the Indonesian aerospace industry, which co-produced and 
co-designed two turboprop commuters, the CN-212 Aviocar and the CN-235, with 
CASA of Spain. However, it struggled on the export markets and its more ambitious 
indigenous design for a regional jet became a major failure (McKendrick 1992; 
Eriksson 2003). Neighboring Singapore became a global player in the maintenance, 
repair and overhaul (MRO) industry, and a producer of advanced aircraft parts and 
subsystems, but it never aimed at developing an indigenous aircraft. South Korea and 
Taiwan, both heavy defense spenders, have both gained capabilities to produce aircraft 
parts and components, and strengthened their positions in the global supply chain 
(Texier, 2000). India’s Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) has developed and produced a 
number of jet fighters (such as the HF-24 Marut and the Tejas), trainers (HPT-32 
Deepak and the Kiran) and helicopters (Dhruv) in the past fifty years. The Indian Space 
Research Organisation ISRO is among a handful of global launch service providers, and 
India is fast becoming a global player in the avionics market (Baskaran, 2005; Mani, 
2013). In its aerospace companies scattered around the country, China has produced a 
large number of military fighters of many generations, trainers and transport aircraft, 
helicopters, as well as a number of civilian turboprops and jets, mostly for domestic use. 
The ARJ-21 regional jet marketed under the Comac brand and the C-919 large civilian 
aircraft currently in development are yet to receive foreign airworthiness certificates 
necessary for export, but have received global attention. Airbus and Embraer have 
recently established final assembly lines in China, while parts and components 
producers increasingly open new establishments in China. Space research has 
traditionally been advanced, and in 2003, China became the third country in the world 
with human spaceflight capability (Nolan and Zhang 2002; Goldstein 2006). In sum, 
many non-European or American countries have witnessed the rise and fall of aircraft 
industries, varying largely in their scale and lengths of production cycles and 
technological capabilities acquired. While only a selected few appear to have been 
catching up with the global leaders, many others keep trying to repeat their success, at 
very high costs. It is therefore crucial to understand the nature of a catch-up cycle. 
Similar to countries, companies have risen and fallen in the past decades, in all 
segments of the aircraft industry. Most of the studies on the dynamics of the aircraft 
manufacturing industry have concentrated on companies that are top-tier producers of 
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large civil aircraft (Moran and Mowery, 1991; Golich, 1992; Frenken and Leydesdorff, 
2000; Pavcik, 2004; Kechidi, 2013, Prencipe, 2013). The historical competition of 
makers of large civil aircraft has consolidated into the Boeing-Airbus duopoly by the 
turn of the millennium, but the regional jet market continues to witness turmoil, as it has 
for the last four decades. Many companies from around the world have or had stakes in 
this market which is intentionally eluded by Boeing and Airbus, including those with a 
long tradition of constructing aircraft such as Fokker, Canadair or British Aerospace and 
its predecessor Hawker Siddeley, newcomers such as the Brazilian Embraer or the 
Chinese Comac that aims to use this as a stepping stone for entering the large civil 
aircraft market. Many of these companies emerged as the largest producer for some 
years, but none of them managed to sustain their top positions for as long as a decade. 
Some, such as the Short Brothers, Fairchild-Dornier, or Indonesian Aerospace have 
launched regional jet development programs that never reached production phase, and 
the heavily indebted companies have effectively exited the market or were acquired. 
Understanding the future directions of global reorganization in this industry segment 
will certainly benefit from uncovering the driving forces behind past instances of catch-
up and leadership change.  
Recent trends of globalization and the expansion of transnational companies in the 
world economy has created new kind of opportunities for latecomers. As illustrated in 
Figure 1.1, the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, one of the most advanced aircraft produced 
today integrates parts and components produced in America, Asia, Australia and 
Europe. Suppliers to the Dreamliner had already demonstrated their capabilities in a 
thorough vetting procedure. Joining such programs for latecomers may be considered as 
a strategic step in their endeavor to upgrade activities. Late industrializers that connect 
to lower tiers in the global value chains possess required capabilities and devise 
adequate strategies may upgrade to higher value added activities. What these 
capabilities and strategies are, and what kind of state intervention may be necessary to 
support them, remains an area of heated debate (Gereffi et al, 2001; Humphrey, 2004; 
Schmitz, 2004; Szalavetz, 2013). 
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Figure 1.1 The global supply chain in the case of the Boeing 787 “Dreamliner” 
 
Source: “Boeing 787: Build globally, assemble locally” The Seattle Times, September 11, 2005 
 
We expect to find the Neo-Schumpeterian school of thought to offers the most relevant 
framework to understand the co-evolutionary processes in aerospace. Given that it is a 
complex system, with multi-level multi-level interactions, it is unlikely that any single 
theory could explain and predict the changing competitive landscape, the sources of 
market power, and the changing locations of production. In these changes, time and 
technological capabilities (alongside physical and human capital) are elements that 
cannot be overlooked, which creates a major challenge for theories on market 
equilibrium in the neoclassical tradition. While political economy may offer partial 
explanation given its ability to incorporate political actors and values and interests in the 
conceptual framework, it focuses less but less on industrial dynamics and the role of 
technology & innovation. The theory of Complex product systems (or COPS, in short, 
see Dosi et al, 2003; Hobday et al, 2005) may be relevant for a cross-sectional analysis 
of the aircraft industry, but it provides little support to study evolution of industries over 
time (Davies, 1997). We argue that research should focus on the industry level – the 
“meso-level” which we considered to be in close interaction with micro- and macro 
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developments in the business and political landscapes, be evolutionary and system-
oriented in its approach. This will be further discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
1.2 Research Design 
The general question ‘What has changed, at what pace in the global aircraft industry?’ 
can be better operationalized if re-formulated it into three more specific research 
questions, zooming in from a macro to a micro perspective: 
Q1: How did the international division of labor (in terms of production, trade, 
innovation) change in the global aircraft industry in the past half a century? What 
are the main patterns of internationalization in the industry? 
Q2: Why have some countries succeeded while others failed to catch-up in aircraft 
manufacturing? What strategies did governments follow in emerging economies that 
fostered sustained growth in the sector? 
Q3: At the level of companies, in the regional jet segment, what have been the 
drivers of successive catch-up and leadership changes? 
The three questions are connected by the overall aim of investigating the same 
phenomenon – change in the global aircraft industry – from multiple perspectives. They 
are distinguished by the different points of entry, their focus on three different aspects 
and levels of change. In order to establish the boundaries of the research, we introduce a 
few definitions for central concepts used in this dissertation. This involves addressing 
four main methodological issues identified at the outset of the study: 
1. The level of analysis problem 
2. The delimitation problem (time, space, activity) 
3. Overcoming the problem of secrecy, confidentiality, and lack of information  
4. Sample selection and generalizing results 
The first problem concerns the selection of the most appropriate unit of analysis to 
address the research questions. The selection of the level of analysis, data and 
methodology are closely linked, and influence outcomes of the study. For instance, if 
we choose to focus on latecomer companies only, we may either overestimate the role 
of a company and may be unable to understand external sources in details. Choosing 
countries as the unit of analysis, our results may be biased by the fact that the largest 
companies have production and even R&D activities in multiple locations within and 
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across countries, which implies that in different locations a company is affected by 
different factors. Our chosen solution to tackle these potential biases is to make use of 
the larger scope allowed by the scale such a dissertation and have multiple points of 
entry: study country-dynamics as well as company dynamics. Chapters 2 and 4 will 
therefore have a more macro focus, primarily on countries, while chapter 5 will be look 
more closely at the factors influencing company strategies as well as their impacts on 
industry dynamics.  
The second problem is delimiting the scope of our research, in time and space. As 
for the time horizon, on the one hand, we recognized that studying evolution requires 
taking a sufficiently long perspective to include company entries and exits, different 
types of technological changes as well as multiple waves of business cycles. On the 
other hand, a too long time horizon makes it difficult to give a detailed account of 
economic, technological and institutional history. Aerospace as an industrial activity (as 
opposed to inventiveness), emerged about a century ago, and underwent a radical 
transformation following the 1950s with the diffusion of the jet engine in commercial 
aviation. We take this moment as the start for our rough delimitation when we aim to 
find answers to the first two research questions. As the third research question focuses 
on regional jets, the starting point for this investigation will be the early 1980s, with the 
emergence of this segment. 
Delimitation of the study also involves making choices on industrial activities of 
interest. There are two main options: taking a company-based approach (everything a 
company that identifies itself within the aerospace sector does is of interest for the 
study), or a product-based approach (only industrial activities related to specific 
aerospace products are of interest). We expect that for a study on the history of the 
industry, the product-based approach provides more specific results, while a company-
based approach is more suitable for an explorative study – thus opt for a product-based 
approach, wherever it is possible. This is also in line with the standard international 
statistical definition of the aerospace industry (that is, the manufacturing of aircraft, 
spacecraft, their parts and components, including engines and propulsion systems). 
However, remain attentive to the fact that this definition may not be easily applicable in 
an infant industry context, as nascent companies that produce aircraft parts may be 
active in other heavy or high-tech industries as well, or in the turbulent era of nascent 
technology, where new products emerge outside the existing classes. Difficulties may 
also arise when the unit of analysis is a complex product, such as a specific aircraft, 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2016013
19 
 
with parts and components are produced around the world, by companies that may be 
competitors of one another in a different market. 
One of the motivating factors for this research is the surprisingly little comparative 
global statistical data available on the industry, which may be linked to the difficulty in 
finding definitions. This is particularly surprising, given the considerable public interest 
in the aviation industry. The most easily available sources are international business 
statistics (such as UN / UNIDO, OECD, or Eurostat), and reports of consultancy 
companies (i.e., Deloitte, 2014). However, when carefully studied, it is clear that these 
sources are either not comprehensive and lack many of the emerging economies for 
many of the years, or – in the case of the latter reports – are less rigorous when 
aggregating incomparable figures. Without comparable production and export statistics, 
it is very easy to exaggerate any threat to established structures posed by new entrants to 
the industry, or overestimate the success of an industry that achieved the maiden flight 
of a new model but failed to sell to airlines.  
Since aerospace producers are typically large firms, often without significant 
domestic competition, and often dual producers of commercial as well as defense 
products, access to data and confidentiality become serious limiting factors. The reasons 
for unavailability of data differ from country to country, but a few common patterns can 
be observed. Most of the industrialized economies (members of OECD) report business 
statistics since 1970, but for earlier years it is mostly published as part of the more 
aggregate transport equipment manufacturing branch. Former socialist countries (from 
Central Eastern Europe to China) have been secretive about information on the sector 
during the Cold War years given their association to national security. Even the 
otherwise highly insightful estimates in declassified CIA reports (Maddison 1998) do 
not offer data on this industry for the USSR. (Spy agencies appear to have only been 
interested in aerospace as a source of military capabilities and less as a source of wealth 
creation.) Even today, the Russian Federation does not publish sectoral value added or 
sales figures, thus impeding historical extrapolations. The high degree of concentration 
of industrial activity is another major difficulty, especially in newly industrializing 
economies. Often there is only a single enterprise. In order not to jeopardize the 
respondents’ anonymity in industrial surveys, statistical offices are forced to publish 
branch level aggregate figures when the industry consists of only a handful of firms. In 
other cases the manufacturing activity in the sector was simply too small to be measured 
separately. But even if domestic aircraft manufacturing activities were measureable, 
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they were short-lived (i.e. some Latin American countries) or could not be differentiated 
from maintenance, repair and overhaul activities. In sum, it is not surprising that no 
comparative study was ever published on the growth of aerospace manufacturing. Yet, 
in a sector with a low number of producers and highly visible products, at least the 
commercial data unavailable in national statistical publications can be obtained from 
company reports or secondary sources.  
It is very important to distinguish the business activity of aircraft manufacturing 
from air transport services provision. The production of planes (aircraft parts, 
subsystems, etc.) is the first activity: aerospace products and parts manufacturing, while 
the airlines industry forms part of “air transport services”. This dissertation deals with 
the manufacturing industry only. “Aerospace” covers aircraft, spacecraft, their parts and 
components (including engines and propulsion systems), according to the definition of 
class 303 in the ISIC Rev. 4 definition. Within aerospace, it is extremely difficult to 
distinguish industrial activities based on their purpose, whether products are commercial 
or military oriented, due to the fact that all the large producers are active in both market 
segments and many of the products and components are of dual use. Commercial 
aircraft development directly benefits from defense-oriented R&D subsidies and 
military orders received by the same company. It is somewhat easier to distinguish 
aircraft and space vehicles manufacturing, although not all statistical agencies provide 
such disaggregated information and not for all years. For the United States, the 2010 
Annual Survey of Manufactures provides an example (see Table 1.1): the first three 
sectors within Aerospace product and parts manufacturing are responsible for aircraft, 
engines, their parts and auxiliary equipment (336411 to 336413) that constitute 85% of 
the industry in terms of value added, and 82% in terms of employment. The rest of the 
industry is related to the manufacturing of guided missiles and space vehicle. Official 
Chinese statistics, for the few years where a distinction is available, provide a similar 
share of about 15% for the space industry, but this proportion is unknown for most other 
Western producer countries. In these cases it is fair to estimate that the share is lower 
given their more limited space activities. At the same time, trade statistics make the 
distinction between commercial and military as well as between air and space activities 
possible. Whenever we present export and import data, we focus on the commercial 
aircraft segment only. 
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Table 1.1 The elements of Aerospace Manufacturing in the U.S. Annual Survey of Manufactures 
(2010) 
NAICS 2007 Code and Description 
Subsector’s share in 
Employment Value Added 
3364 Aerospace product and parts manufacturing 100% 100% 
336411 Aircraft manufacturing 38% 49% 
336412 Aircraft engine and engine parts manufacturing 17% 15% 
336413 
Other aircraft parts and auxiliary equipment 
manufacturing 
27% 21% 
336414 Guided missile and space vehicle manufacturing 12% 11% 
336415 
Guided missile and space vehicle propulsion unit and 
propulsion unit parts manufacturing 
4% 3% 
336419 
Other guided missile and space vehicle parts and 
auxiliary equipment manufacturing 
2% 1% 
Source: United States Census Bureau 
 
The existing literature has no single solution to overcome all these potential biases. 
Some authors have looked at the sector in countries (Hill and Pang; Goldstein, 2002; 
Marques, 2004; Mani 2013); others have taken a regional approach and studied 
aerospace clusters (Niosi and Zhegu, 2005 and 2010). In this dissertation, since we aim 
at understanding a complex problem that is the co-evolution of technological, economic 
and political factors in the long-term development of an aerospace industry, we decided 
to approach the object of study with multiple levels of analysis. Since co-evolution can 
occur in different layers, we need to allow a certain degree of flexibility. In different 
chapters, we take a different angle for the analysis. We study country-level dynamics in 
Chapter 2 to get a comprehensive view on the overall evolution of the industry across 
time. In Chapter 4 we focus on the aircraft industry in selected country contexts which 
allows an assessment of the innovation system and the evolution of its main components 
over time. Naturally, among the actors, we will also study the history of companies. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 the main unit of analysis will be companies, allowing identifying 
windows of opportunity and their interplay with company strategy, in order to 
understand Schumpeterian dynamics. We assume that such a multi-level analysis is 
inevitable to draw sound conclusions. 
 Earlier studies focused on selected (macro- and meso) (Mani, 2013; Marques, 2004; 
Niosi and Zhegu, 2005; Vertesy and Szirmai, 2010; Vertesy, 2011), the novelty in this 
dissertation is to encompass dynamisms observed at three different levels: at that of 
countries, industries and companies. This dissertation also combines quantitative and 
qualitative study of the evolution of the industry in the following way. As it is very 
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important to put micro-level and qualitative developments in perspective, before any 
further investigation, Chapter 2 offers an overview of the contours of the industry in 
aircraft producing countries, providing a quantitative background. Here, we decided to 
be as universal as possible. This will also allow us to select country and company cases 
for a more in-depth study. For selecting the sample of country case studies in section 4, 
our aim was to have a broad geographical and temporal coverage, in order to be able to 
study the differences and similarities in the long-term evolution of the industry, and also 
keeping in mind the aim to sample from cases of success as well as of failure. 
Especially this latter seems to be systematically underreported in the literature, leading 
to repetitions of historical mistakes. It has been often argued that a quantitative study 
fits best the aim of comparing the scale across countries, growth over time, but case 
studies are more appropriate when the research is of descriptive, explanatory nature and 
the outcomes have to be evaluated considering the real world context (Yin, 2012). A 
potential bias in case study designs is the tendency of exaggerating results – this we try 
to balance with our comprehensive, multi-level design and backing up observations with 
comparative statistics. At the same time, we expect to observe unique, often 
incomparable events, for which we try to follow an inductive approach.  
Thus we can summarize our approach in Table 1.2. In brief, we answer the first 
research question in Chapter 2 with the help of an empirical study of the industry's 
evolution based on of statistics compiled by the author on production, value added, 
trade and innovation, from official sources augmented when necessary in order to obtain 
comparable time series. Based on the empirical findings in Chapter 2 and on a review of 
the literature on latecomer industrialization, innovation and capability building in 
Chapter 3, we answer the two subsequent research questions using qualitative case 
studies, structured in conceptual frameworks presented in the respective chapters. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the evolution of sectoral innovation systems, and we conduct a 
historical-institutional study of country-catch-up using a framework of innovation 
system dynamics.  Next, Chapter 5 discusses industrial leadership change in the regional 
jet segment in light of windows of opportunity and preconditions. In this piece of 
research, all cases of leadership change are studied in-depth, with a focus on companies 
as well as exogenous and endogenous events that may have triggered leadership change. 
In order to be comprehensive and objective, we study not only the companies that 
became the leaders, but also incumbents and other challengers. For both Chapters 4 and 
5, we rely on data collected from triangulated sources that include archived company 
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reports, trade journals and newspapers, secondary studies, as well as official statistics. A 
combination of these sources has proved to be very insightful for the aerospace industry 
with a highly concentrated company structure, and where other methods, such as 
surveys are less effective. 
Finally, the conclusions from the studies at the various levels are brought together in 
Chapter 6, which revisits the research questions and summarizes the results.  
 
Table 1.2 A schematic overview of the research design (research questions and applied 
methodology) 
Research question, in brief form Chapter Unit of analysis 
(region of focus) 
Methodology applied 
1. The evolution of the global 
aircraft manufacturing 
industry and 
internationalization 
Chapter 2 Country, world 
region  
(global) 
Harmonizing data from different 
statistical sources; comparative analysis 
of descriptive time-series statistics 
2. Understanding successful 
and failed strategies of 
catch-up 
Chapter 4 Sectoral innovation 
systems 
(latecomer 
economies) 
Comparative case studies using a 
framework of “innovation innovation 
system dynamics”  
(based on neo-Schumpeterian literature) 
3. Industrial leadership changes 
in the regional jet segment 
Chapter 5 Companies  
(from latecomer and 
advanced 
economies) 
Case studies based on the conceptual 
framework of windows of opportunities– 
strategic response – preconditions  
 
In sum, through this multi-level analysis, this dissertation aims to increase our 
understanding of the constant competitive struggle between incumbents and new 
entrants, and tries to understand long-term change by disentangling the various sources 
of incremental and radical system changes. 
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[2] Chapter 2: The Two Waves of 
Internationalization in the Global Aircraft 
Industry 
Note: A modified version of this chapter is being published as “The Contours of 
the Global Commercial Aircraft Manufacturing Industry.” In S. Eriksson, H-J. 
Steenhuis (eds.) The Global Commercial Aviation Industry. New York: 
Routledge. 
2.1 Introduction 
The capacity to design and produce an airplane is very much distributed around the 
world today. Planes flown by major airlines today (see also Figure 1.1) contain 
advanced parts and components produced in American, European and Asian countries. 
This is fundamentally different compared to how the industry was organized in the 
1960s, when aircraft design and engineering, manufacturing and product support were 
typically vertically integrated activities, conducted in the same country, even in the 
same company. In all these activities the dominance of producers from the United States 
was overwhelming. Yet, today, news headlines in the US not only celebrate new 
technological achievements, but also fret about changing market conditions and 
perceived global shifts in the industry. Heated debates were triggeder by developments 
such as when Comac, the new Chinese aircraft manufacturer announced the setting up 
of risk-sharing partnerships for the development of the C-919 – a mid-range jet that 
would make it a direct competitor of Boeing and Airbus –, the opening of final 
assembly lines in China by Embraer and Airbus, or Bombardier establishing a 
component manufacturing centre in Mexico.
1
 Some analysts, such as MacPherson and 
Pritchard (2003) link the increased use of global suppliers to a significant reduction in 
the number of aerospace jobs in the US and fear about its effect on future 
competitiveness of incumbent US producers. Others see this high-tech industry as an 
instrument for moving up the value chain and a way of breaking out of middle-income 
trap (Wade 2010). Commercial aircraft manufacturing is an important economic activity 
which can generate significant export revenues and demand for highly-skilled 
                                                 
1
 See i.e. Crooks, Ed “GE to sign slew of China deals in jobs boost”  Financial Times 18 Jan 2011; Reed, 
John “Aerospace: Manufacturing takes off” Financial Times 16 April 2012 
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employment – beyond its perceived contribution to national security. For the sake of a 
sober discussion on the real impact of internationalization in the aircraft industry, and in 
order not to overestimate its scale, in this chapter we set out to analyze the evolution of 
the industry in aircraft producing countries, as reflected by statistical evidence. 
More specifically, this chapter investigates the changing geographical distribution of 
aircraft production, trade and innovation activities, and the major underlying dynamics. 
As discussed earlier, we focus on aircraft manufacturing at the country level, as defined 
in international statistics, and where possible, distinguish commercial from military-
oriented activities.  
 
2.2 The state of commercial aircraft manufacturing and its main development 
trends 
2.2.1 How to measure country performance? 
The most commonly used indicator to measure the size and changing geography of the 
global commercial aircraft industry has been the relatively most easily available export 
statistics and company sales data. The main advantage of export statistics is their global 
coverage and the systematic collection and publication of data from both trading 
partners. At the same time, export data does not distinguish trade in new or used 
products, so it is only a second-best indicator of successful foreign sales of domestically 
produced aircraft, if figures are biased by the foreign sales of used wide-body aircraft in 
the million-dollar price range. This makes it particularly difficult to compute indicators 
of international specialization and comparative advantage of countries. Company sales 
data offer better insight into the performance of actual products, however, not all 
aerospace companies are publicly traded or are forced to publish their detailed results. 
More aggregate national statistics for the aircraft industry on sales and value added are 
therefore better indicators of actual aircraft production activities, however, as will be 
discussed below, such figures may be too aggregate and make it difficult to distinguish 
commercial from military production.  
Given these considerations, this chapter primarily relies on a combination of data on 
exports, production (value added) to draw the contours of the commercial aircraft 
industry and the latest developments in its internationalization.  
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2.2.2 About the sources 
The statistics described here offer a historical overview of the growth of the aerospace 
industry since the 1970s in 45 countries. The core dataset originates from national 
statistical data, obtained directly from national accounts data in yearbooks, data from 
manufacturing surveys, but also from UNIDO, OECD, Eurostat and other international 
statistical databases, or compiled datasets of the Groningen Growth and Development 
Center (GGDC). In some cases, data were augmented by data from company reports. 
These datasets have been scrutinized and adjusted for purposes of cross-country 
comparisons; values in national currencies were converted with industry-of-origin unit 
value ratios in all possible cases. Detailed information on data sources and extrapolation 
methods used for each country are provided in Vertesy (2011). 
 
The aim was to provide as reliable data as possible for the overall time span, and 
provide as many countries as possible for the last 25 years on value added, gross output 
(sales), employment and exports. Unfortunately investment figures (such as gross 
capital formation, R&D investment) were unavailable on a yearly basis and providing 
incidental figures are meaningless in this context where project success depends on 
investment accumulated over decades. Yet it remains our hope that transparency in the 
sector will increase (at least in the archives) so that future research will be able to fill 
this gap.  
 
Before turning to a discussion of the changing patterns of production and trade in 
aircraft, we first look at how demand for aircraft has changed over the past decades. Air 
transport growth is the key commercial driver of new aircraft sales, a major “pull 
factor” for growth of aircraft manufacturing. 
2.2.3 The changing landscape of demand for new aircraft 
World air traffic has been growing rapidly over the last four decades. The number of air 
passengers has grown more than eight-fold between 1970 and 2010. To better 
understand the volume growth at the global scale, let us suppose that every air 
passenger flies only once a year. While only every twelfth person could have flown in 
1970, about every third citizen of the world could have experienced this fastest means 
of travel in 2010. In reality of course, access to air travel depends on income, and until 
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as recently as the year 2000, some 90% of the world’s air passengers came from high- 
or upper middle income countries. Yet as new economic powerhouses emerge in East 
Asia, so does the geographical distribution of demand for air transport services change. 
According to World Development Indicators of the World Bank, three-quarters of air 
traffic concentrated to Western Europe and North America in 1970, and this share has 
gone down to half by 2010. Over the same period, Latin America and the Caribbean 
region maintained a flat 7% while the East Asia and Pacific region doubled its share to 
nearly a third by 2010. This latter region has, for the first time, overtaken the European 
Union in terms of number of passengers carried.  
For a long time, the aviation market was very limited in many of the emerging 
economies, despite their large territories. China was one of the best examples of an 
“earthbound” country. Even in 1980 it showed passenger-kilometre levels similar to that 
of European countries before the jet age. The number of air passengers in China in 1990 
was similar to that of South Korea. The passenger levels of 2006 are still lower than the 
US levels of 1970. Nevertheless, the growth of air traffic within and out of the country 
exceeded that of many countries with the largest air transport markets. Annual average 
growth in China between 1990 and 2007 was nearly 15.8%, while it was only 6.7% in 
the UK and 3.1% in the USA. It was only China that managed to sustain high growth 
rates – due in part to the very low initial levels of air transport. Still, there is a large 
potential for further growth, by further opening up the airspace for commercial traffic, 
improving air traffic control infrastructure and overcoming pilot shortage. 
The growth of global air transportation has clearly gained speed after 1980. A major 
reason for this was a 1978 deregulation in USA resulting in the entry of new airlines and 
the expansion of services. Similar deregulation took place in Europe in the 1990s, but 
many of the emerging air transport markets remain highly regulated even today. To a 
large extent, the growth is constrained by infrastructural limitations and airport and air 
traffic management capacities. Nevertheless, many of the Asian emerging economies 
have made large investments into tackling these issues and have nurtured the largest 
airport development projects in recent decades.  
Another way to measure the volume of air traffic is by looking at the sheer number of 
commercial departures. In emerging economies air traffic has been expanding at a much 
faster rate than in industrialized economies. The average rate for the period 1973-1990 
was 4.5% for emerging and only 2% for industrialized economies. For the period 1990-
2007 it was 5.8% and 3.8%, respectively. The most rapid growth in traffic in this last 
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period was observable in China and Korea. Changes in air traffic are closely linked to 
changes in economic growth, and the above average GDP growth in Asia explains the 
above-average growth in traffic. Put in historical perspective, the number of airline 
departures in China in 2007 (1.75 million) was still lower than that in Western Europe 
(1.85 million) in 1973, not to mention the USA (7.93 million).
2
 
 
Table 2.1 Demand Forecast for New Aircraft by Major Manufacturers 
Company Boeing Embraer Airbus Bombardier 
Outlook Period 2009-2029 2010-2029 2009-2028 2010-2029 
A. Regional Aircraft 
   Seating capacity definition: <90 seats 30-120 seats <100 seats 20-99 seats 
   Market value (USD bln) 60 200 n.a. ~239 
   Regional Market Size Tot (Share) Tot (Share)     
   (new deliveries next 20 
years) 1920 100% 6875 100% 8321 100% 6,100 100% 
      North America 800 42% 2400 35% 2899 35% 2,860 47% 
      Latin America 20 1% 575 8% 661 8% 350 6% 
      Europe 310 16% 1510 22% 2160 26% 
(incl. CIS)  
950 16% 
      Asia-Pacific 470 24% 575 22% 1374 17% 1580 26% 
         Of which P.R. China 280 15% 950 14% n.a. n.a. 860 14% 
      Russia/CIS 200 10% 405 6% 467 6% n.a. 0% 
      Middle East 70 4% 240 3% 154 2% 
 (incl. Afr.)  
360 6% 
      Africa 50 3% 220 3% 506 6% n.a.  
B. Total Commercial Aircraft Market 
   Total Market value (USD 
bln) 3,590 n.a. 3,100 n.a. 
   All new deliveries next 20 
years  30,900 100%    30,175 100%  
      North America 7,200 23%  7,675 25%  
      Latin America 2,180 7%  2,090 7%  
      Europe 7,190 23%  7,585 25%  
      Asia-Pacific 10,320 33%  8,726 29%  
         Of which China 4,330 14%   3,272 11%  
      Russia/CIS 960 3%  1,332 4%  
      Middle East 2,340 8%  1,497 5%  
      Africa 710 2%  1,270 4%  
Source: Boeing Current Market Outlook 2009-2029; Embraer Market Outlook 2010-2029; 
Airbus Global Market Forecast 2009-2028; Bombardier Commercial Aircraft Market Forecast 
2010-2029 
 
The efforts to bring aircraft manufacturing to Asia are reasonable in light of the 
economic growth predictions (Maddison 2007) and (related to these predictions) new 
aircraft delivery forecast of the world’s four largest manufacturers (see Table 2.1). The 
                                                 
2
 Based on data from the World Bank World Development Indicators. 
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Asia-Pacific region is expected to take up about a third of all new aircraft deliveries, 
becoming the largest buyer. Calculating in 2009 dollars, aircraft sales to Asia will be in 
the range of a trillion US dollars over the next two decades. According to all major 
manufacturers, China alone is expected to receive 11-14 per cent of all aircraft 
deliveries in the same period. North America and Europe remain neck and neck in the 
total forecast of both large commercial aircraft manufacturers accounting for about a 
quarter of global demand. North America will remain the largest market for regional 
aircraft (including both jets and turboprops), but predictions on the shares differ 
significantly (between 35-47 per cent). According to three of the producers, around one 
in every four new regional aircraft will land in Asia, only Airbus predicts a somewhat 
lower share. 
If the various predictions are correct, every percentage point of market share translates 
into 3.1-3.6 billion dollars-worth of aircraft acquisition over the upcoming two decades. 
Such a growth is a clear indication of increased demand for aircraft and parts in 
countries of this group, considering also the additional demand for maintenance, repair 
and overhaul services. All these present strong incentives for a further globalization of 
aircraft manufacturing capabilities, and offer strong leverage potential for countries 
such as China to strategically define the terms of attracting foreign producers to 
manufacture at least some parts and components locally. 
2.2.4 Business cycles in the aircraft manufacturing industry 
Let us now look at aircraft manufacturing from the suppliers’ perspective. The evolution 
of the global aerospace industry closely reflects major macroeconomic, technological 
and political events. The rapid expansion of air transportation was made possible by the 
diffusion of technological innovations such as the jet engine after World War II and the 
emergence of a dominant design of airliners, and was fueled by growth of the global 
economy. Continuous technological improvements in the civilian aircraft industry 
benefitted from military research and development activities in the aircraft and 
spacecraft segments, particularly in the context of the Cold War.  
Accepting the limitation of official statistics discussed above, that for most countries it 
is not possible to disentangle air and space, and civilian from military production, it is 
still very informative to chart the trends of the aerospace industry. Even if the scale may 
differ, the cyclical trends are very similar for the largest segment, commercial aircraft. 
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the evolution of the global aerospace industry 
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between 1960 and 2010. Over these five decades value added increased by a factor 3.5 
to 136.6 billion USD, gross output increased four-fold to over 300 billion USD. The 
growth of the industry was not linear. Figure 1 shows a cyclical growth pattern with 
peaks in 1973-74, 1980-81 and 1991, followed by periods of decline. The most rapid 
growth in value added took place from 1995 to 2007 (annual average of 6.8%), the 
largest of the drops occurred in the years following the end of the Cold War (in average 
7.7% annually between 1990 and 1995). Currently aerospace globally accounts for over 
1.4 million jobs, which is already lower by 23% than at its peak in 1990. Between 1990 
and 2007 more than 400 thousand aerospace jobs were lost around the world. 
 
Table 2.2 Key indicators on the evolution of the aerospace industry, 1960-2010 
  1960 1973 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Total Value of Output (GO) 78,350 108,516 164,700 213,034 159,924 221,769 257,029 300,110 
Gross Value Added (VA) 38,586 56,568 75,846 91,878 61,593 77,716 100,359 136,612 
Total Employees (thousands) 953 1,075 1,680 1,839 1,669 1,531 1,357 1,324 
Nr of Countries in GO sample 15 20 27 33 38 40 40 39 
missing data for significant 
producersa 
6 6 7 5 1 0 0 0 
Nr of Countries in VA sample 16 23 31 34 40 42 43 43 
missing data for significant 
producersa 
3 4 4 3 0 0 0 0 
Source: Vertesy (2011) 
Notes: Data covers all aerospace producer countries, with the exception of the Russian Federation.  
(a) Countries in the sample with missing data most likely exceeding 100 million USD and value added exceeding 50 
million USD.  
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Figure 2.1 Evolution of the Aerospace Industry, 1970-2010 
 
Source: Vertesy (2011, 2015) 
Note: Includes, commercial, military and space segments 
 
This production landscape is shaped by periods of economic expansion and recession in 
the major producers, such as the expansion periods of the late 1970s, the second half of 
the 1980s or the late 1990s, or the recessions following the oil crisis (1973-75), during 
the early 1980s the early 1990s and after 2008. Our consistent time series on aerospace 
producers ends in 2010, which prevents us from observing whether a full recovery from 
this latest crisis has happened yet. Recently published US and European data for 2012 
shows that aerospace manufacturing, in terms of value added in real terms, has just 
recovered to pre-crisis levels. 
During the four decades of the Cold War, the industry benefited greatly from high 
defense expenditures and from the fact that national security considerations often 
overrode economic considerations. However, it is noteworthy that the growth resulting 
from the increasing commercial sales during the post-Cold War era was more rapid than 
ever before. Global production in terms of value added increased 2.2-fold over merely 
12 years between 1995 and 2007. To put this expansion in perspective, it took 30 years 
to achieve a 2.4-fold increase between 1960 and 1990.   
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The aggregate figures presented here provide a comprehensive overview of the industry 
in the most advanced as well as emerging economies. Nevertheless, there are a few 
countries that are not included in the sample which have an impact on the total figures. 
As already mentioned above, the Russian Federation (and the former Soviet Union) has 
not published comparable output value figures for the industry. We estimate that 
Russian output may have matched US levels during the Cold War in military 
production, but commercial production was significantly lower given the more limited 
air transport industry in former communist countries. It is impossible to estimate how 
the inclusion of the Russia and the Soviet Union would influence global aggregate 
figures.
3
  
Table 2.2 also indicates a growing sample size, which reveals the diffusion of the 
industry rather than missing data. Although times series data was incomplete for a few 
producers, this has only limited impact on the global aggregate. Countries missing from 
the early sample are China, the former socialist countries of Central Eastern Europe and 
Israel. China is the main source of inconsistencies over time, because our time series 
data begins with 1981.
4
 However, it has a more limited effect on the global aggregates. 
In 1981 China was responsible for 4.7% of global production, in 1985 3.9%. The exact 
volume of production is unknown because most of the aircraft produced in China never 
left the borders of the country. Secondary sources suggest that military aircraft 
production (by far the largest share of total output) started to increase in the mid-1960s 
and peaked around 1980. We estimate that the inclusion of China would only increase 
the 1960 levels by 1-2% and the 1973 values by 2-4%. Other countries excluded from 
the earlier periods of the value added series include Israel (with no data before 1990) 
and Central Eastern European producers (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, with no 
data before 1995) responsible for a significant amount of fighter and trainer production. 
At this point we cannot estimate their significance, but it is reasonable to believe that 
their aggregate would be lower than that of China in 1973 but higher in 1960. In sum, 
                                                 
3
 The rough military aircraft export trend indicator values published by SIPRI show the highest export 
activity between 1972 and 1989, with a peak in 1980. This corresponds to the production pattern 
observable in the most successful commercial planes (the Tu-134 and -154). The drop by the 1990s in 
both military and commercial production may have been as much as two-third the previous rates. If we 
added these trends to the global aggregate figures, the 1970s and 80s levels would be higher at least by 
50% and the slump between 1990 and 1995 would look even more dramatic. The impact would be far less 
significant from the 1990s onward. 
4
 Official series begin only with 1995. For details on Chinese extrapolation see Annex. 
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the margin of error for the value output estimates could be between 5-8% for the years 
before 1981. 
Similarly to value added, it is also very difficult to quantify the number of persons 
employed in commercial aircraft manufacturing. Even if one the entire aerospace 
industry is considered, the aggregate figures not only hide the civilian/military 
distinction, but also the qualitative change in labor in the industry. Some signs can be 
read from the trends. Cycles are similarly observable as in the value added series, and 
employment very does not deviate from these latter figures until the mid-1990s. Since 
then, however, value added increased while employment decreased. In fact, aerospace 
manufacturing (once again, assuming the broad statistical definition) employment 
peaked in 1990, at around 1.8 million persons employed, and over 500,000 jobs were 
destroyed worldwide until 2010. This is the outcome of a combination of factors, 
including the declining military expenditure after the Cold War, the consolidation of the 
industry through mergers and acquisitions or outsourcing activities, and the diffusion of 
information and communication technologies in all areas of design, production, 
maintenance, or management. For instance, advances in computational fluid dynamics 
and computer aided design virtually replaced wind tunnel tests and the need for model 
construction, this the three recent decades also represent the most significant qualitative 
change in aerospace employment. It is also interesting to look at the geographical 
breakdown of the reduction in jobs: aerospace employment in the US decreased by 400 
jobs, and about a hundred thousand in both Europe, as well as in China. Surprising this 
latter may sound, in fact aerospace conglomerates were consolidated by reducing 
secondary non-aerospace activity of these firms (which were previously also included in 
the statistics). This global reorganization will be revisited in the section on 
internationalization; we conclude here that the overall industry (including the 
commercial segment) experienced significant efficiency gains but lost experienced 
human resources. 
2.2.5 The largest industrial players 
High market concentration characterizes the aircraft industry not only globally, but also 
within countries. The largest American and European aerospace and defense companies 
match and even exceed the size of entire countries’ aerospace industries, both in terms 
of turnover as well as in terms of labor force. Boeing or EADS, with all their activities 
in the aeronautics (commercial and military) and space segments around the world 
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combined, generate more annual sales and employ more persons than important 
aerospace producer countries such France, Germany or the UK.  This degree of 
concentration is the result of a consolidation process of several decades ending in the 
late 1990s, through which the global industry underwent dramatic mergers and 
acquisitions and the formation of vast transnational corporations that integrate a large 
variety of aerospace and defence production activities and services. 
Company size is important in the sector because only the largest players can raise 
sufficient capital (often in joint ventures) to finance the development of new projects 
with new technology.  
 
Figure 2.2 Total and commercial segment sales value for the global Top 20 aerospace producers, 
2012 
   
Source: “Aerospace and Defence Top 100 Special Report” in Flight International, 24-30 Sep 2013, and 
the 2012 Annual Reports of the respective companies. 
Note: Total sales value of companies excludes non-aerospace market segments companies, but includes 
sales at the defense market by the company together with all its subsidies around the world. Commercial 
includes all civilian sales, including the executive market. A commercial/defense breakdown was not 
available (“n/a”) in the financial statements of a few companies. 
 
Among the largest aerospace producing companies (Figure 2.2) one finds not only those 
whose main activity is to design, manufacture or sell aircraft such as Boeing, EADS, 
Lockheed Martin, Bombardier or Embraer, but also engine producers United 
Technologies Corporation, General Electric, Safran or Rolls-Royce, or avionics and 
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other component and system suppliers, such as Honeywell or Thales. Many firms have 
heterogeneous activities, acting both system integrators as well as parts designers; some 
are active in both the fixed wing and the rotary wing markets. Much of the sales of the 
top 20 companies are military oriented, a few of the top companies (Lockheed Martin, 
General Dynamics or Northrop Grumman) are not active at all in the civilian aircraft 
market. For the other companies, the share of commercial sales (at least for those that 
report it) varies hugely, from about a quarter or less (BAe Systems or Finmeccanica) to 
around two-thirds (Boeing, EADS, Dassault), to a 100% (as in the case of Bombardier 
Aerospace).  In fact, the top 10 companies change significantly if producers are ranked 
based on their commercial sales (this alternative rank is shown by the number in 
squared brackets preceding company names in Figure 2.2). In terms of geographical 
distribution, most of the companies have their headquarters in the USA (Boeing, 
Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, United Technologies, 
Raytheon, General Electric, to mention a few) or in Europe (e.g. EADS, BAe Systems, 
Finmeccanica, Thales, Safran), however, a growing share of their activities are more 
globally spread. At the same time, it is very telling for the type of internationalization of 
the global aerospace industry that Embraer, the fourth largest commercial aircraft 
producer, represents the only company in the list with its headquarters located in an 
emerging economy. In a more extended list of the global top 100 aerospace companies, 
there are already a few more companies originating from outside Europe or North 
America, including AVIC of China, Hindustan Aerospace (HAL) of India, ST Aero of 
Singapore and Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI).
5
 These companies are parts and 
components suppliers as well as producers of defence products for local air forces, with 
the exception of ST Aero. This company, part of the ST Engineering group, has gained 
competitive advantage in the maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) and upgrade 
segments, offering a further example of the heterogeneity of what the broad definition 
of aerospace manufacturing entails. It is also the most internationalized among these 
latter. 
 
                                                 
5
 For a 2012 edition, see “Aerospace and Defence Top 100 Special Report” in Flight International, 24-30 
Sep 2013. Hindustan Aeronautics was the 33
rd
 largest aerospace company with 3.1 bln USD revenue; 
AVIC – publishing its audited financial results for the first time in 2012 – was the 37th with 2.7 billion 
USD revenue, driven by helicopter sales;  ST Aero was the 53
rd
 with 1.5 bln USD revenue and KAI the 
55
th
 with 1.4 bln USD. We also note that Fortune Global 500 ranks AVIC well ahead of many companies, 
although revenues stated are overestimated compared to the officially released Annual Reports. 
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2.2.6 How significant is the aircraft industry with respect to the national economy? 
In the leading industrialized economies that produce commercial aircraft, the size of the 
industry directly accounts for around 0.2 – 0.4% of GDP. Even larger shares can be 
observed in Singapore (over 1.5%), the United States (around 0.8%). The indirect 
impact of the aircraft industry is estimated to be as much as three times its direct size, 
considering its linkages with other sectors of the economy. The US shows a declining 
share of the industry with respect to its GDP following 1990, which is due to the 
declining defense and space activities after the end of the Cold War. An opposite trend 
is observable for most other producer countries, including Europe, Canada and China, 
where the relative size of the industry has been increasing since the 1990s. 
 
The aircraft industry is one of the most important positive contributors to the trade 
balance of countries including the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Israel, 
Ukraine, Canada, Italy and Spain. With the shift of many industrial activities to cheaper 
locations, advanced economies have experienced increased global competition even in 
high-tech industries. As we have seen, aerospace has so far remained one of the last 
industrial resources of “the West”, which is also apparent in their export figures. These 
leading producer countries show a revealed comparative advantage in aircraft trade
6
, 
while only two emerging countries join them: Brazil in aircraft and Singapore in the 
export of parts and components. 
2.2.7 General patterns of internationalization 
It is a striking feature of the globalized world economy that the commercial aircraft 
industry, which was an important driver of the globalization process, has continued to 
be concentrated to the North Atlantic region in the past fifty years. The majority of the 
planes flown today around the world are sold Boeing or Airbus, and the majority of 
their parts have been produced in the United States or in Europe. While the emergence 
of low-, medium- and high-tech production capabilities have boosted the overall export 
performance of newly industrializing countries of Asia and of the Southern hemisphere 
so much that their share in total world merchandise exports has increased from 10% in 
1970 to a third in 2010, the global share of these countries in aircraft exports still hardly 
                                                 
6
 This is based on the Balassa formula that measures the relative advantage of set of goods within a 
country’s total merchandise exports.  
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exceeds 10% today.
7
 These figures are especially striking if contrasted with another 
transport manufacturing sector which is both capital and technology intensive, such as 
the automobile industry, which is much more evenly spread around the world, with 
every second car or truck being produced in Asia, more than a fifth in China alone.
8
  
The world’s growing appetite for aircraft is well reflected in the evolution of imports.9 
In the 1960s, the average volume of aircraft imports was around 8 billion US dollars (at 
2005 prices), this increased to 18 billion in the 1970s, doubled over the 1980s as well as 
the 1990s surpassing 100 billion by 1999, topping at nearly 160 billion in 2013. 
Countries of Europe have always been the largest importers throughout these years, 
accounting for 53% of it in the 1960s, 35% in the 1990s as the consequence both of the 
short recession and of the large civil aircraft production picking up speed. In the 
subsequent years, imports increased once again, due to the intensive internal 
collaboration, reaching 65% of global imports in the 2010-12 period. Even if internal 
trade is excluded, the EU accounts for over 30% of global aircraft imports today. North 
America, a primary producer is less of an important importer, responsible for less than a 
quarter of world aircraft imports both in the 1960s as well as during the 2000s (23%), 
with a brief decline in the 1990s.  
The region that experienced the biggest growth in aircraft imports was East 
Asia/Pacific. If we exclude here the OECD countries, we see that the region which on 
average accounted for merely 1.5% of global imports in the 1960s (hardly over 100 
million USD, less than Latin America, began a strong growth period in the 1980s. Just 
as the economy of the region’s countries started to grow fast, the region’s global share 
in aircraft imports increased to 9.5% in 1990s, and further to 24% by 2010-12 – or, with 
OECD countries included (and the EU considered as a block), to 31%. An 8-fold 
increase between 1986 and 1996 brought the region to the center of attention. After the 
1997 financial crisis which had an impact until 2000, the region’s import growth 
                                                 
7
 For the sake of consistency, “newly industrializing countries” refer to a group of 20 Asian (exc. Japan 
and Russia), Latin American and African countries that have at some point in the past five decades 
produced aircraft or aircraft parts. 
8
 Data source: 2011 Production Statistics of the International Organization of Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers, [URL: http://oica.net/category/production-statistics/2011-statistics/; retrieved: May 2013]. 
Note that the share of emerging economies would probably be smaller based on turnover or value added, 
but these figures, and a real industry-of-origin exchange rate are not available to allow for a proper global 
comparison. 
9
 Data presented below refers to aircraft imports obtained from UN Comtrade data, and were adjusted for 
inflation. 
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regained momentum, reaching 35 billion USD dollars in 2012, surpassing even that of 
the EU (not counting intra-EU trade). 
Latin America, which was responsible for 7% of global aircraft imports in the 1960s, 
experienced a growth period in the 1970s, with import volume doubling but remaining 
flat around 1 bln USD in the following two decades. After the relatively weak decade of 
the 1990s when the region accounted for less than 2% of global imports, the 2000s saw 
a rapid growth to 7.4 billion in 2011, and the region’s share reached around 5% in the 
2000s. 
2.2.7.1 Exporters and producers 
The global evolution of commercial aircraft exports is punctuated by similar growth 
spurts and down-cycles that were observed in the case of production. As portrayed in 
Figure 2.3, North American and European exporters have benefited most significantly 
from growing demand abroad. Considering only the period between 1980 and 2012, 
their combined exports have more than quadrupled in real terms. Aircraft export figures 
have an important drawback, because they can include the sales of second-hand planes, 
which can be substantial considering that their prices can range between a few million 
to over a hundred million US dollars. Nevertheless, looking at the fifty-year trend shows 
interesting patterns on the slow regional redistribution of exports. 
Figure 2.3 Evolution of commercial aircraft exports by selected world regions 
  
Source: UN Comtrade; WDI 
Notes: Aircraft exports defined by ISIC Rev.3 codes 792 (excl. 7925), 7131, 714 and 87411; Regions refer to the 
World Bank administrative regions. 
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One notable trend is the gradual loss of market share by North American producers. In 
the 1960s and 70s, 61% of commercial aircraft exports (of capitalist countries) came 
from North America, with more than half of it from the United States alone. By 2012, 
only 38% was originating from North America and a third from the US. Most of this 
lost market share was taken by Europe, which increased its global share in the 1980s 
and 1990s in particular, from 38% in the 1960s to 48% by the 1990s – and levelled off 
since (it was observed at 49% in 2012). Much of the gain is due to the increased 
collaboration between European countries, in the framework of the Airbus project. In 
fact, if we considered extra-EU exports only, Europe and the US are neck and neck 
accounting for around 40% of global commercial aircraft exports. As Figure 2.4 shows, 
the top five exporter countries that account for 77% of world exports, the US, France, 
Germany, the UK and Canada, have remained among the top five since 1980. 
Considering the global growth trends since 1990, we see that the aircraft export of 
industrialized economies (mostly OECD countries) on total increased on average by 
around 3% a year, while that of emerging economies – due to their relatively smaller 
initial scale – grew by 12.5%. This owes much to the success of Brazil as an aircraft 
exporter, and Asian countries as parts and components exporter. Looking at emerging 
economies, we see that commercial aircraft exports experienced an eastward global 
shift, but not a southward shift: Latin America, despite the success of Embraer in Brazil 
and the growth of Mexican aerospace clusters, has a marginal export share. From half a 
percent in the 1970s, the region increased its global commercial aircraft exports share to 
2.6% by 2012. In contrast, commercial aircraft exports from the East Asia and Pacific 
region have grown about twice as fast as the world average over the period of 1962-
2012 (around 13% annual average growth in real terms), reaching a global share of 
about 8%. The three main engines of the region’s growth have been Japan since the 
mid-1980s, Singapore since the late 1990s and, most recently, China. Other East Asian 
aerospace producers, such as South Korea or Indonesia, have achieved more moderate 
export growth since the 1990s.  
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Figure 2.4 The 10 largest aircraft exporters (1970-2012) and their market share (in 2012, %) 
Source: UN Comtrade; WDI 
Notes: Aircraft exports defined by ISIC Rev.3 codes 792 (excl. 7925), 7131, 714 and 87411;  
 
 
Zooming in to the country level, comparing the list of the top 10 exporters (Figure 2.4) 
and the top 10 producers (Figure 2.5) offers interesting insights into the competitiveness 
of countries. The US is a leader both in terms of exports and value added. Four 
European countries, France, Germany, the UK and Italy feature among the top exporters 
as well as top producers, but their rank changes significantly if we consider value added 
rather than export value, which is affected by the strategy of internal collaboration and 
the pricing of intermediate and final products. Most striking is the second position of 
China among the top producers. Here we have to note that these figures may be 
exaggerated due to counting Chinese company’s outputs based on their main industrial 
activity, and also including military production. Nevertheless, most of these products 
are for domestic use, China is yet to establish itself as a major aircraft exporter. The 
other countries appearing on both top lists, Canada, Brazil, Japan and Singapore each 
have a competitive edge in some segments of the industry. Canada owes to its regional 
jet and engine industries, Brazil to the regional jets, Japan and Singapore to parts and 
components manufacturing and its position as an MRO, warehouse and logistics 
provider.  
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Figure 2.5 The 10 largest aerospace producer countries by value added, 1970-2010 
 
Source: OECD, EUKLEMS, Eurostat, UNIDO, National statistical offices; WDI. 
Notes: Aerospace includes aircraft and spacecraft manufacturing 
 
 
The most striking trend that affected the evolution of global aerospace employment, the 
drastic cut in US aerospace jobs, was already discussed in this chapter. The question 
that remains to be addressed is whether these jobs “migrated” to other countries, or were 
lost or migrated to other sectors. Roughly counting (that is, not distinguishing the space 
segment and defense segments), 470 thousand jobs were lost globally between 1990 and 
2011. North America and Europe lost even more than that, 480 aerospace jobs (with 
much of it affecting the US, aerospace employment in Europe has remained roughly 
stable since the mid-1990s) due to the cuts in military spending after the end of the Cold 
War and due to an overall consolidation of the industry. Only a fraction of these jobs 
were recovered elsewhere in the world, suggesting that fears in the industrialized 
countries may be exaggerated. As demonstrated by Figure 2.6, China, the second largest 
aerospace employer, followed a path of its own, and employment levels where shaped 
by internal dynamics rather than global trends. The growth in the early 1990s and the 
subsequent decline is most likely the outcome of a reshuffling of state-owned 
enterprises. Previously identified as numbered “machine building industries” with 
heterogeneous activities and at numerous locations across the country, the mostly 
military-oriented firms were regrouped in 1999 into two conglomerates, AVIC I and II. 
The process of consolidation that has yet to be finalized saw a gradual and limited 
opening to the market and the removal of only some of the duplication of activities, but 
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complexities in ownership remain, according to the still limited information available on 
firm-level dynamics (Goldstein 2006, Eriksson 2011). The most recent years once again 
brought employment growth in China, but it is important to emphasize the persistent 
qualitative differences in the education and skills of labor force, making international 
comparison somewhat problematic. Elsewhere in Asia, aerospace employment has 
remained relatively small compared to Europe and North America, so considering the 
global developments, at least for now, the regional redistribution of employment has 
remained limited.  
 
Figure 2.6 Trends in the global distribution of Aerospace jobs, 1980-2010 
 
Source: EUKLEMS, Eurostat, OECD STAN, UNIDO, National statistical offices. 
Notes: Aerospace includes aircraft and spacecraft manufacturing 
 
To better understand the most recent trends in internationalization, one should take a 
closer look at the developments in emerging economies that are emerging as producers 
of aircraft or their parts. These, mostly Asian, but also Latin American countries are 
responsible for a rapidly growing share of global aircraft imports (more than one in four 
aircraft in value terms, as shown in Figure 2.7). Although, as we have seen above, their 
some 10% share in global output is relatively small, they show rapid growth through a 
new kind of export specialization. From many aspects, these countries show little 
commonality. Some, like Brazil and Mexico run a positive trade balance in aircraft, 
while others, such as Singapore, China, India, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia or 
Turkey are net importers (Figure 2.8). Some of these countries have longer tradition in 
producing aircraft or parts (owing to Embraer in Brazil, ST Aerospace and other 
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transnational companies in Singapore, military and civilian state-owned producers in 
China or IPTN/IAe in Indonesia) while others are relatively newcomers (such as 
Mexico or Malaysia). Production has so far not followed demand, but this imbalance 
provides ambitious governments with some leverage to gain access to technology and 
production capacity to force sellers to source at least some of the value of their aircraft 
from these countries. Yet changing the international division of labor in such a high-
tech industry does not happen overnight, and depends on the successful implementation 
of policy and business strategies.  These strategies show a common pattern, or a new 
wave of latecomer entry, which can be described as entry to aircraft industry through 
the supply chain. 
 
Figure 2.7 Aircraft imports of emerging economies 
  
Source: UN Comtrade; WDI 
Note: Aircraft industry defined by ISIC Rev.3 sectors: 792, 7131, 714 and 87411 
 
 
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
―
 W
o
rl
d
 Im
p
o
rt
 S
h
ar
e 
(%
) 
 
Im
p
o
rt
 V
al
u
e 
U
S
D
 b
ill
io
n
s 
at
 2
00
5 
p
ri
ce
s 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2016013
45 
 
Figure 2.8 Balance of trade in aircraft for selected emerging economies 
   
Source: UN Comtrade; WDI 
Note: Aircraft exports defined by ISIC Rev.3 codes 792 (excl. 7925), 7131, 714 and 87411 
 
At an era when companies are more and more producing goods and services through 
supply chains that span various countries, traditional trade statistics become less and 
less capable of measuring the contribution of each country to the total value of a good or 
service in the supply chain. Recent attempts by the OECD and the WTO tried to address 
this gap by compiling statistical data on the end use of exports (Zhu et al. 2013). Data 
on intermediate trade in aircraft offers interesting insights into ways countries become 
integrated in the global aircraft industry. Figure 2.9 shows two distinct patterns. One 
trading pattern is followed by a single country, Brazil, the only emerging market 
exporter specialized in assembling and selling entire aircraft. In fact, this corresponds to 
a strategy which we called the “first wave” of internationalization, or which is entry 
from the top of the supply chain for an “indigenous aircraft” developer and producer – a 
process in which Embraer of Brazil turned out to be more successful than most others 
(Eriksson 1995, Vertesy 2011).  
The other countries have become increasingly specialized as parts and component 
suppliers, among them China, South Korea or Mexico. They have done so following the 
model established by Japan, which, after a failed attempt to produce entire airliners (i.e. 
the YS-11 by Nihon consortium) shifted to parts and components manufacturing, and 
has become one of the leading suppliers of advanced composite materials
10
. Singapore 
                                                 
10
 For instance, Kawasaki, Fuji and Mitsubishi Heavy industries produce structural parts for the Boeing 
787 Dreamliner. 
(Trade balance, 2012) 
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followed a similar strategy from the establishment of its aerospace industry in the 
1970s, when, leaving behind its single role of an entrepot trading post, it has become a 
provider of MRO services and an important producer of parts and subsystems. This 
graph offers further explanations to the difference between the size of production and 
export of China: although it can sell aircraft in the domestic market, when it comes to 
exports, China’s current strength lies in supplying parts and components. If China’s 
other strategy, that is, indigenous aircraft development, comes to fruition and Comac 
succeeds in exporting the ARJ-21 or C-919 jets, this picture will change. In any case, as 
for now, Figure 2.9 indicates that most of the aircraft-industry exports (more than 80% 
in 2010) of China as well as the selected countries are used as intermediate goods by 
producers in their partner countries.  
 
Figure 2.9 Share of intermediate goods in aircraft exports of selected countries 
  
Source: OECD STAN Bilateral Trade by End Use database,  
Note: Values refer to entire aerospace industry 
 
Yet, there are important differences between how countries of this latter group have 
integrated in global supply chains. Figure 2.10 offers more details on the structure of 
intermediate exports of two selected countries, China and Mexico. It distinguishes the 
five largest foreign users of their aircraft industry products, and looks at their evolution 
over time. In the case of China, we see a slower start, yet a more balanced geographic 
distribution: only after the year 2000 did the process of integration into global supply 
chains take off, but intermediate exports grew rapidly in the following decade, and its 
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customers include US and European producers. Mexican aerospace exports to the US 
amounted to 300 million USD already in 2000 – owing, to some extent, to the 
establishment of NAFTA. This further doubled by 2010, but the US still remained the 
dominant trading partner.  
 
Figure 2.10 Evidence of latecomer entry through the supply chain 
 
Source: OECD STAN Bilateral Trade by End Use database; WDI 
Note: Values refer to entire aerospace industry. The % values in boxes show the share of intermediate products in selected 
export relations. 
 
2.3 The limits to internationalization 
The relatively slower speed of internationalization of the aircraft industry compared to 
others can be attributed to a number of economic and political factors. First of all, new 
entrant companies cannot gain competitiveness overnight, but through the outcome of a 
Value of Chinese Aerospace Exports used as 
intermediate input, by Top 5 partners (USD mln)
Value of Mexican Aerospace Exports used as 
intermediate input, by Top 5 partners (USD mln)
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longer learning process. This depends on joint efforts done by the company as well as 
the host governments, by establishing a learning and innovation system, with the 
provision of specialized human resources, the availability of education, training and 
research institutes and the availability of linkages to other industries and leading 
producers. The provision of specialized labour force is crucial (Niosi 2005). 
Establishing stand-alone institutes is not enough as long as there is a lack of interactions 
(flow of finance, skilled human resources, ideas, products, etc.) between the key actors 
of the innovation system (Vertesy, 2011). Second, if the high costs of continuously 
financing these efforts were not a big enough barrier of entry, latecomers have to reach 
markets limited by strong standards and political obstacles. The more complex activities 
latecomers aim for (i.e., an entire aircraft), the higher obstacles they face. At the same 
time, posing political obstacles is a double-edged sword, as latecomers can also trade 
market access to foreign producers for access to technology and localizing higher value-
added production activities. It also needs to be emphasized that developing and 
manufacturing a modern aircraft are extremely complex processes, and so is optimizing 
supply chains, thus any decisions that are made are affecting the life-cycle of an entire 
aircraft programme. 
Third, scale economics favour established trading patterns, and at least in short and 
medium term, it is much cheaper to buy aircraft and their components rather than make 
them. To a similar degree, the returns to R&D spent by incumbents is expected to be 
higher than to recent entrants, making a race against a target that is moving away faster. 
The largest aerospace R&D spenders happen to be incumbents: the United States, 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom (see the left panel of Figure 2.11). US 
companies are by far the largest aerospace R&D spenders; they spend far more than 
those of the next ten countries combined. It has to be underlined that even if reported 
figures include military and space R&D, their outcomes are important sources of new 
technology used in commercial aircraft. But the R&D landscape has also seen important 
recent changes. China is emerging as a new major aerospace R&D spender as well as an 
employer of scientists and engineers. At some distance, India has also increased its 
aerospace research spending (on its part, this concerns mostly the space sector), and so 
have Singapore and Brazil. As the right panel of Figure 2.11 demonstrates, the growth 
of R&D expenditure by emerging aircraft producers has outperformed that of 
incumbents by some 3 percentage points a year since the year 2000. Direct or indirect 
public support plays a crucial role in these developments, and in fact a number of 
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American and European companies have made strategic attempts to benefit from these 
programs. The emergence of world class R&D capacity beyond the traditional locations, 
and the “competition” by governments to support them also increases the pool of 
available risk-sharing partners for incumbent system integrators, which will further 
increase international specialization along the supply chain.  
 
Figure 2.11 Evolution of Business R&D expenditures by aerospace manufacturers in selected 
economies 
 
 
Source: OECD, National statistical offices;  
Notes: Emerging producers include Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Singapore and South Korea. Available 
data does not allow for distinction between civilian and military R&D. 
2.4 Two waves of internationalization 
In this chapter we have seen that internationalization has characterized the aircraft 
industry for many decades, but has accelerated in the last 20 years. The direction of 
internationalization and its driving mechanisms have also changed. International trade 
in aircraft has intensified, and the reliance on global supply chains is the reality in 
today’s commercial aircraft industry.  
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These findings confirm and complement earlier studies on the internationalization of 
the sector. Mowery and Rosenberg (1989) explained how the process took off at the end 
of the 1970s due to a confluence of changes in policies, market conditions and 
technology. Deregulation in the US air transport services sector, the erosion of the 
government’s funding of (primarily military) research and development (R&D) which 
was essential for establishing US dominance in the industry, the decline in the 
commonality of military and commercial technology, the increasing technological 
complexity and the increasing development costs all contributed to increased financial 
risks for companies. Furthermore, the market share of the US in new aircraft started to 
decline, making foreign sales crucial for financial success of US producers, spurring 
international collaboration. By the 1990s, as Golich (1992) pointed out, collaboration of 
former national champion enterprises had become the only means of survival in an 
industry characterized by high risks and costs associated with R&D and production, 
long investment cycles which had increased 2-3-fold to 10-15 years since the end of 
World War II, and features of the market it served, in which – apart from a product’s 
price, performance and on-time delivery –, politics played a key role for 
competitiveness. Eriksson (1995) surveyed the sector in a number of newly 
industrialized economies and emphasized the increased importance of East and 
Southeast Asia in the global aircraft industry. Niosi and Zhegu (2005) highlighted that 
the main steps in the internationalization process following the initial period of the 
USA’s supremacy were Europe’s catch-up in the 1970s and 80s and the emergence of 
the duopolistic war between Airbus and Boeing, and eventually the worldwide diffusion 
of the industry. The state of the industry today is characterized by concentration, 
competition and also collaboration in R&D, while new countries are becoming part of 
the international aircraft supply chain. Esposito (2004) showed that the evolution and 
intensification of international collaborations in commercial and military aircraft and 
engines has been a gradual process which began with collaboration agreements initiated 
by engine makers, and continued through the creation of the European Airbus consortia 
which was building on lessons from the Concorde project, evolving into a complex web 
of global cooperation. Hagedoorn (2002) offered further evidence that international 
R&D partnering in the aerospace and defence industry increased substantially by the 
1990s, in contrast with that of previous three decades, and in that decade in particular, 
also in contrast with other high-tech industries. With regards to the more recent trends, 
authors point out that new countries beyond the US-Europe core are entering the 
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industry through the supply chain; i.e. China emerged as an international parts and 
components supplier, applying its strong bargaining power to offer market access 
(Eriksson 1995, Goldstein 2006, Eriksson 2011). 
With a certain degree of abstraction, we argue that internationalization of the 
industry in the past half a century happened in two waves. What began with the 
intensification of collaboration between producers that vertically integrated the capacity 
to design and produce aircraft, internationalization through joint ventures for R&D 
collaboration, company spinoffs, mergers and acquisitions reshaped the industry in a 
way that today’s producers are mostly specialized in a few activities along the supply 
chain. In the multi-tier structured industry, the largest aerospace (and defence) 
producers may be competitors at some level in certain products, while collaborating in 
others, for instance, as risk-sharing partners in components and subsystems. Even for 
the US, where many of the collaborating partners are domestic, the trend observed by 
Craypo and Wilkinson (2011) on Boeing jetliners is rather telling: while only 2% of the 
B-707, a product of the 1960s, was produced outside the US, this share was 30% for the 
B-777 of the 1990s; we now see that around 65% of the latest B-787 Dreamliner 
airframe relies on foreign suppliers
11
.  
This first wave of internationalization, which began in the 1960s and ended with a 
major shakeout and consolidation in the 1990s, typically occurred between incumbent 
countries and firms of the North America, Europe and Japan triad. More recently, a 
second wave of aerospace internationalization emerges, distinguishing itself from the 
first wave. Whereas the first one saw the set of aerospace producing countries largely 
unchanged, this new wave sees a global expansion of the industry. This expansion has 
many underlying reasons – structural, political and economic. The new structure of the 
industry that crystallized by the end of the 1990s is more favourable for new entrants. 
While those latecomers that made attempts to join the industry after World War II often 
faced insurmountable technological and capital barriers when they tried to launch mega-
projects and establish (copying incumbents) the entire vertical spectrum of aerospace 
production. It is hardly surprising that many of these attempts – from Argentina to 
Indonesia, and even China – failed to deliver the ultimate goal, the serial production of 
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 Peterson, K., 2011. Special Report: A wing and a prayer: outsourcing at Boeing. Reuters, 20 January, 
<URL: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/20/us-boeing-dreamliner-idUSTRE70J2UX20110120> 
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indigenous aircraft; or, if succeeded, were short lived (Eriksson 1995, Vertesy 2011).
12
 
Yet, both the technological and capital barriers of entry are significantly lowered when a 
new entrant climbs gradually along the supply chain. From Mexico (Martinez-Romero, 
2013) to China and South East Asia, we see new producers that specialize in supplying 
high quality, high tech components for major system assemblers such as Boeing and 
Airbus. Produce and innovate, as observed in many other high-tech industries (Kim 
1997, Amsden 2001, Hobday 1995). This results in less visible, grand scale projects, but 
is probably economically more sustainable.
13
  
The world order after the end of the Cold War became multipolar, in the economic 
and political sense (Wade 2011). Establishing aerospace production (and innovation) 
capabilities is seen in this context as a contributing factor for high-tech competitiveness, 
and a strategic aim for many emerging economies (BRIC countries as well as others) 
that aim at increasing their regional or global influence. Given that airlines in these 
countries are often in state hands, they can strategically trade with market access in 
exchange for access to technology, often in the form of offset agreements. On the one 
hand, high economic growth and demand for transportation go hand in hand, thus the 
growing demand for new aircraft gives strong leverage for emerging economies. On the 
other hand, incumbent parts and component suppliers also see potential in capitalizing 
on the growth outside their home territories, and are ready to invest even if it takes 
longer to recover their investments, and even if they are forced to enter joint ventures in 
partnership with receiving governments.  
The second wave of internationalization is driven by transnational corporations, 
which integrate design and engineering, manufacturing, distribution and after-sales 
support activities in multiple locations around the (Aerostrategy 2009). On the receiving 
end, governments increasingly compete to attract firms in the supply chain, by 
establishing aerospace business parks, providing tax breaks and even supporting R&D. 
Table 2.3 summarizes the distinctive features we attributed to the two waves of 
internationalization. 
                                                 
12
 Of course, the reasons why only Embraer of Brazil succeeded in becoming a successful exporter of 
commercial aircraft already in the 1970s and 80s is far more complex than structural, see (Ramamurti 
1987, Frischtak 1992, Cassiolato et al. 2002, Goldstein 2002, Marques 2004, Vertesy 2011). 
13
 China is a special case here. Although producers from the country have made more successful inroads 
into the industry through the supply chain than in previous attempts for indigenous innovation in previous 
decades, the government in parallel is also pushing large-scale aircraft development programs – see the 
ARJ-21 and the C-919 projects. But the choice to include in these aircraft components designed by 
incumbent (foreign) suppliers shows a strategy of simultaneously gaining competence at all levels of the 
supply chain. 
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Table 2.3 Characteristics of the two waves of internationalization in the aircraft industry 
 First Wave Second Wave 
Years 1950s-1970s 1990s- 
Industrial organization characterized by vertically 
integrated companies 
multi-tier, pyramid structure, 
presence of global supply chains 
internationalization driven 
by 
host governments in emerging 
economies 
incumbent firms + host 
governments in emerging 
economies 
new entrant’s goal establish vertically integrated 
companies (expertise in all 
activities); national security 
interests 
establish specialized companies 
(expertise in a certain system or 
component); move up along the 
supply chain; national security 
interests 
incumbent’s strategy  defend technology and markets collaborate to reduce costs; access 
to growth markets 
new entrant’s dominant 
trade policy 
protectionist strategically protectionist; within 
limits 
incumbent’s dominant trade 
policy 
protectionist strategically protectionist; within 
limits 
Limits to 
internationalization 
high technology and investment 
barriers 
lower technology and investment 
barriers 
Late entrant cases Brazil; Argentina; Indonesia; 
China 
Japan; Singapore; South Korea; 
Mexico; China 
technology market restricted global 
product market global global 
Source: author’s compilations 
2.5 Conclusion 
To conclude our empirical chapter, we found that the global commercial aircraft 
industry has veen undergoing a major transformation. The market for new aircraft and 
their maintenance has become truly global, driven to a large extent by the particularly 
strong demand by airlines in East Asia and in the Persian Gulf. Still today, despite 
significant attempts made by governments around the world, the aircraft industry is not 
as internationalized as other high-tech sectors. The large majority of commercial aircraft 
families are designed and also produced in America and Europe, as shown by 
production and export statistics. We can already observe turbulence in the aircraft 
manufacturing industry, a slow but profound change as the industry expands towards 
East Asia. Strong aerospace clusters have emerged from Singapore to Shanghai, Xian 
and Chengdu, Shenyang and Harbin in China, in South Korea, and are emerging in 
India and Malaysia, while Mexico is on the rise in Latin America. These new 
production centres are creating real competition for incumbent producers.  
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Over the past half a century, new entrants to the aircraft industry tried two distinct 
strategies. The first one aimed at achieving the capacity of indigenous aircraft design. 
This strategy, pursued over from the 1960s to the early 1990s failed to produce 
commercially successful aircraft, despite the huge investments made by Japan, China 
and Indonesia. An exception was the market-niche oriented Embraer of Brazil. 
Another strategy was to build up the technological capability to produce parts and 
components, assemble aircraft under licence or attract leading producers, by applying a 
variety of economic and political means. This latter strategy was first introduced by 
Japan in the 1980s, and was followed by many after the end of the Cold War, proved to 
be more successful for new entrants. Apart from following the technologically less 
demanding bottom-up approach, the other reason of success was the right timing. 
Entering at a time when incumbent producers of industrialized countries were forced to 
rationalize costs and when new information and communication technologies shrank 
distances, access to the market was easier. This way, by further deepening mutual 
dependence, new entrants could gain a foothold in an industry otherwise protected by 
high barriers of entry. The interplay of these developments, which we proposed to call 
the “second wave of internationalization”, triggered a substantial reorganization of the 
entire global aerospace industry, the end of which process we are yet to see in the 
upcoming decades. Nevertheless, statistics on the end-use of exports already shows how 
countries have specialized along the supply chain as intermediate exporters. 
As in the case of all abstractions, the world is more complex and countries tend to 
follow a mix of these strategy. For instance, while attracting leading companies of all 
tiers to produce locally, China also strives to design and manufacture “indigenous” 
aircraft (the ARJ-21 and the C-919), which would typically be the hallmark of a “first-
wave” strategy. Considering on the one hand the serious delays in receiving 
international airworthiness certification for both of these programmes, and the advances 
made by establishing final assembly lines and component manufacturing centres for 
leading global producers, we see that, at least for now, the advantages of the ‘second 
wave’ strategy are more tangible. But needless to say, in a country the size of China and 
with declared regional security goals, the motivations for selecting strategies go beyond 
what concerns the commercial segment of the aircraft industry. But as technology 
complexity, capital intensity, and the long lead time of product development continue to 
pose significant barriers of entry to this industry, all countries try to exploit political 
influence to support the industry so strategies vary. Clearly, a fierce battle is fought for 
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every percent of market share, and gaining and sustaining competitiveness depends on 
many more aspects, as also shown in other chapters of this book. 
Production data shows that the United States remains the towering leader in aircraft 
manufacturing. Fears of North America losing positions are therefore exaggerated. It is 
evident that the US maintains its strong competitiveness partly while gradually reducing 
aerospace jobs, a process underway since the early 1990s. There is however little 
evidence on whether these jobs would go to other parts of the world; we observe a 
general reduction of employment in the sector due to consolidation and possibly 
efficiency gains due to information and communication technologies. Countries of 
Western Europe have managed to maintain a relatively larger share of aerospace jobs 
while increasing exports, but in terms of total output, they face stronger competition 
from Asia. A future change in competitiveness could also be expected in light of the 
significant increases in aerospace R&D spending in China, India and other Asian 
countries.  
It is also important to emphasize that the trends are somewhat blurred by the 
influence of the military and space industry segments and the difficulty to distinguish 
them in official statistics. For instance, while commercial demand is mostly shaped by 
business cycles, military orders continue to play a crucial role in supporting new 
product development, and are an important driver of internationalization of the industry 
and public procurements may cushion against the effect of crises. However, if military 
orders become excessive, they also have the potential of reversing the waves and 
shifting back from globally distributed supply chains to greater domestic concentration. 
This is a future scenario that one cannot exclude. Another future scenario to consider is 
linked to the fate of the particularly strong current demand for new aircraft. In the wake 
of the recent financial crisis, demand for new aircraft did not decline to the same degree 
as would be expected considering the effect of previous macroeconomic cycles on the 
industry. On the contrary, new orders for more economic new aircraft have created what 
some industry analysts see as a bubble that may burst, having particularly strong impact 
on all producers. 
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[3] Chapter 3: Literature on Catch-up, 
Schumpeterian dynamics and Innovation 
3.1 Introduction 
This section provides an overview of the literature on latecomer industrialization, 
technological capabilities and innovation systems. Its purpose is to identify the main 
theoretical foundations for a framework of analysis of latecomer industrialization in 
aerospace.  
The literature review starts in section 2.2 with the old problem of technological 
learning and latecomer industrialization. The basic question that was raised: is there an 
advantage in being a latecomer? According to the Gerschenkronian tradition, being a 
latecomer country holds a potential. First movers have to pay the price of developing a 
new technology, test its applicability in practice, while latecomers can readily take the 
results and avoid the first movers’ costs. As many examples from East Asia have 
shown, latecomers with lower production costs can indeed gain large market shares. But 
historical experience also shows that acquiring technology is not automatic, and is more 
than simply following a pre-written recipe. The second strand of literature we look at 
addresses the difficulties in accumulating technological capabilities and some of the 
actual disadvantages of latecomers (section 2.3). Many authors devised stage models to 
highlight the progress of technological learning in a variety of industries. The 
appropriateness of stage models for the analysis of latecomer aerospace innovation is 
examined in section 2.4. The following section (2.5) discusses the systems of innovation 
approach from a dynamic perspective. Section 2.6 provides a survey of the existing 
literature on innovation, technological change and economic growth in the aerospace 
industry both in countries at the technological frontier and in developing economies. 
Section 2.7 looks at another body of existing works. Here we focus on technological 
development in aerospace, which helps the reader better understand the “big picture”, 
the major trends of technological change at the frontier since the 1950s. The 
summarizing section 2.8 provides an overview of the main conclusions of the literature 
review and highlights the questions so far unanswered. 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2016013
57 
 
3.2 Latecomer advantages and how to benefit from them 
The idea that economic backwardness may be an asset for latecomer industrialization 
has been at the center of debates on economic development. Building on the work of 
Veblen (1919)
14
, Gerschenkron (1962) argued that the more economically backward a 
country is, the greater “the opportunities inherent in industrialization” are. The idea 
behind this is that technologically backward countries can potentially apply existing 
technologies at much lower costs than the countries that developed them. Catch-up at 
the country level occurs as productivity increases due to more advanced technology and 
the per capita income difference narrows between leaders and followers. The larger the 
initial productivity gap (or the greater the distance to the technological frontier), the 
greater is the potential for growth. This happens because latecomers can enter directly 
into large-scale production in the most dynamic industries and take advantage of their 
lack of institutional inertia. The tension between the “great promise” of economic 
development demonstrated by the leading countries and the reality of stagnation is an 
important motivating factor for institutional change in the follower. However, due to 
institutional obstacles catch up cannot occur (such an obstacle was serfdom in Russia or 
the lack of political unity in Germany). In the 19
th
 century, in industrializing Russia 
state intervention compensated for (or substituted) the insufficient (or inadequate) 
physical, human and technological resources required to catch-up. Establishing 
appropriate institutions and organizations are crucial for the successful substitution of 
missing prerequisites. In Gerschenkron’s examples these functions were provided by 
development banks in France, universal banks in Germany and government investment 
in infrastructure in Russia in the late 19
th
 century.
15
  
The rapid development of many East Asian economies in the second half of the 
twentieth century (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea or Taiwan) testifies to the 
possibility of reaping latecomer advantages, providing evidence of dynamic 
developments at firm and sectoral levels in industries such as automobiles, electronics 
and semiconductors (Kim 1980, 1997, 1998; Kim and Nelson 2000; Fagerberg 2000; 
Hobday 1995, 2003; Amsden 1989, 2001; Mathews 2002; Westphal 2002). In a broader 
context, it was found that accelerated growth is achievable with latecomer 
                                                 
14
 It should be noted that Veblen’s view was in many ways sharply different from Gerschonkron’s thesis, 
e.g. considering technology transfer as a more automatic mechanism possibly driven by market forces. 
(c.f. Fagerberg 2005) 
15
 Another often cited example from post-World War II Japan is the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI). 
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industrialization. Fagerberg and Verspagen (1999) empirically showed that 
manufacturing had been an engine of growth in the late industrialization of East Asia 
and Latin America. Szirmai (2005, 2011) concluded that no developing country 
achieved successful economic development without industrialization.  
Gerschenkron underlined the importance of removing institutional obstacles and 
establishing institutions and organizations to realize latecomer advantages. Latecomer 
firms actually also face some significant disadvantages. According to Hobday (1995), 
they are dislocated from technology sources as well as from advanced markets.
16
 It has 
remained a central problem in the literature on latecomer industrialization to identify the 
role of state and private actors in starting and carrying out the institutional changes, 
which can address these disadvantages. The same historical development paths of East 
Asian countries have been interpreted in very different ways depending on the 
spectacles observers were looking through. On the one hand, according to the neoliberal 
view summarized in a widely cited World Bank (1993) report ‘The East Asian Miracle’, 
the success of governments was their ability to provide a stable macroeconomic 
environment and to follow market-friendly policies. This entailed limited inflation, only 
limited appreciation of real effective exchange rate, only brief periods of import 
substitution industrialization, and earnings from exports motivating technological 
upgrading in trading sectors. Additionally, public measures were concerned with human 
capital formation, establishing openness to international trade and a strong bureaucracy 
that relied on contests when making selective supporting measures. 
On the other hand, both sectoral level and macro level studies (Amsden 1989, 2001; 
Chang 1993; Hobday 2003; Wade 1990) found historical evidence of strong state 
intervention. Amsden (2001) showed that “getting the control mechanisms right” was 
the key to the successful “Rise of the Rest”. Recently Chang (2003) and Cimoli et al 
(2009) have further argued (along the lines of Gerschenkron) that no backward country 
has ever developed without a relatively high degree of government intervention to 
facilitate technological accumulation and change the organization of production. Reinert 
(2009) showed how protecting infant industries in areas at the forefront of technological 
progress helped latecomers emulate the richer leaders of their time and reduce the 
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 On the other hand, Mathews (2002, 2006) optimistically argued that latecomer firms are not bound by 
organizational inertia. This allows them to shift quickly from being imitators to innovators, by benefiting 
of the ‘3 Ls’: linkage, leverage, learning in the age of globalization, which enhances their dynamic 
capabilities. (Linking up to global value chains, offering lower costs and gaining access to knowledge, 
technology, or markets. The gains exceed their inputs, offering firms greater leverage. As they do this 
strategy in a sustained way, they learn.)  
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asymmetries in knowledge and technological capabilities, and made technology transfer 
profitable. Only after some measure of parity is achieved could partners specialize and 
trade according to their comparative advantages and could (neo-) colonialist structures 
be prevented. This reconfirms the theses of Friedrich List presented most notably in his 
1841 volume ‘The National System of Political Economy’. List also argued that 
latecomers need protectionist measures to raise infant industries and new competitors, 
because free trade hampered progress by freezing existing trading structure.
17
  
As latecomer industries mature over time, the need for interventions and the nature 
of interventions change as well.
18
 Gerschenkron interpreted the “the gradual diminution 
of backwardness” (infrastructural development and industrial growth) with the 
redefinition of the relationships between the German industry and development banks 
on the one hand and between the Russian state and the industry on the other hand. 
German enterprises were increasingly collaborating with a number of banks (including 
banks they established) as opposed to being subjected to one single bank. Following a 
reduction of state intervention in Russia, universal banks emerged to take on long-run 
investment financing. Notice that while the backwardness of a country was being 
reduced gradually, the change of interventions was not similarly gradual. On the 
contrary, state intervention in Russia at the turn of the 20
th
 century was reduced 
radically amidst depression and social unrest, as Gerschenkron presented it, but growth 
only followed after years of interruption.  
It clearly remains puzzle for policy design how to deal with similar transitions. Lall 
(2004) argued that there is no uniform way. Intervention (industrial policies) needs to be 
selective, since learning depends on the complexity of technology, on the availability of 
information and extent of externalities. At the same time, policies need to learn as well. 
For the case of contemporary China, Gu and Lundvall (2006) showed how policy 
learning co-evolved with the development of industries. It is a question when 
interventions should be phased out or reduced. 
                                                 
17
 “Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions on navigation has raised her 
manufacturing power and her navigation to such a degree of development that no other nation can 
sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away these ladders of her 
greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free trade, and to declare in penitent tones that she 
has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and has now for the first time succeeded in discovering the 
truth.” (List 1841, Book 4, Ch.33, English translation by S.S. Lloyd, 1885.) 
18
 The idea that infant industries can be protected as long as it is temporary has long been accepted by 
classical economist thinkers, such as J.S. Mill (quoted by Lall 2004, note 20). Neoclassical economics 
argues that protection is not justified anymore when a decrease in the long-term average costs causes no 
more losses for producers. Theory leaves the question open how to manage the transition from a state of 
protection to a state of no protection. 
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The underlying assumption behind these arguments for protectionism is a dynamic 
understanding of competitiveness, which involves the possibility for latecomers to 
accumulate the technological capabilities that more advanced producing countries are 
applying are applying. Before entering into a more detailed discussion of the literature 
on technological capabilities in section 3.3, we make a detour to address an often 
neglected question with regard to latecomer entry.  
 
3.2.1 The timing of latecomer entry  
Does the timing of entry into a new industry matter? There are three reasons why timing 
matters. First, the nature of competition and characteristics of innovation varies over an 
industry’s life cycle (Abernathy and Utterback 1978; Utterback and Abernathy 1975; 
Gort and Klepper 1982; Malerba and Orsenigo 1996a; Klepper 1996, 1997). In these 
models, barriers to entry are usually lower at the initial phases of an industry’s 
development, but there is uncertainty about market demand and potentials of 
technological improvements. Despite the easier access, companies in developing 
countries with lower levels of technological capabilities face a disadvantage, because 
the codification of technology is low at this ‘fluid’ early stage. High capital and 
technological entry barriers keep firms from developing countries away from entering at 
an early stage. On the other hand, when a dominant design has emerged and the industry 
is more consolidated, high concentration of powerful market actors can virtually impede 
new entry. In spite of this, successful latecomers from emerging economies have usually 
entered the industry in the mature phase. Hobday (1995) showed how latecomer firms 
made use of the price competition during latter stages by focusing on process innovation 
as opposed to product innovation. Perez and Soete (1988) brought this idea further by 
suggesting that rather than looking implications of life-cycles of products seen as 
independent radical innovations, technological paradigms should be the guiding posts 
for identifying “windows of opportunities” for latecomers. Latecomers that developed 
capabilities to produce products according to a previous paradigm will at a later point 
have to pay the price of unlearning vintage technologies and re-learning new ones. They 
can, however, take advantages of learning while everybody else is learning and entering 
while the threshold is lower at the onset of a new paradigm. The authors acknowledge 
that a certain level of existing knowledge and resources are necessary to make use of the 
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opportunities. This suggests that the question is two-fold: timing may matter not only 
with regards to entry, but also with regards to responding fast to a changing paradigm 
and redefining the growth trajectory. 
Second, similar windows of opportunities may exist from an institutional point of 
view. Timing, we argue, matters because the global political landscape and international 
trade regimes changed over time and as do the volume and pattern of international trade. 
All these changes influence the potential of firms to access technology and information 
as well as the channels through which they can learn. With the emergence of the 
regulation on tariff and non-tariff barriers, intellectual property rights and new quality 
standards, technological learning of firms from developing countries has changed 
significantly even over the last fifty years. In short, countries starting the catch-up 
process now face a different environment than those starting in the fifties and sixties. 
Finally, in light of these changes the ability of governments to devise and implement 
supportive policies has also been changing. The volume of trade realized within 
different units of transnational corporations has increased exponentially (UNCTAD 
1997, 2009). The significance of borders is clearly diminishing. International political 
scientists have highlighted a power shift from central governments to a variety of 
domestic and foreign social and economic actors (Mathews 1997). Both political and 
economic developments increased the interdependencies between all these actors have 
increased, which in turn also increased the complexity of governance tasks (i.e. Rosenau 
1997; Simai 1994; Skolnikoff 1993). Yet, at the same time governments have new tools 
to tackle the increased challenges. For instance, the diffusion of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) offers a greater potential to oversee cross-border 
factor flows and achieve governance outcomes more efficiently (OECD 2003). We 
conclude that the broader political economic context in which catch-up latecomer 
industrialization takes place potentially affects its course and pace.  
3.3 Technological capabilities 
The Gerschenkronian growth potential notwithstanding, the economic backwardness of 
latecomers is a source of disadvantages in terms of capabilities. Leading producers can 
already benefit from scale economies, have access to advanced markets, and also have 
the power to influence suppliers.  They can do so because of their mastery of 
technologies. They have also mastered the knowledge of how to develop new, 
commercially applicable technologies that can sustain their leading position on the 
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technological frontier. According to Ames and Rosenberg (1963), the lack of 
latecomers’ technological capabilities gives them a disadvantage which may outweigh 
other potential advantages described earlier. Using empirical data on structural change 
and comparative levels of total factor productivity, Timmer (2000) showed that 
investments do not necessary lead to catch-up if they are not associated with the 
assimilation of more advanced technology. This proved the argument of Nelson and 
Pack (1999) that rapid development requires not only capital (including human capital) 
investment, but also learning about and learning to use new technologies, as well as 
entrepreneurship and innovation. 
For neoclassical economists, technology was an exogenous resource, or ‘manna 
from heaven’, which producers could directly acquire and apply, ‘transfer’ from one 
country to another. In this simple and abstract scheme previous experience in the use or 
creation of technologies did not matter. However, seminal studies on the nature of 
knowledge and technology point out the tacit element of knowledge (Polanyi 1967), the 
importance of learning by doing (Arrow 1962) and of the historical and institutional 
embeddedness of technology (Rosenberg 1982). Consequently, if a latecomer producer 
decides to apply already existing machinery or methods of production, they not only 
have to invest in acquiring the machines and the training to operate them, but a 
‘receptive soil’ is also required in order to assimilate the technologies. In contrast with 
the neoclassical view, evolutionary economics offers a ‘learning-friendly’ explanation 
of the processes the creation, assimilation of technology in economic processes (Nelson 
and Winter 1982; Dosi et al. 1988). The evolution of the concept of technological 
capabilities should be viewed against this changed intellectual context. 
Abramovitz (1989) argued that the realization of the potential for catch-up in a 
latecomer depends on how advanced its ‘social capabilities’ are. Hence the difference in 
the age of technologies across countries will not lead to more rapid growth in the 
follower unless there is technical competence (educated human resources) as well as 
physical infrastructure and appropriate political, commercial, industrial and financial 
institutions. These are not static but change over time in an interactive way, should a 
technological opportunity arise. Several other authors have also attempted to specify the 
most important capabilities for catch-up. For Dahlman et al. (1987) technological 
development required production, investment and innovation capabilities. Hobday 
(1995) found production and innovation capabilities to be crucial for development. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argued that firms’ innovative capabilities are influenced by 
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their ‘absorptive capacity’, the ability to evaluate, assimilate and apply knowledge that 
is new to them. Lall (1992) made a distinction between technological capabilities at the 
firm level and at the national level. At the firm level, successful commercial operation 
depends on investment, production and linkage capabilities, as well as on the national 
institutional environment and infrastructure. Development, or capability accumulation at 
the national level is the outcome of an interplay of national technological capabilities 
(physical investment, human capital and technological effort), incentives 
(macroeconomic or competitive and the efficiency of factor markets) and institutions 
(including market and non-market ones).  
Bell and Pavitt (1993) distinguished technological capabilities from production 
capabilities at the firm level based on the resources used to produce industrial goods 
from those needed to generate and manage technological change.
19
 In practice, however, 
such a distinction is less than straight-forward, but it may help recognize the need to 
investment into technology accumulation in developing countries. Archibugi and Coco 
(2005) acknowledged that at the macro level technological and production capabilities 
were interdependent. Nevertheless, they attempted to separate them in order to compare 
composite technological capabilities indicators of the World Economic Forum, UNDP, 
RAND and their own ArCo index. The rank correlation showed that although there was 
a general agreement on the main components of the indices, different methods of 
weighting and aggregation made a significant difference. Measurement is nevertheless 
important if it can provide an indicator for technology accumulation. Nevertheless, Bell 
(2006) pointed out that the time dimension of the accumulation process has remained 
under-researched. 
As the concept of technological capabilities broadened in scope, it became more 
ambiguous. Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) applied factor analysis to identify the factors 
in overlapping ‘capability’ concepts to highlight four groups of indicators that matter 
most for economic development. Their results point to the importance of capabilities 
associated with innovation (“innovation system”) and governance.  
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 See also Dutrénit (2004) on capabilities accumulation over time in latecomer firms, or Romijn (1999) 
for an overview on the use of the technological capability concept, on capability building and its 
importance in economic development. 
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3.3.1 Technological capabilities, stage models, and their relevance for the 
aerospace industry 
It follows from the preceding argument that catch-up by latecomers is not possible 
without the accumulation of technological capabilities, which is a learning-intensive 
process. Gerschenkron already pointed out the role of locally existing technological 
knowledge, or, even more, innovative activities.
20
 Lall (2001, 2004) argued that there is 
a potential for underinvestment in advancing capabilities in developing countries, 
because technological learning is risky and unpredictable. Learning only succeeds if 
firms do it deliberately, but firms possess imperfect information and knowledge about 
the technological alternatives from which they can choose. There are several domestic 
and foreign channels through which learning can take place (through interactions with 
customers, input suppliers, technology institutes, universities, consultants, competitors), 
as well as several levels within an organization or in an industry. Once a minimum level 
of know-how to perform industrial activities has been acquired, there are also different 
learning paths to follow, depending on how much firms invest in learning. In short, 
firms need to learn the process of learning. At the industry level, since firms do not 
operate in isolation, their interactions with their environment at various levels offer 
externalities of learning and capabilities accumulation. The outcome of capability 
accumulation at the firm level will be catch-up at the sectoral or national level. 
Observers of the successful catch-up of latecomers to high-tech industries in 
Southeast Asia have pointed out commonalities in the various learning trajectories.
21
 
There is a rich literature on stage models that explain catch-up of successful latecomers 
by their ability to progressively reach technologically more advanced stages of 
production.  
In the model of Kim (1980), South Korean firms first had to implement imported 
technologies before the scientific and engineering staff could assimilate them and 
acquired the capacity to improve them. Throughout this process, firms became 
increasingly competitive, although not without considerable government support in the 
early phases. The learning trajectory described by Dahlman et al (1987) runs from 
production capabilities through investment capabilities to innovation capabilities. Lall 
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 “What makes it so difficult for an advanced country to appraise properly the industrialization policies 
of its less fortunate brethren is the fact that, in every instance of industrialization, imitation of the 
evolution in advanced countries appears in combination with different, indigenously determined 
element.” (Gerschenkron 1962, p.26) 
21
 Some authors are debating whether policy makers and managers consciously followed pre-defined 
strategies or were merely experimenting (Hobday 2009). 
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(1982) emphasized that industries progressed from elementary through intermediate to 
advanced learning capabilities. Hobday (1995, p.1185) has argued that progression is 
not necessarily linear, since research and development (R&D) may be undertaken at an 
early stage. Nevertheless, he found a general tendency of firms starting up simple 
activities systematically at an early stage and gradually accumulating capabilities to 
perform complex activities at a later stage. Chaminade and Vang (2008) argue that 
developing country ICT firms start with competing with low-cost products and advance 
to become knowledge providers in the global value chain. In this transition regional 
innovation systems play a crucial role. 
We argue that these stage models are not applicable to the aerospace industry for 
two main reasons. First, they do not match the distinctive features of the sector. 
Aerospace manufacturing is highly technology- (Smith 2005) and capital intensive. 
New entrants face a very steep learning curve (Frischtak 1994). Access to technology 
for latecomers is limited by the very high entry costs, rather than through patents. The 
industry is characterized by imperfect competition, non-homogenous products and 
major economies of scale. Fixed initial development costs are extremely high (Beaudry 
2001). To overcome private underinvestment in new technology, governments have to 
support manufacturers, either through launch subsidies, export subsidies, military 
procurement or market protection. Arguments of national security, prestige and 
expected spillovers
22
 to downstream industries and services
23
 and to other sectors of the 
economy serve as justification for government intervention. Governments can influence 
the sector through industrial, trade, higher education as well as science, technology and 
innovation policies. Intervention is also needed due to the severe demand fluctuations 
for aerospace products, closely correlated with fluctuations in global economic growth. 
Aerospace firms face cyclical changes in demand and recurrent crises within the 
lifetimes of their products.  
Second, stage models are not applicable for aerospace because the sector’s high 
quality requirements demand firms to possess advanced capabilities early on. The 
technological complexity of aerospace products is rather high in even simpler modules 
(Dosi et al. 2003; Hobday et al. 2005). There is a tradeoff between cost and quality at 
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 The measurement of spillover effects related to the aerospace industry is difficult, especially in 
emerging economies. In the case of the Swedish ‘JAS Gripen’ fighter program Eliasson (2010) applied a 
spillover multiplier and estimated that the social returns above the opportunity costs were at least 2.6 
times greater than the original investment. 
23
 Downstream industries and services include transport, telecommunications, navigation, media or earth 
observation, many of which also offer benefits for public bodies. 
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the core of many stage models of catch-up. A cheaper but less reliable consumer 
electronics product can be sold in large numbers if the cost is low enough. This trade-off 
does not exist for aerospace products. Quality standards for firms entering the market, 
even at the lower end, are higher than in many other sectors, given that an aircraft or 
spacecraft is as reliable as its weakest component. Latecomer firms can only sell their 
products if they meet the high standards set by the global industry leaders. When 
producing under license for foreign system assemblers, component suppliers are 
meticulously screened by the buyers. In cases of domestic procurement governments 
have little room for relaxing product standards without jeopardizing public safety. The 
threshold level of production capabilities is thus very high. Consequently, what would 
be categorized as a basic stage in terms of development in the stage models presented 
above in fact show characteristics of more advanced stages. Both the acquiring of 
threshold level production capabilities as well as sustained further growth require 
intensive investment capabilities, advanced technological learning in related fields, and 
(at least new to the country) innovation on behalf of latecomer firms.  
Therefore, it is sufficient to distinguish only two stages over the evolution of 
latecomer aerospace industries. An emergent phase in which some companies find a 
niche for their products, and the subsequent phase in which companies aim for sustained 
competitiveness, which is needed to sustain sectoral growth in order to catch-up with the 
leaders. For example, the maiden flight of a locally designed new aircraft prototype may 
signal the successful accomplishment of the emergent phase, but it is not sufficient to 
ensure sustained growth. Further innovation in the long run needs to be financed from 
sales, which depends on whether a market niche has been found for the new product. 
Government financing of ‘infant’ firms in the sector is widely accepted. But unless 
state-sponsored producers generate sufficient sales in markets independent from 
procurement by the respective governments, they will not be financially sustainable. 
Eventually, governments and domestic transport firms will be forced to purchase high 
quality aerospace products from foreign competitors. 
It is by no means guaranteed that the second phase follows progressively from the 
first one, or that competitiveness can be sustained. In successful cases of aerospace 
development, there is a transition to sustained competitiveness. But this transition can 
also fail in which case the industry will languish or disappear altogether.  
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3.4 Systems of innovation 
The literature on technological capabilities offered a richer understanding of the 
learning mechanisms or technology accumulation. Authors argued that the simplified 
description of development processes as passive transfers of embodied and disembodied 
technologies from leading countries is misleading. The cornerstone of latecomer catch-
up was active learning, which is realized through interactions. Successful latecomers 
were not simply imitators but organized production and distribution in innovative ways, 
often using advanced science and technology to move into nascent industries (Freeman 
and Soete 1997; Fagerberg and Godinho 2005). Some authors stressed that one should 
not distinguish between the processes of innovation and diffusion, since “diffusion 
involves more than the acquisition of machinery or product designs and related know-
how. It also involves continuing, often incremental, technical change to fit specific 
situations and to attain higher performance standards” (Bell and Pavitt 1993, p.259). If 
that is the case, understanding the functioning of innovation systems brings us closer to 
understanding latecomer dynamics.  
3.4.1 On the origins of the concept 
An innovation system is generally defined as a set of actors from whose interactions 
new knowledge, technology and products are generated, diffused and applied. The 
‘systems of innovation approach’ received increased interest of scholars and policy 
makers in recent decades for two main reasons: in order to better understand (1) the 
differences in growth performance of countries, and (2) the processes of technological 
change and innovation at various levels. Concerning the first aim, the results of 
evolutionary economics, new growth theory and the economics of knowledge provided 
very clear evidence on the importance of innovation and technological factors to 
growth. Furthermore they highlighted the crucial role of interaction among firms and 
other organizations for innovation, which are conditioned by institutional environment. 
To offer an alternative to “reductionist” models, the IS approach emerged to offer a 
broad framework of analysis for technological, economic and institutional change.  
Seen from a different angle, scholarly interest in technology and growth shifted 
away from specific sectors to a broader focus on national institutions and networks in 
which all elements play their parts in growth. This happened at a time when Western 
Europe and North America experienced a slowdown in growth and saw the rapid rise of 
Japan. A seminal study was the analysis of Japan by Freeman (1987). Complemented 
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with the volumes by Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993), these are the ‘Triad’ of basic 
references on innovation systems (Edquist 1997; Lundvall 2007; or Soete et al. 2010). 
The innovation systems approach was primarily influenced by the results from 
evolutionary economics and science and technology studies. Results include the ideas 
that innovating actors face uncertainty and bounded rationality, that innovation requires 
interactions, that institutions and history matter, or the dynamics of techno-economic 
paradigms. Already from the very beginning, innovation systems have been a very 
inclusive (or ‘holistic’) concept. It has attempted to map ‘the big picture’ by looking at 
as large a set of determinants of innovation as possible. In response to studies that only 
treated limited data on R&D inputs and personnel or patents, the growing literature has 
accommodated various narrower and broader definitions of innovation. This ‘catch-all’ 
nature of the concept has not diminished over time, despite some authors’ attempt to 
introduce greater methodological rigor (see the ‘comparability’ critique below). 
At the macro level, List’s systemic view of a developing economy is clearly 
reflected in the innovation systems concept. With regard to the micro level, the systemic 
view of the innovation process can be traced to the synthesis of debates in innovation 
studies (such as the ‘technology push’ vs. ‘market pull’) or the idea behind the ‘chain 
linked’ models of innovation (Kline and Rosenberg 1986). Moreover, due to their 
interaction, the macro and micro levels co-evolve. Seen from a firm’s point of view, 
innovation depends on technological opportunities, the availability of loans and 
(venture) capital, a legal regime guaranteeing the appropriation of results, many of 
which lies beyond their control. On the other hand, if governments strive to become 
competitive and achieve growth in their countries, they need to provide a favorable 
institutional environment for firms to innovate.  
The recognition of these interdependencies resulted in an increased scholarly interest 
in comprehensive, descriptive studies of the processes of social, economic and 
technological change in a historical and institutional context, or appreciative theorizing, 
combining elements of political economy, evolutionary economics, history of 
technology and social constructivism. At the ‘meso level’ the analysis of industrial 
dynamics found support in empirical and modeling works on interactions between 
consumers and producers or knowledge actors  (Malerba 2007). 
Following from the understanding that interactions are at the heart of the innovative 
processes, institutions, the rules and norms that govern them are central to the IS 
approach. There is a clear agreement that institutions cover market as well as non-
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market interactions and provide the ‘fiber’ of innovation, unfortunately there is no 
single definition of institutions. Some authors refer to educational or research institutes 
as institutions (i.e. Nelson 1993) while others call them organizations. Institutions in 
this book are defined according to North (1990) as “rules of the game”, and are 
distinguished from organizations which are considered as actors of the system. 
3.4.2 Level of analysis 
The National innovation systems perspective, which associated differences in growth 
across countries with institutional differences affecting creation and diffusion of new 
technologies, assumed that national borders mattered. Based on Landes (1969), Nelson 
and Rosenberg (1993) argued that historical and cultural differences, the timing of 
industrialization process and government policies shaped national institutions, laws and 
policies. This gave rise to a debate from two directions. First, it was questioned whether 
innovation activities and their effects were bound by national borders. Ideas and 
research results are easily exchanged in a global community of researchers and are 
difficult to appropriate, firms technological collaboration are often international, and 
regional integration often also covers science and technology (see i.e. Freeman and 
Soete (2009) or Caracostas and Soete (1997) on ‘post-national systems of innovation’). 
Shifting the geographical focus to sub-national level of clusters and regions revealed 
differences in innovative activities due to institutional differences in the ‘regional 
innovation systems’ literature (Cooke 1996, 2008; Maskell and Malmberg 1999; 
Malmberg and Maskell 2002; Asheim and Gertler 2005; Doloreux and Parto 2005).  
Second, it was debated whether differences between innovation systems were 
technology-specific or sector-specific. This was primarily a methodological “point of 
entry” problem about whether the dynamics of a technology domain or the dynamics of 
an industry are of interest. Two different strands of literature emerged. The ‘technology-
specific innovation system’ strand is concerned with the systemic explanations of 
technological change as well as their societal implications (Carlsson and Stankiewicz 
1995; Jacobsson and Johnson 2000). The ‘sectoral innovation systems’ literature 
(Breschi and Malerba 1997; Malerba 2002, 2004) focuses on questions of innovation, 
competitiveness and industrial performance in a sector which is defined by a set of 
products. 
Malerba (2004) argued that differences in the sectoral environment explain 
differences in the processes of learning and innovations. Sectoral systems of innovation 
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(SSI) are defined by three major ‘building blocks’: (1) actors, (2) the knowledge base 
and the technological domain and (3) their systematic interactions and institutions. 
Actors encompass not only firms, but also non-firm organizations as well as individuals. 
They range from producers to users, input suppliers, universities and research 
organizations, financial institutes, trade unions, technology associations, entrepreneurs 
and scientists. The importance in the innovation process of different types of actors 
differs from sector to sector. Actors in a sector are heterogeneous, and their different 
technological and learning capabilities, beliefs, objectives and organizational structures 
are all sources of sectoral dynamics. Their behavior and interactions take place in an 
environment that is shaped by different institutions: norms, routines, common habits, 
established practices, rules, laws, standards, etc (see North 1990). Some rules are more 
binding than others; some are more formal than others.  
3.4.3 Applying the sectoral systems of innovation approach for latecomer 
aerospace industries 
The sectoral systems of innovation approach can add useful insights to a study on 
sectoral growth and catch-up in latecomer aerospace industries. First, it offers a 
“mapmaking” tool for an exploratory study. In an industry where history plays an 
important role in explaining industrial dynamics, it duly focuses on the heterogeneity of 
actors, their changing capabilities, the quality and frequency of their interactions. A 
detailed, qualitative study is crucial to understand why the industry is performing well 
in one country and what structural failures or institutional blockages hamper innovation 
and growth in others. It can also reveal what actual tradeoffs innovating firms or policy 
makers face. 
Second, the sectoral innovation systems approach is suitable because it focuses on 
the “meso-level”. If innovations in complex products were the object of our research, 
the recent work of Hobday et al (2005) and Dosi et al (2003) could be an alternative 
point of entry.
24
 But innovation and growth in a sector are of course influenced by firm-
level dynamics, and similarly by macro-level national policies. Our approach thus needs 
to be more comprehensive, beyond the micro level but below the national level, and can 
be called as a national-sectoral approach. 
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 The ‘complex product systems’ (CoPS) literature on system integration which takes place within as 
well as between firms. It also explains industrial dynamics since modularity in complex products is 
reflected in industrial structures and alliance formation. The aerospace industry is often showcased as an 
example for such a system. 
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Innovation systems approaches have often been criticized for the lack of a clear 
definition on what belongs to the system and what remains outside its borders. 
Lundvall’s suggestion to overcome this problem was to identify the core and the wider 
setting of an innovation system (Lundvall 2007). The newly emerged ‘functional strand’ 
of innovation systems literature suggested focusing on key functions which systems 
fulfill (Liu and White 2001; Carlsson et al. 2002; Hekkert et al. 2007; Bergek et al. 
2008). Seen from a different angle, a set of products can also define sectoral system 
boundaries (Malerba 2004), although radical innovations in the long-run will most 
likely modify them. Nevertheless, a product-core can also be applicable in the long-run 
in case of a catching-up industry, where this core is ‘extrernally-given’ by those at the 
technology frontier.
25
 
Another point of criticism of innovation systems studies is their lack of 
comparability over time and space. This can be an important methodological problem, 
since the framework only defines the building blocks of systems in general, but there is 
large variation within the categories. Those studies that take a comparative perspective 
employ indicators on building blocks and innovation in a systematic way and offer 
valuable insights (at the national level e.g. Nelson (1993), or at the sectoral level (Mani 
2005, 2009; Intarakumnerd and Fujita 2009). This is definitely a direction worth 
pursuing. Nevertheless, one should exercise caution when trying to measure the 
performance of an innovation system in transition, for Szalavetz (1998)  pointed out that 
“hard indicators” can be misleading. 
3.4.4 Incremental and radical changes in innovation systems 
From the very origins of the concept, innovation systems have conceptually been 
associated with socio-economic change. With the increasing availability of longitudinal 
data on innovative performance of interrelated actors, there is increased interest in 
understanding how systems change over time, both in qualitative and quantitative terms 
(Lundvall et al. 2006; Dodgson et al. 2008). Fundamental changes in the economy as a 
result of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1934) or the emergence of new technological 
paradigms (Dosi 1982; Freeman and Perez 1988; von Tunzelmann et al. 2008) have 
been widely discussed. These theoretical works focus on an aggregate level. We still 
need to expand our understanding of the co-evolution of science and technology, 
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 The fact that technology applied for aerospace production may originate from other sectors does not 
reduce the power of the approach, as long as the technology flows are carefully considered. 
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innovation and production and the relevant institutional arrangements at sectoral levels. 
In other words, how are changes in the innovation system connected to changes in a 
sector’s physical production? 
Evolutionary aspects of innovation systems have received increased attention in 
recent years.
26
 Two distinct patterns of system change are crystallizing from these 
works. The first type of change refers to incremental changes along a given trajectory 
(bounded by path dependence). The study of the Taiwanese integrated circuit industry 
by Lee and von Tunzelmann (2005) provides useful insights into this type of dynamics, 
in which the interplay of sub-systems and major actors are at the core of a more gradual 
system change. 
The second type of innovation system change refers to a more fundamental system 
transition. In the ‘appreciative theorizing’ model of Galli and Teubal (1997) 
paradigmatic changes and structural adjustments of national innovation systems are 
driven by exogenous environmental pressures. The changes involve restructuring of 
networks, changing openness to the outside world, increased interactions between the 
subsystems (i.e. inter-firm relations evolve beyond simple market-based transactions), 
and the creation of new technology interface units. Lundvall et al (2006) singled out 
institutional rigidity as the key barrier to growth of a NIS beyond a certain point. 
System transitions refer to changes in the “constellation of institutions” and changes “in 
the relationship between producers and users of knowledge”. A system transition is 
required to overcome a contingency mismatch (when change in the environment makes 
the existing institutional set-up ill-suited for new conditions) or when a system reaches 
its inherent limits as a result of endogenous growth. In the domain of technological 
systems, in the multi-level framework proposed by Geels and Kemp (2006), transitions 
are shifts between technological trajectories, which involve the emergence of a radical 
innovation incubated in a ‘technological niche’. Transitions are also discussed in the 
functional dynamics literature, where the authors associate the fulfillment and 
interaction of functions as a prerequisite for systemic change (Hekkert et al. 2007; 
Bergek et al. 2008). Considering that functions are inherent in all institutions, it is fair 
to say regardless of the perspective, all strands of literature appear to agree that 
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 (C.f. Galli and Teubal 1997; Lee and von Tunzelmann 2005; Lundvall et al. 2006; McKelvey and 
Holmén 2006; Geels and Kemp 2007; Edquist and Hommen 2008; Dodgson et al. 2008; Dolata 2009; 
Malerba and Mani 2009), 
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following a successful transition, the basic functions or structure (or architecture
27
) of a 
new system will look fundamentally different from the previous one. 
The cyclical nature of the aerospace industry requires a model that incorporates not 
only incremental but also radical innovation system change to explain latecomer 
development. Recurrent booms and slumps in demand regularly pose challenges to both 
production and innovation. It is reasonable to assume that not only firms, but the system 
as a whole is affected by demand fluctuations. The industry’s performance depends on 
how the innovation system as a whole manages to cope with these fluctuations. 
A central problem with quantitative analysis of radical and incremental innovation 
system changes is often the lack of detailed long-term data. Nevertheless, change in 
inputs, demand and output; changes in the number of actors or changes in the intensity 
of interactions (network characteristics) are indicative of the dynamics on innovation 
system. But in addition to looking at such indicators, qualitative analysis is required to 
highlight changes in the knowledge base and learning processes, changes in the nature 
of interactions among actors (including change network hub change), institutional 
change, changing processes of variety generation and selection. 
3.4.5 The punctuated equilibrium model of innovation dynamics 
The punctuated equilibrium theory on innovations assumes that there are two kinds of 
changes defining long-run technological development. The more subtle incremental 
innovation is from time to time punctuated by discontinuities and radical change. The 
theory originates from evolutionary biology and gained popularity in the innovation and 
especially in the management literature after the 1970s. 
Abernathy and Utterback (1978) linked the two types of technological changes to 
the maturity of enterprises. Early on, new firms enter the market with radical product 
innovations. If these innovations become dominant designs, their producers shift focus 
from product to process innovations. Tushman and Anderson (1986) demonstrated at 
the industry level in three cases (minicomputer, cement and airlines) that technological 
innovation follows a punctuated pattern. They also showed that major technological 
breakthroughs in a sector do not necessarily result in high environmental turbulence, as 
long as these are initiated by incumbent firms. However, if new entrants introduce 
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 The management literature offers interesting insights as well. The concept of architectural innovation, 
introduced by Henderson and Clark (1990) originally refers to changes on the product level in the way the 
main components are linked together. Consider the product design architecture as a simple system, a 
structural change of the linkages of the system that offers a competitive edge to a firm is analogous to 
architectural innovation in a national or sectoral innovation system. 
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radically new technology, it will be competence destroying for existing firms and will 
increase competitive uncertainty. Romanelli and Tushman (1994) showed that a similar 
pattern of changes characterizes organizational development. Equilibrium periods, 
which are relatively long periods of stability, are punctuated by “relatively short bursts 
of fundamental change”. These radical changes create new activity patterns for the 
organization and settle into a new equilibrium. Their reasoning why stability periods 
emerge can be relevant for the industry level as well, not only at the organizational 
level. They argued that actors (buyers, suppliers, financiers) are legally and normatively 
linked to one another and these relationships constrain their activities. In short, 
institutional inertia is an important source of stability. A further explanation of 
institutional stability is found in technological community dynamics. Rosenkopf and 
Tushman (1998) show that cooperative technological organizations emerge in times of 
radical change (in periods of ‘ferment’) and become dominant communities for over a 
longer period while technology changes incrementally. 
Combining these results has important consequences for long-run sectoral 
innovation systems dynamics. According to the theory, two of the key components of 
sectoral innovation systems, the technology base and the actors evolve along a 
trajectory characterized by incremental changes punctuated or interrupted by radical 
changes. Malerba and Orsenigo (1996a, 1996b) confirmed that the interacting 
technological, organizational and institutional changes as well as changing demand 
define the internal dynamics of industries. It follows that radical changes should also 
characterize the evolution of sectoral innovation systems. There are two questions. First, 
is it possible to identify these changes? Second, do such radical changes occur in 
technology followers or only at the technological frontier, to which the previous studies 
referred to? 
3.5 Previous studies on innovation and growth in latecomer aerospace 
industries 
Scholars of innovation, economics of technological change, industrial organization, 
political science and sociology have all found ample room for research in the aerospace 
industry.  The factors that influence the creation of a new aerospace product are just as 
much technological as economical or political. The multifaceted nature of the industry 
offers various points of entries for research which we briefly present in this section. 
Approaches concerned here are those focusing on innovation, technological change and 
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industrial growth in the long run.
28
 First we look at studies on countries at the 
technological frontier, next at studies of latecomers. 
3.5.1 On the evolution of the aerospace industry at the frontier 
For much of the second half of the 20
th
 century, developments in the US were 
equivalent to developments at the technological frontier. Mowery and Rosenberg (1985) 
studied innovation and institutional development in the commercial aircraft industry in 
the US. They showed a long-run transformation in the innovative performance and 
industry behavior due to changing policy regimes. A shift from public to private funding 
and deregulation at the end of the 1970s increased development costs and financial risks 
for aircraft and engine producers, who in turn found a solution in multinational 
collaboration. Subsequently international collaborative ventures have increased 
competitive pressure on components and parts manufacturers. Mowery (1987) and 
Esposito (2004) take a closer look at alliance formation in the sector. 
The effect of the aerospace industry on economic growth has puzzled many 
economists. Surprisingly, no one ventured to measure its contribution to GDP growth in 
the same way Fogel (1964) has analyzed the contribution of railroads.
29
 But there are a 
number of other attempts that led to interesting results. In a historical approach Ruttan 
(2006) argued that in the US general purpose technologies developed due to defense 
purposes (such as satellites or the internet) spurred economic growth. Poole and Bernard 
(1992) found a negative impact of military production on total factor productivity 
growth in aircraft manufacturing in Canada. Eliasson (2010) calculated positive 
spillover effects of a Swedish fighter jet development program.  
The growth effects of the industry are most clearly visible at the regional level. 
There is a growing literature on aerospace clusters, ranging from Seattle (Erickson 
1974) and Montreal (Niosi and Zhegu 2005, 2010) to Southern UK and Wales (Beaudry 
2001; Cooke and Ehret 2008, 2009).  
The aircraft industry has long inspired scholars of technological change and 
evolutionary economists (see e.g. technological paradigm shifts in (Dosi 1982). In a 
series of articles Vincenti discussed the evolutionary nature of development in 
technologies such as air propellers (1979), flush riveting (Vincenti 1984), airfoil design 
                                                 
28
 This also implies that important issues such as market dynamics and firm behavior, competition and 
collaboration (Golich 1992; Hayward 1994) or strategic trade theory (Brander 1981; Brander and Spencer 
1985; Lawrence 2001) are left outside the scope of this investigation. 
29
 Such a calculation is not without challenges. Time saving due to air travel in contrast with rail or 
intercontinental sea travel could reveal some of the effects. 
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(1986) and retractable landing gear (1994). Frenken et al. (1999) tracked variety and 
niche creation, Frenken and Leydesdorff (2000) studied scaling trajectories. Benkard 
(2000) showed that technological accumulation is not simply a process of constant 
learning, but as firms evolve they make strategic choices on both learning and forgetting 
certain production technology.  
Aerospace firms in countries such as Canada or Japan are also relative latecomers 
compared to the US and provide interesting insights into understanding technological 
learning and capabilities accumulation (see Lukasiewicz (1986) on the failed fighter jet 
development in Canada; Mowery and Rosenberg (1985), Kimura (2006, 2007), 
McGuire (2007), King and Nowack (2003) on the accumulation of technological 
capabilities in Japan). 
3.5.2 On the aerospace industry in latecomer economies 
The historical experience of Latin American and Asian countries with the aerospace 
industry since the 1960s and 1970s has been increasingly studied to answer questions 
such as why countries chose to enter the sector; how they managed technology 
accumulation in aerospace and in related industries; how clusters were formed; what 
government policies and firm strategies were followed.  
The early realization of the importance of institution building in the development of 
the sector allowed for a political economy perspective, especially if these studies 
focused on government policies. In addition, insights from the management literature 
were used to explain firm strategies. The export success of Brazil made it one of the 
benchmark cases (Sarathy 1985; Moxon 1987; Ramamurti 1987; Frischtak 1992, 1994; 
Goldstein 2002a, 2002b; Goldstein and McGuire 2004). Other countries and companies 
studied included Indonesia (McKendrick 1992; Eriksson 2003), China (Nolan and 
Zhang 2002; Goldstein 2006), and Argentina (Hira and Oliveira 2007). Texier (2000) 
provides insights on South Korea by explaining a conglomerate’s diversification into 
aerospace. 
Product and industry life cycle theories (Vernon 1966; Abernathy and Utterback 
1978; Utterback and Abernathy 1975; Gort and Klepper 1982) offered a generic 
explanation as to how and why aerospace products diffuse to developing countries 
during the more mature phase of their life cycle. Niosi and Zhegu (2008) show that 
these theories are only partially appropriate to explain developments in the industry. 
They are valid to the extent that developing countries only entered the industry after a 
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shakeout occurred during and after the Second World War. However, there was no clear 
evidence of a shift of production and innovation to new competitors in developing 
countries as new competitors mostly emerged in industrialized countries. Moreover, 
there were several cycles during the 100-year development of the industry, and at least 
two dominant designs emerged.  They conclude that product and industry life cycle 
approaches should be complemented with a look at sectoral innovation systems. The 
studies by Marques (2004), Marques and Oliveira (2009) and Mani (2013) are good 
examples of how the sectoral innovation system facilitated technological capabilities 
accumulation in Brazil and India. Baskaran (2001) and Steenhuis et al. (2007) 
emphasized the importance of both indigenous efforts as well as interactions between 
domestic and foreign actors, because a strategy of self-reliance is bound to fail. Romero 
(2010) discussed the recent trend of foreign aerospace firms moving to a developing 
country (Mexico), and shows the attracting force of clusters. 
All these studies have expanded our understanding of the aerospace industry in 
emerging economies. They provide for the insights and short-term data needed for 
analyzing long-run catch-up patterns. But the possibilities for further research remain 
ample. First, firm or country-level case studies on company growth or innovative 
performance are most meaningful in an international comparison. This has not been 
possible due to lack of comparative data, as many of the studies explicitly point out. 
Ideally, a comparison should be comprehensive and take into account industry leaders 
as well as other latecomers. It should – ideally – also cover measures of industrial and 
innovative performance. A second possible direction for research is to explore and 
explain industrial dynamics of the sector across countries, over a long time-span. The 
aim would be to shed light on the co-evolutionary processes in national-sectoral 
innovation systems. It also opens a window on understanding how emerging companies 
succeed over time on the local and global market.  
3.6 Technological change and industrial dynamics in the global aircraft 
industry of the jet age 
The technological frontier in aircraft manufacturing was shifted outwards again and 
again by innovators located in the advanced industrialized economies, creating a 
moving target for latecomers to catch up with. In order to see what the benchmark for 
latecomer innovators was in a given period we provide here a general overview of major 
changes in key technological domains, including changes in the organization of 
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production. A detailed study of technological development in the global aerospace 
industry is beyond the scope of this book. Rather, we will discuss major technological 
leaps in a stylized manner. Next we turn to major milestones in the global aircraft 
industry (mainly in the commercial industry), which happened in what many (i.e. 
Frenken 2006) called the paradigmatic phase of the jet era. The diffusion of the jet 
engine, increased intercontinental air traffic, and major changes in financing aerospace 
innovation has led to innovation in the organization of the industry. Understanding the 
main drivers of internationalization for leading producers is important to understand the 
context in which latecomers can operate. 
3.6.1 Major driving force of innovation 
Innovation in aircraft manufacturing took place in four domains: propulsion, applied 
materials, avionics, and the organization of the design and production process. 
The importance of demand in driving innovation can be seen in the first row of 
Table 3.1 which summarizes the generic considerations driving technological advance 
in aircraft and engine development. Of course, demand is specified in light of what is 
technologically feasible, but at the aggregate level of the industry, there are a few rather 
distinct goals. 
It is interesting to see on the one hand that from the 1970s further speed increase lost 
its importance, which happened at the time when jet technology became mature with the 
diffusion of the turbofan engine. On the other hand, the oil crisis and subsequent 
decrease in military spending directed attention to energy efficiency and cost reduction.  
Propulsion in aircraft manufacturing has undergone a radical change from propeller 
to jet technology (discussed in section 3.6.2). Since the 1950s itdeveloped along a single 
trajectory and innovation was primarily incremental (see discussion above in turbojet 
and turbofan technology).
30
 The maturity of the engine industry is reflected in the small 
number of turbofan, turboprop and turboshaft (for helicopters) engine producers.
31
 
Propulsion of rockets, missiles and spacecraft has seen more radical innovation, 
                                                 
30
 There were of course other more significant technological innovations, such as the application of 
results from turbojet technology to propeller systems, by creating turboprop engines instead of piston 
engines.  
31
 As discussed above, the three major manufacturers are General Electric Aircraft Engines and 
Pratt & Whitney (United Technologies) in the United States and Rolls-Royce in the UK. In addition to 
these companies (and their joint ventures) who are controlling the large civil aircraft market, smaller 
engines producers (for commuters, executive jets or military aircraft) include SNECMA and Turboméca 
of France; MTU (DaimlerChrysler) of Germany; Volvo Flygmotor of Sweden; FiatAvio of Italy; Aero 
Engine Corporation in Japan; Williams International, Textron Lycoming, Honeywell of the US, and 
Klimov, Kuznetsov, Aviadvigatel, and Saturn of Russia. 
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although liquid fuel systems still represent the dominant design, despite their 
disadvantages (cannot be turned off after ignition, relatively low thrust per quantity of 
fuel consumed).  
The choice of materials not only defines strength and durability,
 32
 but it is also 
central to efficiency in aerospace. One way to boost efficiency is to create more 
powerful engines using metal alloys
33
 that can withstand very high temperatures (over 
1000°C). Another way is to reduce structural weight by using composites. Composites 
are materials combining two or more (in)organic components. They offer the advantage 
of light weight, yet still strong structure and thus help reduce operating costs. Fiberglass 
was already applied in the automobile industry in the 1950s. During the 1960s and 70s, 
new materials such as boron/epoxy, graphite/epoxy; kevlar/epoxy were diffusing to 
secondary aircraft structures, originating mostly from military programs. Despite the 
promising weight reduction they offer, composites have serious drawbacks that explain 
why so many producers have chosen not to use them in primary structures. In 
comparison with metal components, inspection of flaws in composites is more difficult 
and production is more costly because of its labor-intensity. Maintenance costs are also 
higher because, unlike with metal, repair of composites is not possible, and replacement 
parts are once again more expensive. Boeing aircraft produced in the 1970s and 80s 
were using composites accounting for hardly more than 3% of total weight, and the first 
Airbus model contained around 5% composites. The A-320 of the mid 1980s was the 
first commercial aircraft to have 10% composite share, the first Boeing with a similar 
share was the B-777 (Table 3.1). Military aircraft, mostly because of different MRO 
requirements and stealth considerations, were more ready to use composites, the F-18 
E/F and the F-22 of the 1990s had 19 and 24% share respectively.
34
 Boeing took a large 
step with the launch of the B-787 Dreamliner which has a fuselage made of carbon 
fiber, and a composite share of over 50%.
35
 
                                                 
32
 Strength and durability requirements have led to the increased use of steel and titanium. Titanium and 
its alloys have a high strength/density ration, are corrosion resistant, high operating temperature and are 
compatible with composites, yet they are difficult to form and have high machining costs and high notch 
sensitivity. (For more on materials used in aerospace, see Mortensen (2007).) 
33
 Metal alloys are substances composed of two or more metals or of a metal and a nonmetal; mostly 
created by melting and dissolving the components. 
34
 Deo, Ravi B. et al “Low-Cost Composite Materials and Structures for Aircraft Applications” 
http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public/PubFullText/RTO/MP/RTO-MP-069%28II%29/MP-069%28II%29-
%28SM1%29-01.pdf  
35
 The composite structure has been a source of significant delays in the launch of the B-787. Boeing 
dismissed the criticism concerning maintenance difficulties, but the plane is currently undergoing testing 
and is yet to see daily commercial operations.  
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Table 3.1 Overview of major new-to-the-world innovations in civilian aircraft 
 1950s 1960s 1970s-80s 1990s 2000s 
Major goals 
for 
innovators
a
 
Speed increase speed and 
capacity increase 
Economical use, 
fuel efficiency 
increase 
Cost reduction, 
noise reduction, 
capacity increase 
environmental 
considerations 
(Lower CO2 
emissions), 
increase airline 
revenue, cost 
reduction 
Major 
innovations in 
aircraft 
propulsion
a
 
Turbojet: 
P&W JT3C 
(1952);  
Turbofan: 
P&W JT3D 
(1958) 
Turbofan: 
P&W JT8D 
(1964), JT9D 
(1966);  
RR RB211 
(1969) 
GE CF6 (1971); 
 
Turbofan: 
CFM56 (1974); 
P&W PW2000 
(1979), PW4000 
(1987); 
RR RB211-535 
(1983);  
IAE V2500 
(1983) 
Turbofan: 
RR Trent 700 
(1990); -800 
(1993);  
P&W PW4000-
100 (1994), 
GE90 (1995) 
Turbofan: 
RR Trent 900 
(2004) 
Most 
advanced  
aircraft types 
Comet I; 
Caravelle; Tu-
104 
B-707, DC-8;  
B-727; B-737; 
Concorde 
B-747; DC-9;  
B-737; A-300;  
L-1010; DC-10;  
B-757; B-767 
MD-11; B-777;  
A-330; A-340 
A-380 
B-787 
Applied 
materials; 
(Composite 
share of 
weight) 
Aluminum; steel; 
metal alloys 
Aluminum; steel; 
metal alloys,  
composites 
(fiberglass; 
boron/epoxy) 
Aluminum, steel; 
titanium, metal 
alloys, 
Composites 
(boron/epoxy; 
graphite/epoxy; 
Kevlar/epoxy): 
B-737: ~3% ;  
B-747: 2%; B-
757, B-767: 3%; 
A-300: 5%;  A-
310: 7%; 
 A-320: 15%; 
Aluminum, steel; 
titanium, metal 
alloys, 
Composites: 
B-777: 10% 
composite;  
A-330/340: 12% 
Aluminum, steel; 
titanium; metal 
alloys, 
Composites: A-
380: 20%  
B-787: 50+%  
Internationali-
zation of 
production
b,c
 
 Share of foreign 
components:  
B-707: 0% 
B-727: 2% 
Share of foreign 
components:  
B-737: 10% 
(1970s) 
B-767: 15% 
(1980s) 
 
Share of foreign 
components:  
B-777: 30% 
Share of foreign 
components:  
B-787: 70%  
(60% of all 
products) 
Avionics None 
(Independent, 
analogue 
instruments) 
First appearance 
of on-board 
electronics 
Fly-by-wire; 
(first-all-digital: 
A320 1984) 
CRT electronic 
flight displays; 
inertial 
navigation 
systems, auto-
landing systems 
LCD display; 
satellite 
communication, 
GPS navigation; 
integrated 
modular avionics 
Electronic flight 
bags; air-ground 
data link; terrain 
awareness 
system;  
Source: Own compilation based on (a) Sehra and Whitlow (2004, Fig.1); (b) Craypo and Wilkinson 
(2003, p.294); (c) “Globalization Bites Boeing” Businessweek 13 Mar 2008; Mortensen (2007); 
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Technological advance in avionics has accelerated in the past decades. A substantial 
share of the information and communication technologies and electronics used in our 
daily life include parts or solutions that were developed in aerospace applications. 
Before the 1960s onboard sensors, displays and controls were analogue and independent 
from one another. The mechanical instruments were gradually replaced by computers 
with increased interconnectedness. Avionics are used for a broad range of functions, 
including navigation and communication, flight control, engine control, flight 
management, subsystem monitoring and control, collision avoidance and weather 
detection. Additional functions in military aircraft include radar, infrared and other 
target sensors, weapon management, electronic countermeasures, mission planning, or 
formation flight control. By architecture, they encompass displays, controls, 
computation, data buses, safety partitioning, environment, standards (Kayton and Fried 
1996). 
Flight data processing and instrument panel displays have changed radically in 
recent decades. During the 1960s and 1970s, R&D focused on onboard computers ad 
cathode-ray tube (CRT) technology. By the 1980s the first ‘glass cockpit’ aircraft were 
introduced (B-757/767, A-320). Flight management computers and displays giving 
feedback on engine and subsystem performance significantly reduced cockpit workload 
and made a separate flight engineer unnecessary in the cockpit.
36
 CRT displays were 
heavy and bulky, and were replaced by LCD screens in the 1990s. They became also 
very popular in general aviation, where single-pilot operations were fundamental.  
Commercial aircraft today contain over a thousand sensors and boxes of electrical 
components. The very high reliability, safety and testing requirements (both in hardware 
and software) and complex architecture make avionics very costly aircraft components, 
typically amounting to 30 percent of aircraft costs. (In advanced military aircraft they 
can even reach even exceed 50 percent, in some spacecraft 70 percent.)
37
 Today the 
market is dominated by Rockwell Collins or Honeywell of the United States, Thales 
Avionics in France, and BAe Systems of the UK. A burgeoning set of international 
suppliers and partners provide sub-systems. 
                                                 
36
 Most airliners in the 1950s flew with a crew of 3 or 4. New displays reduced pilot eye scanning cycle 
by providing primary data on a single screen. The basic concept of Boeing’s Engine Indication and Crew 
Alert System developed the B-757/767s can be found in the latest models. 
37
 The increased complexity of avionics software development can be seen in two indicators: cost of 
software development for U.S. defense programs rose from $5 to $35 billion between 1985 and 1995; 
Military aircraft of the 1960s had 20,000 lines of codes, modern fighters and commercial transports have 
several million. (“Aerospace industry” Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. Retrieved: 22 Oct 2010) 
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3.6.2 The diffusion of the jet engine  
The rapid expansion of the industry is related to the radical changes brought about by 
the jet engine in military and commercial aviation. The resulting expansion of air 
transport in turn has shrunk the planet and allowed an unprecedented scale of 
international collaboration in development, production and marketing in all industries, 
including aerospace itself.  
The jet engine was first patented by Sir Frank Whittle in 1930, but in 1939 Hans von 
Ohain was the first to design one that actually powered an aircraft, the Heinkel He178.
38
 
The main advantage of the jet technology
39
 over the dominant piston engine of the era 
was a significantly greater power to weight ratio. Given its strategic potential, the 
turbojet technology diffused rather fast across countries during World War II. In 
Germany, Messerschmitt 262 flew for the first time in 1942. In the same year in the 
United States the GE I-A engine mounted on a Bell P-59 made its maiden flight. In 
1943 the British De Havilland Vampire fighter flew for the first time and in the 
following year Rolls Royce started to work on the Nene engine. The first Soviet jet 
fighter, the MiG-9 followed suit in 1946.  
Only after the war did the jet technology diffuse in civil aviation. In 1949 the first 
commercial jet to fly was the British De Havilland Comet 1. The aircraft debuted in 
1952 in scheduled service between London to Johannesburg,
40
 heralding the age of jet 
transportation. However, the first-mover had to pay a high price because of repeated 
crashes due, as it was eventually diagnosed, to metal fatigue (see Rosenberg 1976; 
Verspagen 1999).  The reengineered Comet 3 plane was less successful than the new 
                                                 
38
 Constant (1980) provides a careful study of the evolutionary development of the turbojet engine. The 
author makes a case for the parallel development both in the UK and Germany. 
39
 A jet engine (or gas turbine) operates based on the principle of Newton’s third law (for every reaction 
there is an equal, opposite reaction). Air taken in goes through a compressor and is mixed with fuel in a 
combustion chamber. Rapidly expanding exhausted gas then rotates the turbine blades and thus provides 
thrust for forward movement. 
40
 In the same year the London-Ceylon and London-Singapore, in the following year the London-Tokyo 
routes were opened. Flying time between these latter two cities dropped from 85 hours to 36 hours (Loftin 
1985).  
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designs developed by the follower competitors
41
 from the US, and thus Comets lost the 
market to the Boeing B-707 and the Douglas DC-8.
42
  
Almost at the same time, in the Eastern bloc, the Soviet Tupolev Tu-104 flew for the 
first time in 1955. The Comet and the Tu-104 had many similar features, including the 
wing-root mounted engines, the Tu-104 was a larger, faster and stronger construction. 
More importantly, the plane had rounded windows and was thus not vulnerable to metal 
fatigue. Both of these aircraft represented a milestone in aviation history, half-way 
between the propeller-age and the jet-age. They were pioneers of a new concept, yet in 
many ways (e.g. wing loading or control systems) reflected the old philosophy of 
propeller-driven aircraft (Loftin 1985). 
Following the introduction of the technology in Europe, a new dominant design 
emerged in the USA. This was the Boeing B-707, which first flew in 1954 and entered 
into service in 1958. Boeing’s design incorporated the lessons learnt from own military 
aircraft production (e.g. the B-47) and from European pioneers in commercial aircraft. 
Low-positioned, sweepback wings offered efficiency at high-altitude, high-speed cruise. 
Four turbojet engines attached underneath in single nacelles made repair easier. The 
plane could carry a maximum of 189 passengers to a maximum distance of nearly 
12,800 kilometers, allowing non-stop travel over almost all the oceans and continents. 
The B-707 soon became the most successful jet plane of its age, with over a thousand 
built by 1979. Frenken and Leydesdorff (2000) showed empirically how the company 
could exploit the design principles of the B-707 in subsequent rescaled models built to 
meet user needs (along what the authors called a ‘scaling trajectory’).  
With a very similar design but a longer fuselage, the DC-8 could carry 60 more 
passengers than the 707 (although at a cost of offering a shorter maximum range: 
11,300 km). It first flew in 1958 and entered into service in 1959. In a relatively short 
production cycle – it was produced until 1972 – a total of 550 were built. These two 
                                                 
41
 The technological leadership of Europe over the US before World War II is undoubted (Moran and 
Mowery 1991). Nothing reveals better the nature of the competition between the UK and the US than the 
diplomatic row between the two countries. The Americans may have been trying to win time by tying up 
British aircraft sales efforts “in security red tape”, arguing that the Rolls-Royce Avon axial engine 
powering the Comet 2 as well as military jets constitutes a secret that should be kept out of reach of the 
Soviets (Engel 2000). 
42
 The last of the 114 aircraft produced were delivered in 1964. It is also interesting to see that the nose 
section and cockpit layout of the Comet was used for the French Sud Aviation’s Caravelle that flew for 
the first time in 1955 and entered into service in 1959 and became more successful on shorter routes and 
at airport with shorter runways. The plane could carry 80 passengers (later Super -12 models were 
increased to 140). A total of 280 were built. 
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planes (and a few very similar followers)
43
 brought revolutionary changes to the air 
transport industry. Trans- and intercontinental travel grew rapidly as it became faster 
and more accessible to large part of society. In the US high fuel consumption, at least 
before the oil crisis, was a less important issue. The long take-off runway requirement 
(3 km) of these jets triggered the development and construction of new airports. As 
Moran and Mowery (1991) note, the US federal government was always ready to bail 
out defense contractors (such as Douglas or Lockheed) when they were overrunning 
costs with commercial aircraft development. Moreover, the world’s largest market, the 
US, was highly regulated, spurring competition not in price, but in service and quality, 
which in turn boosted the development of new technologies and their rapid adoption. As 
a result US manufacturers gained a dominant position in the world which they were 
keen on exploiting for exports as well. 
Improvements in engine technology, the development of the more efficient turbofan 
engine
44
, allowed the construction of a second generation of jetliners in the 1960s. New 
metal alloys made airframes stronger; the introduction of composites (fiberglass and 
boron/epoxy) made airframes lighter. The introduction of supercritical wing design 
allowed better performance at higher speeds and lower wing weight. Manufacturers 
could offer a wider selection of jets to meet various airline preferences based on route 
length, payload, speed, or runway requirement. Three US designs of this era, the B-727 
(first flight in 1963) the DC-9 (first flight in 1965) and the B-737 (first flight in 1967) 
have become extremely successful and widely used planes around the world.
45
 But 
technological knowledge was not restricted to the US. Other major aircraft sharing the 
basic knowledge were produced in the UK (the British Aircraft Corporation VC-10 and 
BAC-111, or the Hawker Siddeley HS.121 Trident), in the Netherlands (Fokker F-28), 
and very successfully in the Soviet Union (The Tupolev Tu-134 and Tu-154 models or 
Yakovlev Yak-40). Most of these aircraft (except for the B-737) have two or three aft-
mounted
46
 engines (Loftin 1985).  
                                                 
43
 The Convair 880 (first flew in 1959) and the 990 (1961) were from the same school; the development 
concept opted for a faster design at the cost of payload capacity and range. These considerations 
eventually did not make it as popular as the B-707 and DC-8. 
44
 By adding another fan in front of, and creating bypassing air around the turbojet core engine, 
significant additional thrust (and lower noise) can be achieved with only a small increase in fuel flow. 
45
 More than 1800 of the B-727 were built by 1984, almost 1000 of the DC-9s and more than 6000 (and 
still produced) of the B-737s, in a number of gradually improvements in structure and onboard systems. 
46
 Advantages of the aft arrangement of engines, according to Loftin (1985) include increased stability in 
case of engine failure, lower noise levels, and also allow smaller sized planes; however the advantages of 
a T-tail design are debatable. 
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Another direction of technology development was increased carrying capacity 
during the 1970s, resulting in wide-body models
47
 such as the Boeing B-747 Jumbo, the 
McDonnell Douglas DC-10 and the Lockheed L-101 TriStar. The new designs offered 
significant increases in payload and seating capacity.
48
 Larger engines with high bypass 
ratio and compressor pressure ratio also provided fuel efficiency increases in the range 
of 20% compared to previous models, combined with lower noise levels.  
Increased fuel efficiency was the driver of aircraft development in the 1980s. High 
by-pass ratio engines power the two new models of Boeing (B-767 and B-757), and 
these aircraft represent a clear change of track from the previous “faster, bigger and 
further” plane making strategy.49 The major innovations incorporated in these aircraft 
were in avionics and computers.
50
 This direction of innovation is even more visible on 
the models of the era offered by the newly created European competitor, Airbus, which 
offered for the first time in commercial aviation a fly-by-wire system on the A-320 that 
first flew in 1987. But this already marks a new wave of increased technological 
competition in avionics. Instead of conceptual changes the jet technology saw further 
advancement in refinement, typical of a mature technology.  
In sum, technological changes due to the jet engine made the world smaller; 
transoceanic and transcontinental flights became faster and more accessible. Rapid 
growth in the number of people transported followed. One of the best indicators of 
technological progress is the decrease in direct operating costs of aircraft.
51
  
3.6.3 Internationalization 
Aircraft design and production before the 1960s was primarily done in-house with little 
collaboration among manufacturers. In the US the development of generic technology 
received significant boosts from NASA and Department of Defense research funding, in 
                                                 
47
 The wide-body design offers greater cabin diameter, the two aisles allow faster loading, serving and 
evacuation time, but come at a cost of increased skin friction drag. 
48
 These aircraft offered a maximum seating capacity of 550, 386 and 400, respectively. 
49
 Compared with the latest model of the B-707-320B, the B-767 has nearly the same empty weight yet it 
can carry 100 more passengers – on shorter routes. The B-767 is also 40 miles slower than the previous 
model, but allows shorter landing and take-off field lengths (Loftin 1985). 
50
 Automatic flight control systems and computers offer automatic guidance and control of these aircraft 
from takeoff to landing. More advanced lateral navigation functions as well as vertical flight-path control 
provide a new way to minimize fuel consumption. Pilots have cathode-ray-tube displays at their disposal 
instead of traditional electromechanical instruments. 
51
 From 7.47 USD/seat in case of the DC-3 it went down to 2.61 with the introduction of the B-707 and 
further to 1.3 with the B-747 and 1.65 USD/seat with the B-757 (Mowery and Rosenberg 1989, Table 
7.1.,p.175). 
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Western Europe national champion companies were nurtured (Moran and Mowery 
1991).  
The emergence of cross-country collaboration was driven by two main reasons 
(based on Mowery and Rosenberg 1985; or Mowery 1987). First, as a response to high 
development costs and the limitations of domestic markets, international alliances were 
seen as a way to share the costs of commercial aircraft development and benefit from 
economies of scale in production. Already in the 1960s, European producers were 
starting to explore possibilities to respond to US competitors by setting up joint 
ventures. One such venture was the Aérospatiale-BAC Concorde
52
 project of 1962; 
another was the British, French and West German and Spanish “Airbus Industrie 
Economic Interest Group” of 1970. Similar projects in the military segment saw more 
hurdles on the road as projects became more costly and delivery times increased since 
sharing of technology remained a sensitive issue for competitive reasons even among 
members of NATO.  
Internationalization of production was also driven by government procurement, both 
by air forces and by state-owned airlines. Because these orders involved high costs and 
frontier-technologies, government buyers, especially of countries already having an 
aerospace industry, could bargain for offset agreements. One solution was the local 
assembly of aircraft from kits under license. This allowed for access to technologies and 
improvement of skills, but in a more limited way since it did not cover aircraft 
development or more detailed engineering work. Offset agreements often made 
arrangements for manufacturing components locally for aircraft purchased from abroad. 
As a result of growing specialization, joint production programs started already in the 
1970s. One example is the General Dynamics F-16 fighter, which included European 
companies that were also producing components for planes sold in the US.
53
 
Collaboration at first in production, later in design, to have market access became the 
general practice in the industry, already by the end of the 1980s. It paved the way for 
the R&D alliances in risk sharing partnerships to spread development costs.
54
 The 
advance of information and communication technologies in the 1990s allowed arm’s 
length cooperation in all phases of production and a major global consolidation 
following the drop in military spending at the end of the Cold War.  
                                                 
52
 The supersonic transport aircraft first flew in 1969 and entered into scheduled service in 1976. 
53
 See Moran and Mowery (1991, p.141) for details on the program. 
54
 Boeing, for instance, offered full partnership to some subcontractors during the development of the B-
777, Japanese partners held a 20 percent share in the airframe structure. 
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Alliances and global consolidation were nowhere as visible as in engine 
manufacturing. Already during the “age of national champions” the huge development 
costs and economies of scale forced mainframe manufacturers to look beyond national 
borders for jet engines. Engine production itself is a high value added activity since 
engines could cost around 15-20 percent the value of a new aircraft. European and 
American countries were keen on retaining part of the work in local companies. This led 
to the creation of three major joint ventures. The CFM consortium was formed in 1974 
by General Electric (GE) of the US and the French SNECMA with equal ownership. 
CFM engines power major workhorses such as the Boeing B-737 and Airbus A-320 
family. The International Aero Engine (IAE) venture of 1983 brought together the 
competence of the British Rolls Royce, the American Pratt & Whitney (P&W), the 
MTU of Germany and the Japanese Aero Engine Corporation consortium to power 
single-aisle aircraft in the 150 seat category. Its V2500 engine soon won the support of 
Airbus and McDonnell Douglas. More recently GE and P&W formed a 50-50 joint 
venture, the Engine Alliance to supply the high-capacity long range aircraft, such as the 
Airbus A-380 superjumbo. But besides these alliances, each company also has their own 
engine product lines (in a broad range, from regional or executive jets to wide-body 
aircraft). This duality has led to delays and frictions among partners, as producers 
imposed restrictions on independent use of acquired technologies, especially if 
technology was developed for military programs (Moran and Mowery 1991). 
During the 1990s, new possibilities opened up for collaboration between the former 
West and countries of the former Eastern bloc. However, the promises of drawing upon 
Russian expertise brought only modest results in joint aircraft development. Russia, 
with a previous annual production of hundreds of commercial aircraft, only produced a 
dozen commercial aircraft in a decade after the collapse of communism. Unlike Tupolev 
or Ilyushin, Sukhoi and MiG in the military segment still held on to their markets. 
Collaboration with Russia was more successful in space research and launches, where 
fuel efficiency and economic operation was less of a consideration and where Russia 
still possessed frontier technological capabilities.  
The latest aircraft designs of the 1990s and 2000s included Boeing’s B-777 and 
Airbus A-330 and 340 long-range, wide-body jets that achieved increased efficiency by 
using 10-12% composite material in their airframe and cabin structures. Boeing led the 
strategy of using international partnerships to reduce R&D and production costs. 
Foreign components made up nearly a third of the value of the B-777, and this share has 
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grown to more than 70% in the B-787 currently in the testing phase. The strategic 
competition of Boeing and Airbus resulted in Boeing going for a radical new design 
with the B-787 which, for the first time, incorporates a composite airframe raising the 
composites rate above 50% of the total structure. Airbus on the other hand saw more 
potential in the large capacities and aimed at size. Its latest A-380 superjumbo is, from 
the use of composite materials point of view, not a radical departure from the previous 
trajectory.  
In sum, the aerospace industry has shifted towards an internationalized production 
structure where key assets of producers are core competencies in component or structure 
design and manufacturing, or system assembly. This further strengthened the pyramid-
like hierarchical structure, in which system assemblers are on top, followed by firms 
that develop and produce primary structures and systems in the second tier below. 
Subsystem
55
 and components manufacturers supply them from lower tiers. Aerospace 
companies with expertise in different segments can at the same time participate as 
system assemblers in one program and as co-developers and producers of components 
(risk-sharing partners) in another, creating multi-tier competition in an oligopolistic 
market. It is important to understand how the industrial structure has changed by the 
1990s, because latecomer producers trying to penetrate the industry today have 
substantially different competitive challenges to tackle than in the 1960s or 70s. 
                                                 
55
 Encyclopedia Britannica provides a rich sample of what may belong here. “Aircraft secondary systems 
are reflected in an extensive industrial infrastructure, with products falling largely into four categories: 
(1) structural and mechanical, (2) propulsion and power-related, (3) environmental control, and (4) 
communications and navigation. The first category encompasses aerodynamic controls and actuators 
(mechanical or fly-by-wire systems), doors, engine nacelles and pylon fairings, control surfaces, and 
takeoff-and-landing-gear systems (including nosewheel steering, brakes, shock absorbers, and tires). The 
second category covers propellers, thrust reversers, fuel tanks and fuel-management systems, engine 
starters, auxiliary power units, air-driven generators, and electrical systems. The third category includes 
pressurization and air-conditioning equipment, ice-detection and anti-icing systems, electronic flight-
instrumentation systems, engine-indication and crew-alerting systems, conventional cockpit instruments, 
and autopilots and flight directors. The fourth category encompasses communication systems, navigation 
equipment (including radio, optical, electronic, and inertial-reference systems; instrument-landing 
systems; receivers for satellite-based global positioning systems; traffic-alert and collision-avoidance 
systems; and heads-up displays), and cockpit voice and flight data recorders. Commercial aircraft add 
galleys and toilets, onboard entertainment and announcement systems, emergency slides and rafts, and 
other equipment for passenger comfort and safety. Special subsystems in military aircraft include ejection 
seats and separable cabins, multimode radar, armament, stores stations for external weapons, electronic 
countermeasure systems for confusing enemy defenses, arrester hooks for aircraft carrier landings, 
braking parachutes, identification friend or foe (IFF) systems, and photographic, infrared imaging, and 
other sensory devices for intelligence gathering together with onboard intelligence-processing 
equipment.” (“Aerospace industry” Encyclopedia Britannica Online, retrieved: 22 Oct 2010) 
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3.6.4 The diffusion of technologies to emerging economies  
The case studies in Chapter 6 will discuss the evolution of technological capabilities in 
greater details. Here we provide a brief overview focusing on the key technologies we 
presented above. We use the case of the Brazilian producer Embraer to show how 
certain technologies diffused gradually to an emerging producer. 
Diffusion of the jet engine: The first aircraft Embraer started to produce in 1969, the 
EMB-110 Bandeirante, was powered by turboprop engines produced by Pratt & 
Whitney Canada. Of course, the capability of producing jet aircraft did not necessarily 
require the capability to produce jet engines even for companies on the technological 
frontier. Embraer accumulated the jet technology step by step. It assembled its first jet 
aircraft in 1971. This was a fighter aircraft, the EMB-326 Xavante, a 1957 model of the 
Italian Aeromacchi which was assembled under license in Brazil. The two companies 
jointly developed the AMX jet fighter in 1984 using a Rolls Royce Spey 807 turbofan 
engine. The first locally designed jet (with also a Rolls Royce engine) was the ERJ-145 
commercial regional jet introduced in 1995. At the same time, the production of 
commercial jetliners requires pressurized cabins. The first Embraer civilian aircraft with 
pressurized cabin was the executive turboprop EMB-121 Xingu (1976). 
Composite materials: Simple composites were already used in the first plane, the 
EMB-110 Bandeirante. ‘Wet/hand lay-up’ technique was applied on a few non-
structural components and on fairings
56
. Structural bonding was introduced with the 
AMX fighter and composites in integrated structures were first used on the ERJ-145 
family. Embraer acquired this latter technology when it was producing outboard flaps 
for the MD-11 and through the eventually failed project of the CBA-123 in the late 
1980s. The latest executive jets of Embraer, the Phenom (2007) have totally integrated 
composite structures made with thermoplastic.
57
  
Avionics and glass cockpit: Due to the modular design, the diffusion of avionic suits 
and on-board computers to Embraer aircraft was relatively fast. The joint Italian-
Brazilian AMX fighter already had two computers and state-of-the art displays on 
board. Embraer was cooperating with Rockwell for the avionics on the Brasilia 
commuter. Through a partnership with Honeywell, the ERJ-145 regional jets were 
                                                 
56
 Fairings on aircraft create smoother surfaces in order to reduce drag. 
57
 This paragraph was based on Arakaki, F.K. and Goncalves W.G., 2007, “Embraer Composite Material 
Application”, paper presented at the 16th International Conference on Composite Materials, 8-13 Jul 
2007, Kyoto. 
Most recently, in 2010, Embraer began to construct its own facility in Portugal to produce composite 
structures and components. 
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equipped with the latest “glass-cockpit”. The ERJ-190 jet was one of the first 
commercial aircraft to use head-up display. The latest Phenom executive jets are 
equipped to enable single-pilot operations, which is an increasingly important 
requirement in the business jet market. Despite the rather fast diffusion of avionics 
technology to Brazilian aircraft, the technologies continued to be developed elsewhere 
in the advanced economies. Of course, the technologies have to be tailor-made and 
adapted locally, but no Brazilian companies emerged as competitors of global avionics 
suppliers. But this is related to the nature of the Brazilian aerospace innovation system 
which we shall discuss in greater details in Chapter 6, along with further historical 
details on technology diffusion in other countries. 
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[4] Chapter 4: Explaining success and failure of 
catch-up in aircraft manufacturing 
4.1 A Theoretical Framework on Innovation Systems Dynamics 
It is fair to assume, based on the literature review presented in the previous chapter and 
on the empirical study of the evolution of the industry that two phases can be 
distinguished in the development of a latecomer aerospace industry: an emergence 
phase and a catch up phase. Firms in an ‘emerging’ industry have to overcome several 
barriers to entry: high capital requirements, lack of technological capabilities, lack of 
access to technology and market-dislocation. Technological barriers are gradually 
overcome through access to foreign embodied and disembodied technologies and 
indigenous efforts to adopt and adapt them. This process can greatly benefit from 
spillovers from other domestic industries. Initially, in the emergence phase, the 
disadvantages latecomer firms face outweigh the advantages and sustained growth 
depends on the ability of public actors to support the emergence of a sectoral innovation 
system. But can a fully-developed innovation system ensure sustained competitiveness 
subsequently? Considering that the long-term evolution of innovation systems include 
both incremental and radical institutional changes, it is fair to assume that during the 
catch up phase the innovation system periodically needs to be reinvented and 
restructured. Such radical system changes involve a fundamental restructuring of 
institutions that define the interactions within an innovation system. This is because 
technology at the world frontier develops in a discontinuous manner and similarly, 
discontinuities were found in the long-run evolution of actors, firms, organizations and 
industries. More specifically in the aerospace industry, market volatility and changing 
demand conditions create recurrent crises which call for radical response from 
innovation system actors.  
A combination of these forces has the potential to create major discontinuities in the 
catch-up trajectory of a latecomer aerospace industry and interruptions in the innovative 
processes. We have observed declines and acceleration of growth in the sector in almost 
all countries. We are now turning toward the evolution of sectoral innovation systems in 
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late entrants to aerospace manufacturing.
 58
 We propose a conceptual framework to 
analyze the evolution of latecomer aerospace industries which builds on the sectoral 
systems of innovation approach and is sensitive to interruptions and radical system 
changes.  
In the following sections we give an overview of the main components of a 
theoretical framework which investigates discontinuities in the evolution of innovation 
systems – it reiterates work that has been presented in Vertesy and Szirmai (2010) and 
Vertesy (2011). 
4.1.1 The main components of the framework of interrupted innovation 
Over time, innovation systems – and in particular, we think of a sectoral system of 
innovation in the aircraft industry) can change in many ways: expanding its actors and 
networks (we can call it growing in size) and the interactions can become more 
intensive (grow in performance). The size of an innovation system is defined by the 
input of resources into innovation and technological change (investment in R&D, 
training and education, human capital stock engaged in the development of new 
products and processes or organizational change as well as marketing or economically 
applicable knowledge). Increase in the amount of inputs implies an increase in the size 
of the innovation system. The performance of the innovation system refers to the 
volume of innovative outputs which can be applied in production (knowledge about new 
products, new processes, organizational innovations, discovery of new resources, 
patents, etc.). The maximum amount of innovative outputs a sectoral system of 
innovation can attain with a given combination of inputs under a given institutional 
structure defines the performance frontier of the system. 
Innovation performance is difficult to measure in an unambiguous fashion, partly 
because there are so many dimensions of innovative performance which are hard to 
aggregate.
59
 Indicators characterizing innovation performance could include the number 
of new product designs, the share of new products in sales or the number of patents, 
citations and trademarks. In the absence of direct performance measures, one could also 
use proxy indicators of innovative performance such as the industrial sales performance 
(including sales on domestic and export markets) and market shares of final products. 
                                                 
58
 While we refer to ‘sectoral systems of innovation’, we bear in mind the conclusion from the literature 
review that in the context of latecomer aerospace industries both national and sectoral characteristics 
matter. 
59
 The literature does not provide a clear definition of the performance of a sectoral innovation system. 
Nor does it provide simple ways to measure it over a long time period. 
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This is based on the reasoning that in aerospace increases in market shares can only be 
realized through increased innovative performance. 
When the innovation system is supplied with additional resources, innovation 
performance will tend to increase. But within the limits of a given innovation system, 
long-run performance is constrained by diminishing returns – similar to a production 
function with diminishing returns to scale.
60
 The larger the size of the system, the more 
complex it becomes, and the more costly and difficult it will be to coordinate the use of 
resources effectively.  
We illustrate the relationship between size and performance of a sectoral innovation 
system and the effect of institutional change with the help of a set of graphs. Rather than 
exact measurement frameworks, these graphs should be seen as metaphors.  
 
4.1.2 Learning within an innovation system 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the evolution of the performance frontier 
curve p in relation to innovation system size (resources available for innovation) 
increases. There is no reason to assume that the sectoral innovation system in any 
country performs at the maximum of its potential capacity. As it has been often shown 
since Nelson and Winter (1982), “producing” innovation is difficult. It requires tacit and 
codified knowledge. Agents make choices based on imperfect information. Whether the 
effort brings successful outcome is uncertain. How close a country performs relative to 
the innovation performance frontier thus depends on the amount of learning taking place 
in the system. Learning takes place through interaction of the actors in the system. In a 
simplified way, a country’s vertical movement from point A to B on the graph 
corresponds to increased intensity of interactions among actors. It shows the system’s 
success in learning the art of innovation, or utilizing the capacity given the amount of 
resources invested in the system (horizontal axis). 
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 New growth theory (see Romer 1986, 1990, Lucas 1988) states that there are no diminishing returns to 
increasing knowledge inputs. We argue that this view needs to be modified. Increasing inputs into a given 
static system of innovation are subject to diminishing returns. Only if the innovation system succeeds in 
continuously reinventing itself and changing its nature dynamically will diminishing returns be overcome. 
This requires a kind of transitions from one innovation system to another.  
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Figure 4.1 Performance in a given innovation 
system 
Figure 4.2 Radical Change of the Sectoral 
Innovation System: Transition 
 
Source: author’s compilation  
 
 
4.1.3 Shift of the innovation system frontier 
A shift of the innovation system performance frontier requires radical institutional 
change. This is different from smaller adjustments in the institutions which facilitate 
capacity utilization given an innovation system setup. Smaller changes in tax or trade 
legislation are institutional changes that might affect system performance. Yet they are 
limited in scope and do not alter the fundamental structure and key channels of 
interactions of a system.  
A radical shift of the system is caused by a more fundamental, qualitative change in 
its institutional set up. These changes include the entry of new actors with new 
capabilities that affect existing relations in a fundamental way, a significant change in 
the technological base of the system, and, crucially, a change of institutional 
characteristics. Figure 4.2 illustrates this radical change as the transition from frontier 
curve I to II. Such a shift to a higher performance frontier curve will not only allow an 
industry to increase its competitiveness, but given diminishing returns to innovation 
inputs, it is the only source of knowledge-based competitiveness gain beyond a certain 
size of the innovation system. This is why continued advance in innovation performance 
requires periodic radical restructuring of the innovation system. 
There are a number of empirical issues in innovation system dynamics that this 
simple model can illustrate. For instance, shifts from defense-oriented to commercial 
innovation systems, shifts from systems founded on a strategy of import substitution to 
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open systems, or the shift to the hierarchical, risk-sharing-partnership based innovation 
system structure which characterizes the global industry today.  
The aim of any competitive industry is to continue to increase its innovative 
performance with a given set of resources, in other words, to shift the innovation 
performance curve upwards. But, the establishment of a new system based on new 
combinations of resources and new institutions is a very uncertain and risky process, 
which may well fail. If the institutional memory is destroyed due to external shocks and 
the inflow of recourses is drastically reduced, the system may not be able to transform 
itself. The actors in the system may realize that change is necessary, but they also will 
only be able to realize change if the institutional set up permits them to do so and new 
resources are forthcoming). 
The causes of radical innovation system change in a latecomer industry are most 
likely exogenous to the system. External macroeconomic, political or technological 
shocks cause crises and interruptions in the productive activities. If these events are 
longer lasting, private and public financial resources available as inputs for innovation 
will be depleted. This depletion can also happen if the innovation system fails to meet 
the demands of the competitive environment. Technological change outside the system 
(i.e. in leading countries) can similarly be detrimental to competitiveness of the 
latecomer system as such changes make the existing knowledge base obsolete.
61
 In 
behind-the-global frontier latecomer systems exogenous causes of interruption are more 
likely than causes endogenous to the system, which are more typically found in 
situations where the industry is already operating at the global technological frontier. In 
advanced economies, innovation at the knowledge frontier may lead to creative 
destruction, resulting in endogenously driven interruptions.  
4.1.4 Innovation system trajectories 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show alternative responses to an interruption in the innovation 
system. Figure 4.5 plots how the size and performance of a sectoral innovation system 
in a country changes over time as a result of learning within the system, interruptions 
and radical institutional changes. The trajectory of a country is indicative of the way its 
                                                 
61
 Here we are primarily referring to radical technological changes at the frontier which pose challenges to 
a latecomer that is trying to close the technology gap. But of course, this is not necessarily the case. If the 
latecomer is not catching up and the technology gap is not being closed, even incremental change at the 
frontier can cause the latecomers’s knowledge base to become obsolete. 
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institutions function and reveals the major constraints to and opportunities for industrial 
competitiveness, related to the functioning of the innovation system.  
Figure 4.3 represents the case of a latecomer industrialiser that fails to make the 
transition to a new system of innovation. As resources available for the sectoral 
innovation system increase, its actors learn to utilize the institutional setup to reach 
near-frontier performance with their interactions. The system will move closer to the 
frontier (movement over time from T1 to T3). What happens when the system reaches 
the frontier? Assuming that its aim is to increase performance, staying on a frontier 
where the returns to additional resources decline to zero, would marshal internal forces 
for institutional change.  
 
Figure 4.3 Interrupted Innovation 
 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
If these changes could be realized in a short time, the sectoral system could smoothly 
jump to a new growth path without significant performance loss and any further 
increase will be relative to the new performance frontier.  
But such a smooth transition is very unlikely in an industry prone to huge sudden 
fluctuations in demand. A decline in demand will indirectly result in shrinking resources 
available for innovative activity, which provides an exogenous shock to the innovation 
system. Thus the system is faced with a double challenge: changing external 
circumstances and diminishing returns to investment in innovation within the existing 
system. The innovation system’s performance will decline and an interruption occurs. 
This is illustrated by the movement from T3 to T4 in Figure 4.3 . 
Figure shows the trajectory of a given country in the 
innovation system performance space between points 
of time. 
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and increased knowledge flows;  
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 Should the drop in innovative performance in a latecomer country become too big 
and should the chances to mobilize resources for a recovery be too dim, the interruption 
may result in the abandonment of further efforts to develop this industry. Both the 
innovation system and the productive system will collapse. The emergence of an 
aerospace industry has then failed. 
 
Figure 4.4. Interruption followed by successful transition to a new innovation system 
 
 Source: author’s compilation 
 
Figure 4.4. shows the case of a successful transition to a new system defined by frontier 
curve II. Recovery after an interruption will not immediately show higher performance 
even if a successful transition to a new system of innovation has been achieved. 
Increased performance can only be realized over time as the actors learn how to achieve 
best practice relative to a new performance frontier. Note that at T5, the new system will 
not necessarily be performing better than the old one at T3.  The new system will only 
start to perform better than the old one as the actors learn to work the new system and 
we approach T6. 
 
The arrows show the trajectory of a given 
country in the innovation system performance 
space over time. 
T3  T4 = interruption 
T4  T5 = transition  
T5  T6 = performance increase due to learning 
(Curve II is the reference for T5 and T6) 
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Figure 4.5. A learning trajectory: interruption and successful transition 
 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
In Figure 4.5., we plot innovation system performance of a country against time on the 
horizontal axis, rather than against innovation system size as in the previous figures. 
Here, the development trajectory of a successful transition from one innovation system 
to another will take the form of a set of S-curves. Up to the point of interruption, the 
industry follows a learning curve in its attempt to approach frontier performance. The 
interruption results in an abrupt decline in innovation performance. 
In Figure 4.5., L refers to the actual learning trajectory of the country (frontier 
performance is not reproduced here).  The interval T1 to T3 refers to the learning curve 
of an emerging system prior to the first transition. T3 to T4 refers to an interruption. T4 to 
T6 refers to the successful transition from the innovation system with performance 
frontier I to a new innovation system with a performance frontier curve II. At T6 we see 
the beginning of a new learning curve.  
In the interruption period T1 – T4 there is a crucial challenge for the relevant actors 
to react to the crisis by reconfiguring the institutions in an innovation system and 
possibly expanding it with new resources. This is necessary in order to redirect learning 
efforts onto a trajectory that produces the supply of innovations required by the changed 
demand conditions facing the industry. After the system transition, the actors in the 
sectoral system of innovation try to move towards a new performance frontier, hence 
the emergence of a new S-curve. 
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Figure shows a country’s learning trajectory, 
including the transition between innovation 
systems at points of interruption. 
T3  T4 = interruption 
T4  T5 = transition 
T5  T6 = performance increase due to 
learning  
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The time between the point of interruption and that of system change depends on the 
readiness and capability of the actors to react to changes in the environment. It is thus 
an indication of the flexibility and adaptability of the innovation system of an industry.  
A crucial difference between well-established or mature innovation systems
62
 and 
emerging ones is the greater vulnerability of emerging innovation systems to external 
shocks. These shocks cause interruptions during which previously acquired 
technological capabilities are lost. Even leading producers have found to be prone to 
‘organizational forgetting’, but to a lesser extent that latecomer producers.63 
4.1.5 System performance and competitiveness 
The long-run competitiveness of a high-tech industry depends on the capacity of its 
sectoral innovation system to provide cost-reducing and productivity-increasing 
innovations and new products with technological features superior to those of its 
competitors. How does competition feature in our framework? 
Competition is a key driver of improvements in innovation system performance. 
Suppose that industries from two different countries competing to supply the same 
market face similar frontier curves for innovation performance. The industry that is 
closer to the frontier has a higher propensity to innovate; hence a higher chance to be 
more competitive in a knowledge-based industry.  
However, the performance frontier curves differ from country to country. Countries 
may not only compete in their relative distance from a given innovation performance 
frontier, but also in the position of the frontier itself (e.g. innovation frontier I and 
innovation frontier II in Figure 4.4.). They can increase their competitiveness in two 
ways. First, by learning within a system, what corresponds to moving closer to an 
existing performance frontier as shown in Error! Reference source not found.. 
Second, by making the transition to a radically new performance frontier which is 
superior to the previous one (Figure 4.2 ).   
This implies two different kinds of costs: first, the learning costs associated with 
narrowing the distance to the frontier; and second, the transition costs from one frontier 
to another. These costs have to be borne by the entire innovation and production system. 
Only if the industry is selling competitive products can these costs be recovered. A key 
dilemma for the governance of innovation systems is to find the most cost-efficient way 
                                                 
62
 Chaminade and Vang (2008) use the term ‘mature innovation systems’. 
63
 Production experience can depreciate, not only appreciate over time (Benkard, 2000) 
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to manage system transitions. Incremental changes will not bring about as great gains as 
radical ones, but the costs of radical institutional changes may well be high. Path 
dependence, the comfort of established routines, the lack of information about the 
alternatives, the uncertainty concerning outcomes of institutional change reduces the 
likelihood of the occurrence of major institutional changes.  
Finally, there is another element of competitiveness: the speed of reaction to global 
declines in the demand for aerospace products, in case of crises. Competitiveness in 
these instances is measured by the flexibility of the industry, or its ability to respond in 
a timely fashion to the changing demand conditions by changing its institutions. 
McKelvey et al (2006a,b) discuss rigidity and flexibility of innovation systems and 
identify the period of adjustment to new demand conditions (both external and internal 
to the industry) critical moments.
64
  
4.1.6 External causes of interruption 
A major difference between innovation system change at the technological frontier and 
innovation system change in latecomer countries is the most likely cause of interruption. 
Latecomers by definition enter an industry characterized by Schumpeter Mark II 
competition
65
 and focus their learning efforts on acquiring and improving already 
proven technologies. This entails investment in physical and human capital which, 
especially during the early phases depends on the government’s financing abilities. 
Consequently macroeconomic and political crises and changing competitive 
environments are all potential external causes of interruption and have a far greater 
likelihood of causing interruptions than endogenous technological factors.  
4.1.7 Questions for case studies 
Times of crisis offer ideal points of entry to observe innovation system change. The 
drop in demand puts both the production and the innovation systems to a test. Since it 
jeopardizes survival, it triggers responses from the system. As pointed out earlier, crises 
are cyclically returning challenges in the aerospace industry, and stakeholders need to 
be prepared for slumps and need to learn how to respond and find innovative solutions 
                                                 
64
 Also at firm level, Yuan et al (2010) showed that strategic flexibility matters; it is reasonable to assume 
that a first mover advantage exists when it comes to competition between firms. The producerthat first 
embarks on the new innovation path has the highest likelihood of recovering from a major interruption. 
65
 ‘Schumpeter Mark II’ refers to a consolidated structure where a few large firms make benefit of 
economies of scale and finance R&D investments to maintain their leading position (Nelson and Winter, 
1982 and Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). 
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to weather the crises and set the industry on a growth path more rapidly than its 
competitors. 
In the following section we present five country case studies of how crises triggered 
changes in of the sectoral innovation systems in the aerospace industry. The cases are 
those of Brazil, China, Indonesia and Argentina. The first two cases are cases of 
successful development of the aerospace industry in a developing country context. The 
last two cases are cases where the aerospace industry has so far failed to take off. 
Based on the conceptual framework of interrupted innovation developed above, we 
examined the following analytic questions in the country case studies:  
 
1. What trajectories did the latecomers in aerospace follow? (How can these 
trajectories be measured and analysed? To what extent is the end of the 
emergence phase associated with interruptions and transitions?) 
2. What caused the interruptions in the development of the sectoral innovation 
system? What is the balance between internal endogenous sources of 
interruption and exogenous system shocks? 
3. What were the characteristics of the transition period? (How did interruptions 
and transitions affect the accumulation of latecomers’ technological capabilities? 
Which actors governed the transition periods, and what factors contributed to the 
success or failure of transition from one innovation system to another?) 
 
4.2 BRAZIL 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The aircraft industry of Brazil has received more attention than that of any other 
emerging economies. This is not surprising, since its flagship company, Embraer has 
made it to the top three companies producing commercial aircraft, and has been among 
the top five manufactured product exporters of Brazil. This case shows that Embraer’s 
years of success and failure were all closely linked to the performance of the Brazilian 
sectoral system of innovation in aerospace.  
We provide a detailed historical overview of the origins of aircraft manufacturing in 
Brazil in the 1930s and 1940s and the associated innovative activities, of the emergence 
of a new innovation system in the 1950s and 60s, of the subsequent growth period led 
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by a state-owned enterprise, the crisis years of the early 1990s, the transition to a new 
system along with the privatization of Embraer, until the crisis in the first decade of the 
new millennium. 
4.2.2 The origins of aircraft manufacturing in Brazil 
The development of the Brazilian aircraft manufacturing industry during the Embraer 
era has been studied extensively (Sarathy 1985; Cabral 1987; Mowery 1987; Ramamurti 
1987; Frischtak 1992, 1994; Cassiolato et al. 2002; Goldstein 2002a; Marques 2004). 
However, the origins of aircraft manufacturing on an industrial scale and the origins of 
an aerospace innovation system date back to decades before the foundation of Embraer.  
The 1930s brought about accelerated industrialization in Brazil in a wide range of 
sectors, including airplane production. This was a departure from earlier experimental 
efforts of pioneer aviators such as Santos Dumont, since it now involved serial 
production. Industrialists, the military as well as the administration of Getulio Vargas 
saw potential in larger scale aircraft production. Antonio G. Muniz, a military official 
and aircraft designer trained in France emphasized the benefits of locally training 
engineers. He argued that establishing research, design and manufacturing capabilities 
would reduce dependence on foreign countries (Viegas 1989).  
One of the first aircraft manufacturing companies, the Fabrica Brasileira de Aviones 
(Brazilian Airplane Factory, FBA) was a subsidiary of the air transport company
66
 
owned by the entrepreneur Henrique Lage. The FBA was established in Rio de Janeiro 
and designed a dozen of aircraft for aero clubs and the military using the skills of Muniz 
and Belgian and French engineers. Between 1936 and 1948 over 200 aircraft were built 
(See Table 4.1).  
The approach of World War II increased demand for aircraft. The FBA received a 
number of military launch orders, but same models were also sold to civilian aero clubs. 
Meanwhile, production facilities were set up at the Fabrica do Galeão in Rio de Janeiro 
with German technical assistance to produce Focke-Wulf trainers under license.
67
 
Brazil’s shift from a German orientation to the Allies brought along changes in aircraft 
production. The Fabrica do Galeão was selected to produce the Fairchild PT-19 trainers 
                                                 
66
 The Companhia Nacional de Navegação Aérea (National Air Navigation Company, CNNA), 1935. 
67
 Two models, the Fw 44 and 58 (local designation 1 FG and 2 FG) were produced with 40 and 25 pieces 
during 1940-42. 
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under license (local designation 3 FG). During 1942-43 the factory produced on average 
116 of these planes.  
 
Table 4.1 First series production of airplanes in Brazil, 1936-51 
Year Model Designer Manufacturer Nr. produced 
1936-41 M-7 Muniz / Henrique Lage Fabrica Brasileira de Aviones / CNNA 26 
1939-43 M-9 Muniz / Henrique Lage Fabrica Brasileira de Aviones / CNNA 40 
1940-41 HL-1 Muniz / Henrique Lage 
(Piper) 
Companhia Nacional de Navegação Aérea 
108 
1942-48 HL-6 Muniz / Henrique Lage CNNA 60 
1940-42 1 FG Focke Wulf Fw-44) Fabrica do Galeão 40 
1940-42 2 FG Focke Wulf (Fw-58) Fabrica do Galeão 25 
1942-43 3 FG Fairchild (PT-19) Fabrica do Galeão 232 
1942-43 CAP-1 
Planalto 
Grupo Pignetari Companhia Aeronautica Paulista 
9 
1945 CAP-3 Grupo Pignetari Companhia Aeronautica Paulista 8 
1943-48 CAP-4 
Paulistin
ha 
Grupo Pignetari Companhia Aeronautica Paulista 
777 
1946-51 T-6 Texan (license) Lagoa Santa/Companhia Aeronautica 
Paulista 81 
Source: Cabral (1987) Tab. II.1. and Viegas (1989) 
 
There were a number of other companies trying to enter aircraft manufacturing. The 
Empresa Aeronáutica Ypiranga (EAY) was set up in 1931. The company intended to 
produce glider planes and copied two German models of which only a few were 
manufactured. There was another design that was very influential: the EAY-201, a 
single engine, two-seater plane with wings placed high, based on the successful US 
model, the Taylor Cub. Interestingly, EAY, the innovator, did not have much success 
with the plane. It eventually sold the designs to Companhia Aeronautica Paulista 
(Aeronautical Company of Sao Paulo, CAP). 
CAP was founded in the state of Sao Paulo as the aviation section of the Pignatari 
Group in 1942. This company commenced operations with the production of a 
successful German model, the Alcatraz, and the Saracura before producing a locally 
designed 2-seater, single-engine plane, the CAP-1 (and a more advanced CAP-3) 
“Planalto”. Including the prototypes, around 20 of these planes were built. CAP quickly 
accumulated manufacturing capabilities which proved to be most successful when it 
acquired the manufacturing rights for the EAY-201 model from the Ypiranga company. 
After a few modifications the CAP-4 Paulistinha became the best-selling Brazilian 
plane of its time. A total of 777 planes rolled out of the plant at Santo André between 
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1942 and 1948. Except for the engines, the Paulistinha was made of Brazilian materials 
and parts and has also been exported to South American countries and Portugal. CAP 
never managed to develop (or acquire) a successful model after the Paulistinha, despite 
efforts to design modified versions. The end of the war brought the end of the company 
as well. The decline in military orders and the dumping of cheap second hand North-
American planes on the Brazilian market resulted in the closure of the plant in 1949. 
The Brazilian aircraft manufacturing capabilities of the 1940s were far behind the 
capabilities of European or US plane makers of the era, but they still managed to sell 
their planes due to the wartime demand for “anything that flies”. The technology gap 
became apparent in peacetime. The numerous commercial airlines of Brazil (Aerovias 
Brasil, Cruzeiro do Sul, Varig, VASP)
68
 flew medium sized and larger propeller planes 
(DC-3s, DC-4s, Junkers Ju 52, Convair 240s, Lockheed Super Constellations) and even 
jets from 1959 (Caravelles and later B-707s). The small planes built in Brazil had no 
market outside flying clubs. 
The industry was entering a long decline period during the late 1940s. Postwar 
periods pose a reorganization challenge for industries, a need to shift from quantity-to 
quality oriented production during times of “demobilization instability” (Higham 1968). 
The end of World War II offered a moment for Brazil to reconsider the strategies 
concerning the aeronautical industry. The transportation infrastructure was 
underdeveloped, especially in the vast continental lands of Brazil. Air transportation and 
supplying industries had a huge potential, but also required infrastructural investments. 
4.2.3 The emergence and growth of a sectoral innovation system 
The long transition period over the 1950s and 60s until the establishment of Embraer 
marks a crisis in the industry, but also the emergence of a sectoral innovation system. 
As Figure 4.6 shows, no significant new products were launched. Production involved 
small planes representing older technology. Why did it take over 20 years before a new 
company could emerge from the ruins? 
There was no overarching strategy on how to develop the sector. The government’s 
hesitation to outline any strategy and appropriate large sums in the budget for 
indigenous aircraft development appeared to be vindicated by the failure of aircraft 
                                                 
68
 Many of these originated from before the WWII when they were only providing domestic services. 
Between the two world wars, airlines associated with European governments were fighting for a leading 
position in the Trans-South-Atlantic passenger and mail services. For a thorough account of the fierce 
competition even within French companies, see de Bure (2006). 
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development projects in neighboring Argentina. Competing with foreign producers in 
the commercial air transport market was far beyond the financing ability of local 
entrepreneurs. Before the war, previous experience in the steel or automobile industries 
sufficed to produce simpler small planes, but more sophisticated products required a 
larger pool of aeronautics engineers, technicians and physical capital investments. 
Industrialists instead focused on serving the general aviation market. A famous 
entrepreneur of the time was José Carlos de Barros Neiva, who founded a homonymous 
company in Rio in 1954 and manufactured glider planes. Two years later the company 
moved to Botocatu and produced the Paulistinha and Regente, for which it acquired 
licenses. Although it did roll out a trainer for the air force which was its own design, 
Neiva remained the producer of gliders, single-engine general aviation or agricultural 
planes, and later a component manufacturer of Embraer (which eventually acquired it in 
1980 following financial difficulties).  
 
Figure 4.6 The evolution of aircraft production in Brazil, 1936-2010 
 
Source: own compilation based on Cabral (1987); Cassiolato et al (2002), Embraer Annual Reports, The 
Airlinerlist database <http://www.airlinerlist.com> (downloaded 2009 Feb); and Flight International, 
various issues. 
Note: Since exact annual production is unknown before 1969, the total number produced was spread 
evenly over the estimated years of production. Figures after 1970 exclude new general aviation aircraft 
production runs, among others the license-produced Pipers and the upgraded versions of the Ipanema 
(EMB-201 and 202). 
 
The government did not invest in major aircraft development projects, but it did agree to 
finance the education and training of aeronautical engineers and technicians. 
Specialized training was already available at the army’s technical school established in 
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1939, and at the Escola de Aeronáutica (School of Aeronautics Engineering) at Campo 
dos Afonsos in Rio de Janeiro.
69
 In 1946 this was transformed into the Instituto 
Tecnologico da Aeronautica (Aeronautics Technology Institute, or ITA in short), which 
became the “alma mater” of all the key persons in the sectoral innovation system.70  
Between the two most influential cities, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Sao José dos 
Campos, a town in the Paraiba valley was chosen as the strategic location
71
 for the 
newly established Centro Tecnico Aeroespacial (Aerospace Technical Center, CTA). 
As a branch of the military, CTA was inaugurated in 1950 to conduct and oversee 
research in aviation and space flight in Brazil. It offered post-graduate research 
positions for engineers from ITA, especially in the Instituto de Pesquisa e 
Desenvolvimento (Research and Development Institute, or IPD). IPD was one of the 
four institutes subordinated to CTA, as was ITA which was moved to the grounds of 
CTA. The two other institutes apart from ITA and IPD were the Institute for Space 
Activities and the Institute for Development and Industrial Coordination.  
It was IPD’s mission to develop aircraft locally. It housed several promising 
experimental projects, including a vertical take-off aircraft and the hummingbird 
helicopter involving experienced German engineers. However, neither of the two 
projects advanced to commercialization because of design failures. Other projects were 
more successful and CTA followed a strategy of spinning them off into aircraft 
producer companies. The air force ran CTA, but was not commercializing the results of 
development projects. Aerotec, one of the first spin-offs, was founded in 1962 to 
produce the Uirapuru for air force to replace its aging Fokker trainers (150 planes 
between 1968 and 1977). The most famous spin-off company was Embraer, which was 
a result of a transport aircraft development project. 
The story of Embraer began when the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) commissioned 
CTA to develop a twin-engine, non-pressurized 8-10 seater turboprop transport. IPD 
launched the ‘IPD-6504’ project under the leadership of air force officer and 
                                                 
69
 Colonel Casimiro Montenegro Filho played a crucial role in its foundation. 
70
 “ITA was inspired by the MIT model and in fact, a number of professors from the Aeronautics 
department of MIT (as well as German engineers) went to work at ITA in the early years. By 1988 ITA 
had trained more than 3000 engineers, 800 of which were in the aeronautics field” (Frischtak 1992, p.5) 
71
 Motivations for selecting Sao Jose are numerous, including favorable climate and topographical 
conditions, the accessibility to energy and means of communications, the relative remoteness from urban 
centers while being not too far from Sao Paulo (with the newly built President Dutra highway providing 
easy access to Sao Paolo) and the possibilities for further growth.  
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aeronautical engineer Ozires Silva.
72
 The celebrated French aircraft designer, Max 
Holste was hired to lead the design work. The prototype of the IPD-6504 successfully 
accomplished its maiden flight in October 1968. But it took substantial organizational 
efforts to transform the prototype into a product later known as the Bandeirante and 
required entrepreneurial skills on top of technical skills, and no company in Brazil 
possessed the capabilities to manage a commercial aircraft producing venture.
73
  
The commercialization of the IPD-6504 project did not go to existing companies, 
because both Neiva and Aerotec found the endeavor too risky, fearing too high 
dependence on government contracts
74
. Even the Dutch manufacturer Fokker turned 
down the offer. Silva (2002) noted that given the risk-aversion of Brazilian private 
investors, the only solution was to create Embraer as a state-owned enterprise in 1969. 
Many of the later observers overlook the fact that if it wasn’t for the entrepreneurial 
designers, the military government would not have pushed for establishing a 
commercial company. Instrumental in this endeavor was the “social capital” (in the 
sense of Akçomak and ter Weel (2009) of Silva and other members of the team. By the 
end of the 1960s, members of the class graduating from ITA in 1962 had already 
established key positions in the administration and in the military. It is also interesting 
to note that Embraer developed a corporate culture that motivated employees despite 
their relatively low financial compensation. Embraer was also working on another spin-
off project, a small agricultural airplane, for which the funding came from the Ministry 
of Agriculture. The EMB-200 Ipanema became the most successful single model of 
which over a thousand has been produced (and is still in production, certified also to 
consume ethanol in 2004).  
The Bandeirante prototype that flew in 1968 underwent a number of modifications 
in size and performance before certification and the finalization of the serial production 
design at the newly founded test facilities of Embraer. The final commercial version 
                                                 
72
 In 1965, a group of engineers from CTA were investigating the causes of another accident in the 
interior of Brazil. Among them was Silva, an outstanding graduate of the Escola de Aeronáutica and ITA 
(and later of Calthech). Silva recalled in an interview (Silva, 2009) that it was during this investigation 
when he realized that there was a market niche for smaller transport aircraft with lower servicing and 
airport infrastructural needs. The number of towns with operating airports had sharply decreased in 
preceding years (from a height of 360 to only 45 in 1956). The potential replacement models for the aging 
planes servicing these small airports (mostly DC-3s) required more sophisticated airport infrastructure. 
Brazil eventually chose a path to develop an aircraft instead of spending on the development of a large 
number of airports. 
73
 Max Holste for instance was skeptical of the project’s success and left the team for Uruguay. 
74
 Neiva had been following the IPD-6504 project from the very beginning, and even arranged the historic 
meeting between Max Holste and Ozires Silva, as the latter recounted in his memoirs (Silva 2002). 
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was a 19-seater model, of which a total of 500 planes were produced between 1972 and 
1990.  
The task to mass produce commuter airplanes required capabilities that did not exist 
in Brazil. So far, CTA had successfully accumulated the capabilities to absorb 
technology by establishing a strong engineer training program at ITA, by cooperating 
successfully with foreign institutes (MIT), scientists and engineers. But no Brazilian 
enterprise had experience in producing and selling commuter planes to airlines. 
Frischtak (1992, p.17) and Moxon (1987) note that Embraer chose a unique 
development trajectory as it skipped the step of locally assembling planes under license. 
This is true to the extent that Embraer and the government of Brazil did cooperate when 
it came to targeting capabilities required to fill gaps in the capabilities. 
The entire innovation system responded in a very flexible way: the channels among 
the different actors were open, open also to reach out to and include new actors. First of 
all, the military (after some persuasion) provided the source of finance through a 
military commission for the production of 80 Bandeirantes. Apart from the labor force 
trained at ITA, the required technical knowledge for mass-production was furnished 
from external sources. One of the most important sources was a licensing agreement 
with the Italian manufacturer Aermacchi on the production of Xavante (EMB-326), a jet 
trainer and fighter.
75
 
Aermacchi designers were physically present in Sao Jose dos Campos to provide 
assistance with design of certain parts and solving various tasks; it was a 10 years deal 
that followed through the whole learning curve of Bandeirante production. Another 
source of technological know-how was an offset contract with the American company 
Northrop. While procuring 50 F-5s for the Brazilian Air Force, Embraer was 
commissioned to produce vertical fins, rudders, wings and belly pylons for a 100 of this 
model. It provided Embraer with technologies such as chemical milling, metal-to-metal 
and honeycomb bonding as well as working with composite materials.
76
 
                                                 
75
 Ramamurti quoted Pessotti, Embraer’s technical director: “It was a very interesting cooperation, 
because it brought a lot of technology and expertise that we did not have at that time in Brazil – for 
example, in areas such as tracing technology, assembly of planes, organization of procurement of 
materials, quality control, technical documentation, organization of assembly lines, etc.” (Ramamurti 
1987, p.185). 
76
 “In addition, the contract also forced Embraer to improve on its tool design, quality assurance and other 
production techniques, while stimulating the use of numerically-controlled machine tools” (Frischtak 
1992, p.18). 
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A major foreign source for marketing, sales and support know-how was the 
“collaboration” with US general aviation producer Piper. The process through which the 
Brazilian government selected Embraer’s collaborating partner was more an ultimatum 
than a real competitive deal. As a result of the economic boom of the early 1970s 
demand for small planes grew substantially
77
, and as a result of the foreign exchange 
crisis following the oil crisis of 1973, the government was ready to bring production of 
these planes to Brazil – to Embraer. It followed a strategy of giving monopoly licenses 
to one producer and deterring imports from all the others. The deal offered to three top 
US general aviations producers was as follows: (1) allow Embraer to progressively 
manufacture a greater share of the planes’ components and parts in Brazil; (2) do not 
oblige Embraer to pay any royalties; (3) allow Embraer to make modifications on the 
models; (4) expect collaboration on future aircraft design, production and marketing. 
Despite being the biggest exporter to Brazil, Cessna was opposed to most of the 
demands so an agreement was concluded with the most cooperative company, Piper. As 
promised, import taxes on planes for general aviation were raised from 7 to 50 percent 
in line with the new import substitution policy. Over the years, from 1975 Embraer 
produced thousands of Piper models (under local names and designation: EMB-710, -
711, -712, -720, -721, -810 and -820).  
The rather flexible response and reorganization of the innovation system to 
accommodate mass production owes much to the cooperation of a number of actors, 
who were all motivated by the vision of creating a functioning aircraft industry in 
Brazil. Institutional actors, companies, government agencies in the country were 
dominated ultimately at the individual level by ITA graduates who were ready to 
cooperate in their various specialized positions. Coordinating all these actors and having 
strong negotiating powers vis á vis external actors was the Ministry of Aeronautics. The 
ministry did not shy away from implementing protectionist trade agreements and 
providing support to Embraer in a various ways, be it technical, financial, marketing or 
regulatory assistance. Embraer was also given preferential treatment, and was exempted 
from import taxes and duties on materials, parts and components that were not available 
locally. 
The government also played a crucial role in providing finance. First, by controlling 
51 percent of the so called ‘voting shares’ of Embraer; second, indirectly, by 
                                                 
77
 Import from the US was 540 planes in 1974 in the value of 150 million USD (Ramamurti 1987, p.190) 
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establishing a tax incentive scheme that solved the problem of the unavailability of 
venture capital and making it interesting for private companies to own a share of the 
new state-owned enterprise. Companies (of all sizes, ranging from large state-owned 
enterprises to SMEs) could invest every year up to 1 percent of their federal income tax 
in Embraer shares – on which they could even receive dividends (which they in fact 
received from 1974 onwards). These preferential shares were nonvoting shares. Thus 
they did provide influence on company decisions (the government always maintained at 
least 51 percent of the votes), but they did bring in substantial amounts of capital. 
Ramamurti (1987, pp.192-4) shows that the government’s share in total equity fell from 
82 percent in 1970 to 7 percent in 1981. Additionally, Embraer received further support 
from the air force through procurements and direct R&D support.  
Why did the Bandeirante succeed?  All the efforts to enter the phase of mass 
production would have been in vain, if Embraer had not rolled out a model that actually 
responded to a market needs. The Bandeirante was capable to operate in extreme 
conditions, with minimal ground support and low maintenance requirements and with a 
flexibility of configurations. All this was provided at a very competitive price, a rather 
fast (45 day) delivery time and appealing financing conditions (9 percent interest rate as 
opposed to almost double that amount offer by US competitors). The only disadvantage 
compared to similar models was higher fuel consumption and shorter range.  
The success in finding a niche market explains a lot of the success of Bandeirante. 
Kimura (2006) shows how a commercial aircraft development project failed in Japan 
after the Second World War. Driven partly by the same need to replace aging DC-3s, 
partly by national pride and nostalgia, the public-private consortium NAMCO 
developed a 64-seater turboprop airliner, the YS-11. The cooperating companies 
(Mitsubishi, Kawasaki and Fuji Heavy Industries) developed significant technological 
capabilities in aircraft manufacturing, and 182 planes were sold until the project was 
terminated in 1974. But the project was a commercial failure; the plane was obsolete by 
the time it was introduced. It was competing in a market segment that was being taken 
over by jets. As a result, the Japanese industry had to transform and gain competitive 
competences in component manufacturing. The similarities between the Brazilian and 
the Japanese endeavors are striking: both countries had experience in large scale 
production of planes during the war, but production was discontinued after the war. 
Both countries saw the strategic significance of the aircraft industry, leading to 
significant government investments into R&D and a high reliance on initial military 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2016013
111 
 
procurement at the start of production. Both countries were facing the high prices of late 
entrants: a steep learning curve, high development costs. But while Japan chose the path 
of indigenous production, Brazil successfully invited foreign experts and paid close 
attention to market demands. 
Internationalization of sales was the natural way of securing sales. Serving the 
American market was already a strategy in mind at the design phase of the 
Bandeirantes.
78
 Following the oil crisis, airlines in the US showed great interest in the 
newly developed plane. But it took quite some diplomatic efforts by Brazil to finally 
receive the FAA certification in 1978, due to strong objections by US producers who 
were lobbying for retaliation against the discriminatory import tariffs imposed by 
Brazil. By then, the plane had received foreign certifications in a number of countries 
and was sold to Uruguay (1975) and France, the United Kingdom and Australia (1977). 
The most important market turned to be the United States. The timing of the entry was 
well chosen, as it also coincided with a deregulation of the US market in 1978, which 
resulted in the closure of jet service to smaller airports, thus opening a niche for shorter 
and cheaper commuter service by turboprop planes. An additional feature making the 
Bandeirante cheaper to operate was its 19-seater configuration, since planes above 20 
passengers were supposed to have an additional flight attendant. The market expanded 
fast, but Embraer was among the first movers. The only US-made direct competitor was 
the Fairchild Metro III. To meet the increased demand, the production of the 
Bandeirante reached a rate of over 5 planes a month in 1980 and 1981. Exports 
amounted to nearly 50% of total sales in these years and, (102.7 million USD in 1981).  
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 According to Silva (interview, 2009), instead of responding to the request of Brazilian associations to 
have the metric system on board, they implemented US standards. 
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Figure 4.7 Embraer’s sales, exports and number of employees, 1970-2007  
(Million USD at constant = 2000 prices) 
 
Sources: Embraer, Frischtak 1992, Ramamurti 1987, Cassiolato et al. 2002. 
 
To sum up, during the 1950s and 1960s the basic elements of an emerging sectoral 
innovation system were established. The emergence of its main actors and linkages 
happened slowly and without a clear central mission. Investment in aerospace education 
and research provided an important breeding ground. A sectoral innovation system 
emerged slowly, and in it entrepreneurial engineers played a crucial role as “system 
brokers”. The system broker, Ozires Silva79 and his team at CTA played a central role in 
(1) finding a market niche (commuter aircraft capable of serving airports with poor 
infrastructure); (2) channelling finance and design efforts to successfully develop a new 
product for this niche (IPD-6504); (3) establishing a company to ensure commercial 
valorisation of innovations (Embraer, 1969); (4) creating new linkages to provide 
capital (government launch support, government commissioning of 80 Bandeirantes and 
subsequently new planes, and a corporate tax incentive scheme channelling private 
capital to Embraer) and (5) creating linkages to access technology (through an exclusive 
contract with Piper, a deal with Italian producer Aermacchi, an offset contract with 
Northrop and collaboration with the Canadian engine manufacturer Pratt & Whitney).  
The empirical evidence of successful system transition is ample. On the output side, 
Figure 4.6 shows the production cycles of major new products: the EMB-110 
Bandeirante 19-seat commuter plane, the EMB-312 Tucano (single-engine military 
basic trainer), the EMB-121 Xingu (a pressurized executive twin-turboprop), and the 
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 An air force pilot, ITA (and later Caltech) graduate aeronautical engineer, founder and president of 
Embraer (1969-86), who also played a key role in its privatization in 1994.  
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EMB-120 Brasilia (a pressurized 30-seater twin-turboprop commuter). Figure 4.7 
shows the increase of sales revenues of Embraer (to a historical maximum of 924 
million USD in 1989) and the growth of exports (nearly two-third of sales revenues by 
mid-1980s; growing to 486 million USD in 1989). This shows that Embraer’s strategy 
of aiming at the commercial commuter market
80
 paid off, especially after the 
liberalization of the US market. In 1981, Bandeirante had a 37.8% share in the 15-19 
seat segment (Sarathy 1985). Brazilian aerospace value added grew to 220 million by 
1980 and 790 million USD by 1989. This growth is especially remarkable when 
contrasted to the global industrial landscape, shaken by the oil crisis of 1973. Brazilian 
growth in aerospace was nearly 10-times the growth of the global industry (in capitalist 
economies) during the 1970s. Even after the start-up decade, the 258% expansion of 
production between 1981 and 1989 still overshadows the global average expansion of 
122% (and 125% of the USA), providing a clear evidence of catch-up (Figure 4.8). 
 
Figure 4.8 Trends of catch-up: aerospace value added of Brazil, China and Indonesia compared to 
the US, 1970-2007 (%) 
 
Sources: Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, IBGE, UNIDO. See Appendix A.1. 
We argue that the emergence of the innovation system and its institutional set-up was a 
necessary precondition for the accelerated growth of the industry. We do not debate the 
crucial role of Embraer’s management in successful formulating and executing a sound 
strategy for increased sales performance and growth. However, the physical and human 
resources and the general institutional arrangement for performing innovative activities 
                                                 
80
 Already at the development of the Bandeirante, US FAA guidelines were fully observed to facilitate 
certification, which is essential for exports. Airworthiness certificate was given by France in 1977, by the 
UK and the US in 1978. Feedback from regional airlines and other users was considered seriously for the 
development of subsequent models. 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2016013
114 
 
were available before the creation of Embraer. The government and other systemic 
actors provided key elements such as an affordable supply of skilled labour, R&D 
activities (results of which Embraer commercialized), openness to foreign technological 
sources, military procurement to support new aircraft development, export credits and 
protectionist trade policies. 
The establishment of Embraer as a state-owned enterprise
81
 was the final 
institutional innovation in the formative phase of the sectoral system of innovation 
(SSI). A national champion allowed Brazil to reap the benefits of an already existing 
SSI and to set the forces of innovation in motion. It was a necessary condition for the 
increase of innovative performance, since much of the tacit knowledge required for 
competitive production based on up-to-date technology needed to be acquired through 
‘learning by doing’. 
State ownership did not preclude the Embraer management from governing certain 
functions of the innovation system. The successful emergence of the Embraer-
championed aircraft industry in Brazil – what Ramamurti (1987) aptly refers to as a 
combination of public power and private initiative – was in fact the result of shared 
governance of the innovation system. Following the typology of Hekkert et al. (2007), 
certain functions such as ‘knowledge development’ and ‘knowledge diffusion’ were 
shared between CTA and Embraer’s R&D departments or foreign sources. ‘Guidance of 
search’ for new technologies and ‘market formation’ were jointly influenced by the 
marketing strategy of Embraer and the procurement policies of the Air Force and the 
Aeronautical Ministry. The government played a decisive role (especially at the 
beginning) in ‘resource mobilization’ (including capital, skilled labour and technology). 
Embraer (and other smaller companies) provided ‘entrepreneurial activities’ for the 
system.
82
  
This governing structure remained in place until the next major transition of the SSI. 
Over the years as production increased smaller adjustments were made in the 
institutional framework (often to meet the needs of Embraer). This indicates an 
incremental ‘co-evolution’ of technology, institutions and organizations. However, the 
performance of the innovation system increased and so did its size, without any 
significant trend break.  
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 State ownership was a last resort to overcome the lack of private venture capital (Silva 2002) 
82
 It is an interesting problem whether the emergence of a system broker was a historical accident or 
whether it was a product of the system. We argue that the more advanced the educational and research 
organizations are in the system, the higher the chances for entrepreneurs to emerge. 
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4.2.4 The Crisis of 1990-94 
The period 1990-94 marks the second crisis of the Brazilian aircraft industry. While 
global recession caused value added for the global aerospace industry to decline by 
30%, Brazil was hit more severely. Sales plummeted by some 75% and exports by 80% 
from the level of 1990. Figure 4.6 does not only reveal the reduced production of the 
EMB-120 Brasilia, but also shows that there was a gap during which no new aircraft 
was introduced to the market. This therefore indicates a crisis of the innovation system.
 
83
 
The primary cause of the crisis was a daunting lack of financial resources. The 
preceding years saw the end of the military dictatorship and a financial and economic 
crisis in Brazil. The previous practice of financing new product development with 
government launch support was no longer an option. Financing R&D for a new regional 
turboprop plane from own resources was beyond the capacity of the heavily indebted 
Embraer, and collaboration with the Argentinean FAMA turned out to be too costly. By 
1994 R&D expenditures of Embraer exceeded 30% of its sales (Figure 4.9). The 
company had to reduce its workforce to less than half the 1989 levels.  
 
Figure 4.9 R&D Expenditure and R&D intensity of Embraer, 1983-2007  
(Million USD at constant = 2000 prices) 
 
Source: own compilation based on Embraer annual reports and Frischtak (1992) 
 
The survival of the production and innovation system was at stake. A more than 40% 
drop in patenting by foreign companies marks a significant lack of trust in the Brazilian 
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 See Frischtak (1992) for a comprehensive analysis of the crisis. 
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SSI (Figure 4.10). Although patents are not the most appropriate measure of 
innovativeness in the aerospace industry
84
, the trend of foreign companies patenting
85
 in 
Brazil is a crude indicator of technology flows and technological learning in the 
innovation system. Given a strict intellectual property regime, foreigner’s patenting 
activity reflects their estimation of local technological capabilities. During the 1980s 
nearly 40 patents a year were added to the stock (Figure 4.10), followed by a sharp, 
four-year interruption.  
 
Figure 4.10 Number of patents in the field of aerospace granted by year of application (1974-2007) 
 
Source: Brazilian Patent Office via Esp@cenet 
 
By that time, the technological challenges of aircraft manufacturing changed from 
priorities of fuel efficiency to cost reduction in all operational aspects, noise reduction 
and capacity increase (Sehra and Whitlow Jr 2004). The global industry had already 
introduced new ways to cut costs. These included the geographical expansion of supply 
chains and sharing development costs with component manufacturers, and the 
development of aircraft families with high commonalities between the different models 
produced. Embraer still vertically integrated all design and production phases and 
performed R&D activities in too many different directions (Frischtak 1992). In short, 
following an external political and macro-economic shock the Brazilian aerospace 
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 Patents are less important as indicators of innovative performance in the aerospace industry as 
compared to other high-tech industries such as biotech, since innovations are preferably protected by 
secrecy (Niosi and Zhegu 2005), which is a quite efficient given the high capital barriers. 
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 We distinguished patents in aerospace (classification B64) filed at the Brazilian patent office by the 
nationality of applicants. The two groups are: all-foreign, where there is no Brazilian applicant, and the 
rest, where there is at least one Brazilian applicant. Note that change in the trend can also be caused by an 
overall change in innovative performance of foreign firms. 
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industry lost its competitive edge and the innovation system was not able to help it 
regain. 
4.2.5 A radical change in the Brazilian sectoral innovation system  
The solution to overcome the crisis was a change in ownership that fundamentally 
altered the pattern of interdependencies in the sectoral innovation system. In 1994 
Embraer was privatized to a consortium of Brazilian enterprises and pension funds, led 
by the Bozano Simonsen Group, while the government retained a “golden share” and a 
seat on the board of governors.
86
 
Although the government did not use military procurement for launch support, it 
continued to fund part of Embraer’s R&D activities and exports87 (through FINEP, the 
Brazilian Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) and Banco do Brasil). At 
the same time, spin-off enterprises (with former Embraer employees) joined the local 
supply chain. Privatization resulted in capital injections as well as greater flexibility to 
sign partnership agreements to jointly develop a family of regional jets. But the most 
important organizational innovation to regain competitiveness was the creation of a 
system of risk-sharing partnerships (see Cassiolato et al. 2002; Marques 2004; 
Goldstein 2002a; Figueiredo et al. 2008). This was already the common practice of 
leading aerospace producers in Europe and the US who realized the need to cut costs by 
focusing on core competences and sharing R&D costs with component suppliers. 
Adoption of this new form of organization allowed shorter lead times due to parallel 
manufacturing, but also ensured that Embraer applied the latest technologies, given the 
fact that many of its partners were suppliers of the leading global producers. Embraer 
thus changed redefined its core competence as aircraft designer and system assembler. 
At the same time, this posed new challenges for other companies in the sector, who 
needed the capital and technology to compete with major foreign parts and components 
suppliers to win long-term contracts. 
The hallmark of the new period is the realization of the ERJ-145 regional jet 
program. It was already underway from the end of the 1980s, with numerous changes in 
designs. Interest in the design of a regional jet was already high at the 1989 and 1991 Le 
Bourget air shows. The project could not have been financed without privatization of 
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 The former founding CEO of Embraer, Silva was instrumental in the privatization of the company. As 
he noted in an interview (Silva 2009) that the company was not intended to be sold to foreign competitors 
and in many cases, personal relations helped convince investors. 
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 The PROEX export financing scheme was contested in a WTO trade dispute by Canada, but after the 
settlement a slightly modified version still remains in place (Goldstein and McGuire 2004). 
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Embraer and without four foreign companies, Gamesa (Spain), ENAer (Chile), Sonaca 
(Belgium) and C&D Interiors (USA) teaming up as risk sharing partners.
88
 The plane 
completed its first flight in August 1995 and was first delivered to ExpressJet in the US 
(the regional division of Continental Airlines). The US had been the biggest market for 
the ERJ-145s. The relatively low price, low operational and maintenance costs 
combined with the export financing scheme offered by BNDES and Banco do Brasil 
made the planes especially competitive over Bombardier’s CRJ series regional jets. The 
direct export financing and interest equalization program triggered harsh criticism by 
Bombardier that escalated to an intergovernmental trade dispute in 1996 between 
Canada and Brazil at the WTO.
89
 
Embraer made use of the family concept and introduced shorter versions of the ERJ-
145. The 37-seater ERJ-135 only differed in fuselage length. This latter model also 
appeared in a business jet configuration as Embraer Legacy. A transport model, an 
airborne early warning model and a remote sensing and a maritime patrol model were 
also introduced and sold to military operators on three continents. The high degree of 
communality allowed for reductions in design and certification time, in production costs 
as well as costs for training flight crew and operations for airlines. The ERJ-145 family 
has sold with huge success; over a thousand planes have rolled out in little more than a 
decade. 
It did not take Embraer long to start on the development of a family of even larger 
sized regional jets, the ERJ-170/190s, serving the 70-110 seats range. (Embraer’s 
marketing experts developed the “rule of 70/110”, the important commuter market 
underserved by other producers.) The idea of risk sharing partnerships was at the core of 
this program as well, with an even higher degree of integration and sophistication of 
strategic partners. The planes were truly co-designed by the partners, with Embraer 
taking a 45% stake in the project, and the rest taken by the 16 partners chosen in a 
competitive selection process. One of the biggest partners was GE, the producer of 
engines (a package worth around 20% of the plane price). Honeywell (a GE subsidiary 
by now) was responsible for avionics, Gamesa of Spain for the tail section and rear 
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 Gamesa was responsible for the production of the wings, engine nacelles, fairings of the wing and 
fuselage junction and the doors of the main landing gear; Sonaca for the production of the luggage, 
service and main doors on the fuselage, a front and rear section of the fuselage and the two motor pylons; 
ENAer produced the horizontal stabilizers and rudder controls; C&D Interiors designed and produced the 
interior of the passenger cabin and luggage compartment. For a visual depiction of division of labor, see 
Cassiolato et al. 2002, Fig.1, p.31). 
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 For a details recount of the “export subsidies saga”, see Goldstein and McGuire (2004). 
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fuselage. Liebherr supplied the landing gear and Kawasaki Heavy Industries of Japan 
was in charge of parts of the wing control surfaces made using composite materials and 
pylons. Indicating the efficiency with which Embraer engineers and management have 
“learned” to benefit from risk sharing partners, the project phases have progressed 
tightly according to schedule. The preliminary studies, partner selection, joint definition 
and development phases all involved intensive interactions between the partners, 
facilitated by the use of software allowing entirely digital design and data sharing and 
utilization of a Virtual Reality Center. These changes not only raised the level of 
technological precision, but also significantly reduced development time and costs. The 
80-seater ERJ-170 first flew in February 2002. After a two-year certification process, 
the first plane was delivered to LOT Polish Airlines. A slightly stretched version with 
88 seats, the ERJ-175 was introduced a year later. Another step forward was the launch 
of the ERJ-190 program in 2004. The first 110seater ERJ-190 flew in 2004, followed by 
the 122-seater ERJ-195 a few months later. The American low-cost carrier JetBlue 
became the launch customer with an order of 100 and option for another 100 planes. 
The 190/195 planes have a longer redesigned wing and greater engine thrust. With these 
planes Embraer has directly become a competitor of the larger plane makers Airbus and 
Boeing, challenging their smallest models (the A318 and the B717 and 737-600s 
respectively). 
Additionally, a fleet of business jets complemented the product list available from 
Embraer: the Lineage jet is an ERJ-190 with redesigned interior, while the Legacy 600 
is based on the ERJ-145, with increased range and performance. There is a new family 
under development: the smaller Legacies are newly made mid-light jets whereas the 
Phenom 100 and 300 are (very) light jets in production since 2007 and 2008. Table 4.2 
provides a historical overview of the aircraft produced by Embraer over 40 years.  
Embraer has been expanding its capacity; apart from the original plant (‘Faria 
Lima’) at the airport of Sao José dos Campos (near CTA/ITA), Embraer opened another 
site in Eugenio de Melo in 2001, specializing in the development and manufacture of 
tools and tubing, welded and forged parts, as well as large cabling projects. This site 
also hosts a school for the Engineer Specialization Program, a postgraduate, in-house 
interdisciplinary training for future aircraft designers. Another location, opened also in 
2001 in the State of Sao Paulo is the newly developed Gaviao Peixoto plant where the 
planes for the defense and executive markets are assembled. Neiva’s previous facility 
near the city of Botocatu is the third manufacturing center in the state. The most 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2016013
120 
 
important aerospace cluster nevertheless remains Sao Jose dos Campos, home to most 
of Embraer’s suppliers in the lower tiers, many of them spin-off of CTA or Embraer. 
Apart from the CTA-developed technology commercialized through the establishment 
of a new company, the streamlining of Embraer’s activities resulted in a number of 
employees creating their own company as service providers on the second or third tier.  
 
Table 4.2 The main products of Embraer 
Type (first flight) 
Production Specification 
Years Total nr. 
produced 
Seats  
(max) 
Range 
(nm) 
Maximum 
Speed (kts) 
Altitude (ft) 
EMB-110 Bandeirante (1968) 1972-90 500 19 1,060 250 22,500 
EMB-200 Ipanema agro (1970)  1972- 1,000+ 1 330 120 11,400 
EMB-326 Xavante  fighter (1957 / 
Aermacchi) 
1971-83 181 2 900 436 41,000 
EMB-121 Xingu (1976) 1977-87 141 9 1,270 250 26,000 
EMB-312 Tucano (1980) trainer 1983-98 320 2 1,000 242 30,000 
EMB-120 Brasilia (1983) 1985-98 330 30 550 300 32,000 
AMX (1984) fighter 1989-99 56 2 1,800 626 43,000 
ERJ-145 (1995) 1996-  
1,215 
 
50 1,320 450 37,000 
ERJ-135 (1998) 1999- 37 1,430 450 37,000 
ERJ-140 (2000) 2001- 44 1,630 450 37,000 
ERJ-170 (2002) 2004- 
682 
80 2,100 481 41,000 
ERJ-175 (2003) 2005- 88 2,000 481 41,000 
ERJ-190 (2004) 2005- 114 2,400 481 41,000 
ERJ-195 (2004) 2006- 122 2,200 481 41,000 
Phenom 100  2008- 
178 
6 1,200 390 41,000 
Phenom 300 2009- 8 1,970 453 45,000 
Source: own compilation based on Embraer.com, Frischtak (1992), Ramamurti (1987)  
Notes: number produced as of Q3 2010; includes commercial, executive and defense sales. 
 
The results of these institutional changes were remarkable. Between 1994 and 2000 
sales rose on the wings of the ERJ-145 regional jet family from less than 200 million to 
over 2.8 billion US dollars, more than 97% of which came from exports. Value added 
increased to 2.3 billion USD (Figure 4.11). But while Embraer’s absolute R&D 
expenditure increased, the R&D/Sales ratio decreased from over 30% to less than 5% 
(Figure 4.9), even though Embraer was developing a new family of planes. The larger 
E-170-190 product line can accommodate up to 120 passengers making Embraer a 
direct competitor of Airbus and Boeing in their smaller product lines. Embraer 
introduced over a dozen new models of regional and executive jets since the system 
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transition and became third largest manufacturer of jet aircraft worldwide in terms of 
delivery. 
  
Figure 4.11 Aerospace industry Value Added in Brazil, China and Indonesia,  
1970-2007 (Million USD at constant = 2000 prices) 
 
Source: Brazil: IBGE yearbooks, China: CNBS yearbooks, Indonesia: UNIDO yearbooks.  
Note: The following industry-specific conversion ratios were applied (updated or backdated to 2000): 
BRL/USD: 1.09 (see Chapter 4); CNY/USD: 4.6 (Szirmai et al. 2005); IDR/USD: 4201 (Stuivenwold and 
Timmer 2003). 
 
4.2.6 A new transition? 
Companies in the Brazilian supply chain benefited from the growth during the late 
1990s. However, the share of Brazilian content decreased with the new product line and 
between 2002 and 2005 value added fell back to 2 billion USD.
90
 There are several 
signs of shortcomings of the SSI that may signal some further changes, albeit less 
fundamental than those in the 1950-60s or in 1994.  
The Brazilian aerospace industry recovered from the post-9/11 demand shock 
relatively rapidly. However, the crisis of 2008-09 showed greater vulnerability of an 
industry dependent on regional and executive jets. The relatively outdated technological 
capabilities, the lack of sufficient credit lines and venture capital make it difficult for 
local SMEs to become competitive and join global supply chains as risk sharing 
partners (ABDI 2009). To boost the competitiveness of local SMEs is a major concern 
for the government. There is a growing consensus about the need to modernize the 
education and training system, to support innovativeness through new aircraft 
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development and procurement policies or offset agreements targeting the supplier chain 
to create a globally competitive center of excellence in aerospace.
91
 As a first response, 
in 2009 the government officially commissioned Embraer to development a military 
transport and tanker aircraft (the K/C-390).  
In the meantime, the global competitive landscape is changing and new planes need 
to be even more fuel efficient to reduce operations costs and greenhouse gas emissions. 
The latest large civilian aircraft designs use composite materials at an unprecedented 
scale, in which Embraer is lagging behind.
92
 The cost share of avionics in a new aircraft 
has reached unprecedented heights. Brazilian companies in these two rapidly growing 
technology domains have no frontier capabilities to offer for foreign system assemblers. 
In the regional aircraft market new players (including Comac in China, the Russian 
Sukhoi and Mitsubishi in Japan) have made significant investments to break the 
Bombardier-Embraer duopoly. Thus the competitiveness challenge might call for a new 
innovation system transition. 
We have yet to see major institutional changes in the Brazilian innovation system. 
What changed after the crisis was the launch of the military transport project which 
indicates a replacement of commercial investments with (potentially in the short term) 
public investments (to be phased out by export to the military market in the long run).  
4.2.7 Interrupted innovation in the Brazilian aerospace industry 
The overview of the history of the industry helped us identify historical turning points 
of interruption, crisis and transition. Such turning points (often not single moments but 
periods lasting several years) are the post-WWII crisis in the early 1950s, the creation of 
Embraer in 1969, the interruption following the financial crisis in 1989-90 and the 
transition connected to the privatization of Embraer in 1994. Using the interrupted 
innovation framework developed in chapter 5, the changes in innovation system size 
and performance are charted in Figure 4.12. 
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 Clearly indicated by recent detailed, comprehensive studies, see ABDI (2009) and Montoro and Migon 
(2009). 
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 When deciding for the use of composite materials, there is of course a tradeoff between production and 
spare-parts costs and operating costs.  
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Figure 4.12 The interrupted trajectory of the development of the Brazilian aerospace industry 
(1930s-2007) 
 
(Author’s compilation) 
 
1. From the 1950s until 1969, the growth in size of the system exceeded its 
performance growth, although both were positive. Size expanded due to 
technology inputs from foreign designers and the work of CTA and new skilled 
labor inputs from ITA. The performance increased owing to a few new designs, 
but as production was limited to a few small planes, we assume that less process 
innovation took place. 
2. A transition to another innovation system was finalized in 1969. A state-owned 
company was created that specialized in commercial and military aircraft 
development, production and marketing. Embraer became the single most 
important corporate actor in the system receiving most inputs into innovation.  
3. From 1969 and 1990, both the size and the performance of the system increased 
hugely. (This trend is not linear. The figures presented earlier showed that R&D, 
employees, new products, patents, and sales fluctuated from year to year.) Based 
on the relatively high global market share of two of Embraer’s commuter 
aircraft, we conclude that the performance of the innovation system was close to 
its frontier.
 93
 
4. The interruption between 1990 and 1994 is evidenced by the decrease in system 
size (due to decrease of R&D expenditures, employment and increase of debts) 
and performance (lack of new patents, new product sales or new process 
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innovation). It became clear to the major actors that a return to the old system of 
innovation would be insufficient to sustain competitive advantage. 
5. After 1994, both the size and the performance of the innovation system grew at 
an unprecedented rate, made possible by a transition to a new system based on 
strategic alliances in R&D as well as in production, which allowed the input of 
frontier technologies from the best global suppliers. The increase in size and 
performance was once again not linear (with a significant break in 2002-3), but 
overwhelmingly the trends were positive. 
6. The 2003 drop in value added indicates a new crisis in the industry. This 
primarily concerns companies other than Embraer (which still increased sales 
and export until 2007). However, Embraer’s R&D intensity remained at a low 
level. Until now, no fundamental institutional changes have occurred. 
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4.3 CHINA: Slowly transforming, parallel systems 
4.3.1 Introduction: from military to civilian innovations 
After entering the aircraft manufacturing industry in the 1950s,
94
 China has become a 
producer and – to a lesser extent – exporter of fighter jets (Figure 17), bombers and light 
transport aircraft during the Cold War (CIA 1972, Allen et al, 1995, Frankenstein and 
Gill, 1996). Since the 1990s firms of the Chinese aeronautical conglomerates have 
joined the global supply chains as manufacturer of commercial aircraft parts and 
components for western producers, including Airbus and Boeing (KPMG, 2004). In the 
last decade foreign manufactures (Embraer, Airbus) brought final assembly work to 
China and the Chinese company (Comac) designed and produced a prototype of a 
regional jet (Goldstein 2006). This marks the end of a slow transition that started in the 
late 1980s and established a dualist structure by today. The opening up of the military-
industry complex (MIC) and the expansion of civilian production brought along 
fundamental institutional and organizational changes in an industry that at some point 
during this process employed over half a million people. 
4.3.2 The Sectoral Innovation System in the emergent phase: an inward-looking 
innovation system 
4.3.2.1 Legacies of the Military-Industry Complex (MIC)  
China at its peak in the late 1970s was estimated to produce over 400 aircraft a year (see 
Figure 4.13). But despite the large quantities, Chinese military aircraft technology 
maintained at least a generation’s lag compared to the benchmark Soviet frontier 
technology, due to difficulties in acquiring the required technologies (Frankenstein and 
Gill 1996). Chinese design and production plants had to substitute the previously 
available Soviet technology through reverse-engineering after the 1961 Sino-Soviet 
split. The military-industry complex, created but also hindered by national security 
concerns, has never emerged as a fully functional sectoral innovation system. Unlike in 
Brazil where the aerospace industry concentrated around the single Sao Jose dos 
Campos cluster, at least a dozen of centers were created all over China involved with 
aeronautical R&D, maintenance and production work. The most important production 
facilities were located in Shenyang and Harbin in the northeast, Chengdu in the 
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southwest, as well as around Shanghai, Xian and Taiyuan. Aircraft factories oversaw 
hundreds of enterprises and also produced non-aviation products to utilize idle 
capacities. Productivity was not a major concern for the division of labor between these 
factories and multiplication of tasks was common due to lack of linkages between 
parallel projects. The organization of the industry showed a ‘satellite pattern’, decisions 
were made in Beijing and there was little interaction among the facilities. 
Supervision and coordination of R&D and production activities was the 
responsibility of the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National 
Defence (COSTIND), a body reporting both to the PLA as well as to the State Council. 
The only source of finance was the government (the Military or State Council), and the 
expenditures on various projects remained concealed. The production cycle of military 
aircraft is clearly influenced by political events (Figure 4.13). 
While research and engineer training was located around the production facilities, 
university level education in disciplines related to aerospace were offered in Beijing 
(BUAA) and Nanjing (NUAA). 
Over these inward-looking years Chinese plants developed significant technological 
capabilities to introduce mostly “new-to-the-country” innovations based on reverse-
engineering and local development efforts. The MiG-19 served as the base of two 
planes: the Shenyang J-6 fighter and the Nanchang Q-5 ground attack aircraft. The J-6 
shows little difference from the Mig-19s and was already introduced before the Sino-
Soviet split. This supersonic fighter jet was originally designed with a rather short 
operational life and Mikoyan administration in the Soviet Union replaced the Soviet 
version very soon. But in China the older version was the most advanced model fully 
available at the time of the split and this model was produced in great numbers in 
Shenyang
95
. A redesigned, ground-attack version of the MiG-19 included modifications 
such as a longer fuselage, larger wings, an internal weapons bay able to accommodate 
even nuclear weapons; air intakes put to the sides but fitted with the same “Liming 
Wopen” turbojet engine (a copy of the Soviet Tumansky). This model could reach 
higher altitudes, but lower speeds than the MiG-19. The prototype was already 
completed in 1960 in Shenyang. However, the project was moved to Nanchang in 1963 
after loss of political support. It first flew in 1965 and series production started in 1969. 
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About a thousand planes were built and a few were exported (as A-5s) to Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Myanmar and North Korea. 
China produced may fighter jets based on the Soviet MiG-21. Initially, the 
technology was intended to be transferred to China, but the political split affected this 
project as well. However, after two years, a new deal was signed in 1962. Some kits and 
parts were indeed delivered, but some of the documentation was missing and Chinese 
engineers had to fill in the gaps with a number of technical solutions until the plane 
could commence its first flight in 1966 (at which time the Cultural Revolution caused 
further delays.) Series production started only in 1980; more than 2,400 planes were 
produced over 25 years. Despite its older technology (the Soviet MiG-21 production 
ended in 1985), the J-7 (or F-7, according to its export name), became a rather 
successful model, owing much to the successful design of the original MiG-21 and the 
relatively lower price China asked. The J-6 and J-7s were China’s most successful 
export models. It is estimated that around 680 J-6s and 520 J-7s were sold, bartered or 
donated to other countries (including the trainer version). Figure 4.14 indicates the 
annual number of planes exported. 
The development and the modifications of the Shenyang J-8 fighter characterize the 
functioning of a defense-oriented innovation system. The original model largely 
resembled the MiG-21 based J-7, except for the larger delta wings, and additional 
engine and a very simple radar, making it a more capable interceptor at higher altitudes 
and faster speeds. It first flew in 1969, but it didn’t enter into serial production before 
1979 due to the Cultural Revolution. But the plane fell short of the expectations of the 
PLA Air Force (PLAAF) which was looking for all-weather, high-altitude, and beyond-
visual-range interception capabilities that could counter foreign spy-planes. Even with 
incremental improvements in armament and avionics during the 1980s, the plane 
remained an obsolete model. It is estimated that hardly more than 50 of these J-8I planes 
were produced. A radical modification of the original design involved replacing the 
nose air intake for the engines with side air intake, which allowed the solid nose to host 
a more advanced radar system. The resulting J-8 II showed little resemblance to the 
original J-8, except for the tail section and the delta wings. The new nose design was 
apparently largely inspired by the Soviet MiG-23 and Su-15 fighters. This model 
accomplished its maiden flight in 1984 and was developed parallel with the J-8I 
upgrades. The original 40 km radar range of the J-8IIs was replaced by 70 km radar in a 
1989 batch, still not capable of locating beyond visual range. Maneuverability was also 
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slightly improved and so were avionics. But incremental innovations in its modules 
were relatively slow during the 1980s and 1990s as cooperation with the US was 
terminated after the Tiananmen Square incidents. By the time upgrades were made with 
Israeli and Russian technology, the newer plane J-11 fighter was already available. 
Nevertheless, an upgraded version of the plane was displayed even as recently as in 
2006. It is estimated that 300-350 of these planes have been produced. 
 
 
Figure 4.13 Estimated Chinese Jet Fighter Production, 1960–1995 
 
Source: Allen et al. (1995 Fig.17, p.162) 
Notes: This figure clearly indicates the influence of major political events: the Sino-Soviet split of 1961, 
the Cultural Revolution during the late 1960s and the reforms of Deng Xiaoping following 1978. 
 
 
Figure 4.14 Military aircraft export from China, 1960-2008 
 
Source: SIPRI 
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Notes: Q refers to ground attack class, J refers to fighters; H refers to bombers and Y refers to transport 
aircraft. Double letters indicate trainer versions. 
 
4.3.2.2 The origins of commercial production 
Even before the more fundamental institutional changes of the 1990s, there were several 
attempts to diversify into the production of commercial aircraft. The Y-10 project of the 
1970s proved that Chinese engineers were capable of designing prototypes of a large 
civil aircraft that were able to fly.
96
 However, the project never reached the phase of 
series production and was cancelled in 1983. It did not turn out to be commercially 
viable and the Aviation Administration of China preferred to import more modern 
planes.
97
 
The MD-80 assembly project was the first bold sign of opening up the industry to 
western technology and commercial production. In 1985 China signed a license 
agreement with McDonnell Douglas (MD) to assemble the MD-80-series medium range 
jets in Shanghai. The airplanes were assembled from kits with some components 
fabricated in China. MD provided technical data, training, and on-site assistance. 35 
planes were produced between 1985 and 1994, mostly for the local market (30 were 
sold to China Northern and China Eastern and 5 were exported to the US). The 
Shanghai-produced planes were however repeatedly experiencing technical failures and 
clocked only a modest amount of flying hours. A renewed contract for 20 Chinese MD-
90s Trunkliner with an indigenously produced share of 80% resulted in only 2 planes 
delivered for China Northern in 2000. Despite low productivity
98
 and quality problems, 
the technology acquired through this endeavor gave a major push to the industry, and 
also found its way to the first indigenous design, the ARJ-21 regional jet. 
Quality problems hampered the success of a smaller-scale project, the multiuse 
turboprop military / civilian transport plane based on Soviet Antonov design, the Xian 
Y-7, later the MA-60. These projects already included collaboration with Western 
partners. But these Chinese made planes had limited success on the export markets since 
                                                 
96
 Although the Y-10 shows a high degree of similarity to the Boeing B-707, Chen (2009) argues that 
some of its features even outperformed the B-707. Thus it was innovation, not merely imitation. 
97
 It was based on 1950s technology and Boeing stopped producing the 707 in 1979 due to its high fuel 
consumption. Political reasons might also have played a part: possible pressure from the US as well as the 
end of influence of the ‘Gang of Four’ who were behind the project. 
98
 During the twenty years period of its production, the US produced over 1000 of these planes making it 
the third most successful jets in history, China only assembled 35, most of which were very soon 
grounded. 
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western administrations did not certify the planes due to quality concerns. Most of them 
were eventually grounded for safety reasons or lack of spare parts.  
 
4.3.2.3 Main features of the innovation system99 before the changes of the 1990s 
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF), established in 1949 has accounted for a large share of the 
Chinese defense budget and was a power center from time to time even competing with 
the State Council. It supervised much of the aeronautics, astronautics and pilot 
education. The Air Force Command College, Air Force Engineering University, Air 
Force Aviation University, Air Force Radar College, Air Force College at Guilin, Air 
Force College at Xuzhou, Air Force School for Noncommissioned Officers at Dalian 
and seven flying colleges were under its command. Defense budget was as high as from 
4.6% of the GDP in 1978 but declined to 1.7% in one decade
100
. After 1978, the new 
strategy subordinated defense development to be in the service of the country’s overall 
economic development; allowing commercial interests slowly to gain more solid ground 
from the mid 1980s. 
Self-reliance was the most primary goal underlying innovative activities in 
Communist China before the 1990s, for considerations of national defense. This did not 
preclude cross-border technology flows and even import of components such as jet 
engines for Chinese-made fighter jets, or the use of reverse-engineering of imported 
aircraft (in order not to reinvent the wheel). However, channels were not established for 
intensive knowledge exchange and new aircraft development was a rather isolated 
activity, resulting in innovations being at least a generation behind the global frontier. 
Secrecy prevailed and hampered interactions even between various regional aerospace 
clusters. A division of labor based on the purpose of aircraft
101
 resulted in duplications 
of tasks and lack of use of economies of scope – again, for strategic reasons. Financing 
of innovative and productive activities by the state council or the PLA was not 
transparent. 
                                                 
99
 The pragmatic approach of Radosevic (1997) to see socialist techno-economic networks as innovation 
systems is applicable in the Chinese case as well, since knowledge creation and new product design was 
an explicit aim, even if the incentives and a number of institutions differed profoundly from a capitalist 
system. 
100
 China’s National Defense in 2008  
< http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/20/content_10688124.htm> (Retreived: March 2009) 
101
 For example, fighter aircraft was produced in Shenyang, Chengdu, Guiyang and Nanchang; light and 
medium transport aircraft in Harbin and Xian; helicopters in Harbin and Jingdezhen; bombers in Xian. 
(Medeiros 2005)  (And this list is not complete). 
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4.3.3 The crisis in the inward-looking innovation system 
By the early 1990s, the mismatch between the institutions of the inward-looking 
innovation system and the competitive landscape became unsustainable. The Chinese 
aircraft manufacturing factories were producing a wide range of non-aviation products 
for which demand was higher. Locally designed planes were not economical and not 
safe to operate. Chinese fighters and transport planes would not sell on foreign markets, 
not even in the most price-sensitive Third World countries. Despite the remarkable 
efforts of producing and upgrading planes, the industry was increasing the gap 
compared to the technological leaders. The innovation system which was based on 
reverse-engineering and local improvements became increasingly inappropriate in a 
new era of opening trade relations.  
Yet producers were lacking state-of-the art knowledge, skills and financial 
capabilities to join the newly emerging global supply chains. At the same time, the 
demand for commercial aircraft in China grew sharply which could only be met 
realistically with Western imports in medium term. China had no options but to rethink 
its aircraft industry development strategy.   
4.3.4 A radical change in the Chinese sectoral innovation system in the 1990s 
The transition in the aerospace industry and innovation system was part of broader 
market reforms in China. The iterative but fundamental institutional changes in the 
national innovation system were correctly described as ‘adaptive learning’ (Gu and 
Lundvall, 2006). Certain heavy industries (including automobile) were consolidated in a 
shorter time, but aerospace remains a slow mover, given its sheer size (it employed 
nearly 600,000 workers in 1995) and the reluctance of chief financing and regulating 
bodies of the military to change their mindset. Following a 1991 order of the more 
demand-conscious government, the PLA was to shift 80% of defense manufacturing 
projects to commercial products (Allen et al, 1995), in order to tackle financial 
difficulties. The successful transition of other industries certainly serves as an example 
for aerospace. 
Demand for air travel spurred by growth of the economy has been a major driving 
factor of industrial change. Both international and domestic air traffic have increased 
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dramatically since the late 1980s.
102
 However, the Chinese air transport market remains 
tightly regulated and aircraft load factors and flying hours remain suboptimal, airport 
capacities underused (Goldstein, 2006). 
4.3.5 Empirical evidence of interruption and transition 
Value added: Aerospace value added exceeded 3.5 billion dollars in 1983. Following a 
sudden drop in fighter aircraft production, it fell to 1.9 billion by 1987 and continued to 
decrease to a low of 1.4 billion USD in 1996. After a turnaround, with an average 
growth of over 16%, the value added of Chinese aerospace industry exceeded the levels 
of the early 1980s by 2005. In 2010, it reached a historic 11.5 billion USD.  
Export structure: The composition of the industry’s exports shows a striking change. 
Between 1970 and 90, China exported an annual average of 0.5 billion dollars worth of 
(mostly locally manufactured) military planes. During the following two decades this 
amount was halved. At the same time commercial aircraft parts and components exports 
grew from some 100 million dollars at the beginning of the 1990s to over 1.8 billion 
USD by 2010. Nevertheless, China continues to import almost all of its commercial 
aircraft (Figure 4.15)
103
;  
 
Figure 4.15 Export of Chinese Military and Commercial Aircraft, 1955-2008  
(USD Millions, Constant = 2000) 
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
19
55
19
57
19
59
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
U
S
D
 M
ill
io
ns
, c
on
st
an
t =
 2
00
0
Commercial Aircraft
(of which: aircraft parts)
Military Aircraft
 
Source: SIPRI; UN COMTRADE (data only available from 1992) 
 
                                                 
102
 Passenger air traffic doubled between 1985 and 1990 to 23 billion passenger kilometer. This value 
nearly tripled by 1995 to 68 billion, still merely 10% of US air traffic. It further tripled to 200 billion by 
2005 and latest figures show 290 billion by 2008 (CNBS). 
103
 Import (of mostly complete aircraft) grew from 1.6 billion in 1992 to over 8.4 billion USD in 2006.  
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R&D expenditure: Data on aerospace R&D is available from 1995. From an annual 
average of 100 million USD until 1999
104
 the launch of major national aircraft 
development projects led by 2007 to an increased R&D expenditure of 430 million 
USD
105
. Similarly, there is also a significant increase in new product development 
expenditures starting from 2002 (China National Bureau of Statistics). Comparing 
industrial R&D expenditure to aggregate sales shows relatively little fluctuation and an 
increasing share of R&D (Figure 4.16).
106
 Most recent data from the Chinese Bureau of 
Statistical shows that R&D intensity increased significantly from 2010 to 2011, 
reaching 7.7% of sales. 
 
Figure 4.16 R&D Expenditure and R&D per Sales in Chinese Aerospace Industry, 1995-2007 (USD 
Millions, Constant = 2000) 
 
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics.  
Note: Annual Average exchange rate in 2000 of 8.28 CNY/USD was applied (IMF). 
 
Patent applications: Although we have repeatedly questioned the appropriateness of 
patent statistics as an indicator of aerospace innovation, the trend in patent levels may 
nevertheless provide some information on radical system changes. Indeed, there is a 
clear trend break in the patenting activity of Chinese large and medium sized enterprises 
in 2002 (Figure 4.17). From an average level of 90 applications a year which was 
typical for the late 1990s, the number of applications started to increase and reached 810 
                                                 
104
 For a comparison, during the same period Embraer alone spent the same amount on R&D. 
105
 In comparison, in 2000 the US spent a total of 10.3 billion USD on aerospace R&D, and 14 billion in 
2006. 
106
 At the same time the R&D staff levels decreased. In terms of full time equivalent, the level of R&D 
personnel in the sector decreased from a level of 30,800 in 2000 to 27,200 man years by 2007.  
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in 2007. The number of patents granted only started to show significant changes from 
2007 onwards.
107
  
 
Figure 4.17 Patent statistics of aerospace enterprises 
 
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics, various yearbooks 
Note: Data refers to patenting activity of large and medium sized enterprises defined by main activity 
 
4.3.6 The new Chinese aerospace innovation system 
4.3.6.1 Organizational restructuring of production 
These developments in the accumulation of technological capabilities were set against a 
dynamically changing organizational structure. The first sign of opening up the military-
industry complex was the creation of Aviation Industries of China (AVIC) 
conglomerate in 1993 (controlling all the aeronautic research and production facilities) 
and China Aerospace Corporation (CASC, in charge of the astronautic programs and 
missile system development and production). In July 1999, AVIC was split up into two 
enterprises with the goal to break up the monopoly and to foster competitiveness. AVIC 
I’s business focus was manufacturing commercial, interceptor, interceptor-bomber, 
tanker, transporter, trainer, and reconnaissance aircraft, while AVIC II focused on 
helicopter, transporter, trainer and general aviation aircraft. AVIC I was launched with 
104 enterprises, including 31 of the AVIC's original 34 research centers, and 281,000 
employees. It streamlined its structure by 2006 and had 230,000 employees and 
increased sales revenues. AVIC II was launched with 54 large and medium sized 
                                                 
107
 The lengthiness of the patenting process can well explain this lag. A further growth in 2008 is 
confirmed by the latest statistics on the sector, although not shown in the figure. 
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enterprises, 3 research institutes, 22 other subsidiaries, and 210,000 employees. Either 
intentionally or not, one significant result of the restructuring was increased labor 
productivity through reductions in the number of employees. Total employment in the 
sector shrunk in a decade from some 600,000 in 1995 to a stable 300,000 in 2005. Labor 
productivity increased from 5,000 to 24,000 US dollars per worker between 2000 and 
2007. These are evident signs of consolidation in the industry, even if this might not 
remain the final setup.
108
 
 
Figure 4.18 Employment and Labour Productivity Growth in the Chinese Aerospace Industry, 
1995-2007  
(Thousand USD at constant = 2000 prices) 
 
Source: Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, various yearbooks  
Note: for value added and labor productivity please refer to Chapter 3. 
 
In the complex, cascading structure of subordinate companies, many of the competences 
were doubled but the final products were more complementary to each other than 
competitive with each other, contrary to the initial intention (Nolan and Zhang 2002). 
This was partly the reason why the two sections remerged from 2009 into AVIC, but 
only after a significant overall reduction in employment by as much as 50%. The lack of 
transparency in the corporate structure has from time to time slowed down decision 
making processes, but has also allowed experimentations with new corporate forms, 
especially when it came to joint ventures with Western companies or subsidiaries 
created with a mission of commercialization of results.  
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 There is no information how much of the value added and employment is actually associated with 
aerospace activities. In 2005 Medeiros estimated that non-aviation business made up as much as 80% of 
AVIC’s turnover (Medeiros, 2005). Nolan and Zhang reported earlier that automobiles, components and 
motorcycles alone accounted for 62% of AVIC’s revenue in 1997. 
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4.3.6.2 Foreign aircraft manufacturers in China 
While importing most of the aircraft from Boeing and Airbus, China pushed for offset 
agreements to simultaneously support the technological upgrading of the industry. At 
first this meant less technology-, more labor-intensive parts (hardware) manufacturing 
at dozens of locations across the country.
109
 Production quality increased substantially 
as a result of these deals since Chinese suppliers had to deliver according to the same 
strict standards that other producers faced in the Western countries. The initial political 
necessity to produce in China soon became an economic advantage for western 
manufacturers as they reaped the benefits of lower labor costs (notwithstanding the 
initial learning costs). However, the Chinese contribution remained at the lower tiers of 
the earlier discussed, newly established global industrial structure. A first risk sharing 
partnership venture was only signed by a Harbin-based consortium and Airbus for the 
A-350 XWB project in 2009. 
The first foreign manufacturer to commence final assembly of jets in China was 
Embraer. The Harbin Embraer joint venture
110
 of 2003 allowed the Brazilian company 
to deliver ERJ-145 regional jets for the Chinese market by avoiding import taxes while 
the acquisition of certain parts manufacturing and systems assembly activities was a 
major technological boost for the Harbin plant. The results of the venture were mixed: 
by the end of 2009 only 33 of the original order of 50 jets were delivered
111
 although the 
company had a capacity to produce 24 a year and was expecting new orders. The last of 
the ERJ-145 is expected to be produced in 2011 and Embraer is now awaiting a 
government decision to approve a shift to ERJ-190 production. Otherwise it plans to 
close down the plant.
112
 The Chinese government is hesitant since the ERJ-190 would 
be a direct competitor of the locally developed ARJ-21 (Asian Regional Jet for the 21
st
 
Century), due to enter series production in the same time horizon. 
                                                 
109
 See KPMG (2004) or Boeing (2008). 
110
 The joint venture is special since it allowed a 51% majority ownership for a foreign company. For 
more details on the 50 million USD deal, see Goldstein (2006). 
111
 “Harbin-Embraer’s fate rests with China talks” AinOnline, 28 Jan 2010 
(http://www.ainonline.com/news/single-news-page/article/harbin-embraers-fate-rests-with-china-talks-
23599/) 
112
 “Chinese govt to decide on future for Harbin Embraer: Curado” Air Transport Intelligence News 25 
May 2010. 
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Airbus also established a joint venture for final assembly in China.
113
 Operations 
commenced in 2008 at the Tianjin final assembly line (FAL), a replica of Airbus’ 
Hamburg plant. The first A320 was delivered mid 2009. At the moment, production 
capacity is four aircraft per month. Airbus initially assembled aircraft from kits 
delivered from Europe, gradually changing to locally made parts.
114
 The total 
investment in the Tianjin FAL amounted to 1.47 billion USD
115
. While Boeing was not 
ready to take the risk of going to China, Airbus expects that the long term benefits of 
market access exceed the initial investments.
116
 
4.3.6.3  ‘Indigenous’ aircraft development 
Chinese ambitions to diversify into commercial aircraft development have increased in 
the 1990s. There seemed to be an agreement that the first step would be to gain access 
to advanced foreign technology, but there appeared to be little agreement on how to 
proceed. Although Chinese airlines showed the largest demand for aircraft with larger 
seating capacity, regional turboprops and jets were seen as a stepping stone for domestic 
producers and also as a means to provide access to remote cities with less traffic. The 
MD-90 Trunkliner project fitted in this strategy but failed due to quality deficiencies. 
Another project of the 1990s that failed to realize was the ‘Asian Express’. 
Originally a Chinese – South Korean joint venture from 1994, the Asian Express 
was supposed to be a regional jet in the 80-140 seat range. Following disagreements on 
the final assembly location and the share of the two countries’ stake in the project, the 
South Korean consortium withdrew from the collaboration in June 1996. AVIC of 
China then approached Singapore Technologies Aerospace and three European 
producers, Aerospatiale, Alenia and British Aerospace. Three partners, AVIC (with 
46% stake) Airbus Industrie Asia (39% stake) and ST Aerospace (15%) agreed to share 
the expected 1.7-2 billion USD cost of the project. The sides agreed to develop two 
models in the 95-125 seat range, the AE-316/7
117
. However, the partners did not share 
                                                 
113
 Airbus owns 51% share while the rest is divided by a consortium of AVIC and Tianjin Free Trade 
Zone. 
114
 Avoiding double shipment by directly using components i.e. wing boxes produced by Xian Aircraft 
Industry Group. 
115
 “Airbus delivers first China-made jet, underlining its Asian thrust”, Agence France Presse, 23 June 
2009. 
116
  Production is cheaper in China mainly because of (some) reduction in import taxes and duties. The 
lower labour costs in China are however not necessarily realized in the short run given the high training 
costs for local labor force and the cost of expatriates (125 of the 500 employees). (“Airbus’ China 
Gamble” Flight International 28 October 2008) 
117
 The name indicates that the plane was targeted to be a “little sister” of the Airbus A-320 family 
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the same dedication to realize the project. The Chinese industry was in a turmoil and 
expected to be shaken up, the future of AVIC and the trading company CATIC (China 
National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation) was uncertain. Although 
China was supposed to get the largest share, Xian and Shanghai were contending for 
production locations. Airbus officially communicated that the AE-31X was its preferred 
choice for the 100-seat range, it was already developing and collecting orders for the 
smallest member of the A-320 family, the “A-319M5”.118 Airbus was also hesitant to 
share technology with and shift production to China. Technology transfer seemed 
unavoidable since market surveys showed that airlines expected a high degree of 
commonality between the new plane and the A-320 family. At the same time, 
competition was increasing in the 100 seat segment as the aging DC-9s were requiring a 
replacement and Boeing was one step ahead with the B-717-200 readily available. In the 
end, the Asian Express project was cancelled in 1998, officially explained with financial 
reasons.
119
 It is rather interesting that although European producers were in desperate 
need to find a solution to save their regional aircraft projects, they eventually did not 
collaborate with China. The 1990s witnessed European plane makers such as BAe, 
Daimler, Fokker and ATR gradually losing competitiveness (among others to regional 
jets of Embraer and Bombardier). Producing in China would have, in the long run, 
reduced production cost, even if short term investments and training costs were high. 
The many explanations for the lack of trust on the European side include the existence 
of an arms embargo following the Tiananmen-square, concerns for national security 
concerns when sharing multi-purpose technology and concerns for job migration. 
The 11
th
 Five-Year Plan for 2006-2010 included the completion of the ARJ-21 
regional jet project and the launch of a large aircraft development project for civil and 
military use, supposed to fly by 2015.
120
 Although indigenous in name, both projects 
utilize global technological and investment capacities, following the risk sharing 
partnership practice of Western aircraft producers. The ARJ-21 project that started in 
2002 still reflects many of its local technological origins. Coordinated by a government-
led commercial aircraft company (ACAC, later COMAC)
121
, the four plants involved 
                                                 
118
 The code stands for A-319 minus 5 fuselage frames, eventually it became known as the A-318. 
119
 “Timeout in Asia” Flight Int’l, 5 Nov 1997; “Cut and Thrust” Flight Int’l, 9 Jun 1999. 
120
 “Official identifies eight goals for China's aviation, aerospace industry”, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 
9 Nov 2006 
121
 ACAC, or ‘AVIC-I Commercial Aircraft Company’ was a consortium of four main companies under 
the AVIC I conglomerate, designated to oversee the development, certification and marketing of 
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(Shanghai, Xian, Chengdu and Shenyang) were the same as the ones in the MD-90 
Trunkliner project. It is hard not to notice the resemblance of certain sections of the 
plane
122
. The largest share of development costs of the first regional jet project, the 
ARJ-21 were provided by the public aerospace R&D supporter COSTIND, but leading 
transnational companies participate in financing the development.
123
 The US Federal 
Aviation Authority (FAA) has been involved in the development process in order to 
facilitate certification. The fact that the “First Chinese Made Plane” will not bear “Made 
in China” tags only is an indicator of the maturity of Chinese design and organizational 
capabilities. The arrangement of acquiring technology and finance through risk sharing 
partnerships is similar to the strategy Embraer chose in the mid 1990s, but for the 
arrangement to work efficiently, private ownership of Embraer was crucial.  
The ARJ-21 made its maiden flight at the end of 2008 and four prototypes are 
currently undergoing tests. Series production and the establishment of a distribution 
network has not even begun when the government announced the plans to develop a 
large civil aircraft
124
 in the 168-190 seats category. The COMAC C-919
125
 would be a 
direct competitor of the smaller Boeing and Airbus jets (B-737 and A-320 family), 
bringing new turbulence to a consolidated duopolistic market.  China has yet to gain 
experience in setting foot on the international aircraft market, which involves winning 
the trust of passengers and airlines, establishing the maintenance, repair and overhaul 
network, and efficient supply chain management. This step is crucial to recover the 
huge sunk costs of development, and still requires vast investments domestically and 
overseas. 
                                                                                                                                               
commercial aircraft. In 2009 the company became part of COMAC, the ‘Commercial Aircraft 
Corporation of China Ltd’ established in 2008. 
122
  Highly similar parts include the nose, produced by Chengdu, the fuselage by Xian, the tail section by 
Shenyang or the horizontal stabilizers by Shanghai (Andersen 2008). The aircraft was thus aptly named 
Xiangfeng (flying phoenix), as it was revived from the ashes of the failed MD-90 Trunkliner. 
123
 Foreign partners include Antonov (wing design and testing), General Electric (regional jet engine 
development), Rockwell Collins (avionics), Hamilton Sundstrand (electric system and auxiliary power 
unit and fire protection system), Eaton (control panel), Liebherr (landing gear). Boeing has been 
providing engineering consultancy and cockpit design assistance. 
124
 ‘Large civil aircraft’ is a more appropriate term for this narrow-body jet than the often used ‘jumbo’, 
which normally refers to Boeing B-747s with a seating capacity in the range of 500. 
125
 The list of collaborating partners has not been finalized yet; currently Hongdu (Nanchang), Xian, 
Shenyang and Chengdu Corporations are the Chinese companies involved (“China’s Comac brings more 
suppliers in, Flight International, 24 Sept 2009”), while foreign companies already chosen include many 
of the ARJ-21 partners: General Electric, Hamilton Sundstrand, Honeywell, Liebherr Aerospace and 
Parker Hannifin (based on respective company press releases). 
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The Chengdu and Shenyang plants at the same time continued to produce enhanced 
versions of existing fighter jets and introduced new models, such as the Chengdu J-10
126
 
or the FC-1 Brave Dragon. This latter aircraft is a joint development project with 
Pakistan and is intended for low-cost military markets (Medeiros 2005)
 127
. A fighter-
bomber (JH-7) was developed in Xian during the 1980s and 1990s. Both the existing 
stock of aircraft and the latest developments represent is at least one generation behind 
the technological capabilities of the US while onboard systems and mass-production 
capabilities are still further behind. But the real competitor of China is not located in 
America but in Asia: “Right now, the only arms race China is really facing is with India, 
and [Beijing is] winning,” quotes the influential industry journal Aviation Week and 
Space Technology
 128 
with regard to the development of a fifth generation stealth fighter. 
4.3.7 Interrupted innovation in the Chinese aerospace industry 
4.3.7.1 Summary of the transition 
There were two different types of interruptions in the development trajectory of the 
Chinese aircraft industry. At the time of the first interruption that occurred during the 
initial learning years, a sectoral innovation system hardly existed. China was over-
reliant on one single external technology source and the vulnerabilities of such an 
arrangement became clear as soon as this channel “dried out”. Not until a new system 
was established (including educating, training efforts) could the tacit knowledge be 
recovered through reverse-engineering. But the inherent limitation of switching to an 
inward-looking strategy at such an early phase of development was that the innovation 
performance frontier remained unchanged (if not reduced). Yet this system was rather 
stable for more than three decades due to a variety of reasons. The national innovation 
system did not undergo radical changes, and the major actors and their incentives to 
innovate remained largely unchanged. 
                                                 
126
 The J-10 is an F-16-class fourth generation light fighter jet with fly-by-wire control and a Russian 
engine, launched in 1988, first flew in 1996. It is believed to have received direct technological input 
from the Israeli Aircraft Industries’ discontinued Lavi program (which received input from the F-16 
program), though it was denied by both parties as it would imply American technology transferred to 
China. (Medeiros, 2005 and “Chinese J-10 'benefited from the Lavi project”, Jane’s Defense News, 19 
May 2008; http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw080519_2_n.shtml ) 
127
 The aircaft’s Pakistani designation is JF-17 Thunder, and development partners included Chengdu 
Aircraft Industries Corp., the Pakistani Air Force and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex; is equipped with a 
turbofan engine from the Russian Klimov. Design began in 1994 but the aircraft first flew only in 2003, 
produced in limited numbers since 2007/8 in China and Pakistan, while modifications are still underway.  
128
. “China Promises New, Advanced Fighter”, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 Nov 2009.  
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The crisis of the inward-looking innovation system was caused by exogenous 
political and macro-economic changes in the environment in which forces endogenous 
to the innovation system played little if any role. The interruption can almost entirely be 
explained by China’s transition to a market economy. Yet the speed of the transition 
that took place in the aerospace industry was much slower than in many other industries 
that have become globally competitive by today. This points to sector-level institutional 
explanations. Even if market institutions only emerged gradually in the Chinese 
economy, the aerospace industry showed excessive institutional inertia. This of course 
hardly comes as a surprise in an industry that employed hundreds of thousands of 
employees, and where the role of the military remains influential. On the one hand, 
export is a good indicator of the transition; both in terms of total values and composition 
of the product portfolio. As the export of military planes dropped, parts and components 
slowly replaced and overtook them (Figure 4.15), revealing a greater integration in 
global supply chains. Increasing labor productivity since 2000 (Figure 4.18) on the other 
hand shows learning in the new system created during the transition. 
However, it is a Chinese peculiarity that old structures still survive parallel to new 
ones in a dualist style, even within regional clusters. This is due to the privileged 
position of national defense on the political agenda. The incentives differ hugely for 
units producing for the export markets and those for closed military installations. 
Openness in the innovative process has clearly increased in the commercial segment, 
indicated by the large number of foreign partners involved in the ARJ-21 project (and 
the readiness to involve foreign aviation authorities in the design phase). Self-
sufficiency is not an imperative anymore, even if a techno-nationalist rhetoric remains 
in place. However, foreign ownership of private enterprises is only allowed to a limited 
extent and excessive bureaucracy is still seen as a barrier to innovation. Military aircraft 
design and manufacturing remains still very closed and primarily domestically oriented. 
The transition mostly affected the civilian segment but left many areas open for further, 
incremental adjustments (i.e. 50% state ownership and approval requirement hinders 
fast corporate decision-making). 
The transition was governed (and cushioned from shock) by the government. But 
top-down forces (changed strategies and incentives) were met with initiatives of foreign 
producers who were ready to enter into offset deals to produce parts locally or even to 
bring final assembly to China. This, in the end, shows that the transition was carefully 
constructed in order to support the accumulation of technological capabilities. 
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Figure 4.19 Interruptions and transition in the Chinese aircraft innovation system 
 
(Author’s compilation) 
 
The evolution of the innovation system and the interruption is summarized in Figure 
4.19. The most relevant break in the trajectory (disregarding the Sino-Soviet Split of 
1961 and smaller, “uncharted adjustments” over the 1970s) is the interruption in the 
mid-1980s that lasted until the mid 1990s (the years given in the figure are only 
approximate in the case of the innovation system). The drop in the performance of the 
system refers to a drop in exports and value added as an ultimate indicator, even if some 
new (or modified) products were introduced during this period. The change in the size 
of the innovation system involves a slight contraction based on the assumption that 
military financial input into innovation decreased as the budget constraints became 
tighter and as foreign capital was not yet available. The number of employees working 
on innovation was also reduced. Even if the employees stayed within the same factory, 
many were reassigned to non-aviation engineering and design activities. Subsequently 
both public and private funding increased and so did innovative performance (as shown 
by an increase in labor productivity and exports). 
4.3.7.2 Remaining institutional challenges 
The aggregate, industry level figures hide much of the details and internal structural 
changes and remaining hurdles that make the transition process last so long. Detailed 
information is still unavailable, but we can to point out the main institutional challenges 
and blockages that impede improvement in the performance of the sectoral innovation 
system. 
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1. Ownership: Decision making in the state-owned conglomerates remains slow and 
heavily influence by political considerations; foreign ownership in the sector is 
generally limited to less than 50% (exceptions are the case assembly facilities of 
Embraer and Airbus).  
2. Competition: There is little competition between the producers.129 Military 
procurement policies create sufficient domestic demand for local products. The 
latest Chinese products have yet to make gains on the export markets. Competition 
does not appear to provide any incentives for the rather well-cushioned R&D 
institutes. Interactions between users and innovators are not very intensive. It is 
unclear how much freedom various plants and R&D institutes have in defining the 
directions of research on new technologies and to what degree is there a domestic 
competition for government funds. The protective measures continue to keep the 
industry’s marketing capabilities at a less advanced level, but this is compensated 
for by the size of the domestic market. 
3. Access to technology: the arms embargo by the USA and the EU remains to be a 
major restriction on the flow of technology.
130
 Technology flows between military 
and civilian projects are expected to be limited, although interaction among the 
geographically dispersed units appears to be increasing in both domains.  
4. Flow of skilled labor: labour compensation in the aerospace industry is not 
competitive with wages in coastal cities and foreign-owned enterprises; salaries are 
often still not determined by performance (Medeiros 2005). Considering 
international flows, brain drain is more common than brain gain.  
The transition of the innovation system will remain incomplete as long as many of these 
barriers are in place. The speed of institutional change is defined by the government 
(and the PLAAF) which is pursuing a strategy of slow transition. As long as the 
industry continues to grow at more rapidly than other industries and as long as the 
government has no problem in raising the vast sums for new R&D projects, there will 
be no incentives to make changes in the innovation and production system. 
  
                                                 
129
 Military production appears to be divided by “market segment” served: light fighter jets are produced 
in Chengdu, heavy fighters in Shenyang, bombers in Xian; commercial projects are shared among the 
biggest factories. 
130
 The EU appears to be more flexible in its interpretation of the embargo and is more ready to consider a 
reform. See more details at Sipri “EU arms embargo on China”, (URL: 
www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/controlling/arms_embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/china) 
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4.4 SINGAPORE 
4.4.1 Introduction 
With a total area of 697 square kilometers, with natural resources limited to the strategic 
waterways of the Strait, the deepwater ports and fish, Singapore may seem like an odd 
location for specializing in aerospace manufacturing. But history has proven that the 
size of the domestic market is not necessarily a limit to success and that a well-
functioning innovation system can also be built around repair and production in the 
lower tiers of the industry. Today Singapore is the second-largest latecomer aerospace 
producer in the emerging world in terms of value added and is outperforming even 
Brazil. Between 1977 and 2007 production in Singapore grew almost constantly, with 
the exception of only three years. This is highly remarkable for an open economy in 
such a volatile sector. The reason why Singapore managed to rapidly respond to crises 
indicates the existence of a flexible national as well as sectoral innovation system. 
4.4.2 Background: industrialization and innovation in Singapore 
By the end of the 1970s when the government of Singapore decided to promote the 
development of the aerospace industry, the manufacturing sector had already 
strengthened in the country. The two fundamental conditions for earlier industrial 
growth were, according to Aw (1991), political stability and an investor-friendly 
business climate. The People’s Action Party (PAP) has been continuously ruling 
Singapore with a high approval rating
131
 since before the island state’s independence 
from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965. A system of centralized decision making was 
established that prioritized economic competitiveness and efficiently fought corruption. 
National security was a high priority after the independence of Singapore given the not-
so-friendly relations with its neighbors in the initial years. The Economic Development 
Board (EDB) was established in 1961 for strategic planning and investment promotion. 
An Export Promotion Center was created in 1965 to provide export financing and credit 
insurance to exporters. Trade unions were kept under control by an umbrella 
organization which was incorporated into the PAP structure since 1964. The 1968 
Employment Act strengthened the power of employers and reduced the scope of 
collective bargaining for employees, but a tripartite forum, the National Wages Council 
was a main tool to incorporate workers in long-term growth negotiations since 1972. 
                                                 
131
 The party’s approval rating was 47% in 1963 and climbed to 84% already by 1968. 
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Aw (1991) emphasized that public housing for middle and lower classes was 
significantly reduced social tensions, and workers subscribed to investor-friendly 
reforms given a culture that valued thrift, readiness to change and social mobility, a free 
enterprise market, and consistent, predictable and rational policy making. The pro-
industrialization policies had tangible results. The average annual growth rate was 
13.2% between 1968 and 73, and 8.5% between 1974 and 82. This took place along 
structural transformation, in which the share of industry in GDP increased from 19% in 
1960 to 30% in 1980, and the share of manufacturing in GDP increased over the same 
period from 13% to 22.3%. In the 1960s, around half of the domestic investment was 
financed by national savings, which increased to over two-third from the 1970s. Foreign 
investment was most pervasive in the manufacturing sector, increasing from 45% in 
1966 to 81% in 1979. This was also spurred by the externalization of the American 
economy and an explicit US strategy to develop Southeast Asia to contain Soviet 
influence in the region. 
Singapore followed a strategy of export promotion and has targeted “non-
traditional” industries already since 1959. There was a shift in the promoted industries 
toward technology-intensive sectors (shipbuilding, electrical and non-electrical 
machinery, appliances and supplies, and transport equipment) in the mid-1970s. With 
the provision of loan subsidies, two-third of all loan commitments went into the 
promoted sectors by 1975. 
Education was aimed at technical and vocational training in order to create broad 
basic skills foundation. On-the-job training was a major tool. Since the early 1970s 
Singapore achieved near-full employment and migration policy was highly regulated to 
follow business cycles and skills demand.  
Put simply, Singapore’s economy underwent two major transformations over the last 
four decades. In the late 1970s, it shifted from labor-intensive to capital-intensive, high-
value-added manufacturing. Responding to increasing competition in the region and the 
lack of natural resources, Singapore recognized the need to shift to knowledge-intensive 
activities and services which occurred at the beginning of the 1990s. Explicit innovation 
policies and strategies were devised by the EDB and a National Science and 
Technology Board (NSTB) was established in 1991 to implement them in 2-year 
technology plans. The government was also pushing for reforms in higher and vocation 
education. Already since 1978 Singapore has been systematically monitoring R&D 
activities. In the 1990s, strong incentives were offered to boost total R&D expenditures 
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to above 2% of the GDP by the year 2000. A national innovation system relied on 
intensive interactions between the private sector, the EDB (which was responsible for 
innovation and FDI strategies), and the NSTB (which was renamed to Agency for 
Science, Technology and Research or ‘A-Star’ in 2002). In this structure, strategic 
planning meetings were held regularly since 1987 and competitive challenges could be 
reacted upon rather quickly. Information exchange was also intensive between 
employers, employees and the state agencies in a corporatist, tripartite structure (Yun 
2004).  
 
Table 4.3 Main indicators on the national innovation system of Singapore, 1990-2009 
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Gross Expenditure on R&D (USD mln)a 382 780 1,746 2,658 3,271 
GERD / GDP (%) 0.81 1.11 1.85 2.19 2.28 
Business Expenditure on R&D / GDP (%) 0.44 0.71 1.15 1.45 1.41 
Researchers in Science and Engineering 4,329 8,340 14,483 21,338 26,608 
Patents Owned n.a. 256 1,268 3,475 6,067 
Scientific and technical journal articles 572 1,141 2,361 3,611 3,792b 
Hi-tech exports’ share in Mfg exports (%) 39.7 53.9 62.6 56.6 50.8c 
 
Average Annual Growth rates (%) 
  
1990-95 1995-2000 2000-05 2005-09 
Gross Expenditure on R&D 
 
15.3 17.5 8.8 5.3 
GERD / GDP 
 
6.5 10.8 3.4 1.0 
Business Expenditure on R&D / GDP 
 
10.0 10.1 4.7 -0.7 
Researchers in Science and Engineering 
 
14.0 11.7 8.1 5.7 
Patents Owned 
 
n.a. 37.7 22.3 14.9 
Scientific and technical journal articles 
 
14.8 15.7 8.9 2.5 
Hi-tech exports’ share in Mfg exports 
 
6.3 3.0 -2.0 -3.5 
Sources: National Survey of R&D in Singapore 2009, Agency for Science, Technology and Research; 
World Development Indicators Online 
Notes: a) USD million in constant 2000 prices; b) Data refers to 2007; c) refers to 2008 
 
Table 4.3 gives a general overview of the results of the innovation policies. Between 
1990 and 2009 R&D expenditures increased 6-fold. Compared with GDP, total R&D 
expenditures increased from 0.81 in 1990 to 2.28. After the rapid growth in key 
dimensions of the innovation system in the 1990s, there is a slow-down in the new 
millennium, but the growth is still impressive in light of the several crises that hit the 
outward-oriented economy over the last fifteen years, from the Asian financial crisis 
through 9/11 and the SARS crises to the most recent global financial crisis. 
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4.4.3 The development trajectory 
4.4.3.1 The emergence of the industry (1970s – 1980s) 
From the early 1970s onwards, Singapore capitalized on the growing demand for 
aircraft servicing and maintenance over the years of economic growth of the island
132
. 
Aerospace was given a priority industry status due to its high value-added, skill 
intensive nature (along other industries such as electronics, computers or medical 
equipment). The government formulated a more realistic aim for aerospace 
manufacturing than neighboring Indonesia. In addition to servicing the fleet of the 
Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF), companies were to build up capabilities in 
commercial maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), and parts and component 
manufacturing. Also, Singapore was to become the regional aviation headquarters for 
Southeast Asia. This was intended to provide a mixed source of technology and 
investment in the emerging industry. RSAF was an important customer for maintenance 
and upgrade services of its fighter and trainer fleet, and the growing East Asian 
commercial aviation market was supposed to provide demand for a new regional MRO 
hub that could benefit from its strategic location. 
However, attracting foreign investors did not prove to be very successful during the 
1970s. According to Hill and Pang (1988), this could be explained by four factors: (1) 
lack of a regional market for components; (2) difficulty in sourcing raw materials; (3) 
lack of a bilateral agreement with a foreign certifying authority (e.g. the Federal 
Aviation Authority of the US);
133
 and (4) uncertainty about the availability of skilled 
labor force.  
The government’s systemic response was a reform package in 1979. Incentives were 
offered to invest in the priority industries, including corporate tax exemption for the first 
five years after production start-up.
134
 In order to attract a skilled labor force, a 
corrective wage policy was implemented and education and training institutions were 
expanded, especially in fields of science and engineering. A bilateral Airworthiness 
Agreement was signed with the US in 1981 to mutually accept national certification. 
                                                 
132
 During the 1960s, Singapore was still a low-cost manufacturing location with a rather low industrial 
base. According to Wong (2003) manufacturing accounted for 13% of GDP in 1960 and 28% in 1980. 
133
 Without an agreement to mutually accept national certification, companies had individually to obtain 
certification from national and foreign authorities. For instance, the predecessor of ST Aerospace became 
an FAA certified repair station in already in 1973. 
134
 “Singapore attracts more” Flight International 4 Jan 1986 
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Further important steps were the organization of the Asian Aerospace Exhibitions 
starting in 1981 and the opening of a new airport at Changi.  
In 1981, aviation contractor firms formerly owned by the Ministry of Defense were 
reorganized into the newly formed Singapore Aircraft Industries (SAI). SAI consisted of 
five subsidiaries and two associate companies.
135
 The most important of these was 
SAMCO, which was established in 1975, with a profile in avionics and systems 
overhaul. As shown in Table 4.4, SAI has quickly accumulated capabilities to upgrade 
fighters and trainers and manufacture trainers and helicopters under license. It was 
assigned to refurbish Douglas A-4 fighters and trainers. By 1985 it had modernized 
some 80 plains of this type for the RSAF. In 1985 it was the first company outside Italy 
to receive a license to assemble the Marchetti S-211 jet trainers. In 1986 SAI also 
successfully accomplished the re-engining of an A-4 with a General Electric (GE) 
turbofan. The company was subsequently contracted by the RSAF to re-engineer and 
upgrade avionics on another 50 of these fighters and trainers. During the early 1990s, 
further refurbishment programs involved converting 28 F-5 fighters to reconnaissance 
configuration and upgrading the rest of the fleet with state-of-the-art radar, avionics and 
weapons delivery systems.
136
 The refurbishment upgrading projects provided 
opportunities for technological collaboration with a number of established aerospace 
companies, including Douglas, Northrop and GE from the US and Aermacchi and 
Galileo Avionica from Italy.  
Already by the end of the 1970s SAMCO and the Helicopter Division of French 
Aerospatiale established a joint venture (Samaero) at the Seletar Airport to provide 
helicopter maintenance services in the region. The oil exploration activities in the region 
and military procurement by RSAF offered a growing market for utility helicopters. An 
important milestone was the local assembly of 17 Aerospatiale’s medium-sized AS-532 
Cougar and AS-332 Super Puma models from kits between 1985 and 1988. During 
1991-92 the smaller AS-350 Squirrel and 550 Fennec helicopters
137
 were assembled 
from kits in Singapore.  
                                                 
135
 These included: Singapore Aerospace Maintenance Company (SAMCO), Singapore Aerospace 
Manufacturing (SAM), Singapore Aero-Components Overhaul Company (SACO), Singapore Electronics 
& Engineering Ltd (SEEL), Singapore Aerospace Warehousing and Supplies (SAWS), Singapore Aero- 
Engine Overhaul Ltd (SAEOL), and the Samaero company (“Singapore attracts more” Flight 
International 4 Jan 1986).  
136
 For details see “Gradually Global” Flight International: Asian Aerospace Special 19-25 Feb 1992 
137
 The AS-332 and -532 models, as well as the AS-350 and -550 models are structurally the same; the 
designation AS-5.. indicates military use, AS-3.. indicates civilian use. 
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At the same time, investment incentives as well as the rapidly increasing volume of 
passenger- and cargo air traffic had positive effects on the commercial segment of the 
industry. Between 1973 and 1990, air freight increased at an average rate of 20%, the 
number of passengers carried increased at an average rate of 11% (see Table 4.5). In the 
aerospace sector, the number of firms doubled to 18 between 1980 and 1985.   
  
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2016013
150 
 
Table 4.4 Major local assembly and upgrading projects at ST Aerospace (1974-2007) 
Aircraft Model Collaborating 
Company (HQ 
Country) 
Total 
Nr. 
Built 
Years of 
Production 
Notes 
Fighters/Trainers     
  A-4B Skyhawk Douglas (USA) 32 1974-77 modernized with US components  
  A-4C Skyhawk Douglas (USA) 40
u
 1980-81 modernized with US components; 
license received from Douglas 
  A-4B Skyhawk Douglas (USA) 8
 u
 1983-84 upgraded with US components to 
trainers 
  S-211 trainer Marchetti 
/Aermacchi/(I) 
24 1984-87 assembled under license 
  A-4B Skyhawk Douglas; General 
Electric (USA) 
24 1989-90 Re-engined; modernized with US 
components  
  F-5 Tiger Galileo Avionica  
/Finmeccanica/ (I);  
Elbit (ISR) 
28 
 
40
 u
 
1990 
 
1994- 
Converted to reconnaissance 
configuration 
Upgraded with new radar, avionics 
and weapons systems;  
Subsequently (1998) offered upgrade 
service to Turkey and Brazil 
  F-16C/D BAe Systems (UK)  1996- Cockpit avionics upgrade to ‘Falcon 
One’ 
Transports     
  C-130 Hercules Rockwell Collins (USA) 10 2007-(14) Avionics; systems upgrade (also 
exports upgrade service for 
Indonesia) 
Helicopters     
  AB-205 Bell (USA) 6 1984 Modernized; second-hand from 
Bangladesh and Kuwait 
  AS-332, Super Puma, 
  AS-532 Cougar 
Aerospatiale 
/Eurocopter/ (F) 
17 1985-88 assembled from kits under license 
  AS-350 Squirrel,  
  AS-550 Fennec 
Aerospatiale 
/Eurocopter/ (F) 
20 1991-92 assembled from kits under license 
  EC-120 Eurocopter (EU) and 
CATIC (PRC) 
 1990- Co-development; 15% stake 
  AS-332 Super Puma   2002- Upgrade 
Notes: (u) number is unconfirmed; ST Aerospace includes Singapore Technologies Aerospace and its 
predecessors 
Sources: SIPRI; Flight International, various articles 
 
Table 4.5 Growth of passenger and cargo air traffic in Singapore, 1973-2012 
 1973 1985 1990 1995 2000 2010 2012 
Registered carrier departures 21,300 31,100 30,500 51,600 71,042 128,829 154,429 
Passengers carried (million) 1,249 4,912 7,046 10,779 16,704 24.8 29.1 
Air freight, (million ton-km) 68 981 1,652 3,687 6,005 7,724 7,507 
Source: World Development Indicators Online 
 
Employment in aerospace increased from 2,761 workers in 1980 through 4,000 in 1985 
to 5,676 in 1990. Competitive wages (with an average annual growth of 9% between 
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1981 and 1985) attracted large numbers of foreign staff during the initial years, who 
were slowly replaced by locally trained skilled labor. As Figure 4.20 shows, aerospace 
production (which includes MRO as well as parts and components manufacturing) 
increased substantially during the early years. In 1980 aerospace value added was 192 
million US dollars, in 1985 it was 545 million, and it peaked at 651 million in 1988, 
with an average annual growth of 17% over the period 1980-88. Between 1980 and 
1985 exports increased from 106 to 355 million US dollars, at an average rate of 29% 
per year. By 1990 Singapore’s exports increased to 528.7 million dollars. Singapore was 
still a net importer, mainly due to the new aircraft and equipment purchases of 
Singapore Airlines. According to Pang and Hill (1992) aerospace imports were more 
than 50% higher than exports in 1981 and 1985.  
The aerospace industry’s performance was equally remarkable in comparison with 
other latecomers. In 1983 Singapore forged ahead of the aircraft designer Brazil in 
terms of value added (332 vs. 301 million US dollars). The difference is even greater in 
terms of labor productivity, given that Singapore achieved this value added level with 
1/3
rd
 of the labor force of Brazil. Already by 1981 the level of labor productivity in the 
latecomer Singapore (81.1 US dollars per person engaged) was higher than in the US 
(72.9). This was of course achieved by concentrating on the MRO segment and on one 
cluster, while the US had a more diverse structure. 
 
Figure 4.20 Gross Output, Value Added and Employment in the Singapore Aerospace Industry, 
1977-2011 
Sources: UNIDO, Hill and Pang 1988, Singapore Statistics 
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Box 6.1 Introduction to the civil aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul market 
The civil MRO market comprises of four segments. We provide a brief overview of the nature and 
frequency of the work they entail, the cost structures, and the type of companies involved in the activity. 
Airframe heavy maintenance refers to what is called as “C and D-checks” in commercial aviation. C-
checks include a detailed inspection of the airframe and aircraft components, and corrosion prevention. C-
checks are due after 2,500-3,000 flight hours and may require 2 to 4,000 man-hours work, usually takes 3 
days. D-checks refer to a comprehensive structural inspection and overhaul of the aircraft and can take up 
to 30 days, depending on the size of the aircraft. Since airlines can hardly afford keeping planes on 
ground for such a long period, they divide the work and carry out the inspection and overhaul in the form 
of ‘C1-C4-checks’. All of these operations are carried out mainly by aircraft operators directly or through 
a subsidiary (still around 75% of the global MRO industry), and by independent MRO providers. 
Airframe heavy maintenance accounts for around 18% of global MRO turnover, nearly 70% of which is 
labor cost and 20% is material costs, such as solvents, fasteners and standard parts and airframe parts. 
Replacement parts, or “rotables” are often provided by airlines. 
Line maintenance refers to the most frequent, lighter checks carried out on a daily basis in order to 
ensure that the aircraft remains flight worthy. These are the so-called transit checks, daily and weekly 
checks, A and B checks, which include simple visual checks, trouble shooting, defect rectification, 
overnight maintenance and component replacement. Providing these services accounts for one-fifth of all 
MRO revenues. Line maintenance is almost entirely done by airlines themselves. In about 10-15% of the 
cases they outsource it to subsidiaries or other contract agents. This is overwhelmingly a labor-intensive 
work, material costs incur expendables and consumables. 
Engine overhaul is the largest segment, accounting for around 40% of global MRO turnover.  It aims at 
restoring designed operational conditions of an engine according to performance guidelines established 
by the manufacturer. This is carried out by disassembling, inspecting the engine, repairing or replacing of 
parts if needed, re-assembly and testing. Some “life-limited parts” have a prescribed replacement interval; 
otherwise engine overhaul takes place on an as-needed basis. The frequency of engine overhauls varies 
largely, between 4.5 and 24 thousand engine hours, similarly to the costs, which could vary between 0.45 
and 5.5 million dollars. Materials account for almost two-third of the costs. Engine overhaul is carried out 
mainly by original equipment manufacturers (44%), followed by aircraft operators (25%), independent 
companies (13%, such as ST Aerospace, or Standard Aero, MTU, SR Technics, Aerothrust, etc.) and 
airline subsidiaries (18%, i.e. Delta Tech-Ops, Air France Industries and Lufthansa Technik).  
Component maintenance, repair and overhaul activities amount to around a quarter of the global 
MRO industry. These involve the maintenance, repair and overhaul of the main systems, including wheels 
and brakes, avionics, auxiliary power unit (APU), fuel systems, hydraulic power, flight controls, thrust 
reversers, landing gear, electrical systems, on-board environmental control and entertainment and other 
systems. Wheels and brakes are exposed to the heaviest duty and this is the largest cost item in MRO, 
followed by avionics and APU. These three activities account for 45% of the segment’s turnover. 
Component MRO is the sub-market with the lowest concentration of firms, given the relatively higher 
competition on lower tiers in the aerospace supply chain. Original equipment manufacturers are the most 
important actors in the APU, avionics and fuel systems sub-segment, the rest is dominated by airlines 
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providing in-house MRO or outsourcing it to subsidiaries or independent firms. Material costs are more 
important than labor costs when it comes to component MRO, especially in the case of wheels and 
brakes, APU, hydraulics and flight control systems and fuel systems. The most labor-intensive activities 
are electrical, landing gear and thrust reverser MRO. Specialist services are most important in the 
avionics sub-segment. 
Source: Aeronautical Repair Station Association, 2009, “Global MRO Market Economic Assessment”138  
4.4.3.2 The emerging sectoral innovation system  
By the late 1980s, the Singapore aerospace industry accumulated capabilities to locally 
assemble older generation fighter and trainer aircraft, learned to upgrade them in 
collaboration with US manufacturers. It also gained capabilities to assemble and repair 
helicopters. It became a competitive MRO hub in South East Asia, receiving 
certifications not only for aircraft in the fleet of RSAF but also for the growing civilian 
fleet of the state-owned Singapore Airlines
139
.  
Evidently, aerospace firms in Singapore were actively learning to apply advanced 
technologies to assemble and modify technologically complex aircraft that were at least 
‘new to the country’. MRO firms of Singapore learned to work efficiently and at 
competitive rates. For a comparison, repair and overhaul man-hours were reported to be 
16-25 US dollars in Singapore, in comparison with 25-50 dollars in the US and 30-45 
dollars in Europe.
140
 From the 1980s the industry depended not only on military demand 
but also on the rapidly growing commercial market. The primary channels of 
technology acquisition were foreign direct investments and licensing. The 1980s 
brought capabilities through foreign investment, especially from the US (air frame 
structures, systems and equipment MRO, manufacturing of turbine blades, compressors 
and landing gear). Singapore Aerospace was the main military producer, but a number 
of other transnational companies such as Sundstrand, Honeywell and Aerospatiale 
(Eurocopter) located a regional headquarter in Singapore which increasingly used local 
suppliers for production of smaller parts and the provision of engineering services. 
The emerging sectoral system of innovation in aircraft was embedded in an 
emerging national innovation system which provided a strong knowledge base in 
science and engineering, access to foreign experts but also to a growing pool of locally 
educated, competitive workers. The government provided strong incentives for start-up 
                                                 
138
 URL: http://www.arsa.org/files/ARSACivilAircraftMROMarketOverview-20090821.pdf; retrieved: 18 
Feb 2011 
139
 The Engineering Division of Singapore Airlines was responsible for the maintenance of its fleet which 
by the end of the 1980s consisted of Airbus A300s, A310s, B747-200 and -300s, B757s and DC-10s. 
140
 “Singapore aerospace sprouts wings” Aerospace America, October 1986 
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companies in forms of tax holidays, investment allowances, training grants and 
investment guarantees. The Loyang Industrial Estate near Changi airport was the first 
aerospace industrial park which provided ready-built premises and a good infrastructure 
for new companies. The strong education system offered a full spectrum of vocational, 
technical and engineering programs.  
The emergence of the national and the sectoral innovation systems were carefully 
designed by the government with a goal to benefit from high-value added, high-wage 
jobs in engineering-intensive activities. The sectoral system was designed to make 
benefit of Singapore’s geographical location. These included the economic and air 
transport growth in the Asia-Pacific region, the cultural connections with China, and 
airlines’ need to cut costs through a low-cost maintenance location and product support 
center.  
Evidence that the innovation system has emerged is indicated by its ability to 
manage its knowledge resources in times of economic shocks. The system, unlike in any 
other emerging countries, learned quickly to react and shift to new, more competitive 
areas. 
4.4.4 Interruptions 
The most intriguing feature of the emergence of the aircraft industry of Singapore is the 
absence of long-lasting crises during the 1980s and 1990s. The sector was rather 
successful in avoiding two potentially severe crises of macroeconomic origin. In 1985, 
the disproportionately larger growth of wages compared to productivity caused a 
decline in competitiveness and slowed down export growth and foreign investments. 
Hill and Pang (1988) argued that apart from a drop in exports and imports, the industry 
was relatively unaffected, owing to the instant intervention of the government. We can 
also see that trainer upgrading and helicopter assembly activities provided sufficient 
orders for the industry during this time. The crisis had no effect on value added, which 
was in fact growing by 38.5% in 1985 primarily due to the defense industries. The 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 had also relatively limited impact on Singapore in 
comparison with its impact on aircraft innovation systems in other countries (see 
below).  
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Table 4.6 General Statistics of the Singapore Aircraft Industry (1977-2011) 
Year 
Value 
Added 
(USD 
mln) 
Gross 
Output 
(USD 
mln) Empl. 
Labour 
prod.; 
(1000 
USD/ 
emp.) 
Wages / 
Empl. 
Change 
(%) 
Invest-
ments 
Business 
R&D 
(USD 
mln) 
Number 
of firms 
Export 
Total 
Export 
Parts and 
components Imports 
1977 58 77 1,400 41.8 
 
30.1  
    1978 146 193 1,900 76.9 
 
11.6  
    1979 185 244 2,340 79.0 
 
36.6  
    1980 192 253 2,761 69.4 
 
18.2  
 
106
  1981 207 262 2,535 81.8 
 
36.8  10 99 
  1982 261 335 3,169 82.3 10.4 79.1  11 149 
  1983 332 435 3,494 94.9 1.6 6.4  17 220 
  1984 393 499 3,898 100.8 14.0 37.9  17 255 
  1985 545 692 3,998 136.2 9.7 
 
 18 355 
  1986 605 733 4,111 147.1 -7.6 
 
 19 0 
  1987 607 757 4,343 139.8 5.5 
 
 21 0 
  1988 651 814 4,659 139.7 2.9 
 
 20 419 
  1989 388 650 5,121 75.8 3.0 75.0  22 642 338 1,604
1990 403 759 5,676 71.1 1.5 102.6  26 529 347 1,211 
1991 403 769 6,259 64.3 6.3 81.4  29 394 290 1,633 
1992 575 1,057 7,915 72.7 23.3 178.9  32 402 348 1,769 
1993 638 1,105 8,745 72.9 -1.9 160.1  33 285 270 1,989 
1994 653 1,138 8,736 74.7 5.6 130.1 7.9 36 259 218 1,806 
1995 673 1,179 9,214 73.0 2.4 108.5 7.2 39 414 292 1,824 
1996 732 1,278 9,012 81.3 5.8 83.7 4.4 39 575 410 3,213 
1997 974 1,949 10,402 93.7 1.4 92.3 9.4 45 705 553 3,381 
1998 854 1,997 10,831 78.9 -3.3 128.8 14.7 40 619 488 2,686 
1999 1,004 2,255 10,093 99.5 19.7 146.3 12.2 43 488 456 2,281 
2000 1,034 2,391 10,334 100.1 1.9 160.8 11.7 44 670 534 1,152 
2001 1,364 2,951 11,142 122.4 -5.0 232.7 11.2 46 831 455 3,721 
2002 1,513 3,273 11,278 134.2 9.3 159.1 18.4 49 901 526 3,018 
2003 1,414 3,316 12,931 109.4 -0.4 170.7 22.0 54 1,122 744 3,654 
2004 1,662 3,892 14,584 114.0 2.9 
 
11.0 68 1,141 952 3,655 
2005 1,880 4,508 16,493 114.0 -3.6 
 
15.0 63 1,334 993 3,325 
2006 2,067 5,253 18,169 113.8 1.2 
 
16.5 68 1,987 1,609 5,021 
2007 2,121 5,432 18,777 113.0    19.0  59 2,580 2,090 4,969 
2008 2,071 5,314 18,115 114.3   35.0 70 3,057 2,582 7,142 
2009 2,078  19,545    32.9  3,233 2,927 6,284 
2010 2,142 5,410 18,529 115.8     3,692 3,453 4,390 
2011 2,347  18,581         
Sources: Singapore Statistics; UNIDO; A*STAR Singapore 
Notes: values in US dollar at constant prices 
 
4.4.5 Smooth transitions 
By the time the global industry faced by far the most severe crisis in 1990, Singapore 
had already initiated a fundamental overhaul of its aerospace industry and innovation 
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system. The overhaul was triggered by the declining sales and value added experienced 
in 1989 due to the underperformance of the military segment. In 1989 value added 
dropped below 1984 levels, sales below 1985 levels, labor productivity declined by 46% 
in a single year. Singapore was quick to realize that the global competitive environment 
was transforming towards greater internationalization. It also saw the limits of its 
domestic market and the growth potential of the Asia Pacific region. This realization led 
to a new strategy which implied steering away from the defense industries and 
expanding the commercial segment. Singapore rather swiftly and efficiently introduced 
measures to rejuvenate its aerospace industry by privatization, reorganization and 
internationalization of its largest holding, Singapore Technologies
141
. 
In order to finance further expansion, the government privatized a third of its stake 
in Singapore Technologies Aerospace (ST Aero) in June 1990. The offering was highly 
successful (shares were 33 times oversubscribed) and raised 150 million SGD
142
, almost 
equal to the company’s annual turnover. Commercial maintenance activities were 
shifted to a spin-off company, Singapore Aviation Services (SASCO) before the partial 
flotation. At the beginning of the 1990s, more than 2/3
rd
 of ST Aero’s business was 
coming from the defense segment. The aim was to increase commercialization and 
increase foreign sales. ST Aero’s turnover from foreign operations was already as high 
as 32% by 1989. This increased to 50% by 1990.
143
 In 1990, the company set up ST 
Rotables at Stansted Airport in the UK. In 1991 it established a 20 million US dollars 
green-field investment in Mobile, Alabama to offer commercial maintenance and cargo 
conversions for Fedex. It also established operations in Los Angeles by acquiring a local 
sheet-metal supplier of Boeing with an aim of moving closer to its customers.  
ST Aero also took a major step in venturing into a new area of co-development. It 
signed a deal with the French Aerospatiale (now Eurocopter) and China National Aero-
Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) to jointly develop a 5-seat 
helicopter, the EC-120 (original designation P120L). The joint venture started in 1990. 
Eurocopter owned a 61% share and was responsible for the instrument panel, landing 
gear, seats, rotor system, transmission, final assembly, flight test and certification. 
CATIC (through Hafei Aviation Industry Company) owned a 24% stake and was 
responsible for cabin structure and doors, engine cowlings, pod central and intermediate 
                                                 
141
 In 1989 Singapore Aircraft Industries was reorganized into Singapore Technologies in line with the 
diversification strategy into commercial aerospace. 
142
 This equals to around 100 million US dollars at 2000 prices. 
143
 “Gradually Global” Flight International: Asian Aerospace Special 19-25 Feb 1992 
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structure and fuel system. Singapore Technologies Aerospace owned 15% of the project 
and was responsible for tailboom, fin, horizontal stabilizer, fenestron (tail rotor), general 
doors and instrument pedestal development. The design was successful, but ST Aero did 
not participate in the production of the helicopter later on. Instead, it took on duties in 
line with what it was doing before: MRO and aircraft refurbishment. In the mid-1990s it 
upgraded the F-5 fighters of RSAF with new radar, avionics and weapons systems. In 
1999 it successfully developed a method for passenger to cargo conversion of B-757s. 
In 2002 it entered into a strategic cooperation with BAe Systems of the UK to add new 
avionics suits and mission computers to some of the F-16s Singapore had acquired, 
resulting in the “Falcon One” upgrade. It also upgraded Super Puma helicopters and C-
130 Hercules transport planes for the air force over the 1990s and 2000s (Table 4.4). In 
2006 the company entered the mini UAV systems business after being contracted by the 
RSAF. During the 2000s, STA Aero continued the internationalization of its activities. 
It opened another facility in the USA in San Antonio, Texas in 2006. It entered the 
Chinese market (established MRO facilities in Shanghai in 2004, logistics in 
Guangzhou in 2007); in 2006 it acquired SAS Component A/S in Denmark and 
established a subsidiary in Panama. As a result of the growing on the international 
markets, ST Aero tripled its revenue between 1996 and 2007 and increased profits by 9-
fold to 143 million dollars (Figure 4.21). 
ST Aero was the largest, but by far not the only company in the industry. The 
number of companies in fact increased from 20 in 1988 to 33 by 1992. This increase 
was only partly a result of the creation of subsidiaries. This period also saw major new 
investment in the sector, with an average of 120 million dollars between 1989 and 1995 
(Table 4.6). By the mid-1990s, major companies such as GE, Goodrich, Hamilton 
Sundstrand, Liebherr, Rockwell Collins or Rolls Royce Engines had established a 
presence in Singapore, expanding the avionics and engines knowledge base in the 
country. The largest competitor in the MRO industry for ST Aero was another state-
owned company, Singapore Airlines (SIA). Over the years, SIA Engineering has 
responsible for the engineering work on the airline’s expanding large aircraft fleet. In 
1992, SIA’s Engineering Division became a separate subsidiary, SIA Engineering, with 
an intention to increase foreign presence. SIA Engineering similarly expanded its MRO 
operations in the late 1990s and early 2000s and set foot in Australia, the United States, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam. Between 1996 and 2007 its global 
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employment increased from 4,200 to 6,100, its turnover grew from 407 to 539 million 
dollars (Figure 4.21).  
 
Figure 4.21 Maintenance, repair and overhaul revenues of ST Aerospace and SIA Engineering, 
1996-2012 
 
Sources: SIA Engineering and Singapore Technologies Aerospace annual reports, various years. 
Note: Constant price series converted with a 1.72 SGD/USD rate for 2000.  
 
4.4.6 A new growth trajectory 
In short, during the early 1990s, Singapore’s partly state-owned companies increasingly 
focused on the commercial markets. They realized growth through global expansion. At 
the same time, the knowledge base of the industry was strengthened substantially 
through a focus on innovation and pre-competitive research. Targeted Aerospace R&D 
support programs were designed by the newly formed Agency for Science, Technology 
and Research (A-Star). The program defined new R&D directions: advanced materials, 
manufacturing processes and automation, information and communication, inspection 
and non-destructive testing, and computational modeling and dynamics.  
It may seem paradoxical that the industry as a whole is performing well, despite the 
relatively low R&D inputs in comparison with other sectors in Singapore as well as 
with other countries. In 2009, aeronautical engineering employed less than 1% of 
Singapore’s researchers and received hardly more than 1% of all R&D expenditures. 
Aircraft manufacturing companies in Singapore owned only 14 patents in the same 
year.
144
 In an international comparison, Singapore’s aerospace R&D of 2005 was 15.3 
million US dollars, compared with 155.5 million of South Korea, 340 of Japan or 672 
                                                 
144
 National Survey of R&D in Singapore 2009, Agency for Science, Technology and Research. 
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million of Canada. Remarkably, Singapore managed to establish a “low-cost” aerospace 
innovation system owing to its specialization in the MRO and parts and components 
manufacturing segments. Nevertheless, due to intensive linkages with other related 
industries, aircraft manufacturing in Singapore benefitted from R&D input into fields 
such as electronics and electric, mechanical, computer, and material science and 
engineering, which received around 85 percent of the 2.5 billion USD R&D 
expenditures.  
These close linkages explain how a shift to knowledge-intensive activities occurred 
in aerospace in harmony with the overall shift of the national innovation system. 
Singapore consciously increased the national and corporate R&D during the last two 
decades. From 380 million dollars in 1990, gross expenditure on R&D increased to 3.4 
billion dollars by 2007 (Figure 4.22). Although in comparison with other OECD 
countries, Singapore’s aerospace R&D is relatively low (15.3 million USD in 2005, as 
opposed to 155 million in South Korea, 340 million in Japan or 1.9 billion in Germany), 
but its aerospace activities are centered around selected segments which are closely 
related to existing local capacities (such as avionics and the electronics industry or 
precision engineering and engineering capabilities in general). 
 
Figure 4.22 The National Innovation System of Singapore - R&D Expenditures, 1981-2012 
 
Sources: “National Survey of R&D in Singapore 2009”, Agency for Science, Technology and Research, 
Singapore; Yearbook of Statistics Singapore, various editions. Note: Constant price series converted with 
a 1.72 SGD/USD rate for 2000.  
 
A good indicator of the strong performance of the national and sectoral innovation 
systems is how the aerospace industry weathered the 1997 the Asian financial crisis. 
Due to declining demand of partners in the region, the crises caused a 12% decline in 
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value added by 1998, but growth resumed the following year at an 18% rate. The reason 
for the quick recovery can be explained partly by the strong macroeconomic and 
financial fundamentals with which Singapore entered the crisis (Chia 1999). However, 
even if the Singapore dollar depreciated against the US dollar, it appreciated against 
other Southeast Asian currencies and regional demand for aerospace products (including 
repair) was falling. But the regional markets were declining (aerospace exports dropped 
by 11% drop from 1997 to 1998 and by 20% from 1998 to 1999). Yet the industry 
showed strength by having expanded to overseas markets, and shortfalls in regional 
demand were compensated for by increased military orders. On the other hand, despite 
the crisis, Singapore continued to increase R&D expenditures. The experience also gave 
incentives for companies to further expand overseas presence (see above ST Aero’s 
strategy in the 2000s). 
At the moment, Singapore’s aerospace innovation system and production facilities 
are constantly expanding. The number of aerospace graduates has been constantly 
growing and is expected to reach 1,000 annually in 2010.
145
 Current manufacturing 
activities focus on avionics and aircraft and engine parts and components. The latest 
incentives for investment include a 300 hectares new industrial park at a renovated 
airport in Seletar to be completed in 2018. Three major companies that already indicated 
their intention to move there and expand capacities are EADS’s helicopter maker 
Eurocopter and the engine manufacturers Pratt & Whitney and Rolls Royce. The latter 
intends to bring engine parts manufacturing (wide chord fan blades), engine assembly 
and test work to Singapore to serve the Asian large aircraft market. This shows once 
again that transnational companies value Singapore’s location and their contribution 
made Singapore a “first mover latecomer”.  
Singapore’s future competitiveness lies in the still increasing performance of the 
aerospace innovation system. It can draw from a strong knowledge stock. Almost two-
third of all researchers (60-64%) has been working in the field of engineering and 
technology in the last decade. Their number in business enterprises has been increasing 
substantially, from 5,841 in 2002 to 11,732 in 2007 (in terms of full time equivalent). 
Singapore’s commitment to invest in education, training and R&D is well above the 
regional average. But parallel to the investment in a knowledge-based growth, 
                                                 
145
 This is an aggregate of all graduates from universities, polytechnics and technical institutes, and 
includes aeronautical engineering, avionics, aviation management and ‘mechatronics’. Additionally, 
courses started in 2007 to expand the number of precision engineering specialists (Association of 
Aerospace Industries Singapore, 2010)  
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Singapore’s Economic Development Board still provides incentives to invest in the 
MRO segment similarly to the early years of emergence.  
 
4.4.7 Conclusion 
Within three decades following its emergence, a strong aircraft industry emerged in 
Singapore. The sector is among the top ten in the world in terms of value added, with 
output levels similar to Brazil. The aircraft industry in Singapore differs from other 
latecomers in many ways. It did not seek prestige through producing a locally designed 
aircraft, rather accumulated capabilities to become a highly competitive MRO hub. 
Since 1980, it was one of the very few countries that managed to sustain growth in the 
sector. It was also one of the first Asian producers (along with Hong Kong) to benefit 
from the new winds of internationalization in the 1990s.  
In Singapore, the emergence of the industry and sectoral innovation system was 
successful because of the mixed policy of developing a commercially-focused, but 
militarily-aided system to accumulate technological capabilities. Hill and Pang (1988) 
drew attention to the major differences between the way Singapore and Indonesia 
promoted their aerospace industries. While Singapore followed an outward-looking 
strategy with a strong repair and services orientation, Indonesia was inward looking, 
aimed at manufacturing complete aircraft for the domestic market. Singapore 
capitalized on its competitive advantages and relied on several firms, the Indonesian 
government owned a national champion which was operating in a highly politicized 
environment. The government’s interventions in Singapore were also “extensive” and 
state ownership was considerable, but it was ‘efficiency enhancing’, unlike in Indonesia. 
Already in 1988 the authors called attention to the vulnerability of the Indonesian 
aircraft industry because of its higher political dependence in contrast with Singapore.  
A consequence of the outward-looking strategy was the strong competition 
Singaporean manufacturers and MRO providers had to face. This fostered the 
emergence of a sectoral innovation system early on and close interactions among the 
main stakeholders. Latecomers’ technological disadvantages were offset by the 
government’s activist industrial policy during the years of emergence. This included 
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simultaneously “importing” experts146 and training locally a competitive, skilled labour 
force; procuring aircraft and ordered aircraft refurbishment programs to expand 
technological capabilities of its leading firm. On the other hand, by building industrial 
parks and providing incentives for foreign investment, it laid the foundations of a strong 
private sector in aerospace. The specialization in MRO activities and component 
manufacturing and the proximity of related industries also efficiently substituted 
missing capabilities and became a source of innovation. The aerospace innovation 
system was well embedded in the national innovation system of Singapore. This not 
only offered synergies for the emerging industries, but was the main reason why 
Singapore managed to respond to competitive challenges quickly and avoided decline of 
production that lasted more than a year. 
 
Figure 4.23 Radical innovation system change in Singapore’s sectoral innovation system in 
Aerospace 
 
 (Author’s compilation) 
 
As shown in Figure 4.23, a radical innovation system change occurred between 1989 
and 1992. This shift coincided with a global crisis in the aerospace industry, which was 
triggered by the decrease in defence spending and increase in oil prices at the end of the 
Cold War and beginning of the Gulf War. Singapore was one of the first countries to 
readjust its innovation system and industrial orientation according to the changed 
competitive environment It quickly realized the advantages it can gain from the 
internationalization of supply chains and the dismantling of previously vertically 
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 Immigrant labor was an overall important knowledge source for Singapore. Immigrant stock increased 
from half a million in 1980 to 1.5 million in 2005; also relative share in society increased from 22% to 
35% (World Development Indicators Online). 
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integrated company structures in Europe and North America. Singapore had a potential 
to become a low-cost regional supply and maintenance base, but only if it could expand 
the capacities (gaining economies of scale by expanding internationally) and by 
increasing its portfolio of design and production capabilities.  Joint development only 
occurred in the case of the EC-120 helicopter project, but Singapore remains a potential 
location for components development, given the continued investment in R&D (two-
third of which is paid by the private sector) and in physical and human capital. On the 
other hand, economies of Asia were demonstrating rapid growth which offered 
potentials for the aviation industry and supporting manufacturing and MRO bases. To 
make the state-owned companies more flexible for international expansion and raise 
capital, the government chose partial flotation in the case of ST Aerospace, or spinning 
off the Engineering Division of SIA. (Note the similar considerations behind the 
privatization of Embraer). Because of responding quickly to the new competitive 
environment, Singapore’s aerospace industry has managed to maintain a competitive 
edge in the rapidly growing region, despite existing and emerging competition in Hong 
Kong, Thailand and Malaysia. 
Unlike any other emerging aerospace producer country, Singapore successfully 
managed a ‘transition without interruption’ in the sectoral innovation system. It was a 
fundamental system change in which Singapore was targeting the knowledge-intensive 
activities within the industry. This is indicated on the one hand by the two-fold 
expansion of R&D expenditure and number of science and engineering researchers in 
the national innovation system between 1990 and 1995.
147
 On the other hand, it is 
indicated by the changing product structure of the aerospace manufacturing industry 
(MRO and small parts and components manufacturing of the latest aircraft models; 
avionics and engine components manufacturing and a declining share of military 
programs). The number of new aerospace firms in Singapore increased after 1990, but 
so did the largest Singaporean MRO firms expand in foreign markets.  
Singapore also succeeded in managing the transition efficiently. The aim and means 
of achieving competitiveness were well designed in the emerging innovation system, 
which minimized institutional inertia in a time of transition. For instance, the product 
structure and repair activities did not have the long lead time which aircraft producers 
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 There is no consistent data to monitor aerospace R&D and innovation measures over time. The 
National Survey of R&D by A-Star has a changing coverage of firms between 2002 and 2009, in the 
period available. We therefore rely on indicators for the whole economy. 
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had to deal with. The similarity between existing capabilities and those required in the 
new system was high and highly compatible. What companies had to learn was 
organizational innovation, in addition to a rapidly developing avionics segment and a 
rather incrementally changing engine or aircraft parts production and repair activities. 
Moreover, the innovation system has had a number of actors specialized in fostering 
knowledge exchange, such as the Association of Aerospace Industries in Singapore, 
private consultants or government funded R&D agencies. In addition, a sound 
macroeconomic environment and high economic growth
148
 were similarly important for 
a swift transition.  
In the coming decades, the Asia-Pacific region is forecast to witness further rapid 
growth in air traffic. Singapore’s challenge will be to sustain their first-mover advantage 
as many other countries in the region will compete to become MRO hubs. Large 
investments were made in MRO in Thailand, Malaysia, as well as in China. So far 
Singapore has successfully safeguarded its position (and retained budget airline clients 
as well) against cheaper locations in neighboring Johor Bahru or Kuala Lumpur in 
Malaysia based on its reputation of top-quality service and guaranteed, rapid turn-
around time owing to the efficient organization of engineering and management of 
logistics. Even if neighbors can catch up with the services over time, the incomparable 
performance and investment into the national innovation system of Singapore will most 
likely continue to offer the required linkages to respond to find a new competitive edge. 
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 Between 1989 and 1992, annual GDP growth averaged at 8%. 
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4.5 ARGENTINA: The case of a languishing aerospace innovation system 
4.5.1 Introduction 
Despite a very promising start, a fully functioning aerospace innovation system never 
emerged in Argentina. Local aircraft design and construction activities started before 
World War II in Córdoba where an advanced plant employed over 9000 employees by 
1950.
149
 However, it was a military plant and export considerations played little role in 
new product development. The inward-looking economic strategy soon proved to be 
unsustainable, creating a crisis in a still infant industry. In the absence of a transition to 
a different growth trajectory, the industry languished. Subsequent efforts in the 1960s 
and 1970s by military governments to pump more money in an unchanged innovation 
and production system once again resulted in a short-lived success. Technological 
capabilities continued to erode. Attempts at privatization in 1987 and concessions in 
1995 were not combined with well-designed, radical institutional changes. As a 
consequence only around 1000 employees work in the aerospace industry, which does 
not mean more than maintenance and overhaul activities in Córdoba. 
In 1969, when Embraer started, Argentina had the largest aircraft industry in Latin 
America in terms of employees (value added is not known). By 2003 value added was 
70 million USD, equal to less than 3% of Brazilian value added (Table 4.7). 
 
Table 4.7 Argentina’s Aerospace production in comparison, selected years  
(USD mln at constant = 2000 prices) 
Country 1984 1993 2003 
Argentina 40 9 70 
Brazil 242 260 2,581 
China 3,599 1,692 3,392 
Indonesia 12 192 n/a 
USA 48,281 53,218 47,949 
Source: Argentina: UNIDO (for years 1984, 1993) and INDEC (2003); Brazil: IBGE; Chile, Colombia: 
UNIDO. Note: PPP/UVR applied for conversion of local currency to USD: Argentina: 0.846; Brazil: 
1.09; China: 4.6; Indonesia 4201. (See Chapter 3 for UVRs). 
 
Since its founding in 1927, the plant giving home to aerospace manufacturing and 
related activities in Córdoba has often changed its name, internal organizational 
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 The sources on Argentina can at best be called patchy. Production statistics are almost non-existent. 
Hira and Oliveira note that “there is no documentation regarding audits or financial reports to be found 
regarding the Fábrica; no systemic evaluation appears to have taken place” (2007 p.344).  Limited 
national statistics on the sector at 3-digit level are only available for the years 1983, 1994 and 2003. We 
therefore rely on secondary literature, including industry journals (e.g. various editions of Flight 
International), the Chronicles of the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Province of Córdoba 
(Arreguez 2007) and the insightful comparative analysis of Hira and Oliveira (2007). 
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structure and external dependence. Table 4.8 provides an overview of the changes in 
scale and name. 
 
Table 4.8 Name and size changes of the aircraft manufacturing plant of Córdoba 
Year Name of Organization (Abbreviation) Number of 
Employees 
Construction 
Floor (m
2
) 
 1927 Fabrica Militar de Aviones (FMA) 193 8,340 
 1931  (FMA) n/a 34,000 
 1943 Istituto Aerotécnico (IAe) 3,070 265,000 
 1952 Industrias Aeronáuticas y Mécanicas del 
Estado  
(IAME
) 
9,550 n/a 
 1957 Dirección Nacional de Fabricaciones e 
Investigaciones Aeronáuticas  
(DINFI
A) 
8,273 217,000 
 1967 Fabrica Militar de Aviones (FMA) n/a n/a 
 1968 Area de Material Córdoba  (AMC) 7,507 n/a 
 1987 Fábrica Argentina de Materiales 
Aeroespaciales 
(FAM
A) 
~3,000
a
 n/a 
 1991 rea de Material Córdoba (AMC) n/a n/a 
 
1994
b
 
 (AMC) 2,200 n/a 
 1995 Lockheed Martin Aircraft Argentina S.A. (LMA
ASA) 
1,250 ~220,000 
 2002  (LMA
ASA) 
900 n/a 
 2010 Fabrica Argentina de Aviones (FAde
A) 
1,100 ~220,000 
Source: Own compilation based on Arreguez (2007); Arroyo (2004) various articles of Flight 
International  
Notes: (a) Estimate based on 1985 UNIDO figure of 3,092 for the entire aerospace industry;  
(b)before privatization. Note that sources differ on the actual number of employees reduced over the 
privatization period. Scheetz (2002) reports that “the plant’s 2950 workers were immediately reduced to 
1950 (and then to 950)”, whereas LMAASA director Radcliffe reports a reduction of workforce from 
around 2200 to 1250 when Lockheed Martin took over operations
150
.  
 
4.5.2 The emergence of a sectoral aerospace innovation and production system in 
Argentina 
4.5.2.1 The emergence of aircraft manufacturing in Córdoba 
The Fábrica Militar de Aviones (FMA, Military Aircraft Factory) was established in 
Córdoba in 1927,
151
 more than 700 kilometers northwest of Buenos Aires. The plant 
was and Army depot under the supervision of the War Ministry. Operations began with 
193 workers on a construction floor of 8,340 m
2
. The following year the complex was 
expanded with a number of laboratories, workshops and auxiliary buildings. Initial 
production of small planes under license (e.g. the Avro K-504 Gosport, Bristol F.2B, 
Dewoitine D-21 or the Focke-Wulf FW-44 Stieglitz) was soon complemented with local 
designs. The first one was the AE C-1 Triplaza biplane from 1931. Other notable 
designs include the 5-seater transport plane AE T-1 from 1932, some 61 military 
observer monoplanes AE MO1 and the FMA 20 El Boyero (see Table 4.9). Licenses 
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 “Pampa production could roll again” Flight International 20-26 Mar 1996 
151
 A few smaller, private workshops constructing simple aircraft had already been operating in Argentina 
since 1910, but the scale of their industrial activities were less significant compared to the one established 
in Córdoba. 
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were acquired by FMA to locally produce engine designs of Lorraine Dietrich, Wright 
and Siemens. This provided the know-how to develop the Ae R-16 El Gaucho and I.Ae 
R-19 El Indio engines. 
By the end of World War II FMA had produced around 400 planes (Table 4.9), 
about half of the Brazilian production in the same period. In both countries the military 
was the main user of locally made planes. But while Brazil was producing for the allies, 
Argentina declared itself neutral during most of the war. Argentina was therefore not 
receiving post-war aid and cheap supply of aircraft from the USA, which, ironically, 
meant that its aircraft industry did not experience the post-war crisis that affected Brazil 
until 1960.
152
 Fueled by the isolationist economic and foreign policies of President 
Perón, the aircraft industry was designated as strategic and was given high priority even 
after the war. 
Already in 1943 FMA was renamed as ‘Instituto Aerotécnico’ (Aero-technical 
Institute, IAe), with a mission to develop aeronautical production in Argentina and unite 
the related industrial activities, deemed strategic for national defense. The institute 
combined research, design, production and maintenance work. Army major San Martin 
became the director of I.Ae. At the same time there were significant infrastructural 
developments, including the addition of a new 20,700 m
2
 assembly hall (the largest so 
far in South America). 
A first local product of this techno-nationalist period was the IAe 22 D.L.
153
, a 
trainer inspired by the North American T-6 Texan. By 1950, this was the most produced 
plane in Argentina. Between 1944 and 1950 two batches of 100 IAe 22 D.L. planes 
were delivered. The 22 D.L. used parts and materials produced domestically. The 
number of private companies supplying the aeronautical industry increased from 5 in 
1941 to over 100 by 1945, as a result of a new boost to increase public-private linkages 
(Arreguez, 2007). In 1946 the first bomber in Latin America flew for the first time, the 
twin-engine IAe 24 Calquin (Royal Eagle), of which the military procured a series of 
100.  
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 Although other sectors, especially the agriculture, did experience detrimental effects of Argentina 
being left out of the Marshall Plan and the loss of North American and European markets. 
153
 D.L. stands for “Dientes de León”, or lion’s teeth, in response to US Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s 
earlier reference to Argentina as a “toothless lion”.  
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Table 4.9 Serial Aircraft Production in Argentina 
Aircraft Model Type Engine 
First 
Flighta 
Nr. 
built 
Series 
Production Notes 
Local Designsb 
AE MO1 Military observer Piston (Wright) 1934 61 (1934–37) First local design 
produced in series 
AE C 3 Two-seater 
monoplane 
(Piston, Armstrong 
Siddeley) 
1934 16 (1934–?)  
FMA 20 ‘El 
Boyero’ 
General Aviation Piston (Continental) 1940 131 (1949–51) Designed by FMA, 
produced by Petrolini 
Hermanos 
I.Ae. 22 D.L. Trainer Piston (IAe and Hamilton 
Standard) 
1944 200 (1944–50)  
I.Ae.24 Calquin Attack/Light Bomber Piston (Pratt & Whitney) 1946 101 (1947–50)  
IA 35 Huanquero Multi-purpose aircraft Twin-Piston (IAe) 1953 47 (1957–62) Designed by Kurt Tank 
IA 46 Ranquel General Aviation Piston (Lycoming) 1957 220 (1958–?)  
IA 50 Guarani II Utility Twin-Turboprop, 
(Turbomeca) 
1963 48 (1966–?) Seats 12 passengers 
IA 58 Pucará Ground attack and 
counter-insurgency 
Twin-Turboprop, (Garrett, 
Turbomeca) 
1969 106 (1974–86) The only “exported” 
model 
IA 63 Pampa Advanced trainer, light 
attack 
Turbofan (Garrett) 1984 24 (1988–90,  
2006–07)  
 
Produced under license 
K-504 Avro 
Gosport 
Biplane Piston (Gnome, Rhone) (1926) 33 (1928–?)  
Bristol F.2B Biplane Piston (Hispano S.) (1916) 12 (1930–?)  
Dewoitine D 21 Monoplane Piston (Armstrong 
Siddeley) 
(1925) 32 (1930–?)  
FW-44 Stieglitz Biplane trainer Piston (Siemens) (1932) 190 (1937–?) Licence acquired in 1937 
Curtiss Hawk 75 Fighter Piston (Wright) (1935) 21 (1940–?) Manufactured entirely at 
FMA. Licence originally 
acquired for 200 planes, 
but lacked material to 
complete. 
Beech T-34 
Mentor 
Trainer Piston (Pratt & Whitney) (1948) 75 (1957–65) Designed by Beechcraft, 
produced from kits 
MS-760 Jet trainer Twin-Turbojet  
(Turbomeca) 
(1954) 36 (1958–64) Designed by Morane-
Saulnier, produced from 
kits 
Cessna-182 General Aviation Piston (Continental) (1956) 40 (1969–72) Designed by Cessna, 
produced from kits 
Locally Converted  
A-4AR 
Fightinghawk 
Ground attack Turbojet (Pratt & Whitney) (1954) 28 (1997–2000) A-4M 'Skyhawk II' 
modernized in Argentina 
with US components; 
additional 8 modernized 
in the US 
Sources: own compilation based on information from Arreguez (2007); SIPRI and Jane’s. 
Note: (a) First flight in brackets indicates the first flight of the original model; (b) The list excludes 
models of which only a few prototypes were built.  
 
Migrant European aircraft designers (originating in Germany) during and after the war 
were important sources of technological expertise for both Argentina and Brazil. A team 
under the supervision of Emile Dewoitine designed and built the IAe-27 Pulqui (Arrow) 
jet fighter which successfully accomplished its maiden flight in 1947. Although only 
one prototype was built of this rather peculiar design, it was a major milestone that 
made Argentina the fifth country in the world (and the first in Latin America) to 
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construct a turbojet fighter. In 1947 the former technical director of the German Focke-
Wulf aircraft manufacturing company, Kurt W. Tank and his team of some 60 engineers 
were invited by Perón to work at Córdoba.
154
 The team developed a new jet fighter, the 
IAe-33 Pulqui II (first flight 1950). This was a highly advanced fighter, matching 
capabilities with the Soviet Mig-15 and the American F-86 Sabres. The design and 
adjustment of the technology took several years, and by the end of 1956 the first four 
prototypes crashed or were damaged beyond repair. The air force showed interest to 
procure of the Pulqui IIs even after the regime change following 1955. But the project 
continued at a very slow pace once its German designers left and the aircraft industry 
lost political support. Eventually the project was discontinued and the fifth prototype 
was parked in a museum in 1960 when the government chose to import the F-86 Sabre 
fighters from the USA.  
The failure of the Pulqui II project had technological as well as political reasons. On 
the one hand the design was well beyond the level of existing local technological 
capabilities. Tank’s team worked in a virtual enclave and the German team made little if 
any efforts to integrate the local workforce and to facilitate learning-by-doing. In this 
respect the project was more an offshoot of the WWII German innovation system than a 
product of Argentinean innovation system. It did little to advance the latter (apart from 
possible inspiration of future scientists through demonstration effects). On the other 
hand the project depended on Perón himself and the success of the Peronist economic 
and foreign policies. The industrialization strategy focusing on the domestic market 
failed after a short-lived post-war success, demand for intermediate imports skyrocketed 
and the economy found itself in stagflation (Della Paolera and Taylor 2003). Even 
before the “Liberating Revolution” ousted Perón it became apparent many of the 
extravagant projects (including the nuclear endeavor and the jet fighter) were not 
sustainable. Increased pressure from the USA following the revolution also contributed 
to bringing the projects to a standstill. 
Despite the growing demand for air transport services, the design and production of 
aircraft in Argentina was only destined for military use. Following the first air postal 
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 This fits in Perón’s strategy of acquiring former German (Third Reich) expertise to boost the 
development of the “New Argentina”. Together with Tank came for instance Ronald Richter, a nuclear 
physicist of Austrian origin with the promise to be the first to produce nuclear fusion in the world. Perón 
gave Richter virtually unlimited resources to develop the technology for a new energy source (and 
potentially for a nuclear weapon) in the ‘Huemol Project’. 
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services
155
, passenger air routes were established in the 1930s. The joint stock 
companies of regional airlines formed in the 1930s, were nationalized in 1949 and 
merged into the new Aerolíneas Argentinas (AR). In 1956 the new government broke 
up the monopoly but AR remained the dominant airline (also becoming the largest 
airline in South America), with Austral as its most significant domestic competitor. 
Supplying AR or Austral by locally made planes was never a real option for FMA or its 
successors. The primary goal was supplying and maintaining the Air Force fleet. 
 
Table 4.10 Stock of aeronautical engineers in Argentina (1950-2007) 
 cumulative nr. of university graduates in 
aeronautical engineering 
Estimate of 
active stock
a
 
Year UNLP IUA Total 
1950 18 14 32 32 
1955 54 76 130 130 
1960 59 136 195 195 
1965 86 165 251 251 
1970 142 197 339 339 
1975 218 239 457 457 
1980 275 277 552 552 
1985 343 336 679 647 
1990 472 392 864 734 
1995 614 425 1,039 844 
2000 727 473 1,200 949 
2005 821 554 1,375 1,036 
2007 866 584 1,450 1,068 
Sources: Instituto Universitario Aeronáutico (IUA), Departamento Egresados, Universidad Nacional de 
La Plata (UNLP), Lista de egresados en nuestra base de datos.  
Note: a) active stock is estimated by assuming 35 years of active career for a graduate. 
 
The military ownership of the aeronautical industry is also reflected in the education 
and training of future labor force. The Air Force operated pilot training schools. The 
initially ad-hoc training of engineers and workers of the industry was replaced in 1941 
by regular theoretical and practical courses in aeronautics. The Escuela de Ingeniería 
Aeronáutica (Aeronautical Engineering School)
156
 was established in 1947 in Córdoba 
under the supervision of the Argentinean Air Force. The most important non-military 
graduate training center for aeronautical engineers was the Engineering Faculty at the 
Universidad Nacional de La Plata near Buenos Aires. As shown in Table 4.10, the 
number of graduates was very low, creating an obvious bottleneck for the emerging 
innovation system. Although 864 engineers were trained by 1990, by comparison, in 
Brazil over 3000 engineers graduated from ITA alone until 1988. 
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 The perils of aviation in Argentina in the 1920s and 30s are illustrated by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry in 
his 1931 novel Night Flight. 
156
 It was renamed in 1993 as Instituto Universitario Aeronáutico (University Institute of Aeronautics, 
IUA). 
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A research and testing center was already established under the War Ministry 
during the late 1920s, with its mission encompassing the design, development and 
construction of various prototypes of aircraft, engines and instruments. R&D was 
subsequently incorporated into FMA and its successors.  
4.5.2.2 Incomplete emergence (1927-1952) 
Even with the scant statistical data about the early growth of the industry, the contours 
(and the deficiencies) of an emerging innovation system are apparent. It never 
functioned properly as a fully developed system, as the following overview of its main 
building blocks during the period of 1927-1952 reveals: 
1. Actors: The most striking feature of the emerging innovation system is the absence 
of private companies. Research, design, engineering and production, but also 
education and training were all “integrated” in the military complex at Córdoba.  
The Argentine Air Force oversaw the plant, financed its research and production 
activities and appointed the managers. Tank and his team, a potentially rich source 
of foreign expertise, had very little interaction with the rest of the actors in the 
system. Even though they were located at FMA, they were supported by and 
reporting directly to the president.  
2. Institutional set-up: Ever since its origins, FMA and its successors were run as a 
military unit. Technological independence (following the import-substitution 
strategy) and increasing Argentina’s military capabilities were the prevalent 
objectives, not commercial success. This did not prove to provide successful 
incentives for innovation. External relations of the system were determined by the 
current governmental strategy, including the degree openness to foreign technology 
and the selection of technological partners (orientation shifted from the British to 
the Axis powers during the war). Internal relations were cloaked in secrecy, which 
greatly reduced the potential of establishing linkages with other domestic or foreign 
industries. It reinforced the hurdle to commercialization of technological results. 
3. Capital input: Lack of rigorous accounting makes it impossible to trace the 
amounts invested in development projects. It is only clear that innovative activities 
were financed by the government – as in all other emerging innovation systems –, 
although these were determined by political aims rather than economic ones. The 
lack of financial transparency ensured a culture of corruption already from the very 
beginning. 
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4. Technology base and input: At the time of the establishment of FMA in 1927, 
technological capabilities in aircraft construction and maintenance were existent 
although very limited. It is worth noting that the related automotive manufacturing 
industry was already present in the country with models of leading foreign 
producers being assembled under license.
157
 Similarly in the aircraft industry 
production licenses of small planes (e.g. Avro, Bristol, Dewoitine, Focke Wulf, 
Curtiss and Beechcraft) provided access to foreign technology. After WWII 
European designers (such Dewoitine and Kurt W. Tank and his team) brought 
along not only their knowledge and skills but also blueprints of new aircraft. These 
frontier technologies were incompatible with existing local knowledge and no 
serious measures were taken to help acquire the tacit knowledge. Technology deals 
were not signed strategically with capability accumulation in mind, but rather for 
short-term political purposes. 
5. Skilled labor input: The labor force was almost exclusively trained by the 
academies of the military in Córdoba, first in ad-hoc training courses, later in 
regular engineering program. Shortly after the end of the war an aeronautical 
engineering school was established by the air force (see above) and civilian courses 
started at National University of La Plata. But the number of aeronautical 
engineering graduates did not reach 100 until 1954. As opposed to Brazil, the lack 
of a dedicated aerospace school (such as ITA) became a major shortcoming in the 
innovation system. 
In the absence of statistical data, we can only indirectly deduce the performance of this 
emerging innovation system.  
6. New products: Most of the new products before WWII were small planes carrying 
maximum five persons, capable of very simple, mostly observation missions or to 
be used for pilot training (Table 4.9). The Pulqui I and II jet fighters designed in the 
post-war era represented near-frontier technologies, but they remained inventions 
rather than innovations, as they never reached series production. 
7. Output and Market share: We estimate that by the end of WWII Argentina had 
produced some 400 planes (see Table 4.9). However, none of them were sold 
outside Argentine or for domestic or foreign commercial use. We have no 
information on aircraft import before 1950s; when the military started to import 
                                                 
157
 By 1930 the Argentine car park amount to over 400,000. 
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aircraft from the US during the late 1950s it considerably reduced the high market 
share of locally produced military planes. 
4.5.3 Crisis in the Industry: Replacing wings with wheels 
The initial rapid growth of the industry slowed down by 1950 and the industry was soon 
in a serious crisis. Import substitution with a domestic orientation meant that export 
revenues could not finance the purchase of foreign raw materials and intermediate 
inputs on which aircraft production and other industries depended. Trade deficits and 
lack of growth of manufacturing industries forced Perón’s second government158 to 
make major changes in industrial policy. The survival of the Argentinean aircraft 
manufacturing industry was in jeopardy. In order to save the Córdoba plant, San Martin, 
the head of the plant (and also the Minister of Aviation since 1951) agreed with Perón to 
diversify activities into automobiles (as well as tractors, motors, motorcycles and arms) 
production.
159
 Resources devoted to aircraft design and production were significantly 
reduced as political discontent with the national aircraft endeavor increased, which was 
further aggravated by a growing macroeconomic crisis.  
In late 1955 Perón’s government was overthrown in a coup. The following 
governments
160
 aimed to reverse the major projects associated with Perón, including the 
aerospace endeavors. A large part of the military management was replaced and aircraft 
and automotive production activities were separated. Tank and his team abandoned 
work on the jet fighter and other experimental designs and left Argentina in the 
unwelcoming political climate after the dismissal of Perón.
161
 
The car and aircraft industry of Córdoba was soon formally separated. In 1957 the 
automotive industry was transferred to a separate organization, and aeronautical 
research and production activities were reorganized in the Dirección Nacional de 
Fabricaciones e Investigaciones Aeronáuticas (National Directorate for Aeronautical 
Production and Research, DINFIA), which remained under the supervision of the Air 
Force. When established, DINFIA had 8,273 workers, a floor space of 217,000 m
2
 and 
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 After 5 years in office, Perón was reelected in 1951. 
159
 Perón was also seeking to supply cheaper, domestically made cars to offset the ever more expensive 
import and the reluctantly growing assembly work of foreign subsidiaries. By the end of 1953 some 2000 
cars were produced by IAME. (FMA was renamed to Industrias Aeronáuticas y Mécanicas del Estado – h 
IAME, Aeronautical and Mechanical Industries of the State). 
160
 The “Liberating Revolution” was followed by the military gaining control over the government. The 
first elected president was the right-wing Frondizi, still favored by the armed forces (1958-62).  
161
 Tank himself went to India in where he designed a jet fighter-bomber, the Marut for Hindustan 
Aeronautics. 
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3,500 machine tools in total of 19,500 horsepower. At the same time the Instituto de 
Investigación Aeronáutica y Espacial (Aeronautical and Astronautical Research Insitute, 
IIAE) was established and designated to carry out R&D activities in aerospace.
162
  
However, neither the national governmental, nor DINFIA leadership had a 
consistent strategic vision on the development of the industry. Between 1955 and 1960 
the organization had 9 directors and many parallel projects. The military decided to 
follow up on a design by Tank’s team of which a first prototype was already flown in 
1953. An order of a 100 planes was placed for the multi-purpose twin-engine propeller 
plane, the IA 35 Hanquero, but only 47 were eventually built from 1958 onwards.
163
 At 
the same time the right-wing governments forged closer ties with the USAand signed 
deals to procure US trainers and fighters.
164
 Many of the received trainers (such as the 
North American T-6 Texan or T-28 Trojan) and fighters (e.g. the North American F-86 
Sabre, which Argentina received in the form of assistance) were in the same size range 
as the ones produced in Argentina (e.g. the IAe-22 D.L. or the IAe-33 Pulqui II), but the 
(older) US-made planes showed superior performance characteristics. The new foreign 
purchases were not coordinated with the strategies of domestic aircraft industry 
development and siphoned off much of the resources for procurement of locally-made 
planes. The innovative designs such as the Pulqui IIs would have required more 
investment to be improved to a level that would be marketable abroad. New prototype 
development was largely discontinued. As there was no strategic aim to make 
Argentinean production competitive, the technological capabilities started to erode from 
the 1960s onwards.  
4.5.4 Interruption without transition 
4.5.4.1 The first interruption in the innovation system: the 1950s 
The industry’s crisis due to macroeconomic and political factors caused an interruption 
in the innovation system. The lost financial and political support of grand design 
projects were not replaced by other sources. Capabilities at the macro level eroded with 
the departure of the German engineers, even if they were less connected with the other 
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 Space research culminated in 26 rocket launches between 1961 and 1981. 
163
 A number of derivatives made of this model, in the direction of a transport aircraft (e.g. the Guarani I, 
with a capacity to seat 11 persons). A successful plane from these years was the IA 46 Ranquel, a small 
utility plane used by aero-clubs and for agricultural purposes. (Table 4.9). 
164
 The US government was suspicious of both the Argentinean nuclear and military aircraft development 
projects and was therefore rather willing to sign export deals if that meant an alternative to local plans. 
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actors in the system,
165
 and they were also not replaced. By this time the global industry 
was entering the jet age and the Argentinean innovation system’s distance to the global 
technology frontier was increasing rapidly.  
A radical transition would have been required,
166
 but instead attempts were made to 
sustain the industry without major institutional changes. The industry and innovation 
system were still emerging and lacked many important actors, including private firms, 
educational and training institutes, but most importantly there was no development 
strategy combining industrial, science and technology and education policies. It follows 
that both the size of the innovation system (decreasing of technology and financial 
inputs) and the innovative performance system (very few new designs created) of the 
system declined. 
The rest of the history of Argentinean aerospace industry shows how heavy a price 
the country paid for trying to patching a decaying innovation system. 
4.5.5 Lack of strategic leadership 
Argentina after Perón did not give up on aircraft manufacturing. An alternative to local 
design was to return to local manufacturing of foreign-designed planes. DINFIA 
acquired licenses from Beechcraft (US) to produce 75 propeller-driven T-34 Mentor 
trainers and from the French Morane-Saulnier to produce the MS-760 twin-jet trainers. 
A decade later Cessna (US) gave a license to AMC for 40 C-182s aircraft. However, the 
only local content in these activities was labor. All the components were shipped in kits 
from the USA and France. While in Brazil license-production activities over the 1960s 
and 1970s were part of a strategy to acquire specific know-how, Argentina lacked an 
overarching plan at the government level and lacked entrepreneurs at the firm level.  
The difference between the history of the industry during the 1950s and 60s in 
Brazil and Argentina is striking. Brazil, although also with many often conflicting goals 
at that time, was making significant efforts to create the foundations of an aerospace 
innovation system in the Sao Jose dos Campos cluster. Argentina was conducting 
research into military aircraft design, produced a number of them, but made insufficient 
efforts to create an innovation system. The failure of the Pulqui II project proved that 
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 It is interesting to point out the differences between the Soviet engineers and technical staff leaving 
China after the Sino-Soviet Split in 1961 and Tank and his team Argentina: Argentinean technological 
capabilities were more advanced without the guests, but China made more efforts to reverse-engineer and 
regain the lost capabilities afterwards. 
166
 Diversifying into the automobile industry was an interesting alternative, nonetheless a genuinely 
radical shift – maybe too radical –, but it did not concern the entire industry. 
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the Córdoba plant had not succeeded in integrating foreign frontier technology, and only 
relatively simple aircraft were produced locally under license. Even this expertise was, 
however, already declining during the 1950s. In both countries the military was a major 
source of finance for education and R&D in aeronautics. While the sector was seen 
everywhere as strategic, neither country formulated a well-defined mission for the 
development of the industry.  
 
Table 4.11 Military aircraft import to Argentina (1950-2009) 
Types Model Year Nr. planes Exporter 
Trainers T-6 Texan 1956 
1959 
5 
5 
USA 
T-28 Trojan 1959-60: 45 USA 
T-28 Fennec 1966 45 France 
Aermacchi MB-326 1969-70 
1983 
8 
11 
Italy 
T-34C Turbo Mentor 1978 16 USA 
Aermacchi MB-339 1980 10 Italy 
EMB-312 Tucano 1987-88 30 Brazil 
Su-29 1997-98 8 Russia 
Fighters F-4U Corsair 1956-58: 62 USA (used in WWII, Korean War) 
F-9F Panther 1957-58: 20 USA 
F-86 Sabre 1960: 28 USA 
A-4P ground attack 
Skyhawk 
1966-7 
1970 
1972 
1976 
1997 
25 
25 
16 
25 
36 
USA 
 
 
 
 (28 of which modernized locally) 
Mirage 1972-3 
1980 
1983 
12 
7 
2 
France 
Nesher (=Mirage 5) 1978-82: 39 Israel 
Mirage 3 1982-83: 22 Israel 
Mirage-5s 1982: 10 from Peru (loan for Falklands war, later 
bought) 
Bombers Canberra B(I)-8 and -12 1970-71 12 UK 
Transports Shorts Skyvan SC-7 1971 5 UK 
F-27 1968-81 21 Netherlands 
C-130 Hercules 1968 
1971-72 
1975 
1979 
1992-94 
3 
3 
2 
2 
5 
USA 
 
 
(KC-130H tanker/transport) 
Alenia G-222 1977 3 Italy 
CASA C-212 1989-90 5 Spain 
Source: SIPRI 
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In Brazil a “public entrepreneur”167 emerged to fill the gap of lack of strategic vision on 
commercialization. The reason why such a development did not happen in Argentina 
cannot be merely attributed to bad luck. The institutional framework of the Argentine 
aircraft innovation and production system did not allow the emergence of such an 
entrepreneur. First, the Argentinean aerospace “enterprise” was a military organization 
and not a company with commercial aims. It had no influential private actors with 
experience in commercializing the products. Second, the frequently changing 
governments were incapable of providing financial and political support for the infant 
industry. It was partly due the secretive nature of the military, but it was also in the 
culture of the public science and technology community to be more cautious with 
commercial valorization of applied technology. 
Already by the 1960s DINFIA had cancelled the development of jet fighters and 
focused its activities on transport, counter-insurgency and training aircraft (Milenky 
1980). In addition to the Sabres received in 1950, between 1966 and 76 the military 
governments of Argentina imported some 90 modernized Douglas A-4 Skyhawk ground 
attack jets in several batches, 8 C-130 Hercules transport planes in 3 batches and a 
number of small planes. But the US was not the only supplier. Argentina opted for 
French Mirage III fighter jets in 1970, and despite more ambitious plans 21 fighters 
were acquired between 1972 and 1983 in batches of 12+7+2. These were complemented 
with a 1978 deal with Israel on 26 refurbished IAI Nesher planes (which were largely 
identical to the French Mirage V jets, but equipped with Israeli avionics). (See Table 
4.11 for an overview of imported aircraft.)  
4.5.5.1 Renewed efforts to build up domestic technological capabilities in aerospace 
In 1967 aerospace development and production activities were reorganized after a 
transition year into Area de Material Córdoba (AMC). The plant continued to be run by 
the Argentinean Air Force. Yet reorganization also meant renewed interest in boosting 
the industry’s design output. There were significant technological achievements during 
between the 1960s and 1980s.  
The IA 50 Guarani II, a small utility aircraft, seating 12 passengers was also capable 
of limited troop transport, medical and search and rescue operations. The prototype was 
based on Kurt Tank’s IA 35 Huanquero, and first flew in 1963. Two years later The 
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 Using the term coined by Ramamurti (1987), however, referring to the team of aircraft engineers 
working on the design and marketing of the future Embraer Bandeirante. 
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Guarani II was presented at the Paris Air Show. This could have been an aircraft for 
commercial use (and indeed after the first series of 18 built for the military between 
1966 and 1970, a second series of 14 planes were constructed between 1971 and 1974 
for the civilian market)
168
. According to the published specifications, the Guarani II 
outperformed aircraft in its league. It could fly higher, faster and further than Embraer’s 
star product, the Bandeirante (see Table 4.12).  
 
Table 4.12 Main features of the Guarani II in comparative perspective 
 
DINFIA IA 50  
Guarani II  
Embraer EMB-110 
Bandeirante 
CASA C-212  
Aviocar 
Capacity (crew+passengers) 2+15 2+21 2+26 
Dimensions (m):  
(length/wingspan/height) 14.9 / 19.5 / 5.81 15.1 / 15.4 / 4.9 
 
15.2 / 19.0 / 6.3 
Empty weight (kg) 3,924 3,500 3,700 
Maximum takeoff weight (kg) 7,120 5,900 6,300 
Power plant 2x694 kW   
Turbomeca Bastan VI-A 
Turboprop 
2x559 kW 
P&W Canada PT6A-
34 turboprop  
2x580 kW  
Garrett AiResearch 
turboprop 
Max speed (km/h) 500 460 370 
cruise speed (km/h) 450 326 315 
Range (km) 1,995 1,964 1,760 
Service ceiling (m) 12,500 6,900 7,900 
First Flight 1963 1968 1971 
Total Number Built 35 500 435 
Sources: Jane’s, Aeromilitaria.Com.Ar, Airliners.Net 
 
Puzzling as it may first seem, it is important to note that the aircraft was not responding 
to what commercial markets demanded. None of the 34 planes that are believed to have 
been built
169
 were exported or sold to airlines. Most of them were used for aerial 
photography, calibration of navigation instruments and various transport services. 
Without sales revenues and with an aggravating economic crisis, production was not 
sustainable and Perón’s new government stopped further support in 1974. Figure 4.24 
shows the drastic difference in the production cycle of the Guarani II and the 
Bandeirante. This figure emphasizes the capacity of the newly emerging Brazilian 
producer to design an aircraft for commercial markets and construct it in great 
quantities, in contrast to the laggard position of its older Argentinean counterpart. 
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 Source: “Guaraní” Aeromilitaria.Com.Ar  
URL: http://www.aeromilitaria.com.ar/ind/aviones/gii/index.htm (page last updated: 3 Mar 2007). 
169
 The Argentinean Air Force reportedly used 29 of them, but little is known of the operating history of 
the plane. Aeromilitaria.Com.Ar 
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Argentina showed more resemblance to the also emerging Indonesian plane maker, to 
be discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
 
Figure 4.24 Comparison of annual production of commuter-size aircraft  
by FMA, Embraer and Nurtanio (first 20 years of production) 
 
Source: Cabral 1987, Cassiolato et al 2002, Airlinerlist.Com, Aeromilitaria.Com.Ar 
Note:  The FMA and Embraer aircraft were designed and produced domestically. The CN-235 was co-
designed and co-produced by CASA and IPTN; the figures presented show the number of aircraft finally 
assembled in Indonesia. The production of the IA-50 stopped in 1974. 
 Year 0 refers to the year of first flight of the prototype (EMB-110: 1969; CN-235: 1983; IA-50: 1963). 
 
The zenith of the Argentine defense industries coincided with the military dictatorship 
of 1976-83 (Scheetz, 2002). It was a time of increased military spending amounting to 
as much as 6% of the GDP between 1981 and 83 (see Figure 4.25). Details of the 
expenditure are not known, but the air force evidently managed to corner a large share 
of these expenditures. First of all, it should be noted that the junta’s increased military 
expenditures were unsustainable due to macroeconomic instability. Still the availability 
of new funds, had they been channeled into the innovation system, could have resulted 
in increased innovative performance of the aircraft industry. However, foreign 
procurement and corruption absorbed a large of the available budget. Over these years 
Argentina modernized its fleet with about 80 Mirage fighter jets (including the Israeli 
derivative Nesher) and a number of trainer and tanker aircraft (see Table 4.11).  
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Figure 4.25 Argentine Military Expenditures, in millions of constant (1970) Australs (1969-1987) 
 
Source: Scheetz (1992, Table I, p.186) 
 
AMC in Córdoba was commissioned to produce a hundred of the IA-58 Pucaras. This 
two-seater twin-prop ground attack and counter-insurgency aircraft was first flown in 
1969. Its main features were the capability to operate in unfavorable conditions, simple 
airfield infrastructure requirements and good maneuverability. But it was using already 
dated technology. 106 units were built between 1974 and 1986, and it was the only 
Argentine aircraft “exported”, even though none of these exports were realized through 
regular market transactions.
170
 Due to the limited availability of spare parts, the 
exported planes eventually did not clock many flying hours. Their capability to land and 
take-off on short runways made the Pucara the only aircraft the Argentinean Air Force 
could deploy to the Falkland Islands during the 1982 war, where they carried out 
reconnaissance and light-attack operations. However, the Air Force’s national 
technological pride did not stand the test of war and many planes were soon written off. 
The subsequent Pampa project was a technologically even more challenging venture 
rather successfully realized. Once again it became a victim of changing strategic vision 
and macroeconomic and political instabilities. As of 1978 AMC was looking for 
solutions to produce a new advanced jet trainer to replace the nearly 20 year-old locally 
assembled Morane-Saulnier MS-760s jets. Aiming to follow international standards (to 
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 SIPRI counts a total of 10 exported aircraft. Six were delivered to Uruguay in 1981 as part of a 6.5 
million USD deal from the previous year. In 1992 Argentina signed a deal with Sri Lanka to the tune of 
12.7 million dollars to deliver four aircraft over the following two years for counter-insurgency 
operations. Additionally, the Air Force offered 3 of its Pucaras in 1990 in the form of aid to assist anti-
narcotics operations in Colombia and leased one for a year for Uruguay (Based on SIPRI Arms Transfer 
Database; values are expressed in constant 2000 USD, applying deflators of 0.54 for 1980 and 0.86 for 
1992 (WDI). Note that industry insiders question many of the details of these deals. 
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facilitate foreign sales) and expand existing expertise in license production, AMC 
signed a partnership agreement with the German manufacturer Dornier to assist aircraft 
development.
171
 The resulting prototype of the IA-63 Pampa trainers showed many 
similarities to the Alpha Jet, but it was a simpler and more cost-efficient design, 
equipped with a single Garrett turbofan engine. By the time the plane first flew in 1984, 
the military junta has already fallen following the disasters of the lost Falklands War, 
the shrinking economy and the debt crisis. 
 
4.5.5.2 An incrementally changed innovation system (1960s-1983) 
The realization of the Guarani II, Pucará and Pampa projects marked the revival of the 
aerospace innovation system. Innovative performance increased with the 
accomplishment of complex engineering achievements. This raises a question. Was this 
performance caused by increased learning and interactions within a system defined by 
more or less the same actors and institutions? Or does it mark a transition to a new 
system?  
In our interpretation the innovation system did not change radically. The main actors 
remained the same, even if some additional foreign sources of technology were added 
(but with less intensive and rather unidirectional interactions). The major arrangements 
in the industry were hardly modified. Whatever the name of the Córdoba plant was, it 
was still run by the military. The system continued to be serving the needs of the Air 
Force, and despite some weak attempts to realize foreign sales, economic considerations 
had little influence. Moreover, the long lead times of projects indicate that the system 
was still in its infancy, still not close to the performance frontier. Yet the technological 
characteristics of the products were matching (or even exceeding) those of other 
latecomers. What we can observe here is that increased inputs (finance) could boost 
learning and result in performance increase in an incrementally changed innovation 
system.  
The problem with an only incrementally changed innovation system was that even if 
it reached the performance frontier through learning, it was not competitive anymore. It 
could still add to the accumulation of technological capabilities needed for an emerging 
                                                 
171
 Together with Dassault, Dornier had been producing the Alpha Jet since 1973 but the production run 
was nearing its end.  
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industry, but those capabilities were already obsolete. That it was not sustainable any 
longer was not only proven by the economic crises, but also in combat.  
4.5.6 Failure to radically change an ailing innovation system 
4.5.6.1 A new crisis: the end of the military regime and struggles with privatization 
In order to address the debts and respond to the pressures of the international monetary 
institutions, the Alfonsín government that rose to power in 1983 cut military 
expenditures and made an attempt to privatize AMC. Under the new name of Fábrica 
Argentina de Material Aeronáutico (Argentine Aeronautical Materials Factory, FAMA) 
44% ownership was sold to a consortium of Aeritalia and 10% to Techint.  
The Alfonsin government continued to see potential in military aerospace and gave 
support to both the Pampas as well as a new medium-range ballistic missile program, 
the Condor II
172
. AMC produced a first batch of 18 Pampas between 1988 and 1990. 
The actual design and adjustments made to this took place during times of economic 
trouble in the country. AMC could not secure any foreign sales, although it attempted to 
apply for trainer procurement competitions in the USA (in partnership with LTV), New 
Zealand and Australia. Especially in case of the US application, the chances of a foreign 
producer of trainers have always been very low. The already dated technology of the 
planes and the fact that the Argentinean government was unable to offer competitive 
export credits were certainly not making it a serious contender. 
An overture to commercial production at the end of the 1980s was also not 
successful. FAMA and Embraer decided to co-produce a commuter aircraft, the CBA-
123 Vector. This was a major step in a new direction for FAMA and it offered the 
potential of acquiring newer capabilities as well as Embraer’s already established 
knowledge of how to market planes. However, the project did not become a success 
because production costs were too high, making the plane uncompetitive. Embraer 
criticized FAMA for not being able to deliver the required modules in time and 
according to quality expectations. Argentina also had difficulties in financing its one-
third share of the estimated 300 million dollar development costs.
173
 The government’s 
hands were tied in the midst of monetary and fiscal troubles. 
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 It succeeded a 1970s ballistic missile program and was developed in close collaboration with Egypt 
and Iraq, as the Middle East was seen as its potential market. The project was halted by the Menem 
government in 1993 following pressure from the US. 
173
 Two prototypes were made in 1990 but the project was cancelled due to insufficient market demand. 
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The 1994 privatization of Embraer in Brazil offered a capital injection and new 
sources of dynamism for regional jet production. However, while the sectoral 
innovation system in which Embraer was embedded may have meant an external asset 
to potential investors, the lack of such a system in Argentina decreased the value of 
FAMA (or AMC)
 174
, which was hardly more than a military depot seen as a burden on 
the state. Unsurprisingly, the Menem government’s new attempt to inject capital into 
AMC in 1995 was less successful than the privatization of Embraer. First, the local 
aircraft industry could not show any commercial success similar to what Embraer 
achieved with its commuter planes during the late 1970s and 80s. The latest trainers of 
AMC were at least a generation behind the technology frontier, and were yet to be 
promoted on low-cost markets. Second, the core competence of the “company” was in 
military aeronautics, Argentina’s options for a potential investor were limited to a few 
global defense companies, which were also experiencing a downturn after the end of the 
Cold War. Finally, the main asset of AMC was its 2,200-strong skilled labor force, but 
whether they provided a solid base for lower cost production is doubtful. Hira and 
Oliveira (2007:342) mention a consultancy report that suggested half of the work force 
was “surplus to requirement”.  
An in-depth analysis of the political background of the negotiations and the interests 
of the various stakeholders is beyond the scope of this study. After lengthy negotiations 
Lockheed Martin (LM) won a 25-year concession to operate the Córdoba aircraft 
factory, linked to a deal to upgrade 36 of the A-4 Skyhawks of the Air Force and to a 
promised 14 million dollars worth of investment.
175
 Lockheed Martin Aircraft 
Argentina S.A. (LMAASA) assumed operations on 1 July 1995 and soon reduced the 
work force to 1,250.
 176
 Following the arrival of 8 A-4 Skyhawks upgraded in the USA, 
the first locally converted A-4s Fighting-hawks were delivered in 1998.  
The government retained the right to renegotiate the deal every five years. While the 
signing of the original contract was widely criticized on grounds of corruption, 
incompetency or (at best) acting under pressure, the revision in 2000 expanded the 
responsibilities of LM and was financially more beneficial for the government as it was 
hedged against currency fluctuations. LMAASA now signed up to upgrade the IA-63 
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 The enterprise was once again  renamed to AMC in 1991. 
175
 Part of the deal was to seek to reactivate the manufacturing of the IA-63 Pampa jets and carry out 
maintenance and overhaul operations for both the Air Force and commercial airlines. 
176
 “Lockheed nears AMC deal” Flight International 19-25 October 1994; “Pampa production could roll 
again” Flight International 20-26 Mar 1996, p.9. A different source on the number of employees, Scheetz 
(2002) reports a decrease from 2,950 to 950 (See note (a) to Table 4.8). 
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Pampas and produce 12 additional aircraft
177
 and carry out the maintenance of the Air 
Force’s fleet and produce spare parts. Maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) became 
the core activities of the Córdoba plant, which also offered the potential to serve airlines 
in the region. But the diversification to the commercial segment was not so successful, 
mainly because of the poorer performance of local airlines.
178
 Manufacturing remained 
a small scale activity, with no new aircraft designs. Lockheed indicated that it was 
expecting a domestic launch order of at least 100 Pampas to make use of scale 
economies, but the government (tackling a financial crisis) was struggling to meet their 
existing commitments.
179
 The concession-adventure ended in 2009 as the Kirchner 
government nationalized the plant. Fabrica Argentina de Aviones (Argentinean Aircraft 
Factory, FAdeA), according to the new name, is once again subordinated to the Defense 
Ministry and there is little sign of any new strategy
180
, new management routines or 
greater transparency.  
4.5.6.2 Failed transitions to a more open innovation system (after 1983) 
In 1983, with the lost war, the fall of the military dictatorship and a macroeconomic 
crisis, yet a second interruption hit the (emerging) innovation system. Military 
expenditures and AMC’s labor force were halved and no new foreign technological 
collaboration deals were signed. But the Air Force continued to be influential even 
during the Alfonsín government so the Condor II and Pampa projects were not shelved.  
The attempt to introduce private capital in the newly formed FAMA could have 
initiated major changes leading to a transition. However, basic incentive structures and 
selection processes were hardly modified. Private firm actors were still not significantly 
present, education and training institutions were not reinforced and no long-term 
industrial policies were devised in concert with innovation and science and technology 
policies to make the industry competitive. FAMA’s entering into commercial 
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 Test flights of the Pampas with enhanced avionics and radar began in July 2005; the first delivery took 
place in December 2005 (“Upgraded Pampa trainer begins flight-test work” Flight International 12 Jul 
2005; “Lockheed Martin advances Pampa push in Argentina” Flight International 11 Apr 2006) 
178
 LMAASA had around 58,000 m
2
 floor space for MRO activities in Cordoba. It has gained type 
certificates for a number of planes, including the C-130 Hercules and Aerolineas Argentinas’ B-737s, as 
well as ISO 9001 from TÜV. The local workers accumulated experience in the repair works of the F-27, 
F-28, IA 50 G II, IA 58 and IA 63 types of the Air Force as well as in engines. 
179
 For instance, in October 2003 LMAASA sent home its entire 900-strong staff for 6 days to reduce 
losses; at the same time, the government owed the company 47 million USD. 
180
 The activities of the plant still include providing maintenance services for the Air Force’s fleet 
(amounting to about half of the revenues), upgrading the Pucuras and making  new efforts sell the 
Pampas. At the same time the air force’s entire fleet is aging: only a small share of the fleet was active in 
2007 and some 15 planes crashed in recent years. There have been plans to develop a new trainer to 
replace the ancient T-34s. 
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production was not viable without such broader-scale changes, but Argentina could not 
afford these (especially in the context of neoliberal policies it was obliged to follow). 
Only incremental institutional changes took place. But at the same time, mostly due to 
insufficient funding, these were not followed by increased learning or a movement 
closer to the performance frontier. Thus, the macroeconomic changes at the end of the 
1980s and the failure of the CBA-123 Vector project also mark an interruption in the 
innovation system, since the inflow of R&D funds and new technology from partners 
was significantly reduced. What remained after the break was an innovation system 
serving an industry with a “core competence” in maintenance, repair and overhaul (of 
both military and commercial aircraft).  
The 1995 concession deal with Lockheed Martin has stopped further decline, but did 
not bring system-wide institutional changes. It provided access to technology, but 
hardly more than earlier license agreements; and it did not even secure capital 
investment for technological upgrading. These were improved with the renegotiated 
deal of 2000, which resulted in some increase in system performance. The 2009 
renationalization was once again not a trend break for there is no sign of realigning the 
industry on a competitive growth path.  
4.5.7 Interrupted innovation in Argentina: The rise and fall of an innovation system 
This historical overview shows that a fully-fledged sectoral innovation system in 
aerospace has never emerged in Argentina, in a sense of supporting competitiveness and 
sustained growth. In the 70 years of its evolution there have been some periods of 
increased innovative activities, with tangible results of technologically complex new 
products, but no commercial breakthroughs. 
A summary of the development trajectory of the innovation system is shown in 
Figure 4.26. The emergence of the system was interrupted in 1952 because import 
substitution with a domestic orientation caused a macroeconomic and later a political 
crisis. Yet there has been no transition to a new growth path, based on a strategy of 
export-orientation and the involvement of actors other than the military, most 
importantly, private companies. More investment pumped into an incrementally 
changed system proved to be unsustainable and led to new crises and other interruptions 
after the failure to enter into commercial production. 
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Figure 4.26 The Emergence of the Argentine Aerospace innovation system 
 
(Author’s compilation) 
Note: The abbreviations in brackets indicate the name of the main organization. 
 
4.5.7.1 General conclusions 
Although the ideas of 1927 envisaged the construction of a factory with the long-term 
aim of making it an engine of industrial progress in Argentina, much of the history of 
aerospace in Argentina is the outcome of ad hoc and short-sighted decisions. 
Formulating and adhering to a strategy of what to make locally and what to import is 
just as urgently needed as it has always been since the 1950s and 60s. In the end, it is 
too costly to keep supporting an infant beyond the age of 50. The following lessons can 
be derived from the Argentinean experience. 
1. Nascent innovation systems are excessively vulnerable to exogenous shocks 
Since the accumulation of technological capabilities has remained insufficient to design, 
produce and commercialize aircraft in Argentina, interruptions are results of events 
occurring in the macroeconomic or political context. This is especially typical of 
systems in their infancy, where the performance is excessively dependent on one source 
of finance and technology. (An example of such an interruption was the nascent Chinese 
aerospace industry after the Sino-Soviet split.) The reason is the lack of available 
institutions and actors to counterbalance the declines in government support. In 
conclusion, macroeconomic stability is crucial to provide a sustainable and credible 
source of government finance, political stability and a wide-spread agreement (possibly 
across party lines) is required to formulate and implement a long-term development 
strategy. Without such checks and balances the industry can still grow, but only slowly, 
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at high cost and it can easily become a playground for short-term rent-seeking and 
power struggles. 
2. Make competitive planes or do not make planes at all 
Argentina never had a strategy to sell its products on the market (domestic or foreign). 
If the aim is to produce only for domestic military use, importing planes would have 
been a less costly option, creating a maintenance, repair and overhaul facility only 
would have been more lucrative. 
After the ill-fated Pulqui fighter jet, the planes built in Córdoba were all of obsolete 
technology. All the planes Argentina imported or produced under foreign license were 
also near the end of their production runs. Although such planes are more affordable for 
domestic purposes, if the aim is to acquire the technology to produce planes that sell 
even on low-cost markets, a country can’t afford not to invest in acquiring more recent 
technological vintages. 
Even an emerging industry needs to pay special attention to what products and 
technological solutions are required by the market (domestic and foreign users), and to 
identify possible niches. It is too late to try to sell the obsolete Pampa trainers in the 21
st
 
century. 
The argument that the presence of a high-tech industry boosts science and 
engineering education is shaky. The far-from-frontier knowledge and skills of the staff 
makes them less competitive even when they shift to other sectors, while the low 
payment (Scheetz 2002) deters new students from choosing a career in aerospace. 
3. A military-only innovation system is bound to fail 
The emergence of an innovation system will be unsuccessful if all the sources of 
technology and knowledge, all the interactions are controlled by the military. 
Channeling in investment and technology from private sources ensures not only more 
transparency, but also a more dynamic circulation of ideas. It also helps increase the 
number of actors in the innovation system who can better read the more complex signals 
of market demand than the air force decision makers alone. 
Conversely, the number of new aircraft designs during the post-WWII years 
indicates a superior performance of an innovation system that is open to new actors 
(such as experienced foreign designers). However, the centralization of the selection 
process of new designs by the military hampers further growth in innovative 
performance. These routines and practices also hamper the ability to shift to commercial 
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designs and the output of aircraft with potential commercial applications will be inferior 
to that of a genuinely commercially oriented firm (see Figure 4.24). 
 
4. An emerging innovation system and industry require institutional stability and 
long-term goals 
A lack of overall agreement on the strategies of policies related to industrial 
development, science, technology and innovation, or national defense by the main 
political actors of a country is a source of institutional instability and turbulence. The 
lack of institutional stability undermines the accumulation of technological capabilities, 
and innovative performance cannot increase even during the emergence phase. Goals 
and strategies that depend on solely on state financing are worthless if new governments 
easily cancel the commitments taken on by their predecessors. 
5. The ‘lost decade’ in aerospace was the 1950s 
For Argentina, the 1980s are generally referred to as the ‘lost decade’. For the aerospace 
industry in Argentina, the decade of lost opportunities was the 1950s. Apart from the 
first Perón government, the industry never received sufficient resources and attention to 
allow it to reach a mature, competitive growth trajectory based on commercial sales. 
The distance to the technological frontier appears to have been growing ever since. 
The attempt to close the gap during the late 1970s and early 1980s was 
overshadowed by the Falklands war and the debt crisis. Even if entrepreneurs had the 
foresight to make the crisis-hit industry ride the waves of the just emerging global trend 
of outsourcing components manufacturing by US and European producers to low-cost 
countries, the macroeconomic conditions of Argentina and the insufficient capabilities 
(that became clear during the CBA-123 Vector project) would have posed too big a 
challenge. 
In other words, the case of Argentina shows that without a radical innovation system 
transition the aircraft industry can only survive on a lifeline. At such a low performance 
many more decades are being lost. 
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4.6 INDONESIA 
4.6.1 Introduction 
In a country with a total area of 1.9 million square kilometers spread over 17,500 
islands, the geographical setting itself makes the development of air transportation an 
obvious policy goal. Yet the development of the aircraft manufacturing industry would 
seem a less obvious choice for a developing country which was in the mid-1960s, 
according to Hill “perhaps the least industrialized of the world’s large developing 
nations” (2000, p.155) and where natural resource-based industries accounted for 80% 
of total output (Hill 1990).  
The overall purpose of focusing on aerospace among other high-tech 
industrialization projects was to accelerate the social and economic transformation of 
Indonesia from an agricultural to an industrial society. Dr. Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, 
the aeronautical engineer and later president of Indonesia summarized Indonesia’s 
ambitious technology strategy in his famous phrase: “start from the end, end at the 
start”. Accordingly, in 1976, IPTN, the state-owned aircraft manufacturing enterprise 
began to produce helicopters and airplanes under Western license. In less than half a 
decade it moved on to jointly develop a modified version of the plane, which 
successfully completed its maiden flight in 1983. It started the indigenous development 
of a commuter plane in 1989 that first flew six years later. However, Indonesian-made 
planes never sold successfully in foreign markets. It became clear during the South East 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 that the government lacked the funds to continue 
supporting an industry employing around 16,000 workers. Since 1998, Indonesian 
aerospace manufacturing has been struggling to survive. The case reveals how a sectoral 
innovation system that never fully developed, failed to transit to a new, sustainable 
growth path after being confronted with a crisis. 
4.6.2 The emergence of the Indonesian aerospace industry and innovation system181 
4.6.2.1 The origins of Indonesian aircraft manufacturing 
Aviators and aircraft designers were already active in Indonesia well before the 
establishment of IPTN. Their activities were limited to the design and testing of gliders 
and small plane prototypes, far from what could be referred to as an industrial scale of 
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 The history section relies primarily on five studies: Hill and Pang (1988), McKendrick (1992), 
Goldstein (2002b), Eriksson (2003) and Amir (2007). 
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production. Their main contribution to the conception of the industry was spreading the 
idea that aviation can bridge distances in Indonesia. 
One of the key designers of this period was Nurtanio Pringgoadisurjo. Nurtanio was 
involved in the construction of a number of simple gliders (following the famous 
German Zögling design) and a few single-seat aircraft at the Aircraft Research, 
Experiment and Construction Depot for the Air Force in Bandung. In 1954, he designed 
the Si Kumbang (beetle) all-metal plane of which 3 prototypes were built. In 1958 he 
produced the basic trainer Belalang (locust) prototype, of which 5 units were produced 
later. In the same year the prototype of the Kunang (firefly) sport plane made its first 
flight. In 1960, Nurtanio and three colleagues were sent to Manila, the Philippines to 
study at the FEATI Institute of Technology in the field of aeronautics.
182
 
In the meantime, not only the Air Force, but also president Sukarno became 
interested in the achievements of Nurtanio. The Preparatory Agency for Aviation 
Industry (LAPIP) was set up in 1960 under the supervision of the Air Force. A year 
later it signed an agreement with Poland about a loan of 2.5 million USD to construct a 
manufacturing facility near Bandung airport, for training personnel and to license 
produce a slightly modified PZL-104 Wilga plane developed by the Polish Cekop. The 
44 Indonesian-made versions, known as the Gelatik (rice bird), served for agricultural, 
light transport and aero-clubs purposes. Yet the small plane production has never 
become a commercial success. 
There were several organizational attempts to establish the foundations of an 
aerospace industry industry. The National Council for Aeronautics and Space 
(DEPANRI) was created in 1962 and mandated with national aerospace coordination 
and policy formulation. In 1963 the National Aeronautics and Space Institute LAPAN 
was founded, a research institute designated to develop aerospace technology and advise 
on national aerospace policy. After Nurtanio died in 1966, while testing one of his 
planes, LAPIP was renamed in his honor to Nurtanio Aviation Industrial Institution 
(LIPNUR). The Berdikari Aircraft Industry, founded a year earlier, was merged into 
LIPNUR, which was assigned with the task to produce a basic military trainer aircraft 
and build workshops for after-sales-services, and maintenance, repair and overhaul. To 
cater to the human resources needs of a newly emerging industry, the government 
launched an overseas student scholarship programme as early as 1958, financing 
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 There is a bit of confusion in the literature, Amir dates this event 10 years earlier. 
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aeronautical engineering studies in Europe and the United States.
183
 Aeronautics 
education within the country was rather limited. A sub-study programme on aviation 
engineering was formed in 1962 at the Bandung Institute of Technology. Since there 
was no clear government strategy and LAPIP was a military unit, only a handful of 
students graduated from there during the 1960s. Thus in comparison with Brazil, where 
local engineer training was highly advanced even before Embraer was established, 
human capital formation in Indonesia was significantly weaker. 
A key promoter of industrial-scale aircraft manufacturing in Indonesia was B.J. 
Habibie. After receiving a doctorate in aeronautical engineering at the Technische 
Hochschule Aachen in 1965, he remained in Germany and worked for over 10 years in 
Hamburg for Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) where he became vice president 
and director for technology application. He returned to Indonesia in 1974, accepting the 
call of President Suharto to become his technology adviser. Habibie’s long-term family 
ties to the president were a key source of trust, and he soon took on high level positions 
in the New Order government. In 1978, he became State Minister for Research and 
Technology, and was given the oversight of a number of high-technology projects as 
chair of the Agency for Strategic Industry (BPIS).  
Habibie’s industrial development strategy involved four steps. Phase 1 involved 
technology acquisition by transferring already existing technology through licenses. In 
Phase 2, previously acquired technology would be integrated into the design and 
production of new products. In Phase 3, the existing technology would be further 
developed and investment would be made into new technologies to design and produce 
new products. Finally, in Phase 4, large-scale basic research capabilities were to be 
acquired and implemented to generate new, competitive generic technologies (Steenhuis 
et al. 2007). 
Despite the lack of a pre-existing technological base and an underdeveloped capital 
goods sector, the Indonesian government did not hesitate to formulate ambitious high-
tech mega-projects, including telecommunications, shipbuilding, the national car 
project, nuclear energy and aircraft manufacturing. The late 1960s and 1970s marked a 
period of rapidly increasing oil revenues as a result of the exponential growth of oil 
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 The appearance of aviation on the political agenda may be linked to a 1956 speech by Sukarno on the 
occasion of the fifth year of independence, in which he highlighted the strategic nature of aviation for the 
Indonesian military, economy and politics. 
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production.
184
 The New Order government expressed its intention to invest the oil 
revenues into enhancing domestic technological capabilities. 
4.6.2.2 From licensed production to co-development 
IPTN was founded in 1976 by a presidential degree as a state-owned enterprise with the 
merger of the assets of the Pertamina oil and gas company
185
 and LIPNUR. Habibie, 
who was appointed as the director of the company, had initially chosen a location near 
Jakarta. He later accepted the Air Force’s offer to use the Bandung facilities of LIPNUR 
(180 km from the capital) in return for including ‘Nurtanio’ in the name of the new 
company. Nurtanio Aircraft Industry (IPTN) commenced operations in two small 
hangars of 11,000 m
2
 on a 45,000 m
2
 site outside Bandung on 23 August 1976 and in 
the same year counted 860 employees. Within two decades, IPTN’s facilities had 
expanded to 437,000 m
2
 and the number of employees had risen to 16,000. (see Table 
4.13) 
IPTN and two other institutes, PUSPIPTEK and BPPT formed the basis of the 
integrated aerospace program in Indonesia. The Center for Science and Technology 
Development (PUSPIPTEK) was established in Serpong, close to Jakarta, providing 
research and testing laboratories. The Agency for Assessment and Application of 
Technology (BPPT) took over policy coordination of national technology development 
in aerospace and other high-tech industries. At the same time the domestic supply of 
aerospace engineering graduates was only slowly catching up with demand. Enrolment 
at ITB only numbered some 30 plus students in 1980.  
 
Table 4.13 Key financial data of IPTN, 1976-89, compared with the first years of Embraer  
IPTN 
Years  1976 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Employees 860 1,695 3,162 4,742 7,853 10,774 11,713 12,596 13,000 13,300 14,100 14,20
0 Sales 15.6 34.0 43.5 102.7 106.0 67.5 46.9 86.9 73.4 124.3 149.1 223.7 
Profit (after tax) 1.5 6.9 0.9 2.0 7.4 9.5 13.3 0.3 -16.2 1.8 0.4 5.0 
Investment 49.2 11.4 41.3 84.1 141.8 139.7 119.4 79.8 205.9 85.8 42.7 54.5 
Inv/Sales (%) 315.5 33.5 95.1 81.9 133.7 206.9 254.3 91.9 280.6 69.1 28.6 24.4 
Sales/Emp (1 USD) 18.1 20.1 13.8 21.7 13.5 6.3 4.0 6.9 5.6 9.3 10.6 15.8 
Embraer (EMB) 
 1969 1971 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Employees 589 n/a 3,323 3,353 4,225 4,104 4,300 4,987 5,957 5,414 6,732 6,877 
Sales  21.4 120.4 199.9 228.3 295.7 256.0 269.3 375.5 346.1 439.5 348.2 
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 Indonesian oil production increased threefold from 486 thousand barrels a day in 1965 to 1.5 million in 
1976 (BP, 2009). 
185
 Pertamina was established in 1957 to extract and refine Indonesia’s oil and gas reserves in 1957. Its 
revenues allowed it to have assets in many other fields including telecommunication, real estate or airline 
business but it also became a source of funding for Indonesia’s ruling elite without accountability, leading 
to debts amounting to 10 billion USD by 1975 in a time of rapidly expanding oil production. For more on 
the Pertamina debacle, see McCawley (1978). 
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Comparison of employment and sales: IPTN / Embraer (%) 
Employees 146.0 n/a 95.2 141.4 185.9 262.5 272.4 252.6 218.2 245.7 209.4 206.5 
Sales  158.7 36.1 51.4 46.4 22.8 18.3 32.3 19.5 35.9 33.9 64.2 
Source: Hill and Pang, 1988, Table 4, p.159; McKendrick, 1992, Table 4, p.60.; Ramamurti (1987) 
Note: Values in thousand USD, constant 2000 prices (official exchange rates from World Development 
Indicators: 8421.8 IDR/USD applied.)  
Habibie was very successful in securing deals for technology sourcing. In line with his 
technology strategy of “start from the end and end at the beginning”, IPTN embarked on 
license manufacturing. Already in 1975
186
 a contract was signed with Habibie’s former 
employer, the West German MBB about the assembly of the BO-105 helicopters in 
Indonesia under license. It is estimated that over a hundred of these models (NBO-105 
under Indonesian designation) were built over a quarter of a century, making it the most 
successful product of IPTN. In 1982 a subsequent deal was signed with MBB to 
assemble the BK-117, a more advanced helicopter, but it is estimated that only 3 of 
these were produced in Indonesia. In 1977, IPTN acquired a license from the French 
Aerospatiale to produce the Puma SA-330 (NSA-330) and later the Super Puma AS-332 
helicopters (NAS-332 under local designation) in Indonesia, from kits shipped from 
France. Some 20 of these helicopters were produced according to the best estimates
187
. 
The third rotary wing producer IPTN signed a contract with was Bell Textron (US) in 
1984. Production of NBell-412 helicopters started in 1986, with two units produced in 
the first four years. (See Table 4.14 for an overview of the aircraft and helicopters 
produced in Indonesia) 
 
Table 4.14 Number of aircraft and helicopters delivered by IPTN (1975-98) 
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 Since IPTN was not existing at that time, the Indonesian partner organization in this deal (and in a later 
with the Spanish CASA) was Advanced Technology &  Teknologi Penerbangan Pertamina (ATTP). 
187
 McKendrick (1992, Fig.1, p.50) reports 11 NSA-330s and 6 NAS-332 assembled by 1990. SIPRI 
estimates 9 NAS-330s assembled between 1981 and 84 and 4 plus 7 NSA-332s over the periods 1984-87 
and 2001-07 (SIPRI, 2009). 
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Source: Aircraft delivery figures from Airlinerlist.com (retrieved 2010 Jul); Helicopter production figures 
from McKendrick, 1992, Fig.1,p.50 (IPTN). 
Note: a) only prototypes were built of the N-250, it was not produced in series. 
 
Habibie’s primary interest was in producing fixed-winged aircraft. The key technology 
contract that came to shape the trajectory of Indonesian aircraft production and 
development was signed with the Spanish Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (CASA), 
the company that Goldstein (2002b, p.528) referred to as “the smallest of the 
independent European aerospace firms”. The 1975 deal permitted Indonesia to produce 
the C-212 Aviocar 19-seater turboprop under license. This design was relatively new 
(flown first in 1971) and belonged to the expanding niche of commuter aircraft with low 
airport infrastructure requirements (very similar to Embraer’s Bandeirante) and offering 
a versatile utilization for both commercial and military purposes. CASA sent a staff of 
30-40 technicians to Bandung to facilitate learning to produce the plane, but it was the 
C-212’s “simplicity in design and construction” (McKendrick 1992, p.43) that 
contributed to the relative success of the project. The newborn Indonesian aircraft 
industry had produced five of these aircraft by the end of 1976 and production of the 
type peaked at 17 in 1981. Most of the Indonesian-made NC-212 airplanes served 
domestic demand
188
. IPTN had a license to produce 108 NC-212s and had completed 95 
by the year 2000.
189
 Due to a variety of reasons, 16 of these planes were involved in 
accidents. (See Figure 4.27 for an overview of Indonesian aircraft production.) 
IPTN’s cooperation with CASA advanced to another level when in 1979 the two 
companies agreed to form a joint venture to design and manufacture a 38 to 44-seater 
twin-prop commuter, the CN-235 (CN stands for CASA/Nurtanio). Entry into the 
emerging aviation market of Indonesia and the readiness of the Indonesian counterpart 
to invest in research and development triggered the interest of CASA. For for IPTN the 
deal meant advancing to the second stage of Habibie’s technology transfer ladder 
(‘technology integration’, or the development of new-product using already proven 
technology). This was considered as an in-between stage on the route towards 
indigenous design capabilities. 
In 1979, Airtech was established in Madrid with 70 million USD to coordinate the 
project. CASA and IPTN became equal partners. McKendrick called the division of 
labour on the CN-235 “quite unusual”, because work was divided in a way that IPTN 
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 McKendrick (1992) reports only 6 planes exported by 1986, 5 for agricultural use in Thailand and 1 
for Air Guam; SIPRI lists only the 4 exported to Thailand .  
189
 “Toughing it out”, Flight International, 25-31 July 2000 
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designed and produced the outer wing sections, the rear fuselage, the tail and the interior 
while CASA was responsible for the (technologically more demanding) inner wing 
sections, forward fuselage, centre wing and engine nacelles (1992, p.45). These parts 
were then exchanged and final assembly took place both in Spain and in Indonesia. 
The design phase (1979-82) allowed for an active knowledge exchange. CASA sent 
some 60 employees to IPTN to assist design and further support on aerodynamics 
engineering was received from Boeing. The project was important for IPTN in terms of 
acquiring and upgrading machinery and tools as well: it started using touch numerical 
controlled (TNC) machinery in 1981 and by 1985 24 computer numerical controlled 
(CNC) machines allowed high precision work. CASA also received assistance on wing 
design from MBB.  
The share of foreign components was high: engines, communications and control 
systems, landing gear and base metal had been produced in the USA and Europe. For 
IPTN, this was reduced over the years to 20 percent, although the reduction only 
affected the airframe. 
 
Figure 4.27 Aircraft production cycles in Indonesia (1975-2006) 
 
Source: IPTN, Airlinerlist.com (retrieved: 10 Jul 2010) 
Notes: Year of delivery is a close proxy to year of production, for which there is a lack of information. 
Since many of the planes produced were not sold immediately, there are potential discrepancies, e.g. in 
1981, at least 3 of the NC-212s delivered may have been produced in the previous year. In the case of 6 
CN-235s produced during the crisis years of 1997-98 for Malaysia, but only delivered later are listed for 
1998 based on information from Flight International
190
. There are reports of NC-212 production in 
Indonesia after 2000, but exact number and year are unknown. 
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 “Indonesia tries to rescue Malaysian IPTN deal” Flight International 24-30 Jun 1998 
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Two prototypes were produced by CASA and two by IPTN. One of the Spanish planes, 
Infanta Elena took off in Madrid for the first time in November 1983, followed by the 
Indonesian Tetuko a month later. The division of labour between the parties became a 
source of major problems for the airworthiness certification. When the CN-235 received 
certification of the American FAA in December 1986, it was only valid for the 
prototypes assembled by CASA, not by IPTN (Amir 2007, p.287). Lacking bilateral 
agreement between Indonesia and the USA (the USA was demanding an independent 
aviation authority in Indonesia), IPTN had to turn to other agencies, and finally received 
certification from the British Aviation Authority in 1995. This was crucial for access 
foreign markets. However, customers remained cautious and preferred the planes 
assembled in Spain to those made in a developing country. However, Eriksson (2003) 
notes that by this time CASA had already sold their planes to potential buyers. Exports 
of the Indonesian-made CN-235 planes covered Southeast Asia (Brunei, Malaysia and 
South Korea, with a total of 17 planes) as well as Pakistan (3) and the United Arab 
Emirates (7)
191
. On the global market the (Indonesian and Spanish made) CN-235s 
achieved only moderate success, with a around 5% share in the 20-45 seat segment by 
1990
192
. By 2007 a total of approximately 234 CN-235s have been produced by CASA 
and IPTN together.
193
 Analysts considered the realization of the CN-235 venture as a 
success
194
 for the newly emerging industry of Indonesia and it brought significant 
prestige for Habibie.  
 
Table 4.15 Key performance characteristics of IPTN’s and competing aircraft 
Manufacturer / Aircraft Type 
First 
Flight 
(Year) 
Max 
number 
of 
seats 
Max 
take-off 
weight 
(tons) 
Max 
cruise 
speed 
(knots) 
Fuel 
consumptiona  
(kg/h) 
Max 
Cruise 
Altitude 
(feet) 
Max 
Range 
(km) 
Embraer  EMB-120 Brasilia 1983 30 11.5 300 340 25,000 3,600 
Saab SF-340 1983 37 12.9 282 350 25,000 3,500 
de Havilland  Dash 8-100 1983 39 15.6 269 393 25,000 2,800 
CASA-IPTN CN-235 1983 45 15.1 248 348 18,000 4,900 
Aerospatiale/Aeritalia ATR-42 1984 50 16.7 265 385 25,000 4,600 
        
de Havilland  Dash 8-300 1987 56 18.6 287 457 25,000 2,400 
Canadair CRJ-100 1991 56 21.5 460 928 37,000 3,400 
Embraer ERJ-145 1995 50 22.0 447 n/a 37,000 3,200 
IPTN N-250 1995 56 22.0 300 n/a 20,000 2,000 
Source: Regional Airliner Directory, Flight International 10-16 June 1992; producers  
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 Figures are based on SIPRI estimates.  
192
 Goldstein (Goldstein 2002b, p.529, referring to Dagnino) 
193
 “Status Of Programs” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10 November 2008. 
194
 In 1991, CASA even sold the license to produce 50 CN-235s by Turkish Aerospace Industries in a 550 
million USD deal. As for the safety record of the plane, out of the 43 assembled in Indonesia, 3 aircraft 
were lost in accidents; and another 6 of the Spanish-made planes were involved in crashes. 
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Note: a) at long-range performance 
 
In comparison with similar aircraft, the technological level of the CN-235 in many ways 
met industry standards. In the early 1980s, almost exactly at the same time as the CN-
235, five major aircraft projects were launched in the 30-50 seat range around the world. 
The competitors of CASA and IPTN were Embraer’s EMB-120 Brasilia, the Swedish 
Saab SF-340, the Dash-8 by de Havilland from Canada, and a French-Italian venture’s 
ATR-42. The CN-235 compared rather favorably in terms of fuel consumption and 
range, but this came at a cost of speed and cruising altitude (see Table 4.15). 
Figure 4.28 shows the cumulative output of the same aircraft during the first 20 
years of production in Indonesia and in Spain, transposed to a common starting point 
(year 1 refers to the year of the first delivery). The steeper growth of Spanish output in 
the initial years indicates the difference in manufacturing capabilities and the flatter 
learning curve of the Indonesian industry. The fact that Indonesian production flattens 
out sooner (at around 90 deliveries in the case of the C-212 and around 60 in the case of 
the CN-235) while CASA’s deliverys continued to growing reveals Indonesia’s sales 
problems. 
 
Figure 4.28 Comparison of cumulative aircraft production in Spain and Indonesia 
  
Source: http://www.airlinerlist.com (Retrieved: 16 Dec 2009) 
Source: http://www.airlinerlist.com (Retrieved: 16 Dec 2009) 
Note: Spanish production does not contain the 50 aircraft assembled in Turkey under license 
 
External knowledge flows were also promoted at the government level. A 1979 
technology transfer agreement resulted in collaboration in higher education with the 
Delft Technical University and the Dutch Aerospace Research Institute NLR and was 
subsequently renewed as ISARD in 1985 and as APERT in 1990. These last two 
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agreements were supported by Fokker until the company went bankrupt. The 
collaboration with TU Delft was crucial, since ITB did not offer programs beyond the 
master’s level in the 1990s. 
IPTN signed a number of other contracts that were important for the company to 
gain access to technology, mostly relatively small scale subcontracts and offset 
agreements with leading western manufacturers. An important agreement was signed 
with Boeing in 1982 on management assistance. Over the years, around fifty advisers 
came to IPTN and trained IPTN staff in Seattle, including the son of Habibie, who later 
became the director of the company. In a small offset contract in return for the flag 
carrier Garuda acquiring Boeing aircraft, IPTN was selected to produce the trailing edge 
flaps of the B-737s (to a value of 30m USD) and to assemble stowage bin frames for B-
767s (for 1m USD). In a 1986 agreement, Grumman of the US agreed to train IPTN 
engineers at its home plant. In 1986, Indonesia signed a deal to purchase 12 F-16 
fighters from General Dynamics and to produce parts and components to offset the 
337m USD deal The components included forward engine access doors, wing flaperons, 
fuel pylons, main landing gear doors, graphite epoxy skin, and vertical fins in a value of 
52m USD
195
. A 1990 deal with the Dutch Fokker included a 35 per cent offset 
arrangement for any F-100s bought by Garuda, including the production of wing, tail 
and other primary components. However, the expected full order was never realized. A 
1980 deal with General Electric resulted in the establishment of a Universal 
Maintenance Center in Indonesia six years later, to perform maintenance, repair and 
overhaul (MRO) of aircraft and industrial engines in the region made by GE. This deal 
is significant for making Indonesia a competitor of Singapore which focused on 
becoming a regional MRO hub for the aviation industry.  
4.6.3 Going it alone till the abrupt end 
Once the CN-235 development project had been realized, Habibie believed that IPTN 
was ready to develop an aircraft independently. His intention was to launch a 
commercial aircraft for dual military and civilian use
196
. The initial plan of the 
engineering team was to design a 30-seater replacement for the aging Fokker F-27s 
flown by Indonesian airlines, but a subsequent market research found that demand is 
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 Sources contradict on the value of the offset deal; McKendrick reports 17.7m (1992, p.44), SIPRI 
reports 52m USD (SIPRI 2009). 
196
 Amir’s interview with Habibie (2007, p.287) 
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greater for a 50-seat commuter. Habibie announced the launch of the N-250 project at 
the 1989 Paris air show.  
IPTN signed an important technological agreement in October 1994 with Lucas 
Aerospace Flight Control System to develop an advanced flight control systems for the 
N-250 using the fly-by-wire system developed by Lucas and Liebherr Aero Technik. 
The 3-axes system was an innovation for propeller-driven planes. To further emphasize 
that commercialization was the cornerstone of the N-250, IPTN opened a branch office 
in Seattle and in 1995 made a number of agreements with the local government of 
Mobile, Alabama and US investors to produce the N-250 in the USA at the to-be-
established ‘American Regional Aircraft Industry’. In addition, British Aerospace 
showed interest in manufacturing the N-250 under license in the UK. Habibie claimed 
that orders amounted to 189 planes by the 3 Indonesian airlines and a European leasing 
company. 
The project budget was initially planned to be 600 million USD, however it 
increased to 1.2 billion USD along the road. The work started with a team of 30 
engineers and the team grew to over 1,500 production personnel. To fill the budget gaps 
President Suharto decided to allow IPTN to use an interest-free loan of 185m USD from 
the reforestation fund
197
 (and offered the Forestry Department a 5% royalty from all 
future sales in return). With this cash injection IPTN succeeded in rolling out 
Gatotkaca, the first prototype of the N-250 on Patriots Day in November 1994. The 
plane completed its maiden flight in August 1995. So far, only two prototypes have 
been built. Work on a third one came to a halt in 1998. The first two airplaces clocked 
around 850 flight hours, half of what would have been required for certification. The 
plane never received an airworthiness certificate
198
 and the financial crisis of 1997-98 
brought the project to an abrupt end.  
The unsuccessful commercial launch of the N-250, an apparently technologically 
innovative plane, points in the direction of systemic failures in the Indonesian aerospace 
innovation system. First of all, the idea of ‘going it alone’ was in sharp contrast with the 
strategy of other foreign producers as well as airlines’ expectations, at a time when the 
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 The fund was established to finance preservation and rehabilitation of Indonesian forests in which all 
forest concessionaires had to contribute. A subsequent lawsuit against President Suharto by a group of 
NGOs was dismissed and IPTN never eventually paid back the loans as the loan was converted into 
government shares. Devastating forest fires in the following years were grim testimonies of the 
misconduct. 
198
 Major causes for delay were partly of organizational, partly of technological nature (including 
concerns with the application of the fly-by-wire system). 
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global landscape was being dramatically reshaped by the post-Cold War recession. The 
list of confirmed orders for N-250 was alarmingly short on foreign buyers. Airlines 
were increasingly opting for regional jets instead of propeller planes, and to cut 
operating costs preferred manufacturers that offered a whole range of product lines of 
one family. As the lower rows of Table 4.15 show, the N-250 fitted more in the product 
lines of the 1980s than in those of the 1990s. While the propeller-driven commuters’ 
market was shrinking, the novelty it offered (fly-by-wire system) was not enough to 
convince potential buyers. Cross-border R&D and production ventures were the new 
sources of innovative solutions in new planes. While the vertical integration of the 
design and production of almost all of the modules (except for the engines) was 
functioning in the 1970s and 1980s, it became too expensive a solution in the 1990s. 
Over the 1990s, the changes to a system of increased global competition and 
collaboration caused many famous European and North American producers to be taken 
over or to go bankrupt.  
Still, IPTN took the risk of going against the trend, and saddled itself with 
development expenses that by far exceeded its profits and even its turnover. The reason 
such an endeavor could go ahead was due to the very nature of the innovation system. It 
was not a system aiming at greater market success by commercial and technological 
interactions, but more a rather expensive public experiment to prove Habibie’s theory 
that technological capabilities can be acquired through ‘learning-by-doing’. The tougher 
global competition in the industry was no longer conducive to these kinds of 
experiments. The influence of one strategist on determining the technological 
capabilities was excessive, and correcting mechanisms and institutional checks and 
balances were missing from the system of innovation. These are exemplified by what 
McKendrick (1992) showed to be as underdeveloped managerial capabilities. The lack 
of foreign sales of existing aircraft should have alerted the staff to international market 
signals.  
Sufficient foreign demand for a new plane can accelerate certification in the 
respective country. But since this was not the case and since the domestic certification 
process revealed the need for further technological adjustments, the Indonesian aircraft 
industry started to fall behind the global leaders. 
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4.6.3.1 The emerging innovation system: increases in size and performance  
There is, nevertheless, historical evidence that an aerospace innovation and production 
system was emerging in Indonesia. This evidence is summarized below.  The main 
elements (input resources) that increased the size of the innovation system are the 
following: 
1. Actors: The two main (interrelated) actors providing financial input in the 
system were the Indonesian Government and the Air Force. IPTN was assigned 
with the entire range of industrial activities from design to production and 
marketing. The actors that influenced the course of innovation included foreign 
technological partners, such as MBB, CASA, Boeing and other manufacturers 
offering parts and components production for IPTN. A major gap in the system 
was the lack of domestic private actors and private capital investment. 
2. The institutional set-up: Government legislation provided a protective 
environment favorable to an infant industry. This included an import ban on 
competing airplanes and a guaranteed domestic market (the Air Force and state-
owned carriers were forced to buy domestically produced aircraft), as well as an 
exemption from the “buy Indonesian” policy that compelled other state-owned 
enterprises to purchase domestic inputs. State ownership of IPTN coupled with 
Habibie’s influential role in multiple capacities199 ensured a rather soft budget 
constraint for the company.  
3. Capital input: Investment totaled at 6.5 billion dollars by 1989. The exact use 
of this amount remains unknown (including what was spent on technology 
acquisition or R&D), but it roughly indicates the cost of technological capability 
accumulation. Additionally, at least 1 billion dollars were spent on the 
development of the N-250.  
4. Technology input: Even before the establishment of IPTN, the Air Force had an 
R&D depot and a few small planes were designed in Indonesia. Between 1975 
and 1986, licenses were acquired for four helicopter types (from MBB, 
Aerospatiale and Bell) and one aircraft (from CASA). In connection to these 
projects, at least 50 foreign experts worked at IPTN. A team from Boeing was 
providing organizational support for the management. As a result of offset deals, 
                                                 
199
 Apart from being CEO of IPTN, Habibie was the chair of the Agency for Strategic Industry (BPIS), 
the Technology Adviser to the President and held the position of Minister for Technology and Research 
between 1978 and 1998. Following two months of Vice Presidency, Habibie became the President of 
Indonesia in May 1998, which lasted until October 1999. 
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IPTN produced components for Boeing, British Aerospace, Fokker, General 
Dynamics aircraft in the late 1980s and 1990s. A Universal Maintenance Center 
was also established with the help of General Electric in 1980. 
5. New machinery: By the end of 1985 IPTN operated 63 computerized numeric 
control (CNC) and 51 touch-in numeric control (TNC) machines, 156 
conventional milling machines, 1 chemical milling machine and 3 autoclaves for 
plastic bonding. By the late 1990s, nine additional TNC machines and 24 
milling machines had been added (Table 4.16). 
6. (Skilled) labor input: By 1989 the workforce of IPTN grew to 14,200, peaking 
at at 16,000 in 1997. Many employees were blue-collar workers who received 
in-house training, but a large share of the engineers was trained in Europe and 
North America. Partners (including CASA and Grumman) also offered 
additional in-house training for IPTN staff. University graduates constituted 
around one-sixth of the employees of IPTN in the 1980s. Many of these had 
studied abroad with government or company scholarships. Locally, the Bandung 
Institute of Technology was offering an ‘Aerospace Engineering’ optional 
program from 1962 onwards, which was formalized in 1991. A department of 
aerospace engineering was only created in 1997. A ‘Materials Engineering’ 
program has been offered since 1993, although scholarships were given a decade 
earlier to assist the formation of the program.
200
 However, in comparison to 
other aircraft producing countries, the provision of high skilled labor had major 
shortcomings, mainly due to the fact that all high-tech industries were developed 
at the same time virtually from scratch, where a philosophy of learning-by-doing 
prevailed. 
 
Table 4.16 IPTN’s machinery for aircraft manufacturing 
 
Computerized Numeric 
Control (CNC) machines 
Touch-in Numeric 
Control (TNC) 
machines 
Conventional 
milling machines 
Chemical milling 
machines 
Autoclaves for 
plastic 
bonding 
1985 63a 51 156 1 3 
2000 63 60 180 1 3 
Sources: McKendrick (1992) and “Toughing it out” Flight International, 25-31 Jul 2000 
Note: (a) Number of CNC machines expanded in 1985 from 24 to 63 
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 Information retrieved from BIT’s website; “Faculty of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, 
General Information and History” (www.itb.ac.id) 
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The significant innovative efforts made over the first two decades of coordinated 
industrial development activities had tangible results. Here is an indication on the 
performance of the aerospace innovation system: 
a. New products: Direct outputs of the innovation system are the co-developed 
CN-235 and the N-250 prototypes, both highly complex technologies that were 
even new to the world. A number of new-to-the-country innovations included 
the aircraft and helicopters produced under license as well as the parts and 
components produced for foreign manufacturers. 
b. New production processes: Although there were some changes in the 
production processes along a product cycle, McKendrick (1992, Fig.2, p.54) 
shows no evidence of efficiency gains. 
c. Market share: IPTN has produced almost 100 of the NC-212 aircraft and more 
than 140 of the helicopters under license, almost entirely for the Indonesian 
market. The CN-235 cornered 5% of the global market, mostly due to the sales 
of the Spanish-made planes. 
d. Sales and value added: Within ten years of its operations, IPTN’s turnover 
increased to 87 million dollars. In comparison with the Brazilian national 
champion, average sales of IPTN in the first decade of production, grew more 
slowly, hardly reaching one third of the sales levels of Embraer.
201
 By 1993, 
IPTN’s sales increased to 193 million USD. By 1996 the total Indonesian 
aerospace industry’s value added had increased to 433 million USD. Yet the 
industry has not become competitive and Indonesian exports were restricted to a 
few barter deals of 5 NC-212s and 8 CN-235s. 
4.6.4 Crisis and interruption without transition 
4.6.4.1 Crisis in a still emergent industry 
Already during the lengthy final design and certification process of the N-250, in 1995, 
at Indonesia’s 50th anniversary of independence, IPTN announced the development of a 
new regional jet, the N-2130
202
. Had it been successful, the financing scheme of the 
                                                 
201
 The total sales of IPTN between 1977-86 was around 607 million dollars, for Embraer (1970-79) it 
was 1893 million dollars,  We converted current sales figures to US dollars and deflated to constant 2000 
series using WDI data. 
202
 N stands for Nusantara, 2 for twin engines and 130 for the number of passengers (The plane would be 
offered in 3 sizes, with 80, 100 and 130 seats). (See Goldstein 2002b, note 2 p.530 for a more critical 
interpretation.) 
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project could have been called ‘innovative’. In 1996 a separate financing company was 
created, PT DSTP
203
, to raise the estimated costs of 2 billion USD by selling shares to 
domestic investors, state-owned companies as well as for families (Mursjid 1998). PT 
DSTP would own the prototypes as well as any intellectual property related to the 
aircraft. The investors were supposed to receive royalty payments from the time when 
the N-2130 would enter into production (not before 2003, according to a 1998 
schedule). However, the company failed to raise more than around 1/20
th
 of the required 
capital. No potential foreign partners showed serious interest in investing and analysts 
also dismissed what Goldstein (2002b, p.530) called a “folly”. In the meantime, while 
IPTN was also looking for an investor to finance the remaining 90m USD required for 
the certification of the N-250, Suharto signed a letter of intent to the IMF agreeing to 
stop financing the grand projects, including those in the aircraft industry, in return for a 
bail-out from the Asian crisis, which hit Indonesia the worst among the East Asian 
economies (Hill 2000). Even when Habibie became president of Indonesia in May 1998 
for over a year , the government could not provide more funds for the industry, which 
had accumulated 570m USD in debts by 1999 (Goldstein 2002b). In September 1999 
DSTP was dissolved and the investment into the N-2130 aircraft was written off as sunk 
costs. 
The crisis not only prompted all the development projects of IPTN to be suspended, 
but it affected its sales as well. The Malaysian air force was renegotiating a deal on 6 
CN-235 aircraft that were not delivered on time in 1997. IPTN had to pull out from 
bidding for an Australian air force contract due to its inability to offer a competitive 
financing scheme
204
. In response to the crisis, IPTN was diversifying into non-aviation 
related products (car and agro industry) and cut its workforce from 16,000 in 1997 to 
10,598 in 2000 (by more than 4,000 from 1999 to 2000).
205
 IPTN changed its name to 
PT Dirgantara Indonesia (Indonesian Aerospace, IAe) in the same year. Shifting to the 
core activities of manufacturing aircraft parts for Boeing, Airbus and British Aerospace, 
IAe also made further attempts to market the CN-235s and has produced a few. It is 
struggling to find investors for the N-250 (an attempt of a partnership with China 
failed). While there are still further attempts to launch a new 19-seater aircraft, the N-
219, the most lucrative business for IAe may well be the MRO activities. Today, the 
                                                 
203
 DSTP is short for “PT Dua Satu Tiga Puluh”, or “2130 Company”. Its mission was to provide finance 
for high-tech endeavors in the fields of aerospace, maritime transportation and communications. 
204
 “IPTN Phoenix falls before Australian competition decision” Flight International, 8-14 Jul 1998 
205
 “Toughing it out” Flight International, 25-31 Jul 2000 
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company employs some 3,700 persons and produces the military version of the CN-235 
and also the NC-212 (license extended for the -400 series in 2006) and NAS-332 Super 
Puma under license
206
. Most recently a new agreement was signed with Eurocopter in 
2008 to construct the tail booms and fuselage of the latest version of this helicopter, the 
EC725/EC225, production of the first of the 125 units planned began in January 2010. 
The deal also included assistance during the early stage of cooperation.
207
 
At the same time, it is interesting to see the contrast in the follow-up story of the 
CN-235 at CASA. The Spanish partner also chose to go it alone with the further 
development of the aircraft. The resulting stretched military transport version is capable 
of carrying 50% more payload with new engines. The C-295 made its maiden flight in 
1998 and has been selling rather successfully, owing partly to the boost brought about 
by CASA’s merger into the Europe defense corporation EADS. Further modified 
versions of the CN-235 were instrumental in providing EADS with a foothold on the 
American defense market by providing maritime patrol planes for the coast guard
208
. 
4.6.4.2 Interruption in an emergent innovation system 
The Indonesian industry ran out of steam during the mid-1990s. Despite all the efforts 
and achievements, the innovation system was not mature enough to ensure competitive 
sales in the commuter market. At the same time, the direction of search for new 
innovative solutions was in mismatch with changes in the global competitive landscape. 
The Indonesian strategy of self-reliance was diametrically opposed to the alliance-
favoring solutions that the global aircraft industry was transiting towards since more 
than a decade ago. The decision to develop the N-250 almost alone made the project too 
expensive and technologically less reliable compared to competitors using risk sharing 
partnerships for co-development and co-production (see Embraer’s success with the E-
145 regional jets). Even access to blatantly unlimited government resources was 
insufficient to gain certification and a critical mass of foreign export deals. 
Consequently, without fundamental institutional changes the industry had little chance 
of continuing to grow. 
In this setting the aircraft industry was unprepared to face the East Asian financial 
crisis and the loss of its only financial resource, the Government. The attempt to raise 
“private” capital through the DSTP project and the efforts to find foreign investors 
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 Flight International 28 Oct 2008 
207
 “PT DI makes components for France's Eurocopter” The Jakarta Post 28 Jan 2010 
208
 “EADS-CASA all at sea” Interavia, Summer 2006 
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indicates that IPTN and the government were aware of the problem. However, these 
small steps were not enough for the company to weather the crisis in which both 
innovation and production came to a still stand. The effect of the interruption was more 
devastating in Indonesia than in any other country developing a latecomer aerospace 
industry: 
1. Reduction in the capital flows: In accordance with the agreement with the IMF, all 
government support to IPTN was cut, leaving the company virtually without sources 
of finance. Part of the equipment and machinery in research institutes was also 
dismantled and sold abroad. 
2. Reduction of human capital inflows: The crises had major consequences on 
the aeronautics education system. In 2000 the enrollment in aeronautical 
engineering at ITB was reduced from 70 to 50 students, while the program was 
given a more general profile. Many of the staff were forced to take a sabbatical 
year abroad, a number of experts left forMalaysia or the Netherlands. 
3. Halt of innovative activities: As a result of lack of funding, IPTN shelved the 
N-2130 project and the certification of the N-250.  
4. Production output: Apart from the planes already in an advanced stage on the 
production line, the factory came to a halt. 
5. Sales and value added: Value added further plummeted from as low as 24 
million USD in 1998 to 4 million in 1999. Most indicative of the lack of 
transition ever since is that value added could not exceed 37 million in 2005. 
4.6.5 Conclusion 
4.6.5.1 Emergence and interruption 
Based on the findings in section 4.6.4, Figure 4.29 provides a summary overview of the 
emergence, growth, stagnation and eventual collapse of the Indonesian aerospace 
innovation system. In the years preceding the establishment of IPTN in 1976, we can 
see an increase in both the size and the performance of the system. The increases were 
due to the establishment of a manufacturing facility and the inflow of Polish technology. 
This resulted in new-to-the-country products and presumably process innovation along 
the learning curve.The institutionalization of innovative activities, through the 
establishment of LAPIP in 1960 did not start from scratch, since Nurtanio had already 
been active during the late 1950s and had designed a number of new small planes.  
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Figure 4.29 Emergence of the Indonesian aerospace innovation system 
 
(Author’s compilation) 
 
Between 1976 and 1996 the innovation system’s size continued to increase and 
performance improved to hitherto unprecedented levels. The expansion of the system 
was driven by the expansion of IPTN. Though the share of investment dedicated to 
R&D is unknown, we may assume that learning by was associated with increased 
resources to assist learning, see Table 4.13). New technology was provided through 
licenses for helicopters and aircraft and international exchanges of staff. The improved 
performance of the system manifested itself in increased production figures (Table 
4.14). The arrow to 1996 hides the winding growth path, but the growth trend only 
seems to be interrupted with the maiden flight of the N-250. The mounting expenses, 
the failure to certify the plane and failed attempts to commercialize previous ones 
indicates a stagnating or slightly declining system that reached its critical turning point 
with the financial crisis in 1998, followed by a sharp drop in physical and human capital 
available in the system, which halted all work on new products.  
4.6.5.2 Why did Indonesia fail to make the transition to a new growth trajectory? 
The development of the Indonesian aircraft industry stalled during the emerging phase. 
It remained an infant industry and was unable to make the transition to sustained 
competitiveness. Why did it fail to do so? First of all, creating a viable aerospace 
industry is never an easy task. Aircraft manufacturing is among the technologically 
most complex, highly capital-intensive industries. For a country with no experience in 
high-tech manufacturing to enter this industry, it had to take extreme risks and deal with 
a great deal of uncertainty. The need to cope with this uncertainty and overcome 
shortcomings of infrastructure, human capital and physical capital were theoretically 
sound arguments for government intervention. Indeed, there was a congenial political 
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environment during the whole development of the industry right until the crisis 
(McKendrick 1992). Many comparable policies were applied by Western and emerging 
country governments to support their aerospace industries. 
The need for long-term strategies and solid institutions is crucial, as the failed case 
of Argentina indicates. In this respect, there is no doubt that Indonesia was diligently 
following a clearly formulated strategy (Habibie’s four steps) from the mid- 1970s to 
the late 1990s. But was the strategy feasible in the first place? Habibie implemented a 
technology push strategy. It gave too much priority to technology development over 
financial and marketing considerations (Goldstein 2002b). In particular it was not 
compatible with the global competitive environment. Even if there is evidence that both 
at the company and at government level Indonesia made serious attempts to sell IPTN’s 
planes and considered market demand, this was not feasible given the lack of advanced 
engineering experienced in related high-tech activities and the lack of human resources. 
The problems with the certification process of the N-250, the integration of the fly-by-
wire system and the underdeveloped managerial capacities indicate serious 
shortcomings in IPTN’s technological capabilities. 
Despite the lack of sales of the Indonesian made CN-235 and despite the already 
evident reorganization of the global aerospace industry, IPTN tried to sail against the 
wind, alone. Contrary to Singapore, with hardly any feedback mechanisms from actual 
or potential consumers or from other actors of the “innovation system”, Indonesia 
managed to completely disregard the competitive environment. A possible strategy to 
realize a transition to a more sustained competitiveness should have started with the 
identification of the desired core competences of Indonesian Aerospace. This might not 
have been the manufacturing of a complete aircraft, but rather the production of parts 
and components, with which the company could have participated in global supply 
chains. 
Excessive government attention for aerospace in a developing country has had the 
unintended consequence of shifting much needed resources (including policy focus) 
away from other promising sectors. A look at Indonesia’s industrial development in a 
broader context justifies these criticisms. According figures presented by Hill (1990), 
the disproportionately high levels of protection for engineering and metal manufacturing 
industries received were not justified by the increase in their relative size in Indonesia. 
We do see aircraft manufacturing an increase in value added increase between 1975 and 
986 from almost nothing to 22 million USD, which exceeded the average industrial 
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growth rate of 14.6 per cent per year. However, the share of the capital-goods industries 
(including transport equipment) actually declined from 14% in 1975 to 13% in 1986 
(Hill 1990, Table 2, p.87).  
One should also note that it is easy to overestimate the real output performance of 
Indonesia. Even at the peak of production in 1996, Indonesian value added in aerospace 
was only 433 million USD. This is only 20 per cent the value of Japan and 30 per cent 
of Chinese value added. During the 1990s it was trailing Singapore, though producing 
more than Malaysia and for a few years, even more than South Korea (See Chapter 3). 
Aerospace manufacturing may well have been too big a technological jump for 
Indonesia. The industry was established as an island of high-tech in a sea of low-tech 
production. Technological capabilities in manufacturing in general were low in 
Indonesia, not to mention in the capital goods industries. By the time Brazil started to 
produce commercial aircraft, the states of Sao Paulo or Rio de Janeiro had already 
accumulated four decades of experience in a broader range of industrial activities. In 
1970, one year after Embraer was established, metal products, machinery and transport 
equipment industries accounted for nearly 29% of Brazilian output (Katz 2000, Table 6 
p.1592). Not only was the relative size of the same industries in Indonesia half that of 
Brazil’s, but the technological levels were also much lower. In this respect, the nascent 
Indonesian aircraft industry was at a disadvantage when it came to attracting 
experienced engineers, managers or investors from other technologically advanced 
sectors. 
The foregoing analysis shows that the Indonesian aircraft industry has not succeeded 
in learning to compete. It has accumulated some manufacturing capabilities in a 
remarkably short period of time, but a sectoral innovation system remained incomplete. 
It had weak R&D capacities and insufficient source human resources from the domestic 
higher education system. The sector has also remained commercially weak. Securing 
foreign sales is paramount to decreasing reliance on government funding and for 
recovering at least part of the huge sunk costs of the development of the industry. In the 
end, even the technological capabilities seemed insufficiently attractive for potential 
investors. The industry never managed to move beyond the emergent phase and was not 
able to survive the crises with which it was faced. Even without the Asian crisis, 
innovation was not sustainable in the system. Since 1998, the industry has continued to 
decay. 
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[5] Chapter 5: Understanding firm-level 
dynamics: Successive changes in leadership 
in the regional jet industry 
5.1 Introduction 
Schumpeterian dynamics constantly change companies’ market shares. In their struggle 
to outperform competitors, innovative companies become industry leaders for a certain 
period of time, until new challengers “dethrone” them (Schumpeter 1934, 1942; 
Mowery and Nelson, 1999). Successive leadership changes have characterized the 
regional jet (RJ) manufacturing industry since its emergence. Many of its features make 
it a particularly interesting case to help better understand the nature of leadership 
dynamics. It is a highly turbulent segment of the aerospace industry which has 
witnessed the entry of firms from advanced and emerging economies and the exit of 
long-established producers.  
Most of the studies on industrial dynamics in aircraft manufacturing have focused on 
producers of large civil aircraft (LCA) (Moran and Mowery, 1991; Golich, 1992; 
Frenken and Leydesdorff, 2000; Pavcnik, 2002). The market for RJs, unlike the 
consolidated LCA market, continues to undergo turmoil. Some of the firms had a long 
tradition of constructing aircraft (i.e., Fokker, Canadair or British Aerospace and its 
predecessor Hawker Siddeley), others were relative newcomers (i.e., the Brazilian 
Embraer or the Chinese Comac). There are different motivations why companies aim at 
gaining technological competence in this market: some see RJs as the primary aim, for 
others, it is a stepping stone to enter the more challenging LCA market.  
This chapter explores the history of catch up and leadership change that took place 
in the global RJ industry from the late 1980s to 2010, by studying the co-evolution of 
technology, the competitive landscape, and strategies of firms and governments. It aims 
to explain what triggered periods of catch-up and instances of leadership change, and 
why incumbents lost their leading positions. 
Section 5.2 provides a background on the industry, its emergence and the account of 
two instances of leadership change. Section 5.3 presents the theoretical framework and 
key arguments to test in case studies. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 offer in-depth analyses of 
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leadership change from the early leaders to Bombardier and subsequently from 
Bombardier to Embraer, by discussing windows of opportunity, strategic response and 
the preconditions with respect to all relevant companies. Finally, section 5.6 synthesizes 
the conclusions from the case studies. 
5.2 The regional jet industry and the record of leadership changes 
5.2.1 About the industry 
RJs are defined as turbofan-engine-powered aircraft carrying typically 30 to 120 
passengers at a range of up to 2000-2500 nautical miles.
209
 Their size, range and 
operational costs on shorter distances distinguish RJs from LCA, but both share a lot of 
technological and operational commonalities. The upper boundary of the regional 
segment is rather elusive, the smallest members of the Boeing 737 or Airbus 320 
families are highly similar to the largest Embraer E-Jets. Propulsion, rather than seating 
capacity, distinguishes RJs from turboprop-powered commuters. Turboprops may be 
more economical to operate on short distances than RJs, but are noisier and offer limited 
cruising altitude, speed and range. Based on the definition applied, many smaller jets of 
preceding decades would qualify as RJs
210
. However, those aircraft served different 
markets (connecting main airports rather than extending service to regional airports) and 
were not optimized for economical operation on shorter routes, which were typically 
flown by turboprop commuters. RJs show commonalities with larger business jets. They 
may be identical from a technological perspective, but serve different customers, 
consequently, demand patterns differ. Nevertheless, the various proximities allow 
commercial aircraft producers to relatively easily enter the RJ market. 
RJ manufacturing does not differ from the structure of the mature commercial 
aircraft manufacturing industry. By the 1990s, this had transformed into a pyramid-
shape hierarchy, with system assemblers on top, followed by primary structures and 
system suppliers, and component producers on lower tiers. Aerospace companies with 
multiple competencies can be competitors and collaborators at the same time (Niosi and 
Zhegu, 2005). Competitiveness in the global aircraft industry is affected by many 
interrelated factors: by the availability of capital, access to risk-sharing partners, 
                                                 
209
 Given the lack of a single authoritative source for a definition, we derive our definition from 
Wikipedia, Jane’s and various articles of Flight International, Aviation Week & Space Technology and 
marketing publications of BAe, Bombardier and Embraer. 
210
 For instance, the SE-120 Caravelle, the BAC-111 or the DC-9-10 
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government support, by design capabilities and production capacity, by internal 
organization of corporations and market and by the characteristics of a given aircraft 
programme, such as price and operation costs, which can benefit from commonality 
with other models and maintenance arrangements (USITC, 1998). The complexity of 
factors implies that leadership change is best analysed from a co-evolutionary 
perspective, considering technology, firms, markets and institutions. Such a framework 
has been found applicable for the aircraft industry by Frenken (2000). 
5.2.2 The take-off of regional jets and the early innovators 
The RJ industry emerged at the early 1980s with the introduction of the British 
Aerospace (BAe) 146 family and the Fokker 100. These became successful due to a 
combination of factors. The rapidly increasing oil prices of the 1970s increased demand 
for fuel-efficient aircraft (Figure 5.1). A new generation of turbofan (jet) engines with 
relatively higher bypass ratio became available on the market, allowing jets to compete 
with turboprops on shorter routes, which also benefitted from a subsequent decline in 
kerosene prices in the 1980s. Passengers preferred jets over propeller planes. The 
liberalization of US air transport services in 1978 opened new markets for smaller jets 
offering direct connections between regional airports, and connecting regional airports 
with hubs. Congested hubs discouraged the operation of turboprop commuters carrying 
fewer passengers but taking up similar or even more airspace as larger jets, given their 
slower speeds and exposure to wake turbulence. RJs also offered a modern alternative to 
replace aging turboprop aircraft (Ramsden, 1989). In conjunction, these developments 
radically changed the airliner market. Airlines could now select smaller jets due to 
strategic choice, rather than due to technological constraints.  
 
Figure 5.1 Average annual crude oil prices in real terms, 1970-2011 
 
    Source: US Department of Transport 
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The industry emerged in Europe rather than in the US, which was by far the leader in 
aerospace. But McDonnell Douglas (MDD) and Boeing chose to target the apparently 
more lucrative LCA market, allowing others to exploit the regional niche. The aircraft 
industry was also advanced in the UK and in the Netherlands, and companies benefitted 
from strong linkages with their respective governments. BAe and Fokker could exploit 
their experience of producing and selling various types of aircraft, and established 
networks of suppliers
211
 (Cooke and Ehret, 2009; Broekel and Boschma, 2012). 
Many of BAe’s and Fokker’s strategic choices on design and marketing were 
emulated by subsequent leaders. Both companies recognized that the key to succeed in 
the regional market is cost-efficiency, which necessitate an efficient aircraft design and 
large production capacity. Both companies designed their aircraft in-house. The BAe 
“146” 109-seater jet was based on an earlier shelved project of a predecessor company, 
but was equipped with four modern engines (Hewish, 1982). BAe intensified 
collaborations both in-house and with external partners, including one sharing risk of 
development and production. Fokker’s F-100 twinjet was a fundamentally upgraded 
derivative of its F-28 model.
212
 The F-100 was produced in partnership with British and 
US-based firms. The 146 design utilized the family concept to maximize commonalities 
and reduce costs, and was offered in three sizes to meet airline needs, with capacity 
ranging from 70 to 128 passengers. Fokker also aimed to launch a family, but only 
managed to introduce a smaller derivative (F-70), due to liquidity problems. Both 
aircraft differed substantially from those previously available on the market. The BAe-
146 family offered a wide cabin,
213
 relatively lower noise and the versatility of 
operations. The F-100 offered relatively lower structure-weight per seat (Table 5.1), due 
to using composite materials for control surfaces and interior parts (Ramsden, 1989a). 
The early success of the 146 in the US made BAe the largest RJ producer in the 70-110-
seat segment by 1985. BAe-146 production peaked in 1990, but subsequent upgrades 
                                                 
211
 Many successful commercial aircraft programs originated from the UK following World War II, i.e. 
the Vickers/BAC Viscount, the de Havilland Comet and Trident jets, the Vickers/BAC VC10 or the 
BAC/Aerospatiale Concorde (for a more complete list, see “Post-war UK civil aircraft production” Flight 
International, 19 Dec 2006-1 Jan 2007). The Dutch commercial aircraft industry was virtually equal to 
the activities of Fokker, with its most successful own products, the F-27 Friendship and the F-28 
Fellowship.  
212
 Experts debate the first RJ may have indeed been Fokker’s F-28 Fellowship, 240 of which were 
produced from the late 1960s until the mid-1980s. 
213
 The costs in increased drag due to the “wide narrow-body” fuselage design were offset by the greater 
comfort offered by the 11ft-plus cabin width, the size of previous-generation long-haul jets such as the B-
707. 
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(the RJ-70/85/100) extended the production run to 2001 (Figure 5.2, left panel). Fokker 
followed with a delay, as the high costs of simultaneous product launch (a turboprop 
commuter along the F-100) and exchange-rate volatility led to near insolvency. The 
Dutch government underwrote its debts in 1987. The strong initial sales of the F-100 
made Fokker the market leader in RJs in 1991 (Figure 5.2, right panel). However, 
Fokker’s prices were higher than the new competitors, but too low to recover production 
costs. Failing to attract investors or secure another government bailout, Fokker 
announced bankruptcy and ceased to produce RJs in 1996 (Heerkens and Ulijn, 1999, 
Ligterink, 2001).  
 
Figure 5.2 Number and types of regional jets delivered by British Aerospace (BAe, left panel) and 
Fokker (right) 
  
Source: www.airlinerlist.com (retrieved: June 2012)  
 
5.2.3 Leadership changes 
Changes in leadership in the RJ industry – measured by number of aircrafts delivered – 
are shown in Figure 5.3. The first leadership change happened in 1995 as Bombardier 
launched its 50-seat CRJ100/200 Canadian Regional Jets. Bombardier, a transport 
equipment manufacturer entered the aircraft industry through the acquisition of a 
number of aerospace companies. It successfully transformed a business jet design into 
the CRJ family, which was subsequently stretched to seat up to a hundred passengers 
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(CRJ700/900/1000). With historically unprecedented delivery rates in the RJ segment, 
Bombardier produced over 1,700 CRJs.  
 
Figure 5.3 Regional Jet Deliveries, 3-year moving average, 1980-2010 
 
Note: Delivery dates were obtained from the published lists of www.airlinerlist.com (retrieved: June 
2012), the accuracy of which could only be verified for Bombardier and Embraer in the respective Annual 
Reports. Business jets, and other products of the respective manufacturers are not counted. The data 
includes the following products: British Aerospace RJ: BAC-111, BAe-146-100, -200 and -300 series as 
well as RJ-70, -85 and -100; Fokker: F-28, F-70 and -100; Bombardier: CRJ100, -200, -700, -900 and 
1000; Embraer: ERJ-135, -140, -145, -170, -175, -190 and -195. A 3-year moving average was applied in 
order to smoothen any discrepancy between production and delivery years. 
 
Initially, Bombardier defended its leadership in the 50-70 seat market against the 
challenge from Embraer, the emerging Brazilian competitor with experience in 
turboprop commuter. The 37-50-seater ERJ-145/135 launched following the 
privatization of Embraer became very successful on the global market, making the 
company a serious challenger of Bombardier. Embraer gained a stable leadership in new 
aircraft delivery in 2005 with its radically new design, the larger E-Jet family (ERJ-
170/190 models) that addressed the 70-120-seat market. Bombardier’s decision to avoid 
the above-100-seat market with a purposely-designed jet appears to have cost the 
Canadian firm its leadership in RJs. 
This study aims to shed light on the forces that lead to leadership change, by 
addressing the following questions: What were the main drivers of sectoral catch-up and 
leadership change in the RJ market? What affected the timing of instances of leadership 
change? What did companies gaining leadership do differently from incumbents or 
other challengers? The following section outlines the theoretical framework and 
methodology applied in order to find the answers. 
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5.3 Theoretical Framework: A dynamic perspective on sectoral innovation 
systems 
The key elements expected of a theoretical framework to apply for case studies of 
leadership change are (a) a co-evolutionary perspective on industry dynamics; (b) the 
need to fit national policies alongside company actions, and (c) accommodate the 
technology- and capital-intensity of the aircraft industry. For the reasons described 
below, we argue that an adapted version of the appreciative theorizing framework of 
Lee and Malerba (2013) is applicable for our study. Industry dynamics is understood as 
the outcome of the co-evolution of firms, technology, demand and institutions (Nelson, 
1994). The strength of a co-evolutionary framework is to help explain the 
competitiveness of the aerospace industry (Frenken, 2000). Niosi and Zhegu (2008) 
argued that a broader sectoral innovation systems approach (Malerba, 2002) is more 
suitable than theories focusing on elements of it, such as product or industry life-cycle 
theories. Competitive sectors were found to be associated with a well-functioning 
sectoral innovation system, in advanced as well as emerging economies (Malerba 2004; 
Mowery and Nelson 1999; Malerba and Mani 2009). It follows that in the context of 
high-tech industries such as aircraft manufacturing, not only companies, but host 
governments and local institutions of innovation systems compete for leadership.  
We expect to identify discontinuities in the long-term evolution of innovation 
systems. Periods of incremental change were observed to be punctuated by fundamental 
transformation in all their building blocks: in firms (Abernathy and Utterback 1978), 
organizations (Romanelli and Tushman 1994), industries (Tushman and Anderson 
1986), and the knowledge base (technological paradigm shifts observed by Schumpeter, 
1934; Freeman and Perez 1988, Perez and Soete 1988). In a study of aircraft industries 
in emerging economies, Vertesy and Szirmai (2010) observed recurrent discontinuities 
in the evolution of the national and sectoral innovation systems. They found that long-
term competitiveness of a sector in a country depended on the ability of key system 
actors (firms and governments) to adjust to such discontinuities. Lee and Malerba 
(2013) suggest that discontinuities in the various building blocks of innovation systems 
present windows of opportunity for latecomer firms to catch-up with and overtake 
incumbent leaders in a sector. However, the theory implies that in effect, any firm can 
become a latecomer and new leader. Given the high technological and capital entry 
barriers to this industry, we contest this and in addition to windows of opportunity and 
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strategic responses, we introduce ‘preconditions’. We discuss below how these three 
elements can be interpreted for the RJ industry, and what findings we expect with 
regards to leadership change. 
 
5.3.1 Windows of Opportunity 
Lee and Malerba (2013) distinguished three kinds of windows of opportunity for 
challenger companies, corresponding to the main building blocks of sectoral innovation 
systems: radical changes in knowledge and technology, in demand conditions and in 
institutions and government regulation. Our first question is, what types of windows of 
opportunity contributed to leadership change in the RJ industry. 
A radically new technology offers latecomers a window of opportunity to catch-up 
with incumbents by leapfrogging (Perez and Soete 1988). Incumbents, with capabilities 
and investments related to an old technology, are often reluctant or inflexible to 
embrace a newly emerging technology which is clad in uncertainty or which may 
destroy existing competences (Arthur 1989, Chandy and Tellis, 2000, Christensen 1997, 
Tushman and Anderson 1986, Henderson and Clark 1990, Chandy and Tellis, 1998). 
Such “traps” pose potential problems for incumbent aircraft makers who need to recover 
investments over a long production run. But latecomers may not be in the position to 
apply a new technology. The commercial aircraft industry has been long described as a 
“borrower” of technology developed in the military sector and related industries 
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1982). A latecomer RJ maker which is not involved in 
defense R&D or military production, or has not developed the new technology in-house 
may find it particularly difficult to utilize a new technology for a new aircraft. It may 
lack certain capabilities to do so, or face political barriers to access. We will return to 
these cases later when discussing potential strategic response and preconditions for 
catch-up. 
Changes in demand conditions and abrupt changes in business cycles constitute 
another type of window. Economic growth increases demand for new aircraft, provided 
that firms have access to growth markets. Yet, as Mathews (2005) showed, while 
upturns create opportunities for incumbents to expand production in investment-heavy 
industries, downturns favour latecomers due to the cleansing effect and the liberation of 
resources. For the aircraft industry sensitive to operating costs as well as purchase prices 
(Prencipe 2013), downturns can shift demand for more efficient new products. For 
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similar reasons, demand is likely to be affected by changing fuel prices. Presumably, 
price increases put pressure on airlines to select newer models with lower operating 
costs, or, probably to a lesser degree, select refurbished older models. Declining fuel 
prices on the other hand are likely to offer opportunities for incumbents to extend 
production run of existing models. Changing user preferences, such as passengers’ 
expectation of safety, speed, or comfort, may also influence demand. Preferences might 
be shaped by supply, but also by chance events, such as crashes. 
Regulatory windows of opportunity come in different forms. Prencipe (2013) 
distinguishes direct effects, or rules concerning the certification of new aircraft, and 
indirect effects, regulating the exploitation of a country’s airspace. Other types of 
regulatory or institutional windows open with the changing involvement of the 
government in productive activities, for instance, through nationalization or 
privatization. Regulatory changes may create restricted windows of opportunity which 
can apply selectively for certain incumbent and challenger companies, making it 
difficult to tell a priori who would benefit more. 
We next examine three cross-cutting features of windows of opportunity: 
asymmetry, timing and source, given specific characteristics of the aircraft industry. 
First, the complex structure of the industry (Hobday et al, 2005; Dosi et al, 2003) 
implies that developers and producers may operate under different political regimes 
(Esposito and Raffa, 2007), so are influenced by different windows of opportunity. We 
expect that political actors create asymmetric benefits by regulations. The question is 
whether windows of opportunity triggering leadership change were applicable to all 
firms universally or only restrictively. Second, we expect that the timing when windows 
open matters, considering that the life cycle of aircraft entail long time intervals 
between development, first delivery and break-even point. A company that reacts too 
swiftly (or too slowly) to an emerging opportunity – an incumbent or a challenger – is 
expected to fail if the window closes before it can recover its investments. Third, we 
expect that not all windows of opportunity are exogenous to the activities of firms or 
other innovation system actors. Some windows, such as economic crises, world fuel 
prices or aircraft crashes, arise as random events. But others – potentially regulatory 
windows – may result from company activity or government legislation, or their 
strategic collaboration. In this case, we should find evidence for innovation system 
actors affecting in some ways the nature, timing and length of windows of opportunity. 
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5.3.2 Strategic response 
Leadership change requires the active role of firms to recognize opportunities and 
implement a strategy accordingly (Lee and Malerba 2013). Such strategies involve 
learning, capability accumulation and innovation (Lee and Lim, 2001; Mu and Lee, 
2005). For clarity, we distinguish long- and short-term strategies. Learning and 
capability accumulation aims to bridge the difference between existing capabilities and 
those presumed necessary to close the productivity gap vis-à-vis the incumbents (Lall, 
1992, Kim, 1980, Bell and Pavitt, 1995). These form part of longer-term catch-up 
strategies of a late entrant, overarching decades in the context of the aircraft industry, 
and in the context of emerging economies (Bell and Figueiredo 2012, Vertesy and 
Szirmai 2010). Over this period several windows of opportunity open, but firms lack the 
capabilities to respond, or lack necessary preconditions. We will address this issue in 
the next sub-section. Here we investigate which kind of innovation strategies companies 
pursued, and what strategic role, if any, did governments play. 
When an opportunity emerges, innovating firms decide whether to develop a new 
product or make improvements to existing ones, which market niches to address, and 
how to manage the development of a portfolio of new (or improved) products. 
Innovation strategies rely on past R&D activities, human capital and other capabilities 
of the firm, or its suppliers. Incumbents and latecomers, in advanced or in emerging 
economies may all respond to a window of opportunity, but with different strategies. An 
incumbent presumably prefers a defensive strategy of incremental innovation (Hill and 
Rothaermel, 2003) in order to recover sunk costs. By increasing variety, they adjust to 
different user needs as markets mature (Frenken et al, 1999) – i.e. by replacing engines 
or limited re-design by stretching or shortening the aircraft. As new technology mainly 
originates from component suppliers, this strategy implies incremental capability 
improvement for a top-tier firm. Radical innovation – launching a new product (family) 
to exploit a market niche – is a more costly strategy. This involves acquiring new 
competencies and replacing existing ones. Radical innovation is a more likely strategy 
for latecomer challengers. Unlearning existing capabilities presents less of a burden, but 
learning and acquiring new ones may be a costly challenge, but offers the advantages of 
leapfrogging technology. A supportive government may lower the costs. 
There are plenty of theoretical reasons why governments should be considered as 
strategic actors in aerospace innovation systems. Strategic trade theory suggests that due 
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to the zero-sum competition in this oligopolistic industry, governments and firms act 
strategically against foreign incumbents and challengers another to maximize rent 
(Spencer and Brander, 2008). Public policies shape the institutional environment and 
thus create advantages for firms in various industries (Nelson, 1995). History shows that 
governments have effectively support local firms, with direct development support, 
launch aids or public procurement (Eliasson, 2010). Embraer, a late entrant, has been 
shown to have benefitted from long-term government support apart from its ambitious, 
entrepreneurial management. For instance, the Brazilian government provided the state-
owned Embraer with access to technology, protected its home market, financed product 
development (and co-development), and helped certification in key export markets 
(Sarathy, 1985; Moxon, 1987; Ramamurti, 1987; Frischtak, 1992, 1994; Cassiolato et 
al, 2002). Even after Embraer was privatized, it benefitted from a favourable 
institutional climate and export credits (Goldstein, 2002a, 2002b; Goldstein and 
McGuire, 2004; Marques and Oliveira, 2009). However, governments can easily over-
reach and push defence-oriented policies without considerations of long-term 
competitiveness leading to catastrophic failures (Hill and Pang, 1988; McKendrick, 
1992; Eriksson, 2003; Hira and Oliveira 2007).  
5.3.3 Preconditions for leadership change 
In the neoclassical model of perfect competition, any company could respond to an 
emerging window of opportunity. In an evolutionary framework, path-dependence and 
technological capabilities limit the set of potential challengers (Nelson and Winter, 
1982), as technological advance is cumulative (Nelson, 1994). We aim to test whether 
preconditions matter for leadership change, and if so, what kind of capabilities 
successful new leaders possessed which others lacked, and what role governments 
played in accumulating them.  
Preconditions enable companies to effectively respond to emerging windows of 
opportunity and gain leadership in this capital- and technology-intensive sector. These 
are a set of technological, organizational and investment capabilities which firms 
accumulate through a learning process, often spread among actors of an innovation 
system. A critical mass of technological capabilities and absorptive capacity enable 
them to recognize the value of new information and implement strategies (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Lall, 1992). Management studies have described various capabilities 
competitive firms need, including innovative or dynamic capabilities (Teece et al, 1997; 
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Dutrenit, 2004, 2007), the capacity to invest, establish linkages, manage complex 
production and innovation networks and meet high quality standards (Hobday et al, 
2005; Dosi et al, 2003). Without threshold capabilities, latecomer countries’ aerospace 
industry cannot assume leadership (Baskaran, 2005).  
Technological discontinuities can be both competence-enhancing and -destroying 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986). In this latter case, firms need fundamentally new skills 
and competences for market success, thus existing capabilities matter less, which 
increases the probability for latecomer challengers to rapidly arise. If technological 
change is competence-enhancing, latecomers need to implement long-term strategies for 
catch-up and eventually, leadership change (Lee and Lim, 2001). 
The empirical literature on aircraft producers that entered the industry since the 
1950s (considered as latecomers) suggests that preconditions matter. Successful entry 
and catch-up was the outcome of learning and capability accumulation, which depended 
on the provision of skilled personnel and technology from education and research 
institutes in their proximity and from more advanced countries, as well as access to 
finance and to foreign markets. Long-term, industry-friendly innovation and trade 
policies of their respective governments played a crucial role in both advanced and 
newly emerging economies (Cassiolato et al, 2002; Marques and Oliveira, 2009; 
Goldstein, 2002b; Vertesy and Szirmai, 2010; Maculan, 2013; Niosi 2013; Lukasiewicz, 
1986; Niosi and Zhegu, 2005, 2010; Baskaran, 2001; Mani, 2013; Texier, 2000). At the 
same time, entry barriers may have been relaxed recently as aerospace firms became 
ever more specialized, suggesting that preconditions may lose importance. Entry in the 
1980s, when RJ producers performed many of their activities in-house,
214
 may have had 
higher barriers than as of the 1990s when the industry became globally interconnected, 
as shown by the success of specialized suppliers from Japan, Mexico and Singapore 
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1985; Kimura, 2006, 2007; McGuire, 2007; Martinez-
Romero, 2013; Pang and Hill, 1992; Vertesy, 2013, 2015). 
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 Considering this change in industrial organization, one may distinguish a “less mature” and “more 
mature” state of the industry. But this is an exaggeration as the aircraft industry retained the dominant 
design crystallized soon after the onset of the jet age (c.f. Frenken and Leydesdorff, 2000) – typical of 
what would be considered as maturity in the context of another sector. 
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Figure 5.4 Diagram of theoretical framework 
 
Source: author 
 
5.3.4 Methodology 
We analyse two case studies of leadership change to understand the salient contributing 
factors. The main advantage of such a historical-institutional study is that new leaders 
can be clearly identified retrospectively, along with the relevant windows and the 
winner strategic responses. For a complete explanation of leadership dynamics,
215
 we 
also discuss the strategies and preconditions of “others”: potential challengers and 
incumbents that failed.  
The case studies will be structured as follows. We first present the windows of 
opportunity deemed relevant for leadership changes, and then discuss the strategies of 
new leaders alongside the strategies of other significant companies, including 
incumbents. Finally, we analyse the preconditions for catch-up and leadership change 
from the perspective of the new leader and of the less successful others. Figure 5.4 
provides a schematic overview linking the elements of the framework to expected 
leadership dynamics. 
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 This may be a second-best option to a counter-factual analysis. 
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Leadership in the regional aircraft industry can be defined in various ways. Given 
our sectoral innovation system approach, technology is considered one (certainly 
important) factor among others that contribute to a firm’s market performance. Aircraft 
manufacturing is a high-tech industry where competitive companies are technologically 
advanced and innovative. The ultimate success of a technological – or other – 
innovation is measured by its commercialization (Mowery and Nelson, 1999), so we 
focus on market performance. Measuring market leadership is challenging. Companies 
can be compared in terms of turnover or productivity, number and value of new orders 
or deliveries. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to single out financial data related to 
RJs specifically, given that RJs are one among many business lines of all the companies 
examined.
216
 It is equally difficult to obtain information on aircraft sales value, as deals 
typically remain secret and airlines usually receive tailored discounts. Quantity of new 
aircraft delivery is an accepted measure of market success of a top-tier company. 
Typically only aircraft with a dedicated buyer are manufactured, and such figures reflect 
actual demand better than new orders, which are prone to cancellations (Heerkens et al, 
2010).  
The qualitative historical analyses rely on the rich techno-managerial literature on 
the aircraft industry. Articles on the business and political landscape, interviews with 
leading corporate personnel and description of new products are valuable sources for 
taking stock of capabilities, innovations and strategies. These allow charting the 
evolution of technology, firms and market conditions, identifying windows of 
opportunity and understanding innovation and marketing strategies. Newspapers and 
trade journals, i.e. Flight International, Aviation Today, or Financial Times have often 
been used as input to studies on the aircraft industry (Frischtak, 1992; Goldstein 2002b, 
2006; Cooke and Ehret, 2009). When cross-validated, these sources can be more 
reliable than survey data. In addition, we use aircraft delivery statistics compiled by 
Airlinerlist.com (an independent data collection website of aviation enthusiasts) and 
from Annual Reports of the companies.
217
 
 
                                                 
216
 Most companies have stakes in the defence or in the corporate jet industry as well. Moreover, as 
Ligterink (2001) shows, accounting practices easily hide relevant financial information. 
217
 In some cases, we found minor differences between the various sources on the quantity of aircraft 
delivered in a year, typically due to the mismatch between the financial and calendar years, but none that 
would significantly affect the timing of leadership change and leadership positions. 
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5.4 Bombardier’s leadership in the 50-seat segment (1995-2005) 
5.4.1 Windows of opportunity 
The windows of opportunity that turned out to be instrumental for Bombardier’s 
leadership opened up in different forms over a longer period of time. First of all, 
continuous technological improvements in jet engines made ever smaller RJs 
economically viable, offering “technological windows”. In comparison with the 3:1 
bypass ratio of the Rolls Royce Tay engine selected by Fokker for the F-100, the new 
General Electric’s CF-34 engine family introduced in the mid-1980s offered over 5:1 
bypass ratio and greater thrust-to-weight ratio (Table 5.1). In addition, the diffusion of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) by the 1990s offered efficiency 
gains both for managing large companies (Esposito and Raffa, 2007), and for 
optimizing airlines’ booking systems.  
Second, the “demand window” for smaller jets remained open throughout the 1980s. 
The 100-seat jets of BAe and Fokker demonstrated the viability of the business model to 
replace turboprop service with smaller jets. The established hub-and-spoke system in 
the United States meant that a previously unseen number of communities were now 
connected to major hubs, served by smaller commuter propellers. Hubs were in 
competition, and RJ service allowed increasing their reach and hence their market share. 
The thriving commuter market, however, caused congestion at hubs and a longer travel 
time in comparison with point-to-point travel. Introducing jets on the feeder routes and 
for new city-pairs could increase efficiency. Given the opportunity to choose, 
passengers preferred jet aircraft which they perceived to be safer, more modern and 
more comfortable than turboprops (Bryant, 1994). In Western Europe, a new stage of 
economic integration also boosted demand for air travel for relatively shorter distances.  
An additional combination of demand and regulatory windows opened in the 1990s, 
rewarding first movers. The early 1990s also saw a time of declining military spending 
after the end of the Cold War, global recession, resulting in capital shortage and a long 
wave of mergers and acquisitions for aircraft producers, and strong price competitions 
for new aircraft (USITC 1998). Following the Gulf War, oil prices were low and in 
constant decline (Figure 5.1), allowing airlines to buy more comfortable RJs. Air 
transport around the world was expanding and RJs could offer more frequent feeder 
connections. In Europe, the market was opening towards the former Eastern Bloc. In 
parallel, “scope clauses” introduced in the US turned out to offer a crucial regulatory 
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window. Scope clauses were meant to defend the higher wages of larger legacy airlines’ 
pilots against the lower wages paid by regional airlines, which were established or 
subcontracted to fly feeder and commuter routes and gained significant market share in 
domestic air transport. In order to keep a cap on the upward extension of relatively 
cheaper commuter services, pilot unions and airlines settled with the agreement that 
subcontractors cannot fly aircraft larger than 50 seats. Scope clauses had a major impact 
on the regional aircraft industry as they effectively excluded existing RJs with 70-seats 
from a large part of the regional market. These regulations also gave an advantage to 
jets rather than modernized turboprops in the 50-seat market, as airlines (given lower 
fuel price) could offer more frequent connections with RJs (Thomas, 2012). 
Furthermore, highly publicized commuter turboprop crashes in the US in 1994 and 1995 
(ATR-72 and a BAe Jetstream) pushed preferences towards jet services. 
 
5.4.2 Strategic response 
The expectations on the economic viability of 50-seat jets for routes below 500 nautical 
miles divided manufacturers in the late 1980s, many betted on turboprops. Most of the 
European producers with a stake in the commuter market calculated that on a 200-
nautical-mile trip (the typical 50-seat route) jets hardly offered a 15 minute block time 
advantage, while their fuel costs were nearly double. The estimated development costs 
of a new RJ, about a billion US dollars, seemed unlikely to be ever recovered 
(Middleton, 1989).  
Bombardier became the leader in RJs by essentially creating the 50-seat market, 
rather than attacking the incumbents in their own size class. Bombardier’s strategy to 
take advantage of the windows of opportunity rested on two elements. First, it 
accumulated technology and production capacity through acquisition. Bombardier, the 
transport equipment (snow mobiles, locomotives and light rail transit) producer decided 
to diversify to aerospace by acquiring troubled companies with advanced products. It 
acquired (1) the business jet maker Canadair from the Canadian government in 1986, 
(2) the historical British component supplier (and potential competitor) Shorts in 1989, 
(3) the business jet producer Learjet in 1990 and, (4) with help from the Province of 
Ontario in 1992, de Havilland, specialized in turboprop commuters. This established 
Bombardier as a company offering a range of related products, including business jets, 
commuters, and components (DePalma, 1998). Second, it simultaneously launched the 
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Learjet and Global Express business jets, the closely related 50-seat Canadair CRJ 
regional jet, and the 70-80-seat Dash 8-400 turboprop, all targeting specific niche 
markets. Bombardier found various ways to reduce costs and offer a competitive price. 
It financially consolidated the indebted companies and introduced a new management 
system. It made use of product similarities. The CRJ design relied heavily on the 
Canadair Challenger business jet. By stretching the fuselage and wings, adding 
additional exits and making smaller modifications to subsystems to meet airline 
standards, Bombardier kept development costs at about a third the costs of a clean-sheet 
design. Apart from using the conglomerate’s own funds, Bombardier received repayable 
loans from the Canadian federal and the Quebec provincial governments to finance 
development.
218
 As a result, development time was also reduced: design began end of 
1987, the first CRJ flew early 1991, and was delivered by late 1992 to Lufthansa 
CityLine. Orders from regional subsidiaries of major US and European airlines rapidly 
increased, and soon Bombardier was increasing production capacity. The demand for 
the 50-seat jet segment was boosted by the “second set” of windows of opportunity 
described above (lower fuel prices, application of scope clauses, overall efficiency gains 
and, turboprop crashes in the US) (Figure 5.5). By 1996, when Embraer’s 50-seat ERJ-
145 jet entered the market, the competitive landscape had changed significantly. RJ 
deliveries have overtaken turboprops in the 50-seat market (Figure 5.6), and European 
producers of RJs were losing the strong price war. The overall costs of European 
aircraft were significantly higher due to strong currencies and less efficient production; 
the smallest models (the F-70 and BAe’s RJ70) were exceeding the scope clause 
limitations in the US. As demand for larger RJs increased towards the end of the 
decade, Bombardier introduced the CRJ700, a 70-seat stretched derivative of the 
CRJ200.  
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 Of the 275 million CAD project costs, 78 million was government financed, according to Warwick 
(1991) 
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Figure 5.5 Number and types of regional jets delivered by Bombardier in contrast with BAe and 
Fokker 
 
Source: www.airlinerlist.com (retrieved: Jun 2012); Bombardier Annual Reports.  
Note: CRJ-100/200-700 served the 50-70-seat segment; CRJ-900-1000 served the 90-100-seat market 
segment. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Size and type competition in the regional market 
 
 
Source: Own calculations. Note: ‘RJ’ stands for Regional Jets, ‘prop’ stands for turboprop aircraft. Data 
covers all ATR, Boeing/MDD, Bombardier, British Aerospace, Embraer, Fokker and Saab models in the 
50 (40-60) and 70-110 seat category.  
 
Bombardier could also limit development and production costs by relying on risk-
sharing partnerships and focusing on core competencies in system assembly and 
marketing. An optimal number of partners were selected with the aim to have available 
capacity to meet large-scale orders, which became a crucial factor – in fact, also 
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contributing to the decline of Fokker.
219
 The company realized significant efficiency 
improvements by introducing “the Bombardier Manufacturing System”. This offered 
cost, time and space optimization thanks to computerizing workflow and logistics 
(MacDonald, 2012). A good indicator the success of Bombardier’s strategy is the fact 
that it produced more RJs in a year than any of its competitors had before and kept the 
global market leadership for almost a decade following 1996 (Figure 5.5). 
Both incumbents in the 100-seat RJ market chose to sell turboprops for the smaller 
segment.
220
 The companies knew well the tight competition these aircraft were facing. 
The French-Italian ATR-42 was already launched in 1984. Saab started to develop a 58-
seater turboprop (Saab-2000) having recognized rising demand for its 34-seat SF-340 
(jointly built with Fairchild). Fokker on the one hand remembered the failure of its 
VFW-614 44-seat jet in the 1970s,
221
 and on the other hand, was already involved in 
parallel product developments it struggled to finance. Fokker’s room for strategic 
manoeuvring was limited by its size and liquidity position, and the history of the F-100 
and F-70 were marked by a number of crises. It only survived a liquidity crisis towards 
the end of the development phase in 1987 with the help of a government bailout. The 
higher-than-expected development costs for two parallel programs added to other 
problems. Solving a shortage of engineers by stopping the F-27 and F-28 production 
freed capacity but reduced cash flow. The low value of the US dollar and high exchange 
rate volatility
222
 caused Fokker structural financial problems, given its high US dollar 
exposure: its revenues were in dollars, but costs in Dutch guilders (Ligterink, 2001). 
Cost-cutting measures did not increase its profitability, but decreased capacity. Access 
to finance proved difficult at a time of global aerospace mergers and shakeouts. A 
takeover by DASA offered only a temporary solution to its financial problems, Fokker 
announced bankruptcy in 1996 (Heerkens and Ulijn, 1999).  
                                                 
219
 An interesting element of the competition between Fokker and Bombardier is that Shorts, the company 
acquired by Bombardier, was a component supplier of Fokker. Bombardier could thus learn from the 
negotiations with Fokker, already before introducing the Canadair regional jets, how crucial capacity was 
for competitiveness.  
220
 BAe produced the Jetstream 41 and the ATP, Fokker the F-27 derivative F-50. The F-50 took off in 
1985, serial production started in 1987; BAe’s ATP entered production in 1988. The BAe Jetstream 41, a 
stretched version of the 1980s model entered the market in 1992. 
221
 This unique design performed poorly due to its wide fuselage (increased drag) and weaker engines. 
Technology was evidently insufficiently advanced for an efficient and reliable RJ at the time of increasing 
fuel prices. The project was cancelled in 1977. 
222
 Between 1985 and 1996, the Dutch currency fluctuated between 3.7 and 1.5 NLG to a USD with an 
overall declining trend. 
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Interestingly, the British company Short Brothers also considered launching a 
radically new 48-seater jet, the FJX (Ramsden, 1989b). However, the FJX never 
progressed beyond the concept phase, after Bombardier, recognizing a potential supplier 
but also competitor, acquired the company in 1989. Other European smaller aircraft 
producers struggled in a lethal competition in the 1990s. Collaboration took place only 
for LCA in the framework of the Airbus consortium, which absorbed significant 
resources. Airbus, like Boeing, was uninterested in the more price-sensitive RJ market. 
Saab, despite its experience in producing turboprops and fighter jets, never decided to 
invest in developing RJs. Evidently, the low fuel prices came to the detriment of the 
turboprop market, which witnessed the exit of old European incumbents (Saab, BAe and 
Fokker), where only the Franco-Italian ATR consortium survived. Dornier, a Germany-
based Fairchild subsidiary, recognized the opportunities and launched the Do-328JET 
by equipping its 30-seat turboprop with jet engines. But the aircraft entering in 1999 
trailed its overseas competitors in performance and costs.
223
  
The only other successful contender in the 50-seat RJ market was Embraer. The 
Brazilian state-owned enterprise already launched design in 1989, but was severely 
delayed by financial problems and the difficulty to find partners. Only after Embraer’s 
privatization did the 50-seat ERJ-145 program take off, four years later than 
Bombardier’s CRJ. Its early-1990s crisis gave a head-start to Bombardier, but Embraer 
quickly caught up thanks to the strong designand competitive price of the ERJ-145. This 
benefitted from public support to 22% of development costs and an interest rate 
equalization scheme (Goldstein, 2002a).Considering it illegal, Bombardier pushed the 
Canadian government to fight Brazil’s financing practice at the WTO. 
 
5.4.3 Preconditions for Bombardier’s leadership  
Bombardier benefitted in many ways from being located in Canada. Canada’s sectoral 
innovation system in aerospace had accumulated a very strong knowledge base over the 
preceding decades. The National Research Council financed fundamental research since 
the 1950s, developed gas turbines and offered wind tunnel tests (Niosi, 2000).
224
 
                                                 
223
 Nevertheless, the Do-328JET remains the most significant European competitor in the RJ market, with 
110 aircraft delivered. 
224
 Niosi (2000) notes that the National Aeronautics Establishment of the NRC, created in 1958, operated 
the only wind tunnel of Canada and supported the design of all aircraft and engine models for over a 
decade, i.e. the De Havilland wing designs. 
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Aerospace firms were among the largest Canadian R&D spenders with a revealed 
comparative advantage. The Montreal and Toronto clusters (hosting companies such as 
Bombardier, Bell Textron, Pratt & Whitney, and Honeywell) had a long history of 
competitive aircraft, parts and components (including engines) development and 
manufacturing, relying on highly skilled scientists and engineers (Niosi and Zhegu, 
2005). Bombardier had access to resources of both the Canadian and US aerospace 
innovation systems, thanks to its subsidiaries and to the strong ties between the 
Canadian and US aerospace industries. Canadian firms have been eligible for US 
government contracts since 1959 and maintained intensive technology- and market-
oriented global collaborations (Anderson, 1995, Niosi and Zhegu, 2010). Furthermore, 
Bombardier could draw from its own managerial experience on running complex 
organizations. Perhaps the best indicator for its technological capabilities and market 
knowledge is that Bombardier’s subsidiaries had already delivered over 450 DHC 
commuter aircraft and over 200 Canadair business jets by 1990 (although none were 
market leaders). Its successful other business lines and the supportive regional and 
federal governments provided Bombardier with strong investment capacity. Canadian 
exporters could benefit from repayable loans of the Export Development Corporation 
(Goldstein and McGuire, 2004).  
In the early 1990s, MDD, Boeing and Airbus also possessed the technological and 
financial capabilities to produce RJs – had they wanted to enter the market. BAe and 
Fokker, “entrapped”, as described above, lacked necessary capital. Other companies 
lacked some crucial elements for preconditions. Russian companies inheriting the 
advanced Soviet technology base had to face brain-drain and institutional crisis of the 
sectoral innovation system in Russia. In Indonesia, IPTN, a co-producer and co-designer 
of turboprop transport aircraft lacked the experience to design, produce and market jets 
and could not draw on a well-established sectoral innovation system. Embraer had still 
to accumulate technological capabilities to produce a RJ, but struggled under the effect 
of the lingering effect of the financial crisis and the slow decision-making due to its 
state ownership (Frischtak, 1992). As a result, it neither had the financial capacity to 
launch a 50-seat jet, nor the capacity to enter into joint ventures to access missing 
technologies and funds – until its privatization in 1994. 
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5.5 Embraer’s leadership in the 70-120-seat segment (2005 – ) 
5.5.1 Windows of opportunity 
Demand gradually shifted towards larger RJs by the late 1990s, due to increasing fuel 
prices (Figure 5.1) that started to question the viability of 50-seat jets. The increased 
competition with low-cost carriers forced traditional and regional airlines to be more 
sensitive to cost-efficiency. Airlines ordered modern turboprops or larger RJs with 
lower fuel consumption per seat. The regulatory cap also followed economic realities 
and scope clauses at major US airlines were re-negotiated from 50 to 70 seats, and 
beyond.
225
 Major producers became optimistic about the prospects of the 100-seat 
segment. Boeing foresaw demand for 3,006 new aircraft until 2020
226
 driven by income 
and population growth in emerging markets and by the need to replace aging narrow-
bodies (B-727s and DC-9s) in America and Europe. Older models were more costly to 
operate, and states imposed stricter noise regulations.
227
 Airlines also recognized the 
potential of reducing aircraft size to 100 from the typical 150-180 seat range to allow 
greater frequency direct services, and new city-pair connections (USITC, 1998). 
Technological windows of opportunity for the RJ industry were probably less 
important for this period. Nevertheless, results of incremental improvements in jet 
engines, in avionics, in the diffusion of composite materials were becoming available 
industry-wide, at specialized second- and third-tier suppliers, altogether increasing 
efficiency. In parallel, improvements in the aviation infrastructure (in air navigation 
services, air traffic management) resulted in greater capacity to handle the growing air 
traffic and allow more economical operations. 
Subsequently, market volatility (in the wake of 9/11 or the 2008 financial crisis) 
forced LCA operators in the 150-plus seat range to shift to smaller size, at a time when 
liquidity mattered. Larger RJs offered flexibility of greater frequency at times of boom, 
and a cheaper way to defend network spread when demand dropped. While low fuel 
prices and strict scope clauses offered an opportunity for 50-seat RJs in the 1990s, 
increasing fuel prices, market volatility and relaxed scope clauses opened a window for 
the 70-120-seat segment in the 2000s (Table 5.1).   
                                                 
225
 “Scope Clauses and New Regional Jets – A Coming Storm?” AirInsight, 3 May 2013 
226
 Values refer to the 90-120-seat range (Boeing, 2001); Embraer’s – probably strategically – more 
cautious forecast (Embraer, 2001) estimated 1,650 for the 91-120-seat range. 
227
 In effect, banning old aircraft from operating in Western airspace. As a temporary alternative, some 
operators opted for noise reduction kits (“hush kits”), while others pushed manufacturers to re-engine 
existing models. 
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5.5.2 Strategic response 
Towards the turn of the millennium, the RJ industry was poised to become 
overcrowded, as European and American incumbents and Asian newcomers announced 
plans to re-engine existing models, resize existing models, or develop new designs 
(Doyle et al, 2000).  
Embraer’s winner strategic choice was a radical innovation. It recognized the 
emerging market niche already at the height of its ERJ-135/145 production cycle, and 
explicitly targeted the 70-110-seat market.
228
 When launching the new E-Jet family, the 
company built on its 30-year experience in producing for the global commuter market, 
as well as on the experience from the risk-sharing partnerships already established 
during the mid-1990s. In a stronger position after the success of the ERJ-135/145 
family, Embraer could reduce the number of partners to optimize costs, and attract some 
of them to Brazil. Embraer took a 45% stake in the E-Jet programme, while the rest 
were shared by the 16 partners (Figueiredo et al, 2008).
229
 A few months after the 
launch of the E-Jets in 1999, 20% of Embraer’s shares (with no voting rights) were sold 
to a group of French aerospace firms, EADS, Dassault Aviation, Thomson-CSF and 
Snecma. Embraer, with government backing, strategically selected the investors 
offering in exchange stronger perspectives for future fighter jet procurement and better 
access to the Latin American military market. As a direct implication of the change in 
ownership, Embraer implemented Dassault’s state-of-the-art computer aided design and 
manufacturing systems, a powerful virtual reality platform for co-development, all of 
which offered significant flexibility improvement and cost reduction.
230
 Although the E-
jets were clean-sheet design, they shared in-family commonalities and some degree of 
commonalities with its predecessors to further reduce costs (Norris et al, 2004). A 
crucial source of efficiency gain was selecting an engine developed specifically for the 
                                                 
228
 It publicized the strategy as the “70/110 rule”, see (Embraer, 2005) 
229
 Some of the main partners were GE, the single producer of engines (a package worth around 20% of 
the plane price), Honeywell (a GE subsidiary by now) responsible for avionics, Gamesa of Spain 
responsible for the tail section and rear fuselage. Liebherr supplied the landing gear and Kawasaki Heavy 
Industries of Japan was in charge of parts of the wing control surfaces made using composite materials 
and pylons, although this last collaboration did not go smoothly and was changed for “younger member” 
products of the family. 
230
 For details on the strategic deal, see Moxon and Lewis, 1999; Autry, 1999; Cassiolato et al, 2002 and 
Goldstein, 2002a. 
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E-Jets, (the General Electric CFM34-8E and -10E).
231
 Embraer swiftly launched a full 
family of aircraft. The 80-seater ERJ-170 first flew in February 2002 and was certified 
and delivered to the launch customer two years later. A slightly stretched version with 
88 seats, the ERJ-175 was introduced a year later, followed by the 110-seater ERJ-190 
and the 122-seater ERJ-195, both with redesigned wings and greater engine thrust 
(Table 5.1). The American low-cost carrier JetBlue became the launch customer with an 
order of 99 and option for another 100 planes (Cameron, 2005). The E-Jets directly 
competed not only with the largest members of the BAe RJ100, but also with the 
smallest Airbus and Boeing models.
232
 By 2005, Embraer overtook Bombardier in RJs 
delivery rate (Figure 5.7). The sources of competitiveness for Embraer’s products were 
its sales and operating costs. Operating costs were low because the plane was 
specifically designed for this market. Lower labour costs in Brazil had only a limited 
effect on the prices
233
, given the fact that Embraer aircraft are overwhelmingly (90%) 
produced outside Brazil (despite efforts to increase the local share). Publicly funded 
export credits played an important role in Embraer’s success (although to a smaller 
degree after the settlement of the WTO dispute between Brazil and Canada).  
 
Figure 5.7 Number and types of annual regional jet deliveries by Embraer in contrast with 
Bombardier 
 
Source: Embraer and Bombardier Annual Reports.  
Note: ERJ-170/175 served the 80-90-seat segment; ERJ-190/195 served the 100-120-seat market 
segment. 
                                                 
231
. Introducing a new engine entails substantial R&D costs and time. Two features reduced time for the 
benefit of Embraer: both the commonalities this engine shared with the CFM34 family, and the fact that 
development was already launched for the abandoned Dornier 728 program (Norris, 2003). 
232
 Despite speculations that the aim of a 1999 acquisition of 20% of Embraer’s shares by European 
aerospace investors (including Airbus-owner EADS) was to limit its room for strategic manoeuvres, no 
evidence emerged to substantiate any hostility. Eventually, EADS, the owner of Airbus, sold its stake in 
2007 (Done, 2007). 
233
 Although a certain benefit when contrasted with the potential Bavaria-based competitor, Fairchild 
Dornier. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
ai
rc
ra
ft
 d
el
iv
er
ed
 
ERJ-190/95 (100-120 seat
market)
ERJ-170/75 (70-100-seat
market
ERJ-135/145 (50-seat market)
BOMBARDIER RJ
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2016013
234 
 
 
Embraer also expanded production capacity. Along the original plant at the airport of 
Sao José dos Campos (near the research and training institutes CTA and ITA), it opened 
another site nearby in 2001, specializing in small parts development and engineering. 
This site also hosts an in-house, postgraduate school to train future aircraft designers. It 
also opened a new plant to assemble aircraft for the defense and executive markets. The 
most important aerospace cluster nevertheless remained Sao Jose dos Campos, home to 
most of Embraer’s suppliers in the lower tiers, many of them spin-off of CTA or 
Embraer. With the primary aim to access the Chinese market, Embraer jointly opened 
with AVIC II an assembly facility for its outgoing product line in Harbin in 2002. By 
Apr 2012, 41 ERJ145’s were produced here (Fleury and Fleury, 2011). The plan of 
Embraer to bring the E-190 assembly to China, was, however, rejected in order to 
protect the future market for the newly developed ARJ-21, although it did sell the type 
to various Chinese airlines. A 2011 agreement extended the production of the executive 
jet derivative of the ERJ145 in Harbin.
234
   
The 70-120-seat jet market had several incumbents that failed to remain or become 
leaders. BAe re-engined and modernized the BAe-146 family in 1993 and marketed the 
Avro RJs with some success. However, high production and operating costs (owing to 
the four-engine design) put pressure on the company to make further improvements. 
BAe Systems
235
  eventually made the less ambitious choice to again re-engine existing 
the Avro RJs (RJ-X), but the 30-year-old design received insufficient orders and the 
company exited the RJ industry in 2002 (Kingsley-Jones, 2006).
236
 Boeing and Airbus 
also noticed the windows of opportunity for the 100-seat segment. They chose a 
cautious strategy to extend their existing families downward to reduce development and 
marketing costs. However, these aircraft were derivatives of planes optimized for the 
150-180-seats size, and the one-family-fleet advantages offered to network carriers 
could not offset their relatively higher operating costs. Boeing tried to market two 
aircraft: the 117-seat B-717 it inherited from MDD, and the 737-600, the smallest 
member of the successful 737 family. Sales performance was mediocre for both models 
until Boeing de-listed them in 2006. Airbus offered the less successful A-318, the 
                                                 
234
 As a comparison, Bombardier’s strategy was to manufacture parts of the Q400 and the CSeries aircraft 
in China, but realized fewer RJ sales than Embraer. 
235
 The company formed with the merger of BAe and Marconi Electronic Systems in 1999 
236
 Interesting to add, that the company re-focused its activities as defence producer and component 
supplier, and remained one of the largest aerospace firms. 
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smallest member of the A-320 family for the same segment. A cautious attempt to co-
develop a smaller aircraft  together with Alenia, AVIC and Singapore Technologies 
Aerospace (the AE31x) failed due to insufficient capabilities of partners and concerns 
about technology transfer to China (Moxon and Lewis, 1998). Bombardier chose a 
similar strategy of incremental change to meet demand in the 70-100-seat class. It 
further stretched the CRJ700 to the -900 and -1000 models, until the limits of the 
original design. Bombardier was hesitant to address higher seat ranges with a radically 
new aircraft. In 2000, it shelved the billion-dollar “BRJ-X”, which was an order of 
magnitude higher than stretching the CRJs (Lewis, 2000). Besides the costs, 
Bombardier was unwilling to challenge the powerful incumbents in the large civil 
aircraft market segment. Only after Embraer introduced its new E-Jet series did 
Bombardier decide to revisit the idea. But the development of the radically new 100-
150-seat CSeries RJ was severely delayed by technological challenges and lack of 
orders, and first flew only in 2013. In effect, due to the strategic choices of incumbents, 
Embraer became the sole producer for the 100-120-seat segment. 
Five other challengers tried to launch a new design. Two of them, AVIC/Comac of 
China and IPTN/DSTP of Indonesia, lacked the necessary preconditions to develop a 
competitive RJ for the global market. Comac’s 100-seat ARJ-21 jet successfully took 
off in 2008 after prolonged development, but missing FAA certification limits its export 
potential. DSTP’s 2130 jet concept was abandoned as funds ran out (Vertesy, 2011). 
Fairchild Dornier, the small producer of 32-seat jets, turned out to be the most serious 
contender of the E-Jets. The radically new 728/928 family was developed to address the 
70-110 seat range. Fairchild Dornier already constructed static test models and collected 
significant amount of orders by 2002 (Lewis, 2002). But the 9/11 crises intensified 
competition between Embraer and Dornier, and the Bavaria-based company, with low 
sales revenues, underestimated the development costs of the aircraft which would have 
underperformed the E-Jets, and filed for bankruptcy in 2002 (Kappl, 2002).
237
 
Ironically, both Embraer and Bombardier benefitted from taking over unsatisfied orders. 
In 2000, the Russian Sukhoi launched its Superjet (SSJ) program in collaboration with 
the Italian Alenia. After delays the first SSJ flew in 2008, and commercial operations 
started in 2011. With a seating capacity of 108, the largest SSJ (the SU-100/95) directly 
                                                 
237
 Many competitors, including Bombardier, considered taking over the company and continue the 
728/928 development, but found the 1 billion dollars estimated cost of bringing the aircraft to market 
excessive, while the German or other governments did not show readiness to offer any support. 
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competes with the E-Jets. Its initial sales were limited to the CIS market due to lack of 
trust, exacerbated by the crash of a demo flight in 2011 (Kramer, 2011). However, the 
recent European and American certification offers future growth potential. 
 
5.5.3 Preconditions for Embraer’s leadership 
Embraer, the leading aerospace company of Brazil, gradually accumulated experience in 
the design, assembly and marketing of propeller-driven, pressurized regional-scale 
commercial aircraft and ground-attack jets since its foundation in 1969. Embraer built 
on Brazil’s long history of aircraft production and aeronautical research. The publicly 
financed aeronautical research and training institute ITA and the technological research 
organization CTA were the backbone of the emerging Brazilian aerospace innovation 
system (Marques, 2004). Embraer, a CTA spinoff, has cultivated an entrepreneurial 
culture, but also benefitted from public support. This combination was crucial to 
overcome the technological and market barriers faced by a newcomer from an emerging 
economy. The government strategically financed development, access technology, 
protected the nascent market (by strategically selecting partners while excluding 
competition from others) and facilitated export market access (use diplomacy to speed 
up certification of new models) (Ramamurti, 1987; Silva, 2002). The CTA-designed 
Bandeirante, a 20-seat turboprop and its 30-seater upgrade, the Brasilia, became 
successful export products, of which a total of 500 and over 350 were produced over the 
1970s-1980s, respectively. Embraer developed capabilities to design a jet trainer in the 
1980s when cooperating with Alenia and Aermacchi. While the state-owned model 
worked for the emergence of Embraer, it became a burden after a political and financial 
crisis hit Brazil. In order to survive in the new competitive landscape, the industry had 
to be fundamentally reorganized (Frischtak, 1992, 1994; Cassiolato et al, 2002; 
Marques, 2004). The privatization of Embraer
238
 in 1994 brought a major management 
overhaul for the company and a fundamental institutional change in the Brazilian 
aircraft innovation system (Vertesy and Szirmai 2010). Decision making became more 
efficient in the new private structure, as the company repositioned its core competence 
in co-design, system integration, sales and after-sales support. Embraer could access 
funding and advanced technology through risk sharing partnerships (Figueiredo, 2008) 
                                                 
238
 Buyers included Brazilian and US-based non-aerospace sector investors, while the government 
retained a golden share in Embraer. 
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and attracting new shareholders, even if the domestic supply chain was weak. By the 
year 2000, the delivery rates of the ERJ-135/145 family exceeded that of Bombardier’s 
comparable CRJ200, proving the success of the long-term catch-up strategy. The 
resulting revenue flows enabled Embraer to finance the development of the E-Jet 
family. Brazil’s supportive industrial and export policy further facilitated global sales. 
For this, a one-billion-dollar credit line from the Brazilian Development Bank BNDES 
and the PROEX export financing scheme (offering interest rate equalization for buyers, 
subsequently challenged in the above-mentioned WTO dispute) proved instrumental. 
Many of the other challenger companies failed to succeed to introduce 70-120 seat 
RJs due to missing preconditions. IPTN/DSTP lacked necessary resources to finance the 
development of a RJ, which would have also meant a major step from previous 
technological achievements; the Indonesian aerospace innovation system was 
underdeveloped (McKendrick, 1992). Despite seemingly abundant funding and access 
to foreign suppliers, the lack of prior experience in developing and marketing a 
commercial jet in China and the inefficient innovation system made the development 
process lengthy. Comac had to accumulate technological capabilities on the way, 
slowed down by the complex ownership and management structure (Vertesy, 2011). 
Fairchild Dornier possessed strong technological and management capabilities, and the 
German and US sectoral innovation systems were very strong. However, due to its 
location, the development costs exceeded the financial capacity of the company and its 
investors, and the Dornier received little targeted financial support from the German 
government.  
5.6 Conclusions 
Windows of opportunity and strategic response explain to a large extent why and how 
incumbents failed and challengers succeeded in taking leadership in RJ manufacturing. 
The case studies confirm that in addition, preconditions explain why so many 
challengers failed to become leaders. This section synthesizes the pattern of leadership 
change emerging from the case studies and how each of the three elements of the 
framework contributed to it. An outline of the key sources of leadership change is given 
in Table 5.2. 
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5.6.1 Windows of Opportunity 
We found all three types of windows of opportunity instrumental for leadership change. 
Challenger companies benefited from the availability of new technology on the market, 
such as more efficient engines than those used on existing models, and – typically 
incremental – improvements in aircraft systems. While incumbents (BAe as well as 
Bombardier) could also apply such improvements to upgrade existing products, there 
was a technological limit. Challenger companies had greater freedom to introduce 
combinations of technologies targeting specific market segments, resulting in efficiency 
gains over incumbents. 
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Table 5.1 Technological and market performance of leading regional jets 
Manufacturer 
(family) Aircraft RJ Market 
Maximum 
seats 
In serial 
production 
Nr. 
Produceda 
Maximum rangeb 
Turbofan Engine 
Type 
Engine 
bypass ratio 
Max. cruise speed Cabin 
Width 
(m) nm (km) Mach (km/h) 
British 
Aerospace /  
BAe Systems 
(BAe-146 fam.) 
BAe-146-100 
70/120-seat 
94 1983-1992 35 1,620 nm (3,000 km) 
4 x Textron 
Lycoming ALF 
502R 
5.7:1 
M 0.72 (760 km / h) 3.42 m 
BAe-146-200 112 1983-1993 98 1,600 nm (2,963 km) M 0.72 (760 km / h) 3.42 m 
BAe-146-300 128 1988-1998 60 1,520 nm (2,817 km) M 0.72 (760 km / h) 3.42 m 
BAe/Avro 
(RJ70/100 
fam.) 
RJ70 94 1993-1996 12 1,660 nm (3,075 km) 
4 x Honeywell LF-
507 
5.3:1 
M 0.73 (788 km/h) 3.42 m 
RJ85 112 1993-2002 87 1,780 nm (3,295 km) M 0.73 (788 km/h) 3.42 m 
RJ100 118 1999-2002 71 1,780 nm (3,295 km) M 0.73 (788 km/h) 3.42 m 
Fokker 
(F70/100 fam.) F-100 70/120-seat 
122 1988-1996 276 1,450 nm (2,685 km) 2 x Rolls Royce 
RB.183 Tay 
3.04:1 
M 0.77 (844 km/h) 3.1 m 
F-70 85 1995-1997 45 1,780 nm (3,295 km) M 0.77 (844 km/h) 3.1 m 
Bombardier 
(CRJ fam.) CRJ200 50-seat 50 1992- 1,100 1,585 nm (2,936 km) 
2 x General 
Electric CF34-3B 
6.2:1 
M 0.81 (860 km/h) 2.53 m 
CRJ700 70/120-seat 78 2001- 331 1,504 nm (2,785 km) 
2 x General 
Electric CF34-8C 
5:1 
M 0.85 (876 km/h) 2.57 m 
CRJ900 70/120-seat 90 2003- 274 1,515 nm (2,806 km) M 0.83 (885 km/h) 2.57 m 
CRJ1000 70/120-seat 104 2010- 19 1,622 nm (3,004 km) M 0.82 (870 km/h) 2.57 m 
Embraer 
(E145 fam.) ERJ-145 50-seat 50 1996- 701 2,000 nm (3,706 km) 
Rolls-Royce AE 
3007-A1 
5:1 
M 0.78 (830 km/h) 2.10 m 
ERJ-135 30/50-seat 37 1999- 108 1,750 nm (3,243 km) M 0.78 (830 km/h) 2.10 m 
ERJ-140 30/50-seat 44 2001- 74 1,650 nm (3,058 km) M 0.78 (830 km/h) 2.10 m 
Embraer  
(E-Jet fam.) ERJ-170 70/120-seat 80 2004- 178 2,100 nm (3,889 km) 2 x General 
Electric CF34-8E 
5:1 
M 0.82 (870 km/h) 2.74 m 
ERJ-175 70/120-seat 88 2005- 143 2,000 nm (3,706 km) M 0.82 (870 km/h) 2.74 m 
ERJ-190 70/120-seat 114 2005- 386 2,400 nm (4,448 km) 2 x General 
Electric CF34-10E 
5:1 
M 0.82 (870 km/h) 2.74 m 
ERJ-195 70/120-seat 122 2006- 88 2,200 nm (4,077 km) M 0.82 (870 km/h) 2.74 m 
Source: Own compilation based on manufacturers’ website, airliners.net and flightglobal.com 
Notes: (a) Nr. produced by Dec 2011; commercial variants only, figures exclude business, cargo and defense derivatives; (b) for long range variants 
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Table 5.2 Key drivers of leadership change: preconditions, windows of opportunity and leading products 
Preconditions 
Window of Opportunity New Leader 
(other challengers – type 
of design
a
) Leading product Technology Demand Regulatory 
Bombardier’s leadership in the 50-seat RJ market 
 Advanced 
Canadian 
aerospace 
innovation 
system;  
 Bombardier 
predecessor 
companies’ 
technological 
capabilities  
 more efficient engine 
(5:1 bypass ratio) 
 diffusion of ICTs 
 
 US: hub-and-spoke 
system; competition 
of hubs; congestion 
 EUR: liberalization, 
integration 
 Low oil prices 
 preference for jets 
over turboprops 
 Scope clauses 
capping the 50-seat 
market 
 
 Bombardier – Rad. 
5.  
 (Embraer – Rad.) 
 (Dornier – Incr.) 
 (Shorts – Rad.) 
 Bombardier CRJ200 
and CRJ family, leader 
in the 50-90-seat 
market 
Embraer’s leadership in the 70-120 seat RJ market 
 Brazilian 
aerospace 
innovation 
system;  
 Embraer’s 
privatization and 
experience in 
commutes and 
regional jets  
 improvements in engines, 
avionics, materials; as 
well as in aviation 
infrastructure 
 increasing oil prices,  
 replacement of aging 
narrow-body jets 
 fluctuations in world 
economy 
 scope clauses 
relaxed; 
 environmental 
regulations 
 Embraer – Rad. 
6.  
 (BAe – Incr.) 
 (Boeing – Incr.) 
 (Airbus – Incr.) 
 (Bombardier – Incr.) 
 (Fairchild-Dornier – 
Rad.) 
 Embraer “E-Jet” 
family (ERJ-170/190), 
leader in the 90-120-
seat market 
Note: a) Type of design: Incr. = incremental improvements in existing design; Rad. = radically new clean-sheet design 
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Changing trends in fuel prices created the most important demand windows. The declining 
trend of the 1990s boosted demand for 50-seat RJs; the subsequent increase in oil prices 
opened a window for 100-120-seat RJs. This exogenous factor demonstrates how leadership 
depended on chance. The company with the closest bet on the future of fuel prices became 
the leader. Business cycles played an equally important role. Economic growth in the mid-
1990s and mid-2000s up to 2008 was fundamental to boost demand for RJs that were already 
in serial production. For challengers to become leaders, a delicate combination of changes in 
demand appeared necessary, confirming but qualifying the findings of Mathews (2005) and 
Lee and Mathews (2012). Upturns and expectations of growth secured sufficient investment 
to start new product development. Downturn around the time of product launch (in the first 
half of the 1990s and after 2001) cleaned the market for the benefit of the most efficient 
challenger. Downturns also allowed a head-start to the best challenger (i.e. Bombardier over 
Embraer in the early 1990s, and Embraer over Fairchild-Dornier or Sukhoi in the early 
2000s). 
Among the many regulatory windows, two proved particularly important for leadership 
change. The first type was the introduction and relaxation of “scope clauses”, or internal 
airline agreements that created clear opportunities for RJs against LCAs. These regulations 
were typically exogenous to aircraft producers’ strategies. The other main type of regulation 
were government policies such as loans to support new aircraft development, export 
financing regime, and the changing public ownership of a company, proved beneficial for 
both new leaders. Many of these were “endogenous” windows, showing signs of strategic 
collaboration between companies and their host governments, securing temporary protective 
space for the emergence of leading products. Conversely, insufficient regulatory windows 
may have exacerbated the difficulties of failed incumbents and challengers, i.e. Fokker or 
Dornier. Some regulatory windows affected demand in asymmetrical ways. For instance, 
both incumbents and challengers benefitted from the liberalization of the air transport market 
in the US and Europe. This was not the case with China, where access was provided in 
exchange for technological or economic benefits. Yet, this specific regulation does not appear 
to have affected leadership change. While outside the scope of this paper, it would certainly 
be interesting to estimate the net costs of various interventions in a future study.  
Leadership change necessitated not only the right kind of combination of windows of 
opportunity, but also their right timing. As expected, the timing and duration of windows 
were important to ensure that challengers could find a market niche, recover sunk costs, and 
have limited competition. This of course depended also on sufficiently swift response. 
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5.6.2 Strategic response  
We distinguished innovation strategies from longer term catch-up strategies to better compare 
incumbents’ and challengers’ responses to emerging windows of opportunity. As presumed, 
new leaders relied on the strategy of launching new aircraft families while incumbents opted 
for extending the product ranges of existing families. Launching a radical innovation (the 
CRJ family) to target the 50-seats niche market paid off for Bombardier as the smallest 
products of the incumbents were around 40% larger, thus less economical. Similarly, 
Embraer’s E-Jets had virtually no competition in the 100-120-seat niche due to the 
incremental innovation strategy of incumbents. The common pattern in new leaders’ strategic 
response was the introduction of technologically superior products, produced more 
efficiently. They relied on specialized core competences, such as design, system assembly, 
sales and after-sales support activities, and risk-sharing partnerships. Their main product and 
organizational innovations were new to the RJ market but not necessarily new to the world: 
LCA producers have already applied similar technologies, and their producers implemented 
organizational innovations. In this sense, leading companies were “strategic followers” 
(Mathews, 2005), scaling down existing technology within an existing architecture 
(Christensen, 1997). 
The successful challengers reduced the higher cost of new product development in 
various ways. Both Bombardier and Embraer relied on the existing technology (the Canadair 
Challenger business jet for the CRJs and to a less extent on the ERJ-145 family for the E-
Jets), government support, and on risk-sharing partnerships. Both Bombardier and Embraer 
applied the family concept, and extended their product range by introducing highly similar 
aircraft with different seating capacity or engine performance (see Table 1). Variety creation 
allowed companies to exploit the evolving demand, confirming the findings of Frenken et al 
(1999). “Leading products” were crucial for market leadership. Over the past 30 years, 
leading products were tailored to meetdemand shifting from the 70-100-seat to the 50-seat 
and back to the 70-120-seat market, in response to changing oil prices and competition with 
turboprops and LCA.  
Incumbents faced substantial uncertainty, due to changing oil prices and recurrent crises, 
rather than other factors.
239
 Resizing or upgrading existing products in order to recover sunk 
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 The following quote of Bombardier’s CEO offers a good illustration: “Asked to predict when struggling 
Bombardier will return to financial strength, […] Paul Tellier challenged the questioner: ‘Tell me how long it is 
going to take for the airlines to get back on their feet, where the Canadian dollar will be, where the oil price will 
be, and I will tell you when.’ ” (Warwick, 2004) 
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costs and diversify product portfolio was a rational strategy. For instance, BAe extended its 
RJ production and sold 170 Avro RJs under less favourable market conditions after 1993. 
However, it could not sustain leadership or generate sufficient funds to develop newer 
models. Similarly, Bombardier’s strategy not to develop a new aircraft was difficult to 
challenge, particularly around the 9/11 downturn. Incumbents were trapped by their struggle 
to recover sunk costs and lock-in to production arrangements with low profit margins (Lee 
and Malerba, 2013). They could not launch radical innovations, and were vulnerable to 
disruptive innovations by new challengers (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Christensen, 1997). 
The effect of incumbent traps is more dramatic considering that product life cycles were 
linked to competitiveness (Klepper, 1996). Thus, unless incumbents started to develop a new 
family at the declining phase of their leading product’s life cycle were at risk of exiting the 
industry.  
Uncertainty can also affect the timing of response. Firms that waited too long to respond 
to emerging windows were also trapped by the long lead-time, if the relevant windows closed 
before the product they invested in could reach the break-even point. The Do-328Jet offers a 
good example. In any case, firms need luck and foresight ability to judge how long windows 
of opportunity will be available.  
Alongside companies, governments were confirmed to be strategic actors in innovation 
systems. The question is not whether governments intervened for leadership change, but how 
and when. They have effectively modified windows of opportunity by strategically applied 
interventions, such as standard setting, selection of trading partners, granting market access in 
return for access to technology. Efficient “public-private coalitions” appear to have supported 
successful challengers. At the time of product launch, direct or indirect public financial 
support helped new entrants reduce risks.
240
 Bombardier received export credits while 
Embraer’s buyers had access to interest-rate equalization mechanism. Furthermore, Embraer 
traded the promise of better positions for military procurement in exchange for finding 
investors providing it with finance and technology for the E-Jets. There are two interesting 
lessons from the roles of the Brazilian and Canadian governments. First, that effective 
support can help mitigate the effects of a missed window of opportunity. Although Embraer’s 
ERJ-135/145 entered the market after Bombardier’s CRJs, it quickly caught up in terms of 
delivery rates. Second, governments have political tools to defend incumbents, such as 
                                                 
240
 Government loans are (up to a third of the development costs) even compatible with international trade law. 
See i.e. the 1992 EU – US Agreement on Large Civil Aircraft; the applicability of this agreement to RJs is 
debated. 
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fighting “trade wars” with retaliatory measures. Yet, the Canada-Brazil trade dispute did not 
prevent subsequent leadership change, especially after both parties were found in breach of 
international trade law (see Doh, 2003, Goldstein and McGuire, 2004). The room for 
government interventions is further limited by macroeconomic conditions or domestic 
politics, as shown by the reluctance of the Dutch government to bail-out Fokker in 1996 or 
the inability of Brazil to finance Embraer in the early 1990s.  
5.6.3 Preconditions 
Both successful challengers were experienced aircraft producers when they responded to the 
relevant windows of opportunity. Their salient product innovations that triggered leadership 
change were of competence-enhancing, rather than competence-destroying nature for the 
companies, confirming the findings of Tushman and Anderson (1986). Thus, accumulated 
technological capabilities mattered for leadership in the RJ industry.  
The two leaders have successfully implemented a long-term catch-up strategy, and have 
already climbed the steep initial learning curve. Looking at the company’s trajectory may be 
misleading in the case of Bombardier. While at first it seems to have followed a special leap-
frogging strategy (Lee and Lim, 2001) by rapidly accumulating technological capabilities 
through the various companies it acquired. But from the perspective of the Canadian aircraft 
industry, the path is more gradual: RJs are a continuation of turboprop commuter and 
business jet production. Embraer and Brazil also gradually and systematically built up the 
knowledge and skills necessary to produce and market small aircraft. Both companies 
possessed absorptive capacity to apply existing aerospace technology for RJs. Explicitly or 
implicitly, the long-term catch-up strategy involved collaboration between dominant firms 
and their host governments.  
The advanced state of the sectoral aerospace industry in Canada and Brazil allowed 
companies to effectively respond to emerging windows. Companies could draw upon 
available resources, including skilled researchers, engineers and managers, public research 
organizations, and make use of institutions that facilitated interactions with internal and 
external actors. The successful long-term catch-up of a Brazilian firm highlights the role of 
government investment in the innovation system. It created preconditions for growth by 
training scientists and engineers in ITA, performing public R&D at CTA, providing a 
favourable business environment and access to external finance and technology. Canada has 
similarly been investing in the innovation system since the 1950s. At the same time, both 
sectoral innovation systems were open enough to supplement missing local technology with 
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foreign sources. With risk-sharing partnerships, top-tier firms indirectly benefitted from 
government support provided to second-tier component supplier. Furthermore, active links 
with buyers in key export markets provided firms with the knowledge to identify niches. 
Conversely, where the knowledge base was insufficient or where innovation systems 
underperformed due to institutional hurdles – i.e., in Indonesia, Russia or China –, companies 
were not in the position to implement optimal strategies. Moreover, AVIC/Comac and Sukhoi 
lacked the experience to design, certify and sell aircraft, and could not respond faster than 
Embraer when the opportunity emerged. The difficulty of the apparently abundantly financed 
AVIC/Comac to exploit windows of opportunity provides a crucial message on the limits to 
complementarity between different types of preconditions. Evidently, strong financial 
capability cannot replace missing technological capabilities. 
The capacity to finance new product development proved to be another precondition in 
this capital-intensive sector. Not only strategic choices or incumbent traps, but institutional 
barriers to raise sufficient investment resulted in the downfall of Fokker and Dornier, and the 
delays of Embraer in the 1990s. This had deeper macro-economic roots, such as exchange 
rate volatility. 
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[6] Chapter 6: Conclusions: Schumpeterian 
dynamics in the aircraft industry 
6.1 The three types of cycles and the evolutionary challenge 
We have observed three distinct forms of cycles that affect the growth and decline of the 
aircraft manufacturing industry. First, at the level of products, the fortune of companies at the 
top of the pyramid depends on the sales performance of an aircraft or aircraft family. Sales 
success is not only necessary to recover the sunk costs in development, machinery, marketing 
and support activities, but also to enable companies to make further investments in new 
product development. Production curves can be extended if companies introduce 
refurbished products and modernize components and subsystems, such as replacing engines 
with more efficient ones. This pattern is applicable to large civil aircraft and regional aircraft 
alike, and affects the supply chain. 
Second, at the aggregate level of the aircraft industry, we have identified cycles of 
expansion and contraction, which are closely correlated with business cycles in the world 
economy and affected by global political events. The oil crises, the increased defense 
spending during the last decade of the Cold War, the subsequent Gulf War, the 9/11 shock 
and the most recent global financial crisis are a few key events that made their mark on the 
evolution of the industry.  
Thirdly, between these two levels, we have observed discontinuities in the evolution of 
aerospace innovation systems. Institutions in innovation systems govern learning, 
technological capability building and new knowledge production activities. Recurrent events 
of radical institutional changes that redesign the system and incremental change as actors 
gradually expand their activities within the system framework create a third type of cycles – 
albeit cycles that can only be observed indirectly. 
Recurrent down-cycles and periods of reorganization are particularly interesting 
phenomena for the evolution of the aircraft industry, as they constitute at the same time a risk 
for the survival of industry actors, and offer unique historical opportunities for incumbents 
as well as new entrants to radically change their competitive positions. These moments would 
be textbook cases of turbulence, industrial reorganization, periods of mergers and 
acquisitions, which result in a change in the competitive landscape fostered by “creative 
destruction” – described as Schumpeter Mark I structure (Nelson and Winter, 1982 and 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2016013
247 
 
Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). Periods of crises come in very different size and shape, and 
only some of these will become real moments of creative destruction, but may trigger 
different behavior on behalf of system actors, and have multiple consequences. Yet, 
conversely, the cycles are created by the very behavior of system actors. In the following 
subsections, we elaborate on these interactive mechanisms by re-visiting the three research 
questions. 
6.2 Riding the second wave of internationalization 
The first research addressed the changes in the international division of labor in the aircraft 
industry, and the main patterns of internationalization. In chapter 2, we have found that the 
overwhelming majority of commercial aircraft exports, final products as well as intermediate 
goods, continues to originate from North America and Europe. Their combined exports have 
more than quadrupled in real terms in the past three decades. The double-digit annual average 
growth since 1990 which characterises emerging producers is to some part due to the very 
low initial levels, and also to their gradually increasing production capacity. A more 
noticeable global trend has been a gradual redistribution of exports between the US and 
Europe. At the same time, it is important to note that in 2012, two emerging exporters made it 
to the top 10: Singapore and Brazil, with market shares comparable to that of Japan, Italy or 
Spain. 
Considering the domestic market as well and focusing on value added, we find a more 
significant global redistribution in the mid-ranks of the top 10 aircraft producers. While the 
dominant producer by far remains the US (producing more than 2.6 times the amount of the 9 
subsequent countries), China has emerged as the second largest aircraft producer by 2010. 
We have also noticed a redistribution of R&D activities. The largest business R&D 
spender in the aerospace industry continue to be the incumbents in the US, Europe and 
Canada, we have seen the rapid growth of China (today the 5th largest R&D spender) and the 
gradual growth of India and Brazil and Singapore. 
We distinguished two waves of internationalization in which the aircraft industry 
extended to emerging economies. Although identifying them requires a certain degree of 
abstraction and the waves, in a few cases overlap, there have been notable differences 
between the two, as summarized in Table 2.3. We have seen that entry during the second 
wave of internationalization, occurring in an era when companies are increasingly specialized 
along the supply chain (most markedly since the 1990s), new entrants face lower capital and 
technology barriers than those entering over the 1950s through the 70s, in an era of vertically 
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integrated companies. Therefore, it is not surprising that among the many entrants, the 
success of Embraer was exceptional. Today, internationalization is fuelled by the pull-force 
stemming from the shared strategic interests of governments of emerging economies and of 
incumbent firms in the West. The goals of governments of emerging economies for 
establishing high-tech, high value added activities and move up along the value chain –
national security interests notwithstanding – meet with the company interests in cost saving 
and access to growth markets. Containing this wave creates a particular challenge for 
established players in Europe and North America, which fear the loss of high value added 
jobs. Yet, the scale of threat has not yet been justified; consolidation (mergers and 
acquisitions), efficiency gains through the use of ICT and reduction in defense spending 
appear to have been the major source of aerospace jobs reduction in the US and Europe, 
rather than outsourcing to East Asia. The global aircraft manufacturing industry is still 
concentrated to North America and Europe (around almost 88% in terms of value added) and 
faces and expanding market – thus, contrary to what hawks say, it is not a zero-sum game. 
But comparing the two waves of internationalization, the second one is expected to have 
more profound effect then the first. While statistics show that the fears of North America 
losing positions may be exaggerated, European countries face a more direct challenge and 
need to improve significantly their competitiveness in aircraft manufacturing, attract R&D 
and high value-added jobs, particularly in niche activities. In the end, innovation systems 
compete to attract investors, and the number of potential locations has certainly increased – 
mostly in East and Southeast Asia, Central America, and potentially, Central Eastern Europe. 
Yet, there are significant limits to internationalization, as capabilities cannot be accumulated 
overnight, which require not only advanced training of highly-skilled professionals, but also 
other modes of less formal learning, i.e. ‘learning by doing’. Thus, barriers for latecomer 
entry remain high, as aerospace manufacturing remains a technology and capital intensive 
industry 
. 
6.3 Success and failure in catch-up 
6.3.1 Latecomer performance and evidence of catch-up in the first wave 
In order to answer the question why some countries succeeded while others failed to catch-up 
in aircraft manufacturing, we need to qualify the concept of ‘catch-up’. If catch-up is defined 
in a strict sense (closing the gap or forging ahead of the leader in labor productivity), only 
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Singapore and Brazil have succeeded in forging ahead of the US, and only for limited 
periods. In a more relaxed sense, three emerging aerospace producers, China, Brazil and 
Singapore have approached and in some cases, outperformed leading OECD countries in 
terms of value added in aerospace. In terms of growth acceleration, Indonesia, South Korea 
and Mexico (alongside the above-mentioned countries) have experienced sustained periods of 
faster-than-the-leader growth. Yet, if considering emerging economies as a group, their share 
in global output remains small, making aerospace one of the few sectors where industrialized 
economies hold an exceptionally large global market share. If the process of catch-up is 
defined as an increase in relative value added share, we have a number of cases of catch up 
on the basis of which we can draw conclusions concerning the nature of the catch up process.  
During the first wave of internationalization, four newly industrializing economies 
decided to establish aircraft manufacturing capabilities in their countries: Brazil, South 
Korea, Indonesia and Singapore. We can compare their success in terms of value added 
growth with regards to year 1, as shown in Figure 6.1 in order to compare the development 
trajectories. Evidently, Singapore and Brazil achieved significantly greater growth than South 
Korea and Indonesia. But even in the case of the stronger performers, growth was not 
continuous.  
Figure 6.2 shows evidence for the second wave of internationalization from the 
perspective of emerging economies. By charting the growth in exports that are accounted for 
as intermediate inputs for aircraft industry outputs in destination countries, we can see how 
the share of these nine selected countries grew in the global aerospace value chain from 2 to 
20% over two decades. This growth is impressive even if we disregard the logistics hub effect 
of Singapore. This growth can also be seen as a catch-up trend with regards to the top 
performer US. 
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Figure 6.1 Parallel evolution of the emerging aircraft industries in 4 selected countries 
  
Source: Vertesy (2011) based on UNIDO, Embraer, GGDC, Hill and Pang (1988) 
Notes: Year 1 refers to the start of dedicated industrial development programs (Brazil: 1969; South Korea and 
Indonesia: 1976; Singapore 1977). 
 
Figure 6.2 Top emerging intermediate exporters (with share in world intermediate exports, %) 
 
Source: OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and End-use category 
 
We see that while that while the country growth trajectories look rather unique, many of the 
policies the four countries of the first wave chose to follow were similar. They all provided 
massive public financial support to the industry; sourced advanced technology by assembling 
aircraft under licenses. The air forces played a crucial role in all countries, often by providing 
facilities or creating demand for the locally assembled aircraft or financing by initial launch 
orders. Many of them made some limited modifications to existing models. A crucial 
distinguishing factor between the four country strategies was the early focus on 
commercialization in Singapore and Brazil and a strategy to sell in developed markets. In 
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other words, technology push strategy complemented the demand pull. One can already 
recognize the differences by the second half of the first decade after the launch of activities. 
Sales to civilian markets were not only sources of additional finance for technological 
learning, but also provided incentives to increase quality and efficiency. The differences in 
product portfolios are also interesting. Singapore chose to be an MRO hub and a parts 
supplier, while Brazil chose to sell commuter aircraft. By the end of the first decade the 
strategy of Singapore proved to be more successful. Although Brazil did catch up in the long 
run, the MRO and parts and components production allowed for a more stable growth path in 
Singapore. Of course, Singapore’s aggregate macroeconomic performance was much more 
stable than that of Brazil. Nevertheless, we concluded earlier that crises may represent 
windows of opportunity for adjusting strategies. In fact, we can identify recurrent crises in 
latecomer economies also in Figure 6.1. However this figure does not provide explanations 
for the large variation in the timing, length and depth of crisis periods in different countries. 
In what follows, we revisit the question of what strategies governments followed in emerging 
economies that fostered sustained growth in the sector – by looking at interruptions in the 
emergence and growth of the sector. 
 
6.3.2 Interruptions as windows of opportunity 
We found evidence of interruptions in the growth of the industry in all country cases studied 
in Chapter 4. The Brazilian aircraft industry underwent a crisis between 1990 and 1994; in 
Singapore between 1989 and 1991, China experienced shocks in 1961 and troubles from 
1984 through 1996; in the case of Argentina, during the 1950s and after 1983, while 
Indonesia became a victim of the 1997 crisis. In Singapore a 40% decline in value added in a 
single year was followed by hardly any growth in the next two years before growth resumed 
at 43% in the subsequent year. Brazil experienced a 27% average decline of output for four 
years running and a 67% growth in the subsequent year. From 1984 to 1989 the Chinese 
aerospace output declined on average by 10% per year, grew by 12% for one year (1990), but 
then continued on a downhill course with a 6% decline for six years. Between 1997 and 1999 
Indonesia experienced an average 76% decline in output. The decline was similarly dramatic 
for Argentina. The industry was performing relatively well in Brazil and Singapore prior to 
the crises (both with average value added of around 600 million dollars in the three preceding 
years) but it was also doing rather well in Indonesia (the three-year average was 230 million 
dollars) compared its earlier performance. 
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A combination of macroeconomic, political and industry-specific factors was behind most 
of the crises. Declines in domestic and foreign demand, a drop in public financing, a lack of 
new product sales and a loss of competitiveness associated with aging technological 
capabilities were found to be potential triggering factors. Macro-economic events such as the 
Latin American and Asian financial crises or global recessions can explain the timing of 
interruptions, but they cannot explain their depth and length. Although these are factors 
external
241
 to company management, we argue that recurrent crises are typical for the aircraft 
manufacturing industry. Companies and governments need to respond to crises to secure the 
long-term survival of the industry – which is why we consider them windows of opportunity. 
Our historical studies showed that many instances of crisis not only affected the 
productive, but also the innovative activities. Given that innovation (together with learning 
and capability accumulation) was a systemic activity involving a multitude of inter-related 
actors, certain crises had a major effect on the entire system. We had earlier proposed to call 
this a pattern of interrupted innovation (Vertesy and Szirmai, 2010). Countries narrowing the 
technology gaps with the lead countries did not simply accumulate capabilities in an 
incremental fashion (as suggested by some of the catch up theories). Rather, the accumulation 
of capabilities was a process which was repeatedly interrupted by external macroeconomic 
and political crises and changing market conditions. Radical transitions in sectoral innovation 
systems were followed by periods of industry growth and more incremental changes in size 
and nature of the innovation systems. These transitions entailed a reconfiguration of the 
routines, rules and norms governing the interactions among existing and new actors in a 
catching up system, in line with demands and requirements of changing market conditions.  
Our empirical evidence shows that sustained growth in latecomer aerospace industries is 
not possible without substantial changes in the aerospace innovation system in the country. 
The literature on sectoral innovation systems has emphasized the sector-specific co-evolution 
of “technology, demand, knowledge base, learning processes, firms, non-firm organizations 
and institutions” (Malerba and Mani 2009, p.11). But it has remained less articulate about the 
actual patterns of such co-evolution. While the industry co-evolves with technological change 
and macroeconomic and political events, this does not happen in a smooth incremental 
fashion. It co-evolves in a series of distinct cycles, interrupted by major crises and transitions. 
The cyclical changes in the performance of the sectoral innovation systems are closely linked 
to cyclical swings in the “real” industry.  
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 Although, as in the case of Indonesia for instance, the continued support of prestige aircraft development 
projects was a cause for instabilities. 
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It is not straight-forward how to measure the size and performance of innovation systems, 
how to quantify qualitative changes and how to contrast actual performance with the 
potential maximum performance. The qualitative and institutional changes in particular, 
which occur over time, it is not possible to devise quantitative input and output measures of 
sectoral innovation system over a long time period.
242
 We note that estimating innovation 
system performance frontier curves has never been the aim of this research, rather to offer an 
analytical framework for the case studies and complement it with limited empirical data to 
identify trend breaks. Long-run changes in innovation inputs (R&D expenditures, R&D/sales 
ratios, technology licensing, number of graduates in aeronautics programs, trends in 
foreigners’ local patenting) and output indicators (such as new product sales or composition 
of exports) chart the trajectories and reveal interruptions and periods of transition. Trends in 
production system indicators such as value added and productivity were also used to identify 
interruptions and historical events as turning points.  
 
6.3.3 Exogenous vs. endogenous windows of opportunity 
In order to understand the behavior of key actors, it is important to establish whether the 
sources of interruptions were exogenous or endogenous to the system. Evidence from the 
case studies shows that innovation system changes are not triggered by internal factors – 
gsuch as a slowdown of innovation dynamism as the innovation system comes close to its 
innovation performance frontier, or by radical domestic innovations at the frontier. We found 
that exogenous demand shocks were behind most of the interruptions. Falling sales revenues, 
depletion of funding (public or otherwise), resulted in a drying up of resources available for 
innovation and thus losing competitiveness. At the same time, demand shocks also implied a 
qualitative shift in demand, and even if endogenous technologies were not available, in 
successful cases, systems could adapt to reach out to new technologies – which in turn 
offered windows of opportunity for latecomers to catch up, given that they did not have to 
finance the development of the given technology. 
In fact, we found that radically new technologies did not originate from within a 
latecomer industry but could still revolutionize the industrial structure. None of the countries 
we examined introduced technologies new to the world, rather, it was either new components 
and systems (i.e., engines) or changes in the organization of production (the increased use of 
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hierarchical global supply chains by American and European producers) that triggered 
changes in Brazil and China (i.e., the risk sharing partnership model and the new strategy of 
joining global value chains, respectively).  
Economic and political events external to the industry have represented another important 
type of window of opportunity. The role of government, either as investor, customer or 
technology provider is crucial in the case of latecomers as well as industry leaders. Such 
events were the Sino-Soviet split or the gradual market reforms in China, the strengthening of 
the military regime in Brazil and the financial crisis that ended it, similarly the fall of the 
Peronist regime in Argentina, or the Asian financial crises of 1997 in the case of Indonesia. 
But macroeconomic shocks do not necessarily result in system change – as the case of 
Singapore testifies. The effects of a crisis in the economy in 1985 and in 1997 were relatively 
limited for the aircraft industry and the decline from 1988 to 1989 was halted within one 
year. We noticed that the national innovation system was resilient enough, and continued to 
provide key resources (human capital, re-training and incentives for investment into 
innovation) in a speedy manner – even in what could be considered as a counter-cyclical 
policy. If the system is weaker or underdeveloped, not only are chances for interruptions 
higher, but the ability of system actors to devise a change strategy is significantly lower. We 
will revisit the behavior of key system actors below; but first we discuss why the emergence 
of a sectoral innovation system was crucial for the success of latecomer aircraft industries. 
6.3.4 The crucial role innovation systems in latecomer aircraft industries 
Surprising it may sound, but the aircraft industry is present in practically all countries of the 
world that have an airport, as most airports offer aircraft repair and servicing (MRO) 
activities. We distinguished this from larger scale production (or even large-scale MRO) 
activities, which necessitate a stronger presence of technological capabilities. Considering 
this latter group of countries, we found that none of them achieved accelerated growth in 
aerospace unless they developed local educational, training and research institutes, and 
dedicated policies to facilitate aerospace knowledge assimilation, generation and diffusion. 
Given that aerospace is a technology intensive industry, it is not surprising that a full-fledged 
innovation system is crucial for successful latecomer entry. At the same time, weak, enclave-
type structures are typical for developing country innovation systems (Banji 2006), with 
weak links between buyers and suppliers, or between R&D institutes and relevant universities 
(if they exist at all). In weak national innovation systems, missing elements can rarely be 
replaced by establishing stronger ties with advanced countries. The cases of Argentina, China 
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and Indonesia offer good examples. The jet fighter development during the late 1940s and 
50s in Argentina was actually a spin-off of the German sectoral innovation system and was 
not linked to the development of local capabilities. The project eventually collapsed and the 
industry had to struggle to survive. Similarly in China, jet fighter production came to years of 
standstill after the Sino-Soviet split in 1961 due to the departure of Soviet experts and 
technicians. In Indonesia, indigenous aircraft development projects were frozen as a result of 
a weak innovation system in the late 1990s. In many of the cases these ‘enclave projects’ did 
show increased innovative performance and even industrial growth in short term. Yet none of 
these institutional arrangements were sufficient for sustained catch-up in aerospace. 
Similarly, investments in sustaining the enclave did rarely result in spillovers to the domestic 
economy given the weak links with domestic industry and education and research 
organizations. Even if underdeveloped or missing key structural components, innovation 
systems – or the lack of it – could be identified in all our cases. In the case of China, it was 
interesting to observe that there may be more than one sectoral innovation system – or rather, 
that in the history, it was purposefully built with installing certain barriers or blockages to 
hamper information sharing – but also, effective knowledge exchange between more distant 
aerospace clusters.
243
 These decisions, while probably justified by national security, have 
continued to create inefficiencies in the performance of the innovation system for a long time. 
 
6.3.5 Innovation system dynamics 
The case studies confirmed our expected finding that innovation systems evolve over time, 
and undergo incremental and radical changes. Radical changes bring about transition periods, 
of varying length. 
The length of these periods varies from country to country. The increased 
internationalization of production and consumption somewhat synchronizes country 
experiences. For instance, the end of the Cold War caused a major crisis in the global 
aerospace industry and all countries that entered the industry at different times and had 
acquired different levels of capabilities experienced a crisis during the mid-1990s.
244
 But in 
Argentina, Brazil and China major interruptions had already occurred well before the end of 
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 This is not the same as regional differences, e.g. between the Silicon Valley and Route 128 in the US 
(Saxenian, 1994)  
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 And experience one even more simultaneously during 2008-09, although this remains beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
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the Cold War. This indicates that country-specific factors matter at least as much as industry-
specific ones.  
Country-specific factors appear to be similarly important for the length of the period 
between the beginning of an interruption (indicated by a significant drop in output) and the 
start of the transition (the creation of a new institutional arrangement in the innovation 
system).  
We distinguished two phases in the successful development of an aerospace industry: an 
emergent phase and a phase of sustained competitiveness. It is an interesting question 
whether the end of the emergent phase in aerospace evolution is inevitably associated with an 
interruption. This seems not to be always the case. In the case of Brazil, the sectoral 
innovation system had already developed and was functioning well by the early 1980s and 
the industry had achieved sustained competitiveness, well before the crisis and interruption 
around 1990. Nevertheless, the transition after 1990 provided an opportunity to decrease the 
participation of the state in financing innovative activities. 
The trajectories of our case study countries show that in all countries public funding was 
indispensable for the emergence of an aerospace innovation system.
245
 In Brazil CTA and 
ITA were funded by the government and so was Embraer at the time of its establishment. No 
private capital was channeled into the Chinese innovation system before the 1990s. Similarly, 
the emergence of the innovation system was funded by public sources in Argentina and 
Indonesia.  
However, while state support is essential during the early years of entry into aerospace, 
state bureaucracy may become an obstacle as the infant industries become more mature. The 
sudden withdrawal of the state from a system centered on government (or military) financing 
– witnessed for instance in Indonesia, Brazil and Argentina – itself represents a system shock, 
which ultimately requires radical institutional changes – and thus a transition. In this sense, 
the transition was unavoidable in Brazil. 
There are surprisingly many common features in successful innovation system transitions 
across countries. First, there is a tendency to shift from a military to a civilian innovation 
system. Second, there is a trend towards increasing participation in international R&D and 
production networks. This is in accordance with the internationalization of the global industry 
both in development and production (many of the “organizational innovations” were initiated 
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competitiveness is what Gerschenkron referred to as the need to substitute the missing institutional prerequisites 
to growth.   
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earlier by dominant American and European manufacturers). For the sectors in transition this 
implies establishing connections with foreign sources of technology and shifting towards 
more production for export markets.  
 
6.3.6 Interruptions, transitions and the accumulation of technological capabilities 
Aerospace producers at medium and higher tiers of the supply chain face immense sunk costs 
due to the costly machinery and training involved. Firms make these investments if they 
expect to recover these costs in a long enough production run, or if they expect to be able to 
expand production cycles by selling related products which require relatively less additional 
investment. If a production run is interrupted by a temporary decrease in demand, but picks 
up again, firms may face liquidity problems, but if credit is available to bridge the crisis, they 
should be able to recover once demand picks up again. However, if the market, following a 
crisis, demands new products which cannot be supplied with existing capabilities of the 
company, the company’s survival is at risk. It is already experiencing financially troubles, but 
in order to recover, it needs to invest more in new technologies. This is a typical scenario 
associated with innovation system transitions.  
Evidence from the case studies shows that the speed at which new technological 
capabilities are accumulated following a transition may be linked to two factors. The first is 
the absorptive capacity of a firm, which depends on how related prior knowledge is (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990). The second is the financing ability of the firm or the available sources 
of support within the innovation system. This latter, if linked to a coherent technological 
development strategy, can compensate for insufficient absorptive capacity. Take the 
examples of Brazil and China. In Brazil, Embraer’s experience in designing commuter and 
marketing commuter aircraft (the Bandeirante, the Brasilia) and a jet fighter (the AMX) were 
cosely related to what was required for regional jets (the ERJ-135/145). Yet, it (like most 
other firms in the global market) lacked financial resources to develop and produce every part 
and component in-house. The transition involved streamlining the activities, focusing on core 
competences and establishing collaborative joint ventures to source others. In this way, new 
private investors saw a growth potential in Embraer required to finance the acquisition of new 
capabilities related to the core competences. At the same time, using the terminology of 
Tushman and Anderson (1986), the transition destroyed existing competences of the 
company. In China, the capabilities of AVIC (and its predecessors) to “design” and 
“produce” Soviet-style “commuters” and fighter jets were only very distantly related to the 
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aimed commercial regional and larger jets. However, giving the industry strategic priority 
opened government coffers to finance the acquisition of missing technological capabilities 
(through license manufacturing MD-80s, producing aircraft parts for western plane makers, 
co-developing the ARJ-21 with western partners). Apart from the technological relatedness 
dimension, absorptive capacity at the organisational (firm) level also has a management 
dimension. The efforts to change practices and routines, or to “un-learning” inefficient 
solutions should not be underestimated either, as McKendrick’s (1992) study on IPTN in 
Indonesia reveals. In a mammoth-sized AVIC conglomerate the replacement of management 
practices is especially crucial and explains why the recovery has taken such a long period. 
Given the specialization in MRO and product upgrading early on, the absorptive capacity 
of Singapore Technologies Aerospace was strong. New technologies required to serve a 
larger MRO market were closely related to what was available earlier. Relatively little 
organization change or new management practices were required, due to the already existing 
outward orientation. The transition was a competence-enhancing one. 
The negative examples from Argentina and Indonesia similarly fit in this frame. 
Deficiencies in absorptive capacity of FAMA was excessive in the 1980s, and neither the 
financially troubled Argentine government or private investors were ready to raise funds.  
And closing the gap between existing capabilities and what a commercially-oriented 
innovation system would have required in terms of products, organization of production and 
marketing capabilities would have been costly. The case was very similar for IPTN / 
Indonesian Aerospace after the Southeast Asian financial crisis. The large gaps and lack of 
funds indicate why transitions have not yet occurred.  
The previous examples focused on leading firms. Transitions similarly affect the 
technological capabilities of other firms in the sector. In Brazil, as Embraer was privatized, a 
number of new firms entered the market, many of them established by previous employees of 
Embraer. This allowed to preserve certain capabilities at the industry level what the leading 
firm has lost, but this was only temporary, because in the long run, Embraer increasingly 
collaborated with foreign component suppliers. Even if some of these suppliers in the last 
decade established subsidiaries in Brazil, these were more trade posts and did most of the 
value added activities in their home locations. The case of Singapore is different. The 
Economic Development Board offered tax breaks and established science parks to invite 
leading foreign firms to open regional headquarters and production and potentially R&D 
facilities. As a result, the transition was competence-enhancing and brought new capabilities 
also in the lower strata of the supply chain.  
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Accumulating technological capabilities involves costs and uncertainties even during 
periods between radical trajectory changes, which originate from the tacit component of 
knowledge (Lall 1992). The times of radical trajectory changes bring along different kinds of 
uncertainties and costs that stem from breaking path dependencies and establishing new 
routines and new channels of learning and collaboration. With regards to external technology 
sources, the challenge is to identify new partners and create mutual trust. In many of the cases 
there was a significant element of path dependence in international partnerships across 
trajectory shifts. This was observable both in Singapore and Brazil, where many of 
experienced partnerships from the 1980s survived major changes in the 1990s as well. The 
macro-economic changes in China during the 1990s were deep enough to establish new joint 
ventures with previously unimaginable western partners, but at the same time the long 
tradition of collaboration with Russian manufacturers did continue in jet engines and defense 
systems. 
Given the high costs associated with establishing new capabilities for firms, it is good to 
mention that evidence shows a possibility to prepare for upcoming interruptions and 
transitions. If actors invest in ‘pre-competitive research’ (research on possible new 
technologies required to sustain competitiveness), they can ensure a relatively fast transition 
which lowers the costs of transition. This is especially crucial for latecomer innovation 
systems that have advanced close to the world frontier. This could already be observed in the 
cases of Singapore and Brazil in the 2000s. Educational and research institutes play a central 
part in preparing for upcoming transitions. 
 
 
6.3.7 Actors that govern the transition period 
The competitiveness of the industry during the growth period that follows a transition (or the 
emergence) depends largely on which actors play a leading role during the transition (or 
formative) periods. The government is, especially during the emergence phase,  indispensable 
as a key actor. The type of government (military or civilian), its position in the decision-
making hierarchy, and the nature of government involvement (did the government impose 
institutions or did it facilitate the creation of interactions) makes a difference in the structural 
and functional outcomes of the new innovation system (in the incentive structure, variety 
creation and selection mechanisms). Countries, where private actors and entrepreneurs were 
more involved in the creation of institutions, tended to perform more successfully. The 
DOI: 10.14267/phd.2016013
260 
 
comparison of Argentina and Brazil in terms of governance is telling. In both countries the 
military played a crucial part in the establishment of aerospace research and production 
activities. But already in the 1970s the success of Brazil owed a lot to entrepreneurial 
participation and the inclusion of players with a market-oriented mind-set. Similarly, the 
privatization of Embraer was once again driven by entrepreneurs and was crucial to the 
elimination of inefficiencies.  
If national security considerations are more important for the development of an industry 
than commercial ones and the transition is completely governed by the military, a failure to 
establish a sustainable system is almost inevitable. The institutions created during the 
transition reflected the expectations of one non-market actor, which led to failure in 
Argentina in the 1950s and in the early decades of the industry’s development in China.  
 
6.3.8 Transition institutions 
The role of the national innovation system is particularly important in times of transition. 
Transitions in aerospace can be inspired and supported by similar institutional changes taking 
place in other sectors of the economy. This was very much the case in China in the 1990s, 
when the success of reforms in many sectors and regions was a motivating factor for the 
transition in aerospace as well. The most prominent case is Singapore, where a well-endowed 
national innovation system provided the basis for a rather smooth system transition. 
Singapore has constantly increased its investment in education, training and research in areas 
close to aerospace manufacturing (science, technology and engineering). The globally 
competitive knowledge base served well the aerospace industry. In addition, active 
interaction between system components and actors ensured an “early warning” of, and a rapid 
response to loss of competitiveness. The case of Singapore also shows that an open system of 
innovation is of paramount importance. Both during the emergence phase and during 
transition, Singapore attracted expatriate experts and foreign direct investment to fill in the 
knowledge and capability gaps. This is very much in line with what Galli and Teubal (1997) 
referred to as “anticipatory institutional changes”. Such changes that take place at the higher 
system level (read, national innovation system) reinforce restructuring at the subsystem level 
(national aerospace industry) and reduce the effort required for a successful transition.  
It is also interesting to consider uncertainty in times of transition. Interruptions and 
transitions may also take place in innovation systems at the technological frontier, because 
the same forces of co-evolution may well apply there as well. (The volatile growth of the 
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industry in industrialized countries appears to underscore this assumption.) What is different 
in the case of latecomers is the degree of uncertainty that actors in latecomer aerospace 
innovation systems face. The further away they are from the technology frontier, the less the 
technological uncertainties are and the better they can benefit from benchmarking already 
established best practices.  
Nevertheless, as the very heterogeneous nature of trajectories show, every transition 
involves a considerable degree of experimentation. These ‘experiments’ are carried out by 
incumbent actors who are constrained by their existing capabilities and learning abilities, and 
the usually highly concentrated structure of the industry and the close connection between 
leading actors and governments make incumbents powerful enough to deter external actors 
from entering the national sectoral innovation system or limit their actions. This is especially 
true in cases where the development of the aerospace industry is closely linked to a 
nationalistic rhetoric. The success of these experimental periods thus depends on the ability 
of system actors to look beyond the system boundaries. 
 
6.3.9 Factors contributing to the success and failure of transitions 
It is a crucial point in interrupted innovation that the emergence of an innovation system does 
not yet guarantee sustained competitiveness. Only if the system succeeds in surviving a major 
interruption, will growth restart following a transition, resulting in sustained competitiveness. 
A successful transition depends primarily on how well key current and potential actors 
understand the causes of the crisis and the new competitive environment, and how they are 
able to overcome institutional inertia. In the four country cases, transition did not happen 
without some form of policy intervention. The question is how to achieve “good governance” 
of the transition that creates the institutions for long-term growth.  
The successful management of transition period involves coordinated, strategic 
intervention. Transition processes are uncertain and changing established routines and laws is 
costly. However, if an interruption occurs, the cost of “non-transition” also increases rapidly. 
There are negative externalities in the form of growing unemployment, loss of expertise that 
can be directly transferred to other industries, deteriorating export performance, and 
increasing debt burdens in the supplier chain and for development banks. Since the social 
costs of failure are so high, the government has a legitimate reason to try to initiate systemic 
change. But firms and entrepreneurs also have an important role given the competitive 
challenge the industry faces.  
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Both the emergent and the transition phases require coordinated action by the key 
stakeholders, involving the identification and creation of missing institutional elements. A 
transition will not occur unless there is sufficient will on the part of the key actors. This may 
require the formation of explicit or implicit “coalitions” of major actors who can ensure 
financial and political support for the new system and who can expect major returns from the 
new system. Firms and entrepreneurs intrinsically have a better understanding of the 
competitive landscape and can act as ‘lobbyists’ for system-wide change (cf. Athreye, 2010). 
Entrepreneurship can also play an important role in identifying the capabilities in the old 
system that are worth preserving. However, since it is still a catching up system in an 
emerging economy, underdeveloped infrastructure and missing institutions remain significant 
impediments to change. For instance the shortage of venture capital was often pointed out in 
even the best performing country, Brazil.  
The nature of entrepreneurship also makes a difference. Short-term rent seeking resulted 
in less effective concession agreements in Argentina, while aiming for a long-term solution 
was instrumental for the successful privatization of Embraer. To some extent, competition 
can also promoted by the government, as the case of China shows. But the lack of 
competitiveness-driven firms and the absence of an entrepreneurial culture in the Chinese 
aerospace system may well be the reason why the transition took almost two decades 
following the interruption in the 1980s. 
An external shock and an interruption during the emergent phase in a latecomer 
industry can be fatal. The timing of the first major interruption is one of the important factors 
explaining the success or failure of transitions. We identified an emergent or formative phase 
during the initial years of the evolution of the industry and its sectoral innovation system. 
During this phase the industry has to acquire a minimum level of technological capabilities 
required to produce aircraft or components utilizing current (or older) technology. Acquiring 
a threshold level of capabilities is particularly costly in the capital and skilled labor intensive 
aerospace industry. It involves the creation of some elements of a sectoral innovation system 
(i.e. firms, aeronautical engineering curricula in higher education, public research 
organizations, and so forth).  
Earlier we criticized the appropriateness of stage theories to describe the evolution of 
aerospace industry in latecomer countries and argued that the ability to innovate is essential 
for growth. We have seen that production capacity alone was not enough to sustain the 
industry in the long term. Although Argentina produced fighters and trainers during the 
1970s, and Indonesia produced small transport planes during the late 1980s and mid-1990s, 
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these planes did not meet the quality requirements of the markets and could only be “sold” to 
their own governments. This was due to the underdeveloped sectoral innovation systems 
(which lacked a sufficient technological base, private actors, and market incentives in 
Argentina and a sufficient pool of skilled labor in Indonesia). 
Learning by doing is an essential way of accumulating capabilities to innovate. But if 
learning is inefficient due to the lack of capital and skilled labor, the probability of an 
interruption occurring before the innovation system has matured sufficiently is high. Such an 
interruption had devastating effects in Argentina, both at the beginning of the 1950s as well 
in the 1980s, and in Indonesia in 1997. Brazil, however, survived the interruption in the 
1990s because it already had a fairly well-developed sectoral innovation system. Still the 
system transition lasted four years and involved a fundamental reconfiguration of innovative 
and productive activities. In China, the innovation system was quite well developed by the 
1980s (even if it was not functioning in a competitive way since the incentive was more to 
achieve a given quantity of output rather than quality) and could therefore survive its 
interruption. 
If the main components of an innovation system are in place, a crisis can be overcome 
through reconfiguring the institutions, the functions of the various components and their 
interactions. Had a full-fledged innovation system not yet emerged prior to the crisis, more 
missing components would need to be supplied in addition to reconfiguring the role of the 
already existing institutions. Theoretically, considering the arguments on latecomers’ 
advantages and path dependency, the less developed an innovation system is, one might 
expect that there is less the institutional inertia to overcome. But this reasoning does not hold 
for aerospace. Countries are more likely to fail if the innovation system is interrupted by a 
crisis before the phase of emergence has resulted in a full-fledged innovation system. This is 
illustrated by the examples of Argentina and Indonesia.  
The reasons for this relate to the capital intensity of the industry. Competitive aerospace 
manufacturing depends on sufficient investment capabilities. Following the interruptions in 
Argentina or in Indonesia, the decline of the industry was due to a lack of investment. The 
problem here is that the existing level of technological capabilities matters in a crucial way 
for attracting large amounts of foreign investment. The more developed an innovation system 
is, the higher its chances to acquire new sources of capital. Latecomers entering the aerospace 
industry – firms and host governments – need to be ready to invest in the establishment of an 
innovation system.  
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6.4 Leadership changes 
The third research question aimed at understanding, at the level of companies, the drivers of 
successive catch-up and leadership changes in the regional jet segment. Our framework, 
based on Perez and Soete (1988), Vertesy and Szirmai (2010) and Lee and Malerba (2013) 
put particular emphasis on different kinds of windows of opportunity (technological, demand 
and regulatory), on company innovation strategies devised in response to the emerging 
windows, and on the preconditions that boosted or hampered potential challengers to 
effectively implement their strategies. In what follows, we revisit our conclusions presented 
in section 5.6 to discuss emerging patterns of leadership change and the fate of past leaders, 
which we find instructive for future contenders and potential investors. 
 
6.4.1 Emerging patterns of leadership change 
We found that leadership changes occurred in a relatively short period of time, and were 
linked to production cycles of families of regional jets. In the case of BAe, the source of 
leadership was the 146 family (over 1984-1990), in the case of Fokker, it was the F-100/70 
(1990-1995), in the case of Bombardier the CRJ family (the CRJ100/200/700/900 models), 
between 1995 and 2005, with a short interruption in 2000, in the case of Embraer it was the 
E-Jets (E170/190 models), following 2005. The fact that companies were able to act so fast is 
due to the capabilities that had already existed in the countries. 
Without certain preconditions, no challenger could gain leadership in the regional jet 
market. First and foremost, a precondition was technological and investment capabilities 
within reach for challenger companies, which is hardly surprising considering the high 
technological and capital intensity of the sector. None of the newly emerging leader 
companies were new entrants to the sector by the time they set out to challenge the leadership 
position of the incumbents; they had already a long experience in aircraft manufacturing. In 
other words, they paid the cost of entry and passed the steep initial learning curve earlier. 
Crucially, they possessed absorptive capacity to apply for regional jets technology that 
already existed in other segments of the aerospace industry. They could also draw upon 
resources available in the innovation system. That is why government support was crucial to 
create the preconditions for growth, by training scientists and engineers, performing public 
research and development and providing favourable business environment and access to 
external finance and technology in all our cases. We note that alongside the support for the 
innovation system in a given country hosting the headquarters of a challenger firm, these 
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firms could benefit from the active involvement of other governments that hosted a second-
tier component supplier. In this way, all four leaders benefitted from US technology. 
Furthermore, technological and investment capabilities alone are not sufficient for leadership 
change, unless these were complemented by a sufficiently deep knowledge of the market, 
which a company could gain from the sales of related products. In the case of BAe and 
Fokker, it was the experience with a regional-scale, older generation jet (BAC-111 and F-28), 
for Bombardier it was the experience as a component supplier (Shorts for Fokker) as well as a 
turboprop commuter producer, in the case of Embraer, its experience with commuter aircraft 
operating airlines mattered. This also implied an active engagement in after-sales support and 
maintenance. The resulting in-depth knowledge of the market was crucial for being able to 
provide appropriate response to new demand, and thus secure sufficient orders to reach the 
break-even point. 
Company leadership in the regional jet industry has been associated with leading 
products. Leading products are aircraft – or aircraft families with a high degree of similarity 
with one another but seat ranges or engine performance, i.e. the BAe-146-100/200/300 and 
the Avro RJ70/85/100 – that constitute the backbone for a company’s market leadership, or 
the largest share of their output in terms of number of deliveries. Over the history of the 
regional jet industry, leading products were addressing different market segments within the 
sector. The leadership of BAe and Fokker in the 70-100-seat segment rested upon the 
fortunes of the BAe-146 and the Fokker F-100, Bombardier owed its success in the 40-50-
seat market to the CRJ200, and Embraer once again took the leadership in the larger, 70-120-
seat segment with the ERJ-170/190 jets as oil prices rose and smaller regional jets could not 
compete with turboprop any longer.  
Whether a family becomes a leading product, depends on the timing and duration of 
windows of opportunities. The long lead time between the development of the concept of a 
new aircraft and the entry into serial production brings a fair amount of risk to the enterprise. 
If an innovator launches the development of a new product having read signals that a 
combination of window of opportunities have opened, but these windows have been closed 
by the time the new product enters the market, the cost of failure for the company is 
enormous. Leadership change therefore depends on the favourable condition and timing of 
windows of opportunities.  
First, typically a technological window of opportunity opens in combination with the 
promise of a demand window, so that the combination of these two should make it favourable 
for the innovator to launch the development of a new product. However, in order to turn this 
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new product into a leading product, a demand window, often in combination with a window 
created by changes in the regulatory environment, should be open at the time when the 
development process is finalized and the new product is to enter into serial production to 
boost orders and sales.  
Leading products do not necessarily have to be radical clean-sheet designs, but 
improvements of existing models by re-sizing and re-engining, as in the case of the Fokker 
100. However, it appears that the chances of remaining in the market after newly emerging 
windows of opportunities with these kinds of products may be more difficult than with clean-
sheet design, as (at least) two-generation-old vintage platforms easily become uncompetitive. 
In fact, Fokker’s design and the company did not survive the 1990s challenge, but BAe’s 146 
rejuvenated as the Avro jets still generated sales in the 1990s. However, re-engining them as 
the RJX was not sufficient anymore for the BAe models to survive Embraer’s challenge in 
the 2000s. Similarly, Bombardier stretched and re-engined its new design and succeeded in 
extending the production cycle until today, although not anymore as a leading product. This 
proves that product life cycles matter for competitiveness (Klepper, 1996), and companies 
that fail to already initiate development of a new product family at the declining phase are at 
risk of exiting the industry. Slow reaction to windows of opportunities in a competitive 
environment may be worse than no reaction at all. The lead-time in the sector is long, and 
there is a real risk of windows of opportunities closing by the time the product receives the 
necessary certifications for sales. Thus a product’s life-cycle will not be aligned with the 
windows of opportunities, and low delivery rates not generate sufficient revenue to reach the 
break-even point and accumulate capital that can be invested in a new clean-sheet design. 
There is, of course, an element of luck and foresight ability to be able to judge how long 
windows of opportunities will be available. These two factors, slow response and erroneous 
judgement contribute to what can be called the “innovators’ trap”, which may be the fate of 
leaders and followers alike, as once a firm has launched a product development, it is locked 
in due to the investments and established networks. 
The timing of windows of opportunities and the successful launch of potentially leading 
products have a number of policy implications. Along with the questions of “What did 
governments do to support challengers?”, or “What did governments do to ensure that current 
or past leaders are withstanding challengers?”, we also have to ask “When did governments 
intervene effectively?”. First, preconditions for companies to respond to emerging windows 
of opportunities depend on the performance of the innovation system, on the availability 
skilled human resources, basic as well as applied research results from public research 
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organizations, and institutions that facilitate interactions. Second, the speed of response 
depends on the availability of capital for new entrants to develop and launch a new product, a 
risky activity where direct or indirect public finance has always played a role and where 
government loans are (up to a third of the development costs) even compatible with 
international trade law.
246
 Third, governments’ regulatory measures can modify windows of 
opportunities, and instruments such as standard setting, certification or operation 
requirements, or selection of trading partners have in fact been strategically applied. Fourth, 
at the time when a new product is ready to enter markets, governments have once again a 
range of tools at hand to create a trade-friendly business environment. Price is a determinant 
factor of competitiveness of aircraft, where a weaker currency combined with 
macroeconomic stability can help, however, if that condition is lacking, governments have 
found a way for export financing by interest-rate equalization mechanisms or export credits. 
National prestige aside, it is not leadership but innovation-based competitiveness which may 
be in the best interest of the public, for what it is equally crucial to ensure that interventions, 
if exist, are temporary. 
The source of windows of opportunities was typically external to the incumbent or 
challenger companies’ activities, however, some institutional factors could be influenced by 
producers with a large enough size and power. In some special cases, windows of opportunity 
were opened with the strategic collaboration of key actors in the innovation systems (leading 
companies, governments, or airlines), such as the creation of favourable tax conditions, an 
export financing regime, or the preservation and later relaxation of scope clauses. Yet the 
effectiveness of such “tinkered” opportunities in the longer term depended on the existence of 
other windows of opportunities (such as sufficient demand).  
Windows of opportunity that entailed favourable market conditions or growing demand 
for regional jets were in principle open for incumbent as well as challenger companies. 
Incumbents could often not exploit these as much as newcomers because of the sunk costs in 
their existing (less competitive) products that have not accumulated a break-even delivery 
volume. This absorbed substantial financial and engineering resources, thus did not have the 
capacity to respond to challenges. In a few cases where former leaders could liberate some 
capacity, they could regain their leading positions – as seen in the case of Fokker coming 
back after it lost leadership with the F-28 to BAe.  
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 See i.e. the 1992 EU – US Agreement on Large Civil Aircraft; the applicability of this agreement to regional 
jets is debated. 
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The common pattern in firms’ strategic response to windows of opportunities over the 
past three decades entailed the introduction of technologically superior, produced more 
efficiently in greater production rates. Thus it was an increasing competition to design aircraft 
with more cost-efficient operational performance, and to be able to offer greater production 
capacity. Challengers therefore succeeded by ever more focusing on a core competence (lead 
design, system assembly, sales and after-sales support activities) which allowed efficiency 
increase and cost reduction. Their main product innovations were new to the regional jet 
market but not necessarily new to the world: even the organizational innovations (i.e. risk-
sharing partnership model) were already introduced in the large civilian aircraft segment 
earlier. In this sense, the companies can be considered as “strategic followers” (Mathews, 
2005) or those scaling down existing technology within an existing architecture (Christensen, 
1997). 
 
6.4.2 The fate of past leaders 
European aircraft makers of smaller aircraft struggled in a lethal competition in the 1990s, 
and the collaboration in the framework of Airbus absorbed significant resources and did not 
succeed in the regional segment. Even if the necessary threshold technological capabilities 
were available, the financial capacity of firms and individual host governments was limited 
and targeted mostly the larger civil aircraft segment. Saab, for instance, already had 
experience in producing a reliable regional turboprop aircraft as well as fighter jets, but has 
never combined these technologies into commercial jets which would have needed significant 
investment. Dornier, as a subsidiary of Fairchild, did show its capability by launching the Do-
328JET, a 30-seat jet version of its regional turboprop aircraft Do-328, but the performance 
and efficiency of the aircraft first delivered in 1999 fell short of that of its overseas 
competitors, and the loss-making company declared insolvency and could not launch a 
radically new design.
247
 The lack of investment capabilities precluded the company from 
entering the more promising 70-120 with a new design. Evidently, the window of opportunity 
for 50-seat regional jets in the 1990s opened at the detriment of the turboprop market. 
Eventually, only the French-Italian ATR consortium managed to survive the shakeouts in the 
turboprop market that saw the exit of Saab, BAe and Fokker. With hindsight, European 
companies have made a wrong strategic response by retaining their own programs and not 
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 Nevertheless, the Do-328JET remains the most significant European competitor in the regional jet market, 
with 110 aircraft delivered. 
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pooling resources as Bombardier managed to do. There are many explanations why no such 
European consortium could succeed in the regional jet segment (Heerkens et al, 2010). An 
important reason for producers’ inability to collaborate in new projects was their lock-in in 
parallel programs initiated in the 1980s that proved less cost-efficient than the rest. Product 
life-cycle in the industry is long, and sunk costs of initial investments can only be recovered 
after 300-500 aircraft are sold, thus more than two-three companies have no room in a 
constrained market. 
Sunk costs in development and lock-in with a relatively out-of-date design can be just as 
important a problem for incumbent leaders as for others. In this sense, both BAe and Fokker 
became victims of their own success. The design of their 100-seat regional jets and the use of 
international partners to share the burden were efficient and innovative enough to offer a 
competitive edge in the 1980s. It appeared to be a logical strategy for the companies to invest 
the limited amount of capital at hand into their competitive advantage serving a promising 
enough market, rather than embark on an uncertain venture into making a 50-seat jet. To their 
misfortune, airline economics made the 50-seat jet market more lucrative in the 1990s, and 
the Bombardier and Embraer aircraft proved to be disruptive innovations in a niche market 
(Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Christensen, 1997). As a result, their products, the BAe-146 and 
the F-100, did not generate sufficient revenues to allow investment of own resources in a 
substantially new development program, and did not have access to additional, significant 
government funding. On the contrary, both companies were constantly under pressure to 
economize their operations and were forced to cut workforce in order to be profitable.
248
 
Fokker was the first to be forced out of business in 1996. The takeover by DASA, a company 
itself struggling with the EF2000 Eurofighter programme and the Dornier operations, did not 
result in solving Fokker’s cash-flow problems. With pessimistic outlook for the Fokker 
product line, neither the Dutch government nor potential Asian investors could save the 
company from declaring bankruptcy in 1996. 
To mitigate the effect of substantial sunk costs in light of changing technological and 
demand conditions, a viable option for incumbents is to resize or upgrade existing products. 
Resizing an existing design in order to better meet market demand has its inherent technical 
limits. For instance, shrinking the BAe-146 and F-70/100 designs to be competitive against 
Bombardier and Embraer was not feasible. Upgrading, on the other hand, has proved to be 
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 Fokker underwent a rationalization programme in 1994-95 and cut workforce by a third to 8,500 workers and 
managed to reduce production lead time by half. The Avro operations of British Aerospace took even harsher 
cuts from 7000 to 1950 jobs in assembly and marketing (“Fokker prepares for new round of cuts” Flight 
International, 22-28 Feb 1995). 
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good solution for British Aerospace, as it managed to conduct an overhaul of the BAe-146 in 
the Avro RJ programme in 1993. Major changes included adding new Honeywell engines, all 
digital avionics and a new cabin, which contributed to improved performance and reduced 
maintenance costs. This way, the life cycles of the three sizes of the BAe-146 (the -
100/200/300) were successfully extended, and 170 additional aircraft were sold under the 
new designation RJ-70/85/100. But as shown earlier, yet another upgrade of these products 
based on a thirty-year-old design was not marketable any longer after the turn of the 
millennium, and BAe Systems chose not to raise funds for a clean-sheet design. With another 
downturn in the industry looming in the wake of 9/11 2001, BAe Systems announced the 
cancellation of the RJX programme and eventually ended regional jet production two years 
later. By this strategic move, the company decided to focus its activities on other segments of 
the aerospace industry (defence, or supplying the large civil aircraft industry) and BAe 
Systems has remained one of the largest aerospace firms. 
It is also interesting to point out that many of the leadership changes overlapped, at least 
partly, with economic downturns. The first half of the 1990s saw a down-cycle and a 
consolidation in the global aerospace industry, but the aftermath of 9/11 also brought a shock 
to the industry. Mathews (2005) and Lee and Mathews (2012) argued that downturns may 
provide for favourable timing of entry for challenger firms. In fact, we notice that the 
relatively less costly regional jets offered airlines increased efficiency in contrast with larger 
aircraft. This clearly aggravated the problems of the incumbents, and British Aerospace and 
Fokker struggled to reach the break-even point with their regional jets with lower delivery 
rates. 
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Figure 6.3 A duopoly change reflected in the cumulative number of regional jets delivered 
 
Source: www.airlinerlist.com; company annual reports 
 
One can also notice another historical trend behind leadership dynamics: the duopoly 
regime of the 1980s (BAe-Fokker) has, after the painful decade of the 1990s, been replaced 
by another duopoly regime consisting of Bombardier and Embraer. This also corresponds to a 
change in the industrial organization from a mostly in-house producing and innovating 
structure to one relying primarily on global supply chains and risk-sharing collaborations 
with companies specializing in a narrow segment of the value chain. It is interesting to note 
that the simultaneous presence of a high number of competitors coincided with relatively low 
fuel price. This could also have implications for the future competition with new entrants 
such as Comac’s ARJ-21, Mitsubishi’s MRJ or the Sukhoi Superjet (to list only the aircraft 
that successfully flew) – should, of course, these companies and their host countries have 
realized all the necessary preconditions and favourable demand windows open in their 
favour. 
 
6.4.3 Outlook 
Future leadership changes are to be expected in the RJ industry. The capacity of our 
methodology to predict which company at what time will next assume leadership is limited 
by the uncertainties as to the nature and timing of new exogenous windows of opportunity. 
Nevertheless, salient trends can be identified based on known capabilities and revealed 
strategies. Embraer is likely to maintain its leadership for some years with the overhauled E2 
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jets. Bombardier’s fate depends on demand for its C-Series jets in the non-traditional 110-
160-seat class.. Unlike past incumbents, Bombardier’s product portfolio is diverse enough to 
help the firm overcome the “incumbent trap”. Sustained, low fuel prices may improve the 
chances for late entrants in the 100-seat class, such as Comac, Mitsubishi or Sukhoi. Even if 
the models recently introduced fall short of becoming leading products, a modest market 
presence may provide necessary capabilities for the long-term catch-up and eventual 
leadership of these firms. 
Another question is whether our conclusions on the RJ industry are valid for other capital- 
and technology-intensive sectors, such as LCA, automobile or shipbuilding, or industries 
involving complex product systems. While demand conditions may differ across sectors, high 
capital and technology barriers to entry renders preconditions similarly important. Even in 
relatively less strategic industries, excluding the role of governments from industry dynamics 
would be unrealistic. 
Finally, one may wonder how specific these conclusions are to the regional jet industry. 
Other capital and technology-intensive industries, from other segments of the aircraft 
industry, to other transport equipment sectors, as well as industries involving complex 
product systems, where accumulating sufficient technological capabilities are necessary for 
latecomers to be credible challengers, may arguably follow similar paths. Of course, market 
conditions differ, and competitiveness has a completely different meaning (if any) in the 
highly geopolitical military aircraft industry than in the automobile or shipbuilding industry. 
The large commercial aircraft segment would of course show most similarities in leadership 
dynamics. Such an analysis would nevertheless require a longer historical and narrower 
geographical scope: at least in the jet age, an initial British leadership in the 1950s was early 
on replaced by American companies, only to give way to the recently established Boeing-
Airbus duopoly.  But the nature of preconditions, of windows of opportunity and of strategic 
response would be very similar. 
 
6.5 Cautionary remarks for companies and governments with aerospace industry 
ambitions in Central and Eastern Europe 
Most of the late entrants discussed in this dissertation were located in emerging economies of 
Asia and Latin America, but it is important to note that many countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), including Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia look 
back to a century of history in the aircraft industry, and experience similar challenges of 
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crises and the need for a system transition after the collapse of the former Eastern Bloc 
(Boyko, 2013; Bochniarz et al, 2015).  
This dissertation has not focused on helicopters and smaller aircrafts used by general 
aviation or sports clubs. Typically, the CEE region is active in this segment. While there are 
potential avenues for upgrading, it should be clear that the regional and large civil aircraft 
industry is rather saturated at the top. Yet, there are certainly more potential in joining the 
supply chain and develop niche competencies, considering the “second wave” of 
internationalization as a global industry context. 
At the same time, we note that measuring the spillover effects and conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis of investing in the aircraft industry remains outside the scope of this study. Neither 
did we have sufficient and comparable investment data, nor did we think it was possible to 
account for all costs and gains. We therefore cannot offer any recommendations whether the 
aircraft industry is a good target for specialization for CEE economies (that is, better than 
other high-tech activities) – rather, if it is targeted, what should be kept in mind. 
First of all, it cannot be overemphasized that aircraft manufacturing is a business activity, 
and all the emerging actors that followed government-led, military-oriented strategies have 
failed miserably. This is not to say that governments have no role in creating infrastructure, 
sufficient absorptive capacities, fostering an environment conducive for learning and 
technological development, access to distant buyers, but the ultimate aim should be 
delivering products that withstand competition in their own right in the global arena. But 
finding niche markets, implementing strategies of radical or incremental innovation remains 
within the scope of companies. From this perspective, policy formation should also be seen as 
a multi-actor process. 
The importance of foreign investment, both as a source of new technology and finance 
should not be underestimated. The case of Singapore showed that significant sustained 
growth can be achieved without relying on a single “national champion”, but with hosting 
transnational companies. The role for private actors in lower tiers of the industry thus appears 
to be important for long-term success. 
From the finding that interrupted trajectories are ubiquitous in the aerospace industry, we 
can draw a number of policy lessons for governments. In principle, the main role 
governments can play is to ensure that a sectoral innovation system is well-functioning, to 
reduce the detrimental effects of crises, and to foster successful transition process in 
collaboration with business actors in times of radical change. However, it is clear that policies 
not only have to be tailor-made to the phase (emergence of the industry, transitions or 
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subsequent growth phases), but both the extent to which government involvement may be 
justified, as well as the length it may be justified vary over time. While a more active role is 
conducive in times of emergence and transitions, governments should gradually recede 
during phases of growth. 
Creating a well-functioning innovation system entails the close coordination of policies 
in multiple domains: higher education and advanced training; science, technology and 
innovation policies, industrial and trade policies.  
In terms of higher education, a strong knowledge base in natural sciences and engineering 
is just as important as having strong economics and management training, as the knowledge 
base of competitive aerospace companies can be very diverse – covering aeronautics, 
material science, electronics, IT, and also management. The history of Singapore in the 1980s 
shows that expat experts can complement gaps in the knowledge base in the short term, while 
the case of Indonesia shows that unless there is are strong local higher education capacities, 
the industry is at risk of failure. Universities can be ideal sources of creativity and new ideas 
which are fundamental in an innovation system at any level of industrial development. The 
public role in supporting world class higher education is unquestionable in both basic and 
applied sciences, although in the latter; collaboration with industry needs is certainly helps 
meeting labor market demand and – at least short and mid-term – competitive needs. It 
should also be kept in mind that educational programmes cannot be adjusted to industry 
cycles, should therefore aim for longer term which is best at ensuring flexibility of graduates 
in the future.  
As for science, technology and innovation policies, public support to the growth of 
technology clusters and research facilities is crucial in the emergence phase and in transition 
phase – that is, strategically attracting business in a given segment. Singapore provides for a 
good example in providing facilities in industrial parks at favorable conditions significantly 
reduced entry barriers for foreign subsidiaries and local start-ups, while ensuring that benefits 
are seen as temporary and all actors aim for gaining competitiveness in the long run. 
Proximity to the airport, to education, research was similarly an important source of growth 
for the Sao Jose dos Campos cluster in Brazil. It should of course be noted that the provision 
of facilities was in both cases complemented with tax breaks and other incentives that not 
only reduced costs but strengthened the trust of potential investors that the government is 
committed to long-term development – however, corruption and abuse of public funding is a 
potential unwanted side-effect which has to be properly addressed, for the sake of avoiding 
lock-ins with few, inefficient industry actors, such as in the case of Argentina. 
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It is also important to find an “exit strategy” already at phase of introduction of public 
support. As a new growth trajectory emerges, the need for and scale of public intervention 
gradually declines. The growth of newly established firms (or resumed growth of old firms 
that survived a crisis) allows them to increase R&D expenditure. At the same time, policy 
should closely monitor the evolution of the industry in order to have an early-warning for 
looming crises and be ready to exploit them as windows of opportunity. 
The room for devising trade policies strategically (read, using protectionist measures or 
activist trade policies) for countries that are members of the WTO, the EU and parties to the 
OECD agreements related to aircraft trade are significantly narrower than in the case of other 
latecomers from emerging economies. We have clearly identified strong public support 
measures in the case of regional jet producers (Brazil as well as Canada); while launch aids 
and R&D credit have been found in trade disputes to be of equivalent nature. The recent as 
well as ongoing global trade disputes in civilian aircraft suggests that opposition to export 
promotion increases, but a general ban on all forms of support to aircraft producers has been 
and remains out of question. So far the solution was to find a compromise that took into 
consideration the different country practices of direct and indirect support to local aircraft 
producers.
249
 At the same time, innovators monopolies continue to be a major source of 
industry asymmetries – a reality for all actors to bear in mind. Furthermore, as trade barriers 
are declining, so is the importance of the size of domestic market. It was possible for both 
Brazil and China to effectively protect their commuter planes or fighter planes from foreign 
competition before the producers went down the learning curve. But since foreign sales were 
always essential for recovering development costs, the lack of openness may backfire. 
Of course, while governments are also among the actors of the system, and are 
heterogeneous actors – comprising a set of ministries and often military organizations, which 
operate under uncertainty and have different resources, capacities, information, incentives 
and short or long-term objectives. Governments, often with little business experience, need 
also to learn governance practices (Gu and Lundvall 2006). Policy formation itself can be 
seen as an innovative outcome.  
 
Finally, for companies of Central and Eastern Europe, the main question remains is (and this 
warrants further investigation), with what activity can they secure the best position in the 
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 For instance, the 1992 EU-US Agreement on Large Civil Aircraft outlined the differences between EU and 
US support. The agreement made an attempt to balance the EU practice of direct support [to Airbus] in the form 
of repayable “launch aid” and the indirect, non-repayable R&D support practice of the US.  
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global supply chain – as assemblers of small planes, or as suppliers of knowledge-intensive 
subsystems, such as avionics, or developers and producers of composite materials. These 
companies may capitalize from the proximity of related industries, such as automobile, 
electronics, precision engineering or chemical sector, and from close ties with universities 
and research institutes. There are many different views concerning the future of aircraft 
manufacturing and particularly about the future trends of innovations which may cause 
upcoming radical changes. We have looked at the mechanisms and implications of many of 
them in the case studies, but it would have been too early to draw meaningful conclusions 
about future ones in this dissertation. 
 
6.6 Aircraft production, innovation and the changing global balance of power 
On the one hand, relatively higher economic growth in emerging economies that create 
demand for expansion of air transport services, which in turn creates demand for new aircraft, 
which in turn increases leverage for these countries to attract production and innovation 
activities, results in a diffusion of production and innovation capacity in emerging economies. 
On the other hand, greater economic power brings about a greater global political role and 
often (although not a necessarily implying) an increased demand for stronger military power 
and the ability to project it further. The result of these trends may lead to the strengthening of 
the military aircraft industry alongside the civilian, consequences of which go beyond the 
realms of technological and economic development. However, it is important to acknowledge 
that changing military power may not only be the source, but also the consequence of aircraft 
industry development and innovation activities.  
Such trends are particularly noteworthy in the case of the so-called BRICS countries. 
Recent events suggesting the readiness of China to embark on a more activist international 
presence, the introduction of the air defense identification zone on the East China Sea, the 
building of new air bases, and the apparent military aircraft development strategies can be 
seen as important steps evidencing a changing global balance of power. Newly emerging 
military might can be found in other parts of the world – i.e., Brazil has dispatched Embraer 
jets for more efficient surveillance of its vast continental territories and its economic interests 
over the Atlantic. Russian producers are regaining their technological edge thanks to public 
support and growing export success. As can be seen in reports of the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), selling military aircraft, equipment and weapons have 
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always included a special strategic bond between buyers and sellers, and a certain degree of 
dependence of the latter on formers.  
None of the countries are new entrants to the military industry. Given the close links 
between a large share of military and commercial technologies, they can and have capitalized 
from developments in the civilian segment. However, the close links can also introduce an 
element of risk when it comes to the question of how sustainable industrial growth can be in 
the long run – with strong military actors. We have found that there was a major difference in 
sustainability outcomes between countries where the air force was the sole or dominant buyer 
of the industry’s products and where the commercial segment was also strong. For instance, 
although military technology and initial orders were crucial for the emergence of the industry 
in Brazil and Singapore, both Embraer and Singapore Aircraft Industries owed much to their 
success to meeting the quality and marketing requirements of commercial buyers. Argentina 
and Indonesia in many ways have fallen victim to the military influence. The Córdoba factory 
in Argentina remained under the influence of the military. The military was a dominant buyer 
of IPTN aircraft in Indonesia. China has been a special case, with an increasing strength in 
the commercial segment alongside the military industry complex, but clearly, the difficulty in 
commercial jet aircraft launches is influenced by the military dominance in the industry. Yet, 
nothing is black and white in this sector: military procurement can not only contribute to the 
development of dual-use models, but can also help the survival of companies in times of 
crises. For instance, the Brazilian government’s support to the launch of the KC-390 transport 
jet was timed to be counter-cyclical, in a way to mitigate the effect of the 2008 financial 
crisis. However, if military development goals are not aligned with technology targets for the 
commercial industry, or not coordinated with other actors of the innovation system, these 
support measures are of little use – and could result in a permanent reliance on military orders 
which destroys competitiveness.  
From the perspective of hegemonic cycles, we may be experiencing a long transition 
period in world politics, and at least the transition period may bring about a multipolar world 
order, with a declining role of the US. The speed of this political transition is unclear. But 
considering the persistence of US dominance in the sector, it is surprising to find that the 
speed of transition in the global aircraft industry in terms of production remains relatively 
slow. At the same time, the region that is more directly challenged by emerging actor is 
Europe. As in many other domains, it can only be considered as a global industry actor if the 
dispersed industry actors are more closely integrated. 
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